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Foreword
In the intellectual life of a scholar, it is not infrequent for a research question to 
rattle around in the back of the mind for years. Then all of a sudden comes the 
realization that the time is ripe to tackle the topic, and that an attempt has to be 
made at presenting, discussing, and empirically analysing it. I will not go into the 
reasons why I think that this is now the right moment to address the question on 
the implementation of the two traditional democratic values, and their trans-
form ations over recent years, partly as a consequence of the economic crisis, and 
its prospective sustainability. Maybe in his Discorsi Machiavelli was only right 
when he recommends going back to values in times of crisis. There are, of course, 
other objective and subjective reasons, and the former will emerge directly and 
indirectly in the first chapter.
Here, I would like instead to justify why in a discipline where scholars more 
and more are publishing articles in journals, I considered it necessary to write a 
book, with all the consequences this entails. As from every possible angle writing 
thirty pages is a smaller task than writing 300, the first reason would be that I am 
a masochist and convinced that the group working with me looks like me. A justi-
fication closer to reality is that in my view the salience and complexity of the topic 
is such that it could not be analysed, together with its empirical cases, if not 
through the opportunity for in-depth discussion and the length that only a book 
affords. This is so even though even a book has to find ways to make long stories/
narratives short, possibly through proper, effective, and reliable quantitative data.
In other words, I still believe that after all the changes our profession has been 
going through in the last few decades, a book can still be a better tool of commu-
nication under some precise conditions, such as those that characterize this work. 
A book offers an opportunity and a constraint. It provides a structure where 
empirical reasoning can be adequately developed, imposing the time and the 
rhythm of going through it and working it out in detail. Empirical dimensions 
and theoretical insights are, by this means, kept tightly together.
The book is the result of the work of a research group directed by me and 
formed by Daniela Piana, Francesco Raniolo, Mario Quaranta, Cecilia E. Sottilotta, 
and Claudius Wagemann. Together we have been working for years on the quality 
of democracy at a comparative level, publishing various articles and books. This is 
the last, and we hope the most significant work. In addition to my direction of the 
entire research, there was a division of work among us. Piana mainly focused her 
attention on freedoms; Raniolo and Wagemann on equality; Raniolo and 
Quaranta on attitudinal data toward democratic values and democracy; Piana 
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and Sottilotta on the European Union. About the book, in addition to the chap-
ters written by me only, each one of the members of the group co-authored with 
me one or more of the other chapters. More specifically, Wagemann was the co-
author of Chapter 2, but Raniolo also contributed to it; Piana of chapters 3 and 6; 
Quaranta and Raniolo of Chapter 4; Raniolo of Chapter 5; Piana and Sottilotta of 
Chapter 7.
In thanking all those who helped us in the research, we would particularly 
acknowledge the thoughtful help of Francesca Sica for collecting the data on wel-
fare. Also, Anna Geyer, Joschka Frech, and Marta Matrakova were essential for 
collecting the data on equalities; Mariafrancesca D’Agostino and Chiara Facello 
for helping us to gather data on immigration; and Luca Carrieri for checking the 
data on freedoms.
We would also like to warmly thank all the scholars, practitioners, and institu-
tional actors who accepted the invitation to share with us their experiences, quali-
fied views, ideas, and insights. Our conversations with policymakers helped us to 
challenge our interpretative hypotheses and enrich our analysis. A special thanks 
also to all the international organizations that made their datasets available to us. 
The activities of these institutions have opened new opportunities for research, 
which we are very willing and pleased to acknowledge.
Finally, our gratitude goes to old friends and colleagues who accepted the bur-
den of reading the first draft of the book. Many thanks especially go to Dirk Berg-
Schlosser, Moreno Bertoldi, Maurizio Ferrera, Anna Gwiazda, Liborio Mattina, 
Angelo Panebianco, Michele Salvati, Anna Sroka, and Eugenio Somaini. We 
would also like to thank the referees of Oxford University Press for additional 
suggestions. Their reading prevented misunderstandings and mistakes. Others 
may still be present. However, for those, the responsibility is entirely mine.
Florence, 20 January 2020
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1
How to Grasp the Key Democratic 
Transformations
1.1  The Key Questions
A democratic regime is usually assumed to implement freedom and equality as 
the key and most important values (see, e.g., Bobbio,  1984; Guttman,  1980; 
Rosanvallon, 2011; and others). In addition to existing liberal and egalitarian 
ideolo gies, when asked about their notion of democracy, most people refer to one 
of those two values or a mix of them (see Kriesi and Morlino, 2016, pp. 307–25). 
Some authors (see, e.g., Bobbio, 1995, p. viii) also suggest that democracy is the 
only regime where citizens are freer and more equal than in any other. Sartori 
(1987, pp. 7 –8) would agree with this statement, but also stresses how in the very 
notion of democracy ideals and empirical aspects are inextricably intertwined. 
However, even if his perspective is accepted, it should be borne in mind that all 
features that are consequent to ideals and give empirical substance to them are at 
the core of a democracy and, as the ideals may be differently formulated and 
emphasized,1 there are different concrete positions and interests about them. And 
the consequent conflicts among collective and individual actors are unfolded, the 
related choices are made and, more or less frequently, implemented.
In this vein, it is worth recalling that not only do different people in the same 
country often support different democratic ideals, but also that some ideals are 
more widespread in some countries than in others (see Ferrín and Kriesi, 2016). 
Since the end of the Second World War, there have been changes and adaptation 
of those values and related aspects. This has been the case from at least two differ-
ent perspectives. On the one hand, technological advances have profoundly 
transformed the mass media and, consequently, the key aspects of the shaping or 
reshaping of public opinion. On the other hand, again as a consequence of other 
socio-economic transformations, democratic ideals themselves have been 
changed and readapted.
1 Of course, within a democratic regime some ideologies propose other ideals, such as authority, 
nation, and order. Nevertheless, the classic recurrent democratic ideals are the two mentioned above, 
as will be seen below.
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As a number of scholars have been stressing (see, e.g., Mounk, 2018, esp. chap-
ters  1 and 2), all of this resulted in a growing difficulty in translating popular 
wishes and demands into public policies. Moreover, in the period 2008–18, when 
the Great Recession (2008–14) and its aftermath affected the Western world and 
some European countries in particular, the difficulties in delivering goods that 
were implementing those values were exacerbated. The obvious question to ask, 
then, is how and to what extent have the two key traditional democratic values—
freedom and equality—been implemented during these years, even if in different 
ways. The critical question we intend to address here is: how and why has the 
content of democracy, that is, the actual implementation of freedom and equality, 
been changing in terms of its characteristics and extent in the first decades of the 
twenty-first century? Our question is more specific than the famous classic one 
posed by Dahl (2006, p. 76) when asking ‘might . . . . a new age emerge in which 
some well-established democratic countries sink into significantly less demo-
cratic forms of rule?’ But we are proceeding along the same lines. Indeed, accord-
ing to Dahl (2006, p. 77), we might have a ‘movement [. . .] in both directions’, that 
is, toward stronger (political) equality and at the same time the opposite, a 
stronger inequality. However, is this so?
Moreover, in addressing the question above we consider the following state-
ment by Sartori (1987, p. 357) to be an essential starting point: ‘equality presup-
poses freedom [. . .] Liberty comes first, . . .on the simple consideration that 
equality without freedom cannot even be demanded.’ However, such a statement 
has to be reconsidered in contemporary democracies, even in the most recently 
established ones, as the limitations and constraints on the implementation of 
both ideals have been taking other paths (see below and next chapters). Scholars 
(see, e.g., Morlino, 2011; Parsi, 2012; Giebler and Merkel, 2016) have empirically 
falsified even the recurrent normative assumptions regarding a trade-off between 
freedom and equality (see, e.g., Nozick, 1974). It is not possible here to review this 
key issue in depth. However, at least one crucial aspect can be highlighted. 
Research into the quality of democracy that includes freedom and equality as well 
as other dimensions in the analysis shows how a key mechanism in the process is 
mutual convergence, that is, the worsening or improvement of one dimension or 
quality is usually complemented, within some range, by a parallel worsening or 
improvement of all other dimensions (see again Morlino, 2011, pp. 247–8). The 
corollary of the effective working of such a mechanism is that there is also conver-
gence, even after ideological conflict or tension, between freedom and equality as 
well. The empirical analysis of contemporary democracies supports this conclu-
sion, provided that we consider the same subdimensions and indicators. 
Hypothetically, we could add other subdimensions and show the empirical pres-
ence of some tensions among indicators of—for example—economic freedom 
and some egalitarian policy. Thus, the only actual solution is a theoretical one. 
Namely, we assume that the subdimensions and indicators we decided to adopt 
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for those qualities, freedom and equality included, are the most meaningful and 
salient in detecting how much and with what characteristics those qualities are 
present in a democracy. And when the empirical checking is done, they do not 
show continuous tensions, but rather a consistent complementarity.2
Researching this topic during the first two decades of the twenty-first century, 
we cannot ignore the impact of the Great Recession. It started in Europe after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and, if we take into consideration the 
data on GDP growth, goes on at least approximately until 2014, when there was 
an evident inversion in the data (see the official Eurostat, OECD or World Bank 
statistics). For our purposes here, we can note briefly that economic and financial 
crises are characterized by (1) instability of financial, monetary and other mar-
kets; (2) a decline in gross domestic product (GDP), despite all the limits this 
indicator has; (3) growing unemployment complemented by decreases in invest-
ment and trade exchanges; and (4) a protracted economic situation characterized 
by several years of very low growth or stagnation (see also Kindleberger, 1987). 
Moreover, the 2008 –14 crisis had its peculiarities, as it started with a crisis in the 
housing and financial markets, following a protracted phase of positive trends in 
the economic markets. This can easily be seen not only when looking at GDP and 
unemployment trends, but also at private and public investment, family con-
sumption, inflation, and public debt until 2007. Overall, we can agree with the 
statement by Copelovitch et al. (2016, p. 812): ‘the joint effects of the global finan-
cial crisis and the Euro crisis have caused more lasting economic damage in 
Europe than the Great Depression of the 1930s’.
It should be added here that while it is possible to provide precise timing for 
the economic crisis, the same cannot be said for its political consequences. This is 
so for several reasons. If, for example, we consider voting behaviour, the electoral 
results may or may not be affected by the crisis. It depends on the timing of the 
elections. If they are held at the very beginning of the crisis, when the conse-
quences are not yet perceived, then the impact is nil. If they are in the middle 
phase, the impact is often only partially felt. The political consequences may be 
felt more powerfully when the crisis is over, but there have been long debates with 
a subsequent radicalization of voters. In other words, ironically, there is the (elect-
or al) effect (changes in voting behaviour) when the cause (economic crisis) has 
already disappeared. If we do not consider just the electoral impact but broaden 
our view by analysing the political impact, then Bermeo and Bartels (see 2014, p. 3) 
give an accurate timing of the impact and its reasons. They show how the 
impact only comes when incumbent politicians announce and make decisions 
2 Lauth and Schlenkrich (2018) develop a thoughtful analysis where ‘mutual reinforcing effects’ are 
complemented by ‘trade-offs’. In a previous book (2011 and see above) Morlino argued that the first 
relevant empirical mechanism is ‘mutual convergence and is the dominant one. However, a domain 
where the tension is present is security vis-à-vis freedom (see esp. chapters 3, 6, and 8).
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to cope with the crisis. In Europe, this happened no earlier than two years after 
the beginning of the crisis in 2010, when the European Union Council decided 
on what measures to adopt to tackle the crisis. This happened as much as a year 
after the worst moment in the crisis (2009). In other words, the political conse-
quences of the crisis do not come when all its main indicators become manifest, 
but when political decisions, such as the famous austerity provisions in several 
countries, make it known to the people and provided scope for adverse reactions 
(to the decisions). For example, in Italy there were reactions to the crisis when the 
Berlusconi government fell, and the new technocratic government led by Monti 
was formed in November 2011, that is, three years after the beginning of the cri-
sis. The reaction of the people, with a massive vote for a protest party, came with 
the 2013 elections six years later, when the crisis was partially over. On the whole, 
the crisis is a key element. This is confirmed by the adverse reactions of the people 
even when there are anticipated decisions by the incumbent political authorities 
without an effective deep crisis or even a proper crisis. For example, there was no 
severe crisis in the UK with the Cameron cabinet and the referendum on Brexit in 
2016, and there was no crisis in Poland (see chapters 2 and 3). Ultimately, signifi-
cant links can be established between the effects of the crisis on the domestic 
components of democracy and the rising tide of nationalism, discernible in 
domains ranging from trade protectionism to anti-immigration stances.
Moreover, on the political consequences of the Great Recession there have 
already been a number of analyses about how economic issues become dominant 
for voters in times of economic recession (e.g., Singer, 2011); how incumbent par-
ties are punished when there is an economic crisis (e.g., Kriesi, 2014); the more 
general effects of the economic crisis on voting (see esp. Hernandez and Kriesi, 
2016; or Lindvall, 2014); the impact of the economic crisis on parties (e.g., Bosco 
and Verney, 2012); and how the crisis deeply affected the welfare state in a specific 
group of countries, such as Southern Europe (see Petmesidou and Guillén, 2014). 
The impact of the economic crisis can also be seen at the level of participation 
and competition, as Morlino and Raniolo (2017) showed regarding the four South 
European countries. However, as mentioned above, the most recurrent position 
on the Great Recession is expressed by Bermeo and Bartels (see 2014, p. 3), who, 
while recognizing the change of voting and the punishment of incumbent leaders 
and parties, stress that the reactions and consequently the impact have been 
minimal. In other words, almost everything seems to be confined to a temporary 
change in voting behaviour and some limited protest. Within this perspective, the 
socio-economic analysis of the phenomenon carried out by Kahler and Lake 
(2013) plays down the effects of the crisis even more. They start by affirming that 
‘the Great Recession [...] is the worst economic crisis to beset the world economy 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s’ (p. 1). But they go on stressing how 
‘despite its negative effects on incumbent governments, the economic crisis has 
provided few signs of fundamental political realignment, policy experimentation 
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
How to Grasp the Key Democratic Transformations 5
[...] or mobilization by new political actors [...] rampant economic nationalism or 
serious erosion of international collaboration has not emerged’ (p. 2) (see also 
Lane, 2012; Bermeo and Pontusson, 2012; Streeck and Shäfer, 2013).
Following the results of our previous analysis (see Morlino and Raniolo, 2017), 
we consider the Great Recession as an intervening phenomenon that pushed and, 
in some cases, transformed already existing background conditions deriving from 
both internal and external trends. In other words, the economic crisis had a ‘cata-
lysing effect’. Contrary to the classic Schumpeterian hypothesis in economics, 
suggesting that crises bring about innovative destruction, we consider that in 
politics this economic crisis magnified and accelerated latent or less latent trends 
and factors, which were already present within Western democracies. Thus, to 
reply more effectively to our key research question, we need to look mainly at the 
structural factors in the background of this crisis. They include globalization, 
which is characterized by different dimensions (technological, economic, socio-
cultural), by a growing interdependence of markets, by a transformation of cap it-
al ism into ‘finance-capitalism’ (see esp. Gallino, 2011), by a change in the world 
order with the growth of international anarchism, and the new economic roles of 
other large economies such as China and India. We should also consider the 
waves of immigration, especially from Africa, and several terrorist events, to 
achieve a more complex, multifaceted picture characterized by changes and 
uncertainties for both freedom and equality. In recent years, authors such as 
Stiglitz (see esp. 2003 and 2012), Piketty (2013), Milanovich (2016) and others 
have analysed and helped to better understand these structural phenomena, espe-
cially globalization and the evolution of the capitalist economic context. It is the 
related consequences on the implementation of the values we consider that we 
will focus on in the next chapters.
In the comparative research, presented here, we analyse France, Germany, Italy, 
Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom from the last decade of the twentieth 
century onwards, to better show the changes we detected. As expected, the six 
largest European democracies have been differently affected by the crisis, as they 
also had different background factors. In fact, there is one country that was 
almost not affected by the crisis, despite significant political consequences 
(Poland); one country that is outside the euro area and is heading towards a dra-
matic exit from the European Union (UK); one that may even have benefitted 
from the crisis (Germany); and three others more seriously affected by the crisis, 
but with different external and domestic characteristics and hence with different 
results (France, Italy, and Spain). In any case, the overall research design  is not a 
systematic comparative one, like ‘most similar systems – different outcome’ 
(MSSO), which can reduce complexity and identify more distinct patterns within 
medium-range theorizing. This is compensated, however, by the qualitative 
assessments of the cases and the distinct features, which are identified (see chap-
ters 5, 6, and 7).
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We decided to conduct our research in the six largest European democracies, 
paying attention to the size of the total population, as the aim of the book is to 
analyse the effective freedom and equality implemented among as many European 
citizens as possible. The citizens of the six countries comprise almost 360 of the 
European Union’s total population of approximately 500 million in 2018, that is, 
more than two-thirds. To avoid any misunderstanding, we should add that there 
is no assumption about a causal link between economic crisis and democracy 
concerning size/population. The issue is only one with great significance for the 
research questions we address. Moreover, when considering and trying to explain 
the different aspects and results among the six countries, including only the lar-
gest democracies allows us to parametrize, namely to hold constant, the country 
size in our analysis, even at the cost of excluding smaller countries with their spe-
cificities in terms of political consequences.
A further question had to be considered. Should the democracies we analysed 
be considered Europeanized or not? In other words, how and to what extent are a 
few key characteristics of EU democracies transformed by EU membership? 
When pondering whether the dimensions for consideration incorporate the 
European side, we eventually decided to stick to the traditional notion of a 
democracy-cum-sovereignty, and, as seen below, devoted a special analysis to the 
European factor (see Chapter  7). From this perspective, the inclusion of the 
United Kingdom and Poland, which are not part of the Euro area, is a welcome 
aspect that should allow us to assess better the impact of being inside or outside 
that area regarding the basic questions we are interested in.
In our research, we adopt the theoretical framework on the quality of democ-
racy developed in an earlier book (Morlino, 2003); some articles (see esp. 
Morlino, 2004); an introduction to another volume (Diamond and Morlino, 
2005); and, above all, the two last chapters of a third book (Morlino, 2011). We 
also consider the subsequent debates (see, e.g., Geissel et al., 2016). As will see in 
next chapter, we will mainly focus on the empirically relevant subdimensions of 
our qualities that include, in addition to the content dimensions, equality and 
freedom, the procedural dimensions, that are rule of law, electoral accountability, 
inter-institutional accountability, competition and participation, and the result 
dimension, which is responsiveness (see Morlino, 2011). At the same time, the 
external factors we mentioned above, brought about by globalization, and by 
immigration and terrorism events, should also be considered to capture the 
dynamic at stake comprehensively.
Let us now move on to discuss and empirically define the two critical demo-
cratic values of freedom and equality. However, before that, it is necessary to 
address two crucial, often overlooked issues. First, freedom and equality for 
whom? That is, what are the demos, the people, who are entitled to be free and 
equal? From the vantage point of the classical theory of democracy, the reply is 
obvious: citizens are entitled to the rights which, when implemented, should give 
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some degree of freedom and equality. However, in contemporary democracies, 
many non-citizens reside in a given country. As freedom and equality are two 
ideals, the most consistent decision seems to be to include those who live legally 
in that country, notwithstanding the different legal regimes existing on this issue 
(see also Dahl, 1997).3
The second preliminary problem to address is: why consider only the two men-
tioned values and not the third one frequently associated with them in recurrent 
rhetoric, namely, fraternity? After all, since the beginning of the French 
Revolution, the reference has always been to liberté, egalité et fraternité. The pri-
mary reason for excluding an explicit analysis of this third value lies in the evolu-
tion of the way the two other values are conceived. In fact, as a consequence of the 
social transformations characterized by the weakening of communitarian atti-
tudes, democratic theory and democratic politics alike have gradually forgotten 
the third value. The fraternity was also the expression of Christian culture and has 
been absorbed by the two other values and related to aspects of solidarity as 
expressed by those rights that also set the conditions for equality (see sec-
tion 1.3).4
1.2  What Is Equality?
In addition to the justification and the empirical definition of equality, there are 
three sets of questions we should address and try to answer: (1) What are the 
characteristics and trends of economic and social inequalities in the six coun-
tries? (2) What are the domestic determinants of socioeconomic inequalities? (3) 
How can external factors explain the existing characteristics and trends in 
in equal ities that the empirical analysis has shown?
Justification. Why is socioeconomic equality a democratic value? As is well 
known, this has been a classical value since long before the mass liberal demo-
cratic regime was gradually ‘invented’ during the nineteenth century. More pre-
cisely, a key component of ideologies that became part of the political regime, and 
which we have labelled as liberal-democracy, is the promotion of socio-economic 
3 This is also a politically relevant decision as there are parties and widespread opinions in Europe 
that would limit to citizens only the rights related to freedoms and equality (see below and next two 
chapters).
4 Let us add that the concept of fraternity underwent a significant transformation. Despite its cen-
trality in some stream of political thoughts, even in recent years (e.g. Gluckmann, 2011)., the shift to 
solidarity is related to the interplay with the rise of laicity and secularism. This shift does not solve the 
puzzle of the ‘us’, which is implicit in any possible collective value (equality, social justice, solidarity 
included). Moreover, this value is central in some communitarian doctrines, including socialist ones 
(see, e.g., Mulhall and Swift, 1996). Finally, Morin (2019) proposes an integration among the three 
values where fraternité brings the recognition of our common humanity and the respect for its differ-
ences. For Morin also the solidarity is the primary way to implement fraternity.
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equality. In addition, there have been other non-democratic ideologies that had 
equality at their core. This is not the place to illustrate Marxism and other 
 ideologies in which equality lies at the heart of a normative system. However, in 
a nutshell, from an analytic perspective, the justifications of equality are based 
on the belief that it is a value, a good to be implemented in itself, or the indirect 
source for other values or goods. There have also been many other justifica-
tions. However, all of them raise doubts of a different kind from a normative 
perspective.5 As Dahl stresses (2006, p. 37) there is also a wide range of other 
non-ideological motivations based on emotions such as altruism, compassion, 
empathy, envy, anger, and indignation. Here, we will concentrate on more 
em pir ic al ly relevant justification.
First, a key reason to consider equality as a democratic value stems from a pro-
cedural perspective on democracy. In fact, as is also well known, an enlightened, 
relatively unconstrained and fair formation of political opinion, which is essential 
for voting as well as for the proper functioning of accountabilities, responsive-
ness, participation and competition, entails at least adequate education and living 
conditions. However, the presence of such conditions is only possible within an 
equal society. This argument shows very powerfully how the substantive aspects 
of democracy are related to the procedural dimensions, and how those lines of 
thought that have disentangled the formal features from the substantive ones are 
completely wrong. Accordingly, Dahl (1989, p. 311) very effectively emphasizes 
how the ‘democratic process [. . .] promotes freedom [. . .] promotes human devel-
opment [. . .] protect[s] and advance[s] the interests and goods they (human 
beings) share with others….’.
The second, strong empirical justification of equality comes from the empirical 
data and the related, subsequent conclusions reached by Wilkinson and Pickett in 
The Spirit Level (2009), the subtitle being How Greater Equality Makes Societies 
Stronger. Their key propositions are that ‘economic growth, for so long the great 
engine of progress, has, in rich countries, largely finished its work’ (Wilkinson 
and Pickett, 2009, p. 5) and today health and several other social problems, such 
as the level of trust, mental illness, life expectancy, infant mortality, obesity, chil-
dren’s educational performance, teenage births, homicides, imprisonment rates 
and social mobility are related to income inequality. The higher the inequality, the 
worse these problems are. More significant income differences imply greater 
social distance, a hierarchical society and profound social stratification (see ibid., 
chapters 2–12). Although some subsequent analyses cast doubt on a number of 
correlations, which do not necessarily involve a causal connection, the key aspect 
of their empirical research that justifies the salience of equality for a better soci-
ety, with freedom as a complementary dimension, is solidly supported. The 
authors do not explicitly discuss democracy in the book, taking it for granted, 
5 Somaini (2002, chapter 1) effectively illustrates all these justifications.
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and are much more interested in giving compelling, empirical reasons for equal-
ity.6 Besides the aspects mentioned in their analysis, we might point to the con-
nection between equality and interpersonal trust (see, e.g., Rothstein and 
Uslaner,  2005) as an element that eventually contributes to the more effective 
working of democracy, if not to a better democracy.
The third—and, for some, even more important—and related justification 
makes more explicit an aspect that also exists in other, non-egalitarian ideologies. 
This goes back to the close connection between equality and justice, especially 
distributive justice (see also Gosepath, 2016). As suggested by Bobbio (1995, p. 
8), unlike freedom, which is an individual value, equality is a social value, and at 
the same time, the necessary condition for justice or fairness. Although to differ-
ing extents, and with different characteristics according to the culture, people are 
prepared to accept unequal societies but are much less or totally unwilling to tol-
erate injustice understood as unfairness. This has already been emphasized by 
Stiglitz (2012,chapter 5), and is one of the most salient results of recent psycho-
logical research: as in the real world, there is a considerable variation ‘in effort, 
ability, moral deservingness [. . .] people don’t care about reducing equality per se 
[. . .] people have an aversion toward unfairness’ (see, e.g, Starmans et al., 2017, 
pp. 3 and 5). It confirms the salience of the intuition at the heart of the most 
influential political philosophy of recent decades by John Rawls (see  1971), in 
addition to enabling us to understand some of the reasons for the enormous, 
 profound, widespread attention and success Rawls has been having over all 
these years.
Fairness, however, is not possible without socio-economic equality. Or, from a 
different perspective, pursuing the goal of fairness is not possible without policies 
aimed at redressing extreme inequalities. Thus, the salience of socio-economic 
equality is restated and again necessarily lies at the centre of our attention. 
However, we are well aware that, on the one hand, the effective implementation of 
equality appears to be a utopian objective, in addition to not being advocated by 
all supporters of democracy; and, on the other hand, the justifications above are 
undermined by periods of economic crisis, even more so by a protracted one like 
the Great Recession. Pursuing social and economic equality involves the lifting of 
limiting barriers by providing effective social rights, even if this is not openly 
declared. The most significant problem associated with the implementation of 
these rights lies in the cost that they impose on the community, which entails 
taxation and the efficient use of resources, which need to be redistributed first of 
all towards public education and interventions in the labour world. Assuring 
individual health, environmental protection, disability and old-age pensions has 
also redistributive consequences, even if only partially.
6 Their work has also been criticized from different perspectives. See Gilmore (2014), who briefly 
but effectively summarizes those criticisms and Wilkinson’s responses.
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Accordingly, during the 2010s, the justifications of equality have been com-
pounded, if not contrasted, by the impact of the economic crisis, the ensuing 
austerity policies and greater social indifference. Besides, in such a context, the 
reasons for collaboration and solidarity have changed. However, we need to 
remember that the reasons for supporting socio-economic equality and the 
related policies had already begun to weaken after 1989 with the liberal economic 
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, the basic statement by 
Crouch (2004, esp. chapter  1) on post-democracy is that a consequence of the 
transformation of contemporary democracies more and more towards elitism is 
the progressive loss of appeal of any egalitarian theme. In analysing the ‘crisis of 
equality’, Rosanvallon (2011) singled out how the historical reasons and the 
related justification for promoting equality have been fading away irrespective of 
the economic crisis and have instead been opening up new space for national 
protectionism and xenophobia. He refers to three factors in particular that were 
previously pushing our democracies toward equality, but which have gradually 
disappeared: the ‘fear that a lack of reform would cause social and political tur-
moil, the practical impact of the two world wars, and a decline in the belief in 
individual responsibility for people’s destiny’ (Rosanvallon, 2016, p. 16).7
Definition. When defining equality, Sen (see, e.g., 1992) is quite right in stress-
ing the necessity to immediately consider the question ‘equality of what?’ or, we 
might revise, ‘inequality of what?’. In our work, we are interested in social and 
economic equalities with regards to both results and opportunities. However, let 
us add that in a more consistent empirical perspective, considering also the con-
nections with democracy, it seems more appropriate to refer right from the begin-
ning to social and economic equalities, and to no other kind of equality (see also 
below). Here, for our research, ‘economic and social equalities’ are the ‘qualities of 
all people living in a given territory being equal regarding income and other 
resources’. However, although the definition necessarily refers to the results, 
equality should also be analysed in terms of opportunities. Namely, the existence 
or otherwise of the conditions for redressing inequalities.8 As regards results, it is 
known that economic (in)equality refers to differences in income and social (in)
equality to differences in social resources, which can also be related to gender and 
ethnic origin. As for opportunities, pursuing equality implies that everyone has 
an equal opportunity to improve their own life as policies are decided and imple-
mented that create the best conditions for improving income and social resources 
(see Table 1.1).
7 The scholarly debate on these issues is much broader and richer than appears from this cursory 
analysis, especially, for example, regarding policies for easing inequality without economic growth, or 
about undermining the incentive to growth when strong egalitarian policies are enacted.
8 For a thoughtful discussion of the distinctive features relating to the equality of results vis-à-vis 
the equality of opportunities, see Somaini (2002, esp. chapter 3). To more clearly see the connection 
between equality and fairness, which is not merely analytical (see above), it should be remembered 
here that Dworkin (see esp. 1981 and 1981a) discusses those two notions (result and opportunities) 
concerning fairness as well.
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In deepening the key features of the proposed definition, a key concept requir-
ing specification is that of resources. Important clarification on this issue has been 
contributed by some of the leading contemporary philosophers who have pro-
posed theories of equality and justice in recent decades. We are mainly referring 
here to Rawls, Dworkin, Sen, and Nussbaum, and to their notion of resources or 
something similar. Rawls talks of ‘social primary goods’, which include, besides 
basic freedoms, income and the social bases of self-respect, as aspects of basic 
institutions that assure the worth of citizens as moral persons (Rawls,  1971, 
pp.  58–61). When considering Dworkin (1981), we can set aside his notion of 
in tern al resources, which refers to personal talents only and consider his notion 
of external resources instead. Again, besides liberties (see next section), these 
include education, healthcare, employment and claims to external space, personal 
property and public goods. Here, as stressed by Yilmaz (2016, pp. 234–5), it is 
salient for us to note that ‘Dworkin regards resources as inputs to production 
which can be used to create income. [. . .] This implies that Dworkin’s resourcism 
is closer to be a theory of equality of opportunity, while Rawls’ equality of primary 
goods is a theory of equality or fairness of outcome.’
Sen and Nussbaum present a different perspective, also a salient one for us, in 
which it is more relevant to look at the capabilities to function rather than to 
resources to better understand inequalities. This concerns people’s adequate 
opportunities to undertake the actions and activities that they want. Sen (1992, 
esp. chapter 3) labels them ‘functioning’ and capabilities.9 They are more ex pli-
cit ly spelled out by Nussbaum (2011, pp. 33–4) in a list where, in addition to sev-
eral forms of freedoms (see next section), the author includes: being able to live a 
human life of standard length, to have good health, to be adequately nourished, to 
have adequate shelter; to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason, cultivated 
by an adequate  education, to use imagination and thought in connection with 
experiencing and producing religious, literary, musical and other works and 
events of one’s own choice; to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude and 
justified anger; to have the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being 
able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others with 
provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, 
9 We might also mention Dahrendorf (see, e.g.  1979 and 1988) within this perspective (see 
also below).




economic income growing income
social social differences social mobility
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
12 Equality, Freedom, and Democracy
ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin and species; to live with concern for and 
in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature; to  laugh, to play, to 
enjoy recreational activities; to control one’s environment; to hold property (both 
land and movable goods), and to have  property rights  on an equal basis with 
 others; to have the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; to be 
able to work as a human, exercising practical reason and entering into meaning-
ful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers. Of course, there is no 
doubt that this long and fascinating list is fully part of a utopian world.
The political scientist O’Donnell (2004) follows these paths by referring to ‘the 
universalistic attainment of at least some basic rights and capabilities’ (p. 11). Sen 
and Dahrendorf are being explicitly and implicitly referenced here, and O’Donnell 
emphasizes how ‘posing the issue of capabilities in the political sphere involves 
going beyond the universalistic assignment of the rights of political citizenship. It 
leads to the question of what conditions may allow the effective exercise of these 
rights’ (2004, pp. 30–1).
If we translate these suggestions empirically, with some unavoidable simplifica-
tion, we can easily accept a notion of economic and social equality which, recall-
ing once more the matrix of Table  1.1, refers to the social rights to check how 
much they are implemented and subsequently the extent to which the related 
inequalities are redressed through policy measures. In this perspective, we can 
see how the much older notion of the welfare state, as developed by Marshall with 
his theory of citizenship (1950) and the distinction between civil, political, and 
social rights laid down and implemented through the policies of a few European 
democracies in the same years, already established the basis for the empirical 
analysis of equalities. From this point of view, the critical work by Rawls, 
Dworkin, Sen, Nussbaum and others has provided a much stronger ethical foun-
dation for the empirical analysis. Thus, there is a remarkable, objective conver-
gence among all these works that significantly strengthens the entire issue of the 
necessity of equality or policies for redressing it within a democracy.
Coming to the more specific resources and social rights, when analysing eco-
nomic and social in/equalities in an empirical perspective, in addition to the allo-
cation of economic resources within the population, we should consider the 
actual implementation of them. They include the right to education, the right to 
health or mental and physical well-being; the right to assistance and social se cur-
ity; the right to work; the right to human dignity without gender or ethnic dis-
criminations; the right to strike; the right to study; the right to healthy 
surroundings, and, more generally, to the environment and to the protection of 
the environment; and the right to housing.10
10 For equalities and freedoms (see below), the European Pillar of Social Rights approved by the 
European Parliament (2017) and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, initially approved in 
Nice (2000) and absorbed by the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), provide a first general picture of rights to be 
included in our empirical analysis. See also Chapter 3.
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We will return to the more specific aspects for carrying out the empirical ana-
lysis in the following chapters. For now, though, three critical issues still deserve 
attention. First, there is an extensive literature that addresses political equality 
only. This is the case, for example, with the last book by Dahl (2006), which is on 
precisely this topic. Two other authoritative scholars in the field, Rueschemeyer 
(2005) and Verba (2006), also stress this kind of equality rather than other equal-
ities. In their Democracy Barometers Merkel and his colleagues (see esp. 
Bühlmann et al., 2012) do the same. We can acknowledge without difficulty that, 
from both a normative and a purely analytic perspective, it is possible to under-
stand the reasons for this choice. From the first point of view, authors or citizens 
are interested in the liberal component of democracy and the related beliefs; from 
the second one, political science scholars like to consider the procedural compo-
nent of the regime we call democracy. For example, Merkel and his colleagues 
analyse political equality in terms of transparency, participation, and representa-
tion (see Bühlmann et al., 2012). However, when we ask the people, whether citi-
zens or not, about democracy the reference to socio-economic equality as a goal 
and a good to deliver immediately comes to the fore (see Ferrin and Kriesi, 2016). 
In the effort of understanding better what political equality is, Sadursky (2008, 
esp. chapter 2) stresses the equality of political opportunity and political impact. 
Some years earlier, Dahl (2006, chapter 2) had suggested a complex notion that 
relates to effective participation, equality in voting, enlightened understanding, 
final control of the agenda, inclusion and fundamental rights; in other words, he 
considers the key elements of an ideal democracy. But here the key question is 
how to guarantee and implement these aspects. If we limit ourselves to political 
equality, we even prevent ourselves from understanding better that kind of 
equality.
This can only be done when we turn away from political equality to socio- 
economic ones. In fact, in a previous important book, Dahl (1989, pp. 323–4) recalls 
the conditions for political equality by mentioning: ‘differences in resources and 
opportunities for employing violent coercion; in economic positions, resources 
and opportunities; and in knowledge, information, and cognitive skills’. There are 
also other conditions for political equality, and these are effectively spelled out by 
Dahl (1986, p. 9): ‘political equality must be maintained by a definite set of legal 
and constitutional arrangements, supported by general opinion and enforced if 
need be by law, that effectively guarantee each citizen certain rights, opportunities 
and obligations necessary, and if fully achieved, perhaps even sufficient to insure 
political equality among citizens’. Thus, for example, for political equality to be 
achieved, we need to pursue the lack of corruption, open access to the judiciary, a 
competent administration, a plurality of the media, open participation, free and 
fair competition, and others. Dahl (2006) is therefore correct in connecting that 
notion also with the key elements of a democracy. In this vein, we are back to 
socio-economic equalities and are aware of the need to include other aspects in 
such an analysis. When discussing this point, Verba (2006, p. 514) states that 
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‘resources and opportunity make political equality deeply dependent on equality 
in other domains, such as education, income, connectedness, and health and 
well-being’. Having mentioned all this, we can add that the meaning of democ-
racy for the people refers those non-political equalities. Consequently, a more 
salient and in-depth analysis of democracy also has to refer to the substantive 
equalities we discussed above.
There is a second consideration to point out, which we present by posing a 
question: why do we consider equalities/inequalities and not poverty, which is 
also strongly related to them? After all, social rights and welfare measures are 
aimed at eradicating poverty and much less at redressing inequalities. The simple 
reply is that the two concepts are different and refer to different empirical refer-
ents. As Bermeo (2009, p. 15) points out, we can start by observing that, while in 
the last few decades we can readily detect the growth of inequality, at the same 
time we can see a decline in poverty. Whereas socio-economic equalities focus on 
the differences and distribution of resources of the kind we mentioned above, 
poverty considers a given amount of resources, which are arbitrary, although rea-
sonably, devised and are owned by a group of people. Both phenomena are rele-
vant and related. For example, a low level of poverty makes a high degree of 
inequality less pressing and dramatic. Moreover, from an ethical perspective pov-
erty is usually considered a more critical problem than inequality, which is 
accepted or tolerated by many people, and, as stated above (see justification), 
becomes not acceptable mainly when closely related to (in)justice or (un)fairness.
The third issue we would like to address can also be presented with a question: 
why are we considering equality and not another classical value that is often 
evoked, especially in Catholic culture, namely solidarity? To begin with, let us 
remember that according to a broadly accepted definition, solidarity is ‘a feeling 
of being connected to and responsible for others [. . .]. Solidarity refers to the type 
of relationship in which people feel that they have an obligation to help others, for 
instance, because they experience a connection and “we-ness” with them based 
on a community of interest and values [. . .].’ (Coicaud, 2011, p. 2465). However, as 
for equality, solidarity is closely connected to justice. It can be considered a 
requirement of justice. Above all, as Coicaud (2011, p. 2466) again emphasizes, 
solidarity provides some of the possible motivations for justice: only identifica-
tion and connection with ‘brothers’ provide an inner reason to call for justice. It 
also stresses the social conditions of a collectivity and the social nature of each 
individual’s existence within it: solidarity ‘necessarily asks for the interests of each 
to be taken into account and looked after’, although—let’s remember—there is no 
obligation involved in solidarity, if not a moral one. From this perspective, the 
criterion of fairness and the distributive characteristic at the heart of justice are 
also at the centre of solidarity. Hence, the next step is that beliefs in justice sup-
ported by solidarity can be implemented through policies of equality. In this 
sense, when considering equality, we can take solidarity for granted, although it is 
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fair to point out that this notion has acquired stronger salience especially since 
2000, when a section of the European Charter was dedicated to it (see title 4, 2000 
and 2009).
The first set of research questions. With this in mind, and intending to include 
in our analysis the six previously mentioned democracies over the period 
1990–2018, first we need to empirically detect and analyze the trend of in equal-
ities in the various aspects we considered above. In doing this, it should be added 
that in addition to separate economic equality from the social one, it is worth 
further distinguishing social equality into at least two dimensions. The first is a 
cultural one, which relates to ethnic features and has been gaining momentum as 
a consequence of a protracted phenomenon of immigration during the first dec-
ades of the twenty-first century at least; and another one, which concerns other 
socially relevant aspects, such as education, health, social protection. We, there-
fore, need to distinguish and analyse: (1) economic inequality, which may be dif-
ferently formulated (see next chapter); (2) social inequality, namely the 
implementation of the principal social rights such as pensions and support for 
disabilities, namely social protection in general, healthcare, education, with 
related characteristics and trends; and (3) ethnic inequality. This first analysis will 
also unavoidably refer to the existing gender discrimination, especially in the 
labour market, as well as to unemployment and the level and characteristics of 
poverty. The changing pictures of these inequalities will also be explored. In our 
analysis, the difference between the cases will be stressed.
The second set of research questions. Once we get the full picture of the exist-
ing economic and social inequalities with the related trends and analysed the 
attitudes and demand of equalities by citizens and the political commitments of 
party leaders, the next step is to ask how the socio-economic inequalities are 
affected by the other democratic dimensions. Hence, did some of the specific pro-
cedural and result sub-dimensions of the quality of democracy, contribute to 
worsening inequalities? In other words, what are the first main domestic ex plan-
ations of the different pictures we mapped out?
The third set of research questions. The next questions explore a related puzzle, 
that is, how external factors and actors can explain the existing characteristics 
and trends in inequalities. Of course, here we will not take into consideration 
earl ier economic and social changes. There is an extensive literature on this (see, 
e.g., Piketty, 2013; Milanovic, 2016; Stiglitz, 2012).11 Our perspective and interest 
are on the external political factors. Accordingly, we are going to focus on the role 
of  the European Union. In the management of the crisis and, before that, the 
question of the impact of the EU on inequalities, we need to envisage possibly 
contradictory effects, whereby the EU is both trying to redress inequalities with 
11 There is a big debate on these themes in economics, which also emphasizes the limits of the fac-
tors adopted to explain inequalities.
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cohesion policies and at the same time is pursuing other economic policies that 
exacerbate inequalities. In the EU, for instance, fiscal austerity measures may gen-
erate positive effects in some countries, and negative effects in others, shrinking 
resources, increasing citizen dissatisfaction, and ultimately magnifying the 
impact of the crisis itself over several years.12 Therefore, the European Union’s 
various institutions should be considered as key intervening variables.
1.3  What Is Freedom?
Following the structure of the previous section, in this one we are going to ana-
lyse the justification, the empirical definition of freedom, and some key research 
questions about the characteristics and trends of freedoms in the six countries, 
the impact of the other democratic dimensions, the impact of external factors, 
and in the conclusion the consequences of freedom on our democracies.
Justification. Like equality, freedom precedes the development of the notion of 
contemporary democracy. Moreover, the notion of freedom and many other ideas 
associated with this value has engaged the minds of scholars and  people at large 
ever since ancient times. However, differently from the other key democratic 
value, the status of freedom as the key value of liberal-democratic regimes has 
rarely been contested: ‘democracy without freedom is a contradiction in terms’, 
states Beetham (2005, p. 33). A minimalist definition of democracy, inspired 
mainly by Dahl (1971, esp. chapter  1), includes: ‘a) universal male and female 
suffrage; b) free, competitive, periodic and fair elections; c) more than one political 
party; d) different and alternative sources of informatio’ (Morlino, 2011, p. 32). In 
other words, the definition ‘considers genuine respect of at least civil and political 
rights to be essential, assuming that these rights exist if there is eff ect ive universal 
suffrage, the quintessential expression of political rights, [..]; if [. . .] there are free, 
fair and regular elections, an expression of the effective existence of freedom of 
speech and thought; if there is more than one genuinely competing political party, 
a manifestation of the existence of a real and practiced right of association; and if 
there are different sources of media information with different proprietors, proof 
of the existence of the above-mentioned freedoms. In other words, in this 
 definition [. . .] aspects such as competition and participation are complemented 
by an effective guarantee of freedoms’ (ibid.).
Authors such as Rawls, Dworkin, Sen and Nussbaum, whom we mentioned 
above, and others, who focus on equality, have presented theories where freedoms 
or an overall notion of freedom complements equality. This is to confirm that 
12 Solid conclusions have now been reached about the negative impact of austerity measures. See, 
e.g. Stiglitz, 2012, esp. chapter 8.
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unlike the debate about whether equality is a core value of democracy, there is 
almost no doubt that freedom or freedoms is/are considered to lie at the heart of 
democracy. Consequently, it would seem that there is no real necessity to provide 
an explicit justification.
In this review, the analysis by Dahrendorf (1979, 1994) is also relevant, when 
referring to Weberian ‘life chances’ and developing a theoretical proposal of the 
new liberalism, which is characterized by ‘provisions’ and ‘entitlements’ and com-
plemented by ‘ligatures’. Provisions and entitlements overlap with the civil, pol it-
ical and—above all, within the perspective of equality—social rights that Marshall 
(1950) had already theorized; the ligatures relate to belonging, that is, the sense of 
being part of a national community. In this vein, fraternity is a possible link that 
justifies the rights, that is, the provisions and entitlements. From our perspective, 
the relationships between provisions and entitlements and, more generally, 
between equality and freedom are more relevant. Dahrendorf envisages active 
freedom as an agency, deriving both from the provisions, the assets that can be 
legitimized, and from the entitlements, that is, from civil and social rights, but 
also through the political and participation rights men and women enjoy. From 
this viewpoint, equality becomes a condition for the implementation of freedom. 
This is especially so if the reference is to the equality of opportunities rather than 
to the equality of results. In essence, freedom rests on life chances that, however, 
depend not only on the possibility of individual choice but also on the social and 
institutional conditions that may implement material well-being and the positive 
rights of use and distribution.
When we turn from the analysis of scholars to people’s beliefs (see Ferrín and 
Kriesi,  2016, esp. part I), the centrality of freedom is confirmed, although to a 
different extent vis-à-vis equality. Considering European countries alone, we can 
go from countries like the ones in Northern Europe, where freedoms in terms of 
civil and political rights are prominent and social rights are taken for granted, to 
others in Southern Europe where attention to equality in terms of social rights is 
rather prominent.
Definition. The elaboration of a definition is also related to the research goal. 
In our case, it is to achieve an empirical definition that allows us to effectively 
detect the existing freedoms in the countries we are analysing. Accordingly, we 
accept and consider as consistent with our purposes a variety of different the or et-
ic al notions of freedom, from those proposed by classic authors, such as Locke, 
Hume, Constant, Mill and Tocqueville, to more contemporary ones like Carter 
(1999) and Kramer (2003), or even authors with communitarian views, such as 
Pettit (1997) or Skinner (2012). The proposal by Sunstein (2019, pp. 11–12) in 
terms of ‘architectures of choice’ is also analytically relevant for us: if freedoms are 
architectures of choice, then equalities unavoidably interact with them. Especially 
economic rights may present an architecture of choice, which is not consistent 
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with both the architecture of civil rights and the pursuit of equality. However, the 
critical aspect is that an empirically meaningful set of freedoms adequately 
reflects those notions.
Consequently, although meaningful and salient from a philosophical perspec-
tive to the notion of ‘overall freedom’ suggested by Carter (1999, esp. chapter 1), 
the alternative view of the different freedoms to single out is much more mean-
ingful for the empirical research. In this vein, Berlin (1969, esp. pp. 162–6), with 
his distinction between two liberties, which is grounded in a previous classic lib-
eral tradition, is an appropriate starting point. We can thus start with ‘negative 
liberty’, the freedom from or, following Sartori (1987, pp. 302–3), the ‘defensive or 
protective liberty’, that is, the ‘protection against arbitrary and limitless (absolute) 
power [. . .] that permits the governed effectively to oppose the abuse of power by 
the governors.’ And, further below, Sartori spells out how ‘complete freedom may 
be said to imply the following five traits: (a) independence; (b) privacy; (c) cap-
acity; (d) opportunity; and (e) power’, with the first two notions clarifying the 
meaning of negative, protective liberty as the Hobbesian absence of external 
impediments, and the last three notions making explicit the content of positive 
liberty. These five components of freedom define it as ‘freedom of choice’ and are 
related. Independence ‘protects and permits the individual to choose [. . .]. Privacy 
is to choose without being pressured, by looking quietly into oneself; capacity is 
[. . .] a broadening of available choice; opportunity is the coming within reach of 
alternatives among which to choose; and power is [. . .] the condition that makes 
for an effective equal freedom to choose.’13
The following question is how to translate those sub-dimensions empirically. 
An appropriate and possible response for the first step in this direction seems to 
lead back to the suggestions by Nussbaum (2011, pp. 33–4) on the core cap abil-
ities which, in addition to the features of equalities (see above), all democracies 
should support and implement concerning freedoms:
Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure 
against violent  assault, including  sexual assault  and  domestic violence; having 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and choice in matters of reproduction.
Senses, Imagination and Thought. To use the senses, to imagine, think, and rea-
son—and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, a way informed and cultivated 
by an adequate  education, including, but by no means limited to,  literacy  and 
basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use one’s mind in ways 
protected by guarantees of freedom of expression concerning both political and 
artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable 
experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain.
13 The connections between liberty and power are spelled out by Panebianco (2004, pp. 37–52). 
Moreover, we should note that every definition of freedom is related to the rule of law. Cicero’s famous 
sentence is pertinent here: ‘We are servants of the laws in order that we might be free.’
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Emotions.  Being able to have attachments to things and people outside our-
selves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, 
to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude and justified anger. Not having 
one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety.
Affiliation. Being able to live with and towards others, to recognize and show 
 concern for other humans, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able 
to imagine the situation of another (protecting this capability means protecting 
institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting 
the freedom of assembly and political speech); having the social bases of self-respect 
and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is 
equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination based on race, 
sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin, and species.
Control over one’s environment. Political: Being able to participate effectively in 
political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, 
protections of free speech and association. Material:  Being able to hold  prop-
erty (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis 
with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; 
having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to 
work as a human, exercising practical reason and entering meaningful relation-
ships of mutual recognition with other workers.
When referring to previous ana lyses (see Morlino, 2011, chapter 7), comple-
mented by other empirical research on this (for example, by Freedom House), 
there are three sets of freedoms we should include: personal dignity, civil rights 
and political rights. First, personal dignity mainly includes right to life and per-
sonal security, the right to privacy, control over appearance, protection from any 
domestic violence, prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, abolition of the 
death penalty, prohibition of slavery and forced labour, choice of marriage part-
ner, absence of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender discrimination.
Second, essential civil rights include personal liberty, the right to legal defence, 
the freedom to choose one’s place of residence, freedom of movement, the right to 
expatriate or emigrate, freedom and secrecy of correspondence, freedom of 
thought and expression, the right to information and a free press, and the free-
doms of assembly, association and organization, including political organizations 
unrelated to trade unions. Besides, within the broader category of civil rights, so-
called economic rights should also be mentioned. Elaborated by Giddens (1984), 
these include the rights to private property and to establish private business or 
entrepreneurship, within the social limits fixed by the law and without undue 
interference from state or non-state actors; also, the rights associated with 
employment and connected with how the work is carried out, the right to fair pay 
and time off, and the right to collective bargaining.
Political rights include the right to vote, the right for political leaders to com-
pete for electoral support, and the right to be elected to public office (passive 
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electorate). Moreover, the political right par excellence, that is, the right to vote, 
can be strengthened and extended. A way of doing it is when the voter gains the 
possibility/right to elect the government either directly (elections for the head of 
state or prime minister who also fills the office of the head of government), or else 
de facto (when the leader of the winning party or coalition in a bi-polar context is 
elected prime minister). An even richer version of this right is achieved when 
citizens can influence or choose the electoral candidates in intra-party or primary 
elections. One difficulty to resolve about this issue is the extension of political 
citizenship to adult residents in a territory so that immigrants can also participate 
in this part of the political process.
Why focus on freedom/s and ignore the notion of autonomy? As pointed out 
by Held (2006, p. 263), autonomy ‘connotes the capacity of human beings to rea-
son self-consciously, to be self-reflective and to be self-determining. It involves 
the ability to deliberate, judge, choose and act upon a different possible course of 
action in private as well in public life.’ If considered in this individualistic per-
spective, autonomy is possible if civil and political rights are effectively guaran-
teed, in addition to being also included in the protection of personal dignity. If we 
also include in our analysis the autonomy of communities or subnational entities, 
then other aspects should be considered, but ultimately that autonomy is 
grounded on the guarantee of individual civil and political rights (see Paquin, 
2011, pp. 124–8). This, therefore, justifies why freedoms and not autonomy will 
be at the centre of our analysis.
The first set of research questions. Briefly, based on the definition above and in 
parallel to what we are going to do with inequalities, the first obvious set of ques-
tions should detect and analyze the trend of freedoms in the various aspects we 
considered above, namely:
 1. personal dignity: are the distinctive features of dignity recognized and 
guaranteed?
 2. civil rights: how strongly are civil rights guaranteed, and privacy, economic 
rights and equal and secure access of citizens to justice included?
 3. political rights: how strong is the right to associate, access free and plural 
information both in a traditional and a web-based manner and, by those 
means, ensure that the right to vote is appropriately and de facto 
protected?
The second set of research questions. Building on the full picture of the exist-
ing freedoms and the related trends, the attitudes and demand of freedoms by 
citizens and the political commitments of party leaders will be explored, and the 
next analytic step is to ask how those freedoms are affected by the other domestic, 
specific dimensions if there are. If not, what are the key aspects explaining the 
characteristics and levels of freedoms?
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The third set of research questions. We can now ask how to explain the assessed 
freedoms, or how to explain the existing characteristics and trends that the 
empirical analysis has shown when considering external aspects with again a spe-
cific focus on the actual role of the European Union been in these domains.
There will also be a fourth and final set of questions that concern at the same 
time equalities and freedoms. When considered together, are there relevant con-
nections to stress among (in)equalities and freedoms in our countries? Are 
in equal ities worsened by possible emerging limitations of freedoms and inversely 
did the growth of inequalities, when existing, set relevant limits to an effective 
guarantee of civil and political rights? Are there more convincing, comprehensive 
explanations when all domestic factors and actors are considered and comple-
mented with external factors and actors? When confronting our empirical con-
clusions with the existing literature on the topics, we focused on, what is different 
and new? And in conclusion, what can be done in our contemporary democracies 
to combat these inequalities and consolidate social rights?
1.4  What Next?
Before anticipating the content of the chapters, very briefly we would like to make 
explicit our approach to reply to the questions addressed above. Starting from the 
empirical results we discuss in the next two chapters, we ask what the factors are 
and who are the actors, at the elite or collective level, supporting the implementa-
tion of equalities and freedoms. In other words, by singling out explanatory fac-
tors alongside this analytical perspective, we endorse a situated actor model 
(Boudon, 1984), where the agency is put into motion within the scopes bounded 
by and through the means provided by the institutional setting. More precisely, 
this two-level analysis (agency and structure) can be well expressed through the 
double filtering process, suggested by Jon Elster (1979). In short, in the social sci-
ences, the explanation must consider human action as the product of two ‘filters’. 
The structural and institutional ‘constraints’ constitute the first filter the actors 
have to cope with (structure problem). They are the institutional arrangements at 
an economic and political level. The second filter sets what ‘actions’ (decisions, 
programs, policies) will be undertaken following the competitive strategies and 
conflicts involving the actors in the field (agency problem).
As regards the data we include in our analysis, in addition to other published 
sources referred to in the book, especially the EUROSTAT (see esp. Chapter 2) 
ESS data on democracy (see Chapter 4), the empirical analysis we conduct here 
relies on additional qualitative reports on the United Kingdom, Spain, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Poland. They were based on a questionnaire that was pre-
pared at the beginning of the research project and then implemented in the field 
research. Moreover, the data on the specific impact of austerity measures 
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collected with the Horizon 2020 research EMU-SCEUS will also be part of the 
ana lysis on the specific role of the European Union (see Chapter  7). Thus, the 
quantitative analysis complements qualitative data collected in these reports 
within a comparative methodology, designed possibly to provide a greater depth 
to the explanatory section of the work.
Thus, in the following two chapters, we will analyse the aspects and trends of 
economic and social equalities (Chapter 2) and freedoms (Chapter 3) in the six 
countries. Chapter 4 will explore the demand for equalities and freedoms by citi-
zens and the political commitments of party leaders. Chapters  5 and 6 will be 
devoted to how respectively equalities and freedoms are affected by domestic 
aspects. By focusing on the European Union, especially in the management of the 
economic crisis, and before it, Chapter 7 will assess the role of external factors 
with the consequent impact on equalities and freedoms. In addition to connect-
ing equalities and freedoms and drawing the lines of entire research, Chapter 8 
will confront the result of the research with alternative views and analyses. The 
concluding remarks (Chapter 9) will discuss the perspectives of change of the two 
values within contemporary democracies. In this respect, we expect that our 
analysis will ultimately enable us to provide an empirical assessment of their 
transformations in the contemporary democracies and to reply to a final question 
on how can democracy implement the key democratic values, although to a dif-
ferent extent and with diversified characteristics?
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Inequalities
Leonardo Morlino, Claudius Wagemann, and Francesco Raniolo
2.1 Not Only a Macro Perspective
The analysis of (in)equality does not just relate to government activities, in that 
government can or must provide the necessary resources or legal regulations to 
guarantee equality, but also concerns people’s lives as individuals. Stiglitz’s well-
known book (2012), together with the works by Sen (e.g., 1997), Piketty (2013), 
Milanovic (2016) and others, all concur on the relevance of these two dimen-
sions, although with different perspectives. So, in addition to the macro perspec-
tive on democracies, a micro perspective that considers individual citizens as 
units of analysis is also appropriate when speaking about equality. It is worth 
recalling here that equality is a relational concept. While individuals can be (un)
free independently from how (un)free the other people are (but see chapter 3), 
when speaking about people’s (in)equality, every individual is assessed in relation 
to comparators, i.e., other individuals. Considering individuals’ positions con-
cerning other citizens’ positions is, therefore, a fundamental principle in the 
analysis of (in)equality and is the focus of this first section (2.1).
Individuals may differ in many respects, having different religious beliefs, 
political opinions, or sexual orientations. However, it is the question of economic 
(in)equality which has long been dominating the debate about equality in the 
social sciences (see Chapter 1, section 1.2) and it is even said to have resulted in 
an essential political cleavage, which also influenced the formation of party sys-
tems (see, e.g., Bartolini, 2000). Furthermore, economic (in)equality reflects the 
individuals’ economic possibilities, which provide further opportunities for 
access to (material and immaterial) goods. What is more, the main crisis con-
sidered in this book is an economic one. Thus, if it influenced equality, then the 
focus has to be on its economic dimension. Consequently, as a first step, we will 
look at economic equality, assessing it at the level of individual citizens.
The second section will then invert the perspective, will change the analytical 
level of the individual, and will move on to look at state and government ac tiv-
ities. After all, it is the democratic state that possesses the necessary resources 
(and the mission) to reduce or correct patterns of inequality or to moderate its 
negative effects. Therefore, we will consider state measures (often, but not only 
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expressed in terms of shares of expenditures) designed to reduce inequality. This 
can be regarded as the social (in)equality.
The third section will again take an individual-related perspective but will look 
at another form of equality, namely ethnic (in)equality. This kind of (in)equality 
became an increasingly prominent topic (without a doubt in public opinion and 
political debates) in European democracies in the immediate aftermath of the 
economic crisis when the so-called migration crisis of 2015 suddenly reshaped 
the political agenda. Although the debate became more accentuated during the 
significant influx of refugees in those years, questions of ethnic (in)equality had 
already been prominent in public discourse long before then. The economic crisis 
that began in 2008 might have had a particular effect on ethnic (in)equality 
though, in the sense that it has intensified, ameliorated or otherwise altered exist-
ing patterns of such (in)equality. For example, due to an eventual loss of personal 
economic well-being, or as a result of high unemployment rates, attitudes towards 
migrants might already have changed during or shortly after the economic crisis 
(and before the migration crisis), with a further intensification during and after 
the migration crisis when migration rates increased or were perceived to be 
increasing (see also Chapter 5). Therefore, when looking at ethnic (in)equality, we 
have to analyse both the economic crisis and the overlapping migration crisis.
In attempting to empirically address a complex, multidimensional concept 
such as (in)equality, we are consciously simplifying it by analysing the three 
dimensions just mentioned. Despite such simplification, the concept and the 
related phenomenon maintain their meaningfulness. In this vein, then, our dis-
cussion is based on various indicators drawn from different sources (see Table 
2.1). However, we should be keenly aware of the limits of all those measures. Not 
only is the phenomenon we have the ambition of analysing empirically very com-
plicated, but the same measures may appear inadequate to provide a precise pic-
ture. For example, if we consider the different sizes and characteristics of informal 
sectors of economy or the size of tax evasion1 we can realize how effective reality 
can be partially different from our picture. On the positive side, not to be forgot-
ten, there is that our effort is mainly a comparative one; that is, the differences can 
be seen even if compelled to gloss over the hidden, informal aspects of reality we 
observe.
Let us also add that other forms of equality are also essential and have similarly 
seen significant changes over the last few decades: just think of the various aspects 
associated with gender roles. However, we are concentrating on economic, social, 
and ethnic (in)equality, as we consider these three dimensions to be the most vis-
ible ones when discussing the effects of the recent crises. Nonetheless, wherever 
1 To be more precise, official OECD data show how tax evasion is on average similar and relatively 
low during last three decades in France, Germany, and United Kingdom (around 1.8% of GDP), but 
higher in Spain (about 2.8%) and even higher in Italy and Poland (about 4.0%).
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possible, we will extend our discussion to the intersections of equalities, that is, 
looking at economic inequality from gender and other perspectives.
2.2  Economic Inequality
The Gini Index (Gini,  1912) is probably the most traditionally used index for 
measuring economic inequality. It looks at the distribution of personal incomes 
and uses this as a proxy for economic equality. Note that it leaves out aspects such 
as private property, and so it does not give a complete picture of economic oppor-
tunities. Moreover, as stressed by Piketty (2013, chapter 7), it is a synthetic index 
that does not distinguish between capital income and labour income and ul tim-
ate ly squeezes a complex multidimensional reality into a number. Despite this, 
the index is still helpful and revealing for our research purposes. The index ranges 
between 0 and 100 and is normed in a way that low values indicate more income 
equality (in fact, with a Gini index of 0, income would be distributed completely 
equally, i.e., every employee would earn the same), and that high values indicate a 
more unevenly distributed income (and a hypothetical Gini index of 100 would 
mean that just one person in a society receives the whole income, with everyone 
else getting nothing). Figure  2.1 shows the trend of the Gini Index during the 
period of observation in our six countries.
Just a cursory look indicates that lower values (indicating more income equal-
ity), which had appeared in the years before the economic crisis, become rarer 
after the economic crisis, while the maxima, which had been reached before, have 
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not been matched or exceeded since. In other words, we can see two general 
trends. First, total inequality has increased. However, this increase is due to for-
merly more equal countries becoming more unequal, while those that had already 
been unequal in income, stay unequal. Thus, second, there is an interesting trend 
towards a cross-country convergence in income inequality. Thus, if 2006, before 
the crisis, is the starting point, and 2018 the last year we consider, Germany went 
from 26.8 to 31.1; Spain 31.9 to 33.2; France 27.3 to 28.5; Italy 32.1 to 33.4; United 
Kingdom 32.5 to 34.2; with Poland, as a deviant case, from 33.2 to 27.8.
As for country trends, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom obtain more 
un equal positions, but these are based on different trajectories: Spain and the 
United Kingdom display similar peaks of inequality. Looking at the Spanish 
curve, the economic crisis is the moment when the previous trend towards a 
lower level of inequality, which had been reached in the early and mid-2000s, was 
suddenly interrupted and inverted. The British development is similar in peaks to 
the Spanish one, but it does not change notably or systematically with the eco-
nomic crisis. The Italian curve—also reaching high levels recently—shows a 
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Figure 2.1 Gini Coefficient2
Source: Eurostat.
2 No data is available for 2003 (for some countries also for 2002). The Polish data starts in 1999. 
There are several Gini indices around and being used. We have opted to refer to the EU-SILC survey, 
which is the most standard one. Its only limitation is usually that it only provides data for OECD 
countries, but this is not an issue for our countries under research (for the problematique of the differ-
ent indices, see Solt, 2016).
3 This is due to some decisions made by the Berlusconi government already in 2005 following the 
infringement procedure open by the European Commission. See on this also Chapter 4.
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As for the countries that perform more equally, they show different processes. 
Germany and France are probably most similar in that they have become more 
unequal over time, but this sets in a bit earlier in Germany (2007) than in France 
(2008). Poland is a different case, developing into a much more equal situation of 
income distribution after 2006. Summarizing this and linking to the question of 
the economic crisis, only Spain and France experienced some changes during that 
period. At the same time, income inequality also increased in Germany and Italy, 
but this trend sets in earlier than in 2008. Poland even shows a trend towards 
more equal incomes.
There is a further perspective on the Gini index since the data is also available 
before and after implementing social transfers (including pensions). This version 
of the index indicates the gap in income distribution before the state intervenes 
with social policy measures that are what the gap would be if there were no social 
transfers. Consequently, the ratio indicates the effect of social transfers. Note that, 
unlike above (see Figure 2.1), Figure 2.2 covers the values from 2005 onwards.
Figure 2.2 illustrates that in all the countries where inequality increased during 
or after the crisis years, social transfers had a significant effect. Thus, if we com-
pare the Gini index before social transfers with the one after social transfers, the 
effect of social transfers and therefore of state activity, in a relative manner, that is, 
independently from the level of (in)equality, point to two salient aspects. The first 
concerns the level of the ratio: the higher it is, the more effective the social trans-
fers are in reducing inequality. Germany is clearly in the lead, with France and the 
United Kingdom also occupying high or relatively high levels, followed by Poland. 
Social transfers have the least effect in Italy and Spain. Second, when looking at 
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Figure 2.2 Ratio Gini Coefficients before and after social transfer
Source: Eurostat.
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that the graph alone does not distinguish between the effectiveness of social 
transfers at high levels of inequality (where small improvements might already be 
the result of a significant effort) and at low levels. If we concentrate on Spain, as a 
country where equality decreased during the crisis years, we find that social 
transfers became (a bit) more effective in those years. However, as we have seen 
above, this was still not enough to prevent a rise in inequality even after social 
transfers. Nevertheless, the graph indicates that it could have been worse. If by 
way of contrast, we look at the British case, we see that the Gini index after social 
transfers has ups and downs during and after the crisis years, without, however, 
showing notable and durable increases. In the United Kingdom, the Gini index 
before social transfers indicates that during and after the crisis inequality did 
increase. This means that social transfers had a significant impact on offsetting 
inequality in the UK. Indeed, the ratio between the two values (i.e., our proxy for 
the importance of social transfers) also increases in precisely those years.
The Income Quintile Share Ratio is another index for income equality and is 
explicitly supported by Piketty (2013, p. 406), who emphasizes how these kinds 
of an index can give a more precise idea of inequality. However, it does not con-
sider the whole distribution of incomes, but just the margins. It is calculated as 
the ratio between the upper quintile of the income distribution (which marks 
the income above which the highest 20% of all incomes lie, that is, it indicates the 
starting point for the high earnings) and the lower quintile (which marks the 
income below which the lowest 20% of the income distribution can be found, 
that is, it marks the starting point for the low earnings). The ratio indicates how 
much higher the high income is than the low one. A value of 4, for example, says 
that the top 20% earner earns four times as much as that person whose income 
marks the border between the lowest 20% of the income distribution and the 
highest 80%.
Note that when looking at quintiles (and not at the top or bottom 1%), the 
index does not consider extreme wages, such as those of top managers or soccer 
stars, but those of people who are earning well, although not extraordinarily well, 
and, on the other end of the scale, of people, who are not earning well but who at 
least reach a reasonable low level.4 It is thus a further good representation of 
potential wage gaps, and of how the margins of the income distribution relate to 
mid-level incomes. It is essential to underline that the ratio does not give any 
information about how high or low wages are (i.e., it does not tell us whether low 
levels of income are too low to guarantee a minimum living standard), but is just 
4 However, in the past two decades, inequality about wages and employment has been increas-
ingly ‘polarized’ in the United States and several other industrialized countries. In short, the wage 
and employment structure shows more significant benefits for hyper-specialized and low-skilled 
workers, while it becomes negative for medium-level workers (Autor, 2014). In Piketty’s analysis (see 
above) the structure of wealth (income and capital) takes the unimodal form in favour of the 
wealthiest 1%.
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a relative measure. Figure  2.3 illustrates the trends in the six countries under 
consideration.6
For most of the countries and the general trend, the picture largely confirms 
the findings from the Gini Index. Initially, more equal data (such as for France 
and Germany) worsen. While this means more equality between the countries, it 
also means convergence in inequality as a general trend. As mentioned, France 
and Germany show a trend towards more inequality over time, with Germany 
changing a bit before the economic crisis (2007) and France in 2008. The Polish 
case is again the exception. There is a notable trend towards equality during the 
period of observation. The income quintile share ratio also confirms the trend for 
Italy and Spain that was found when analyzing the Gini coefficient: both show 
unusual patterns of inequality, with only the change in Spain setting in during the 
economic crisis, while income distribution in Italy starts to become more unequal 
before that.
Only in the case of the United Kingdom, can we see a small difference between 
the income quintile share ratio and the Gini coefficient. While the Gini index, 
especially when we look at the most recent period, suggests that the United 
Kingdom has to be grouped with Italy and Spain as unequal countries, it seems to 






















































Germany Spain France Italy Poland United Kingdom
Figure 2.3 Income Quintile Share Ratio5
Source: Eurostat.
5 No data are available for 2003 (and for some countries not for 2002 and 2004 either). The Polish 
data starts in 2000.
6 Let us add that Piketty and a group of other economists have been developing a way of measuring 
economic inequality along with income group, which is consistent with the measure mentioned above 
in the text. However, in their last report, the data are on France and Germany only when considering 
European countries and are not updated (last year is 2014). See Alvaredo et al., 2018.
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are seeking to represent a very complex phenomenon, namely the distribution of 
income in a given society. Therefore, any attempt to interpret the differences 
between the two indices is rather ambitious and would require an in-depth 
knowledge of the individual data that generated the underlying percentages. That 
said, one suggestion for a preliminary explanation is that, in the UK, differences 
in income are not so much between the higher and the lower earnings (therefore 
the somewhat lower value for the income quintile share ratio), but within the 
mid-level earnings group. Nonetheless, by and large, the income quintile share 
ratio confirms the findings from the Gini coefficient.
Continuing this line of argumentation, it is worth having another look at the 
margins of the income distribution. When looking at the quintiles, we have 
observed a higher risk of (relative)7 poverty in countries with high absolute levels 
of the ratio, because inequality is visible in terms of more significant wage differ-
ences between the rich and the poor than in countries with low absolute values of 
the ratio. However, there are also specific data on the risk of poverty, expressed by 
the at-risk-of-poverty rate. There are different ways of calculating this. We opted 
for the version which considers 40% of the median value of the income distribu-
tion.8 The graph (Figure 2.4) visualizes the trend.
If we look at the lowest bands of the income distribution, the picture is a bit 
clearer than when considering the overall situation. France’s and Germany’s per-
formance again points towards more equality than in other countries. As for the 
trend, not much changes in these two countries. This is in marked contrast to 
Italy and Spain, where levels of poverty risk are generally higher than in the other 
countries considered, and there is a continuous increase from the crisis year of 
2008 onwards and a decline since 2015–16. However, in absolute numbers, the 
phenomenon is more relevant in Italy with about 5 million individuals as absolute 
poor during last years.9 The situation is again different in the UK (but growing 
7 It is important to stress that all values refer to relations. Whether or not the fact that the Spanish 
low quintile earner receives a seventh of what the Spanish high quintile earner does should make us 
worry about poverty depends on the general wage level. Only if that seventh did not guarantee an 
acceptable standard of living, could we speak about poverty in absolute terms?
8 Alternative methods of calculation foresee higher percentages, and thus more people would be 
attributed to the group of the poor. We have opted for the lowest level for which data is available (40%) 
since the income quintile share ratio has already provided us with indications on people who are low 
earners but do not belong to the lowest group. Considering the 40% value, therefore, gives us the 
opportunity to look at another (poorer) group and to expand our analysis as a consequence. Moreover, 
we do not consider 40% of the mean, but of the median, since we expect the distribution to be skewed 
towards high incomes, and the mean is greatly affected by very high incomes. Although the choice of 
the median makes the indicator already a bit less relative, it is, of course, clear that not even the ‘risk-
of-poverty rate’ can give us information on absolute levels of poverty (on this see fn 7).
9 According to the official definition, ‘The absolute poverty threshold represents the monetary 
value, at current prices, of the basket of goods and services considered essential for each family, 
defined according to the age of the components, the geographical distribution and the typology of the 
municipality of residence. A family is absolutely poor if it sustains a monthly consumption ex pend-
iture equal to or less than this monetary value.’ See ISTAT at https://www.istat.it/it/files//2019/06/
La-povert%C3%A0-in-Italia-2018.pdf. See also for other details on Spain INE at http://www.ine.es/.
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between 2017 and 2018) and Poland: in both countries, the risk-of-poverty rate is 
at medium or low levels but seems to have decreased since the early 2000s. The 
crisis, therefore, did not coincide with more inequality in these two countries.As 
with the Gini Index, the risk-of-poverty rates can also be assessed in terms of how 
they would be without social transfers, by using the percentage of the rate before 
social transfers. The percentages are quite high, because they also include pen-
sions (we used this scenario when comparing the Gini indices as well), and a pen-
sioner would be at great and imminent risk of poverty if (s)he did not receive any 
pension funds. Figure 2.5 shows this rate before social transfers.
The interesting convergence, which the graph shows above all after the eco-
nomic crisis, provides us with only limited information. Concerning government 
interventions in the field of economic (in)equality, the ratio between those who 
would risk poverty, if there were no social transfers (the ‘potentially poor ones’), 
and those who still risk poverty, despite all social transfers (the ‘really poor ones’), 
is much more telling, because it informs us about the potential and the amplitude 
of social protection. This ratio has to be read as ‘if there were no social transfers, 
the percentage of people risking poverty would be xy times as high as it really is’. 
The higher this ratio is, the more effective social transfers have been in reducing 
the risk of poverty, which, by the way, is the function of social transfers (see 
Figure 2.6).
This graph identifies the French social protection system as the most effective 
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Figure 2.4 At-risk-of-poverty rate10
Source: Eurostat.
10 No data are available for 2003 (and for some countries not for 2002 either). The Polish data starts 
in 1999.
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of social protection. Without social protection, the risk-of-poverty rate in France 
would be between 12 and 18 times as high as it is. Two more things are notable: 
reading the data in this way, Italy and Spain show the lowest ratio (values between 
4 and 6), which means that social protection does not have such a great effect on 
people’s risk of poverty. Remember, however, that both countries increased their 
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Figure 2.6 Ratio between the at-risk-of-poverty rates before and after social transfers
Source: Eurostat.
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was so necessary that it did not substantively improve the ratio between the risk 
rates without and with social protection or increasing social expenditures has not 
been the right means of addressing the phenomenon. What is more, apart from 
France, no country shows a meaningful trend regarding the ratio, and, in France, 
the trend is not tied to the crisis years. Thus, while government expenditures on 
social protection have been increased in the crisis countries, these expenditures 
(if they do so at all) just help to keep the situation as it is but do not entail 
improvements. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6, which shows the ratio between the 
rates before and after social transfers.
All the indices we have considered so far—the Gini coefficient, the income 
quintile share ratio, and the risk-at-poverty rate—refer to questions of income. 
Thus, as regards economic equality expressed through income, we can affirm that:
• there has been a general trend towards more inequality over time, even if in 
our cross-national comparison this growth among countries at high devel-
opment levels comes out less evidently. ‘(A)lthough discrepancies between 
countries have narrowed, emerging evidence suggests that in equal ity within 
countries is rising’ (Verbeek and Osorio Rodarte, 2015, p. 1) both between 
social groups, as shown by Milanovic (2016), and between ter ri tor ies, as in 
the widening gap between North and South in Italy (Svimez, 2019).
• Italy and Spain usually perform worse than the other countries, while France 
and Germany do better;
• the worsening of the situation in Spain and, at lower levels, in France coin-
cides with the years of the economic crisis;
• this coincidence of the trend with the crisis years can be confirmed for the 
Italian case only as far as the risk of poverty is concerned; for the other indi-
ces, the worsening of the situation began occurring in Italy well before the 
crisis period (see fn 2);
• Poland, as a deviant case, shows a trend towards more equality over time, 
above all since the early 2000s onwards; this development might be due 
to  Poland’s late transition to democracy and a capitalist economy (see 
Chapter 5);
• the United Kingdom is characterized by ups and downs, with a slight indica-
tion of more inequality over time.
As we mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, other dimensions of 
equality apart from economic parameters, such as gender, will not be treated in 
separate sub-chapters but will be presented with regards to selected aspects. One 
of these aspects refers to the question of whether men and women receive equal 
pay for the same work. This has been coined the gender pay gap.
Unfortunately, the main data source for this chapter, Eurostat, does not provide 
us with the same data basis for the whole period of observation. While data until 
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2006 is available for the ‘overall economy’, data from 2007 onwards is differenti-
ated by individual economic sectors. However, this should not be a major prob-
lem for our discussion here, since our argument regarding the economic crisis 
mainly needs to consider the time around and after 2008. Admittedly, such 
limit ed data availability does not make it clear whether a trend, which is ob serv-
able after 2007/8, is just the continuation of a trend which had already set in 
before (that is, independently from the economic crisis), or whether it is some-
thing new. Nevertheless, the data allows us at least to observe the situation in the 
period during and after the economic crisis.
As for the choice of the economic sector, any sector could be the right choice. 
We opted for the sector defined as ‘Industry, construction and services, excluding 
public administration, defence and compulsory social service’ which corresponds 
to NACE Code R2.11 We chose this sector because we believe that industry and 
services similarly attract men and women and that there are not necessarily typ-
ical ‘female’ or ‘male’ jobs in this sector. Regarding the interpretation of the val-
ues, they indicate the difference between the average wage of men and women, 
with the men’s wage being the mathematical basis. This means that, if the gender 
pay gap is given as 20%, then women earn 80% of the men’s wage for the same 
work done.
It is interesting to see that those countries, such as Germany and the United 
Kingdom, which performed better regarding income equality, show more 
in equal ity when we look at gender issues. Indeed, there seems to be income 
equality in Germany, but the general statistics hide the gender inequality lying 
behind that equality. Italy is a good contrast case to Germany. While the Gini 
coefficient, the income quintile share ratio and the risk-at-poverty rate show that 
income is distributed more unequally in Italy, the gender pay gap indicates that 
there is hardly any income difference between men and women. The same holds 
for Poland, where, unlike Italy, general income equality has been rising a lot in 
recent years. Spain and France occupy a middle position.
When looking at the trend, we do not observe any notable changes. Above all, 
the year 2008 and its aftermath cannot be identified as an essential critical junc-
ture for income (in)equality between men and women. Thus, while for some 
countries the crisis years marked an important point regarding general income 
(in)equality, such a trend cannot be identified for the specific question of the 
intersection between income and gender. Though the evidence is not conclusive, 
and there are different positions on this point in the literature. For instance, 
Karamessini and Rubery (2014) note that although employment gaps between 
women and men narrowed in the wake of the crisis, this was due to a 
11 NACE Codes represent a system of economic branches, developed by the European Union, 
elaborating the equivalent ISIC system of the United Nations.
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de teri or ation in male employment rather than improvements for women. Besides, 
austerity policies are already having an increasingly negative impact on demand 
for female labour as well as on access to services that support working mothers.
Being employed is a fundamental prerequisite for having an income. Therefore, 
for the remainder of this subchapter, we look at the question of unemployment. 
This is strongly linked to economic (in)equality since high unemployment rates 
deprive the affected individuals of many opportunities to participate in economic 
transactions, in the production process of an economy, or societal benefits. More 
precisely, as Dolvik and Martin (2015, p. 387) stated on the ground of a collective 
research project, ‘increasing unemployment tends to reduce income inequality’, 
despite all the alternative ways of increasing growth and employment imple-
mented by the countries we are considering. What is more, the inherent value of 
work for self-esteem and life satisfaction has frequently been acknowledged.12 
Having a job is, therefore, an essential aspect of equality. There is no need for a 
particularly sophisticated index to assess this since unemployment rates (for the 
active population) give a good picture of the situation (see Figure 2.7).
Germany and the United Kingdom show low unemployment rates in general, 
with just some changes of small intensity, which do not necessarily occur around 
the crisis period. Poland, as before, shows a general trend towards more equality, 
and the changes are completely decoupled from the crisis period. The other three 
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Figure 2.7 Unemployment
Source: Eurostat.
12 As stressed in research conducted within a relatively new interdisciplinary field, which focused 
on wellbeing and quality of life. See, for instance, the European Quality of Life Survey, funded by the 
European Union.
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although at very different amplitudes, we can observe higher unemployment rates 
after the crisis. The most notable change can be seen concerning Spain with 
unemployment rates rising to more than double previous values. When we 
change perspective and check the differences in the last twenty years (1997–2017), 
the notable features are different. Observing the data, we can see a basic improve-
ment of employment in Germany, the UK, and Poland, while in Spain unemploy-
ment remains high and in France and Italy, there is no marked difference.
As is well known, however, general unemployment is just one topic in the 
political and the political science debate. Frequently, youth employment is given 
special consideration. In terms of the central concept at stake—equality—this is 
yet another form of intersection: economic (in)equality intersects with gen er-
ation. The development is, not surprisingly, very similar to the one of unemploy-
ment in general. However, it also becomes evident that, in those cases where the 
economic crisis opened a general trend towards inequality, namely Italy and 
Spain, the situation is even worse for the younger generation. This pattern is more 
visible in Italy than in Spain, above all in recent years, where young people suf-
fered much more from unemployment than the general population. The situation 
in Germany, Poland, France and, to a more limited degree, the UK improved. 
Generally, it can be held that, in addition to inequality in terms of labour market 
opportunities, there is a form of inequality which affects the relationship between 
the young generation and the general population.
There is a different way to express this aspect of generational inequality in par-
ticular, namely, to compare general unemployment rates with unemployment 
rates for the young. This can be achieved by simply dividing the unemployment 
rates for young people below the age of 25 by the general unemployment rate. All 
values are above 1, which indicates that youth employment is higher than general 
unemployment in all six countries, over the whole period of observation.
The general trend of the data indicates a slight development towards a more 
significant gap between unemployment of the young generation and general 
unemployment. However, the crisis year does not seem to play a role. The 
observed trend was there already, and it does not alter much after 2008. 
Nevertheless, there are some minor changes in the United Kingdom (around 
2005, before the economic crisis). So, while cross-case patterns are interesting 
to follow, the longitudinal trend does not show any notable peculiarities. Above 
all, the crisis is not visible from the graph.
In general, as regards the economic (in)equality of individuals, we can conclude:
• Over time, there seems to be a general trend towards rising economic inequality.
• Social transfers help to offset the adverse effects of inequality. This is so 
above all for the crisis countries. However, while beneficial, the effect of 
social transfers is not high enough to make a significant contribution to 
solving the problem of inequality.
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• Among the countries under consideration, Germany appears to be charac-
terized by a relatively good extent of equality. What is more, the crisis year of 
2008 does not seem to have induced any notable changes for Germany.
• France, Italy, and Spain share the characteristics of a tendency towards more 
inequality. However, this happens to different extents: while the observed 
picture is most precise for Spain, where the crisis of 2008 also figures prom-
in ent ly, it is weaker for Italy and even weaker for France. Furthermore, as 
regards income data (but not unemployment), the trend in Italy seems to 
have been towards inequality, but this was already the case before the crisis 
of 2008. France belongs to the group of countries with in equal ity patterns 
that are only observable for unemployment, while there is a more equal dis-
tribution of income.
• Poland has moved towards more equality, but there is no sign that the crisis 
played any role.
• The United Kingdom is the most difficult to characterize. Unemployment 
rates are generally rather low, and the indicators for income distribution (a 
bit less so for the Gini Index) group it at medium to low ranks of inequality. 
At any rate, the crisis period is not particularly visible in the development of 
(in)equality in the United Kingdom.
• When intersecting data on economic equality with other characteristics, such 
as gender (in)equality or generational (in)equality, there are certainly notable 
differences between countries. However, according to our data the over-time 
trends do not show significant changes and, above all, the crisis years cannot be 
identified as especially meaningful for an eventual change in gender or age-
group (in)equality concerning economic indicators (see above).
While the partial insights might already be interesting on their own, it is worth 
mentioning that, regarding economic (in)equality, Spain exhibits the most explicit 
patterns, as nearly all indices increase during or after the crisis of 2008, some-
times even in essential ways. Without wishing here to venture a causal argument, 
it can nonetheless be held that the equality dimension of the Quality of 
Democracy (understood in terms of economic equality) changed to a large extent 
in Spain after the crisis.
2.3 Social Inequality
It is certainly wrong to see the development of economic inequality as a free-
floating process, determined exclusively by market forces. Instead, collective 
actors, corporate actors, and not least, the governments and political forces do 
intervene. Governments usually intervene in order to correct the dysfunctional 
effects of the market. Indeed, a difference between liberal and coordinated market 
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economies13 has been made, and different political parties opt for different 
degrees of economic intervention, but, by and large, pure laissez-faire is hardly an 
option for the countries under research.
The present section, therefore, looks at government activity that provides many 
welfare provisions and thus can count as an answer to economic inequality. It does 
not look, however, at the success of such activity. It would be hard to differentiate 
between whether positive effects of state intervention have not become vis ible, 
because it has not occurred (i.e., governments do not want to intervene), or 
because the governments have intervened, but the intervention has not been suc-
cessful. Therefore, we concentrate on one aspect by which government activity can 
be assessed, independently of its success. In our view, this is best expressed through 
the development of expenditures for welfare, implemented by governments. Over 
the past decades, this has been carried out in our democracies through the build-
ing of the welfare state. Consequently, we see the trans form ations induced by wel-
fare state provisions as a determinant of the resulting (in)equality existing in a 
country in a given moment or along with a trend. As Hemerijck (2013, p. ix) 
eff ect ive ly states, ‘to the extent that social policy measures “prepare” . . . individuals 
and families to confront new social risks and knowledge economy . . . the welfare 
state contributes both to economic efficiency and social equity’.
The substantial literature on the topic (see Ferrera, 2013), supported by exten-
sive empirical research, also displays how, during these years, the welfare system 
that gave content to social rights has been profoundly transformed. As Ferrera et 
al. (2000) and Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003) point out, during the last few dec-
ades there has been a ‘recalibration’ of the entire welfare system as result of socio-
economic transformations in the different domains, including demography, 
where social rights were implemented through various kinds of social protection, 
including pensions, health care, unemployment, and social services and family 
policies. More specifically, the new needs of the elderly population, changes in the 
gender division, decline of fertility, deindustrialization, new forms of poverty, 
immigration (see below), changes in labour markets and the partial fading away 
of lifetime jobs, together with technological changes, were complemented by the 
necessity to increase the efficiency of provisions rationalizing them. All these fac-
tors lay at the heart of the recalibrations. Namely, that is, they are crucial for the 
changes in social rights in terms of norms and institutions involved, and conse-
quently of the rebalancing of welfare provisions with distributive changes as well.
Within this evolving context the Great Recession, which started in 2008 and 
persisted at least until 2014, proved to be a great challenge for the entire welfare 
system of all the European democracies, in evident connection with the budget-
ary situation of the countries involved. In these years, and especially from 2010, 
13 See Hall and Soskice (2001) for this terminology, and Chapter 5.
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European Union institutions, the Commission, the European Council, the 
Council of Economic Ministers, and the European Central Bank, also played a 
key role, particularly concerning Spain, which was also helped by the EU (see 
Chapter 7 for more on this). This role had an inevitable impact on the welfare 
system of the affected countries. Among others, two joint research studies (Dolvik 
and Martin, 2015 and Wulfgramm et al., 2016) provide an initial review of the 
impact on all the democracies we are analysing, except Poland. This country—
and this is worth remembering—remained virtually unaffected by the economic 
crisis and at the same time in 2015 had the relative lowest share of social ex pend-
itures among most of European Western (25.8), but beyond the average of Central 
and Eastern European countries.
The main question arising from the picture, briefly sketched above, is: how has 
social inequality evolved within the perspective of welfare provisions? To start 
replying to this question, we can view the share of government expenditures on 
social protection (see Figure 2.8).14 To do that we decided to show those ex pend-
itures as a percentage of the effective GDP. For reading better the data, however, 
we should immediately recall that when there is the economic crisis with the 
decline of GDP, there is an apparent growth of expenditures. However, such 
growth is not real, but it only is mathematical of a decrease of the denominator in 
the percentage. In fact, for example, between 2008 and 2009, we can see that arti-
ficial growth in all countries, except Poland. In this last country, slight growth is 
effective as there is no decline in GDP. In Italy and Spain only, the other crucial 
years of GDP decrease are 2012 and 2013, and also in these two cases, an artificial 
growth of social expenditures is recorded.
It is also worth noting that many measures of social protection are prescribed 
by law. In other words, governments have a limited choice of whether to alter 
them or not. On this, Krugman (2009) has already pointed out the centrality of 
the ‘automatic stabilizers’ in dealing with the economic crisis. They countered the 
decline of employment and production during the Great Recession since 2008. 
Although their usefulness is reduced in systemic crises, this author reminds us 
that if the current crisis is not as terrible as in the 1930s, it is due to the function-
ing of the automatic stabilizers and the increase in the public deficit, and this was 
well different from what happened with the Great Depression of the 1930s (see 
also Kelton, 2016). However, we come back to this issue in Chapter 5. All govern-
ments can do is to cut social expenditures and expenditures in other policy areas 
14 Eurostat suggests the following empirical definition of social protection: ‘support for sickness 
and disability; old age; survivors; family and children; unemployment; housing; applied research and 
experimental development applied to social protection; social protection and social exclusion not 
elsewhere classified (esp. cash benefits and benefits in kind to victims of fires, floods, earthquakes, and 
other peacetime disasters; purchase and storage of food, equipment, and other supplies for emergency 
use in the case of peacetime disasters; other social protection affairs and services that not assigned 
under the previous entries)’. See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title= 
Glossary: Classification of_the_functions_of_government_(COFOG).
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where there are no precise or less precise indications. So, paradoxically, if there 
are many obligatory expenditures in the social protection area, then social 
ex pend itures might increase, but in Spain and Italy, their ways to cut was found 
(see chapters 5 and 7). With this in mind, Figure  2.8 shows the highest social 
protection in France, a middle level in Italy and Germany that are almost at the 
same values. Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom are around the same lower 
level with the Britons being in decreasing trend.
In the remainder of this section, we will concentrate on two other perspectives, 
which are more indirectly connected to economic opportunities. More precisely, 
we focus on health and education. The following graph (see Figure 2.9) illustrates 
the development of public expenditure on health.15 This is not only an indicator 
of the importance of the health system for government spending, but it also gives 
us valuable information about government measures taken in order to reduce the 
effects of economic inequality. Indeed, the higher the level of public expenditures 
on health is, the more likely it is that these higher rates of expenditures help to 
correct inequality induced through income differences. If the health system is suf-
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Figure 2.8 Expenditures for social protection in % of the GDP
Source: Eurostat.
15 The empirical definition of health is that suggested by Eurostat and includes: ‘Medical products, 
appliances, and equipment; outpatient services; hospital services; public health services; R&D related 
to health; health not elsewhere classified.’ See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.
php?title=Glossary:Classification_of_the_ functions_of_government_(COFOG).
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or available at low prices, and that also more complicated treatments are sub sid-
ized mainly with public money.
This graph (Figure 2.9) shows that health expenditures are always the highest 
in France. The United Kingdom comes lower at the same level than Germany, but 
relatively speaking in a much better relative position vis-à-vis all other countries, 
if we recall the social protection expenditures. Poland shows a fundamental rising 
change, although still occupying the bottom position among the countries under 
consideration, which is probably an illustration of late effects of the transition 
process after 1990. We can also observe some salient details for the countries 
most hit by the economic crisis, namely Italy and Spain. The curves in these 
countries become flatter and do even slightly decline after the crisis years, with 
even a more evident effect in Italy, more in Spain. All other countries do not seem 
to be affected so much by the crisis, as far as health expenditures are concerned.
In terms of substantial interpretation this means that, after the crisis, the gov-
ernments of crisis countries did not further increase their efforts to counter eco-
nomic inequality with the help of more expenditures on health but stopped or 
even reduced such efforts. In other words, alongside a rise in economic in equal-
ity, the citizens of these crisis countries did not enjoy more benefits from public 
financing of the health system, contrary to the expectations raised by the in ev it-
able trend toward population ageing in these countries. When there is growth, it 
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Figure 2.9 Expenditures on health
Source: Eurostat.
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A further perspective is to explore expenditures on the educational system16 
which is emerging as a more and more relevant aspect within the entire welfare 
system (see also Bieber and Wulfgramm, 2016, pp. 296ff). This perspective is akin 
to looking at health as both forms of expenditure reduce the need for private 
investments and, therefore, help to moderate the effects of economic inequality. 
Two additional aspects are, however, important about education. First, education 
is usually considered a major factor when it comes to creating opportunities for 
the future. The underlying logic is that the more public money is spent on educa-
tion, the less important different family backgrounds and parents’ economic 
opportunities will be for children’s future careers and economic possibilities. 
Investments in the education system thus always point to governments’ attempts 
to curb inequalities induced by different opportunities that future generations 
may or may not enjoy. This also ties in Sen’s (1992) notion of looking at (in)equal-
ity not only in terms of results but also of opportunities (see Chapter 1). Second, 
this opportunity is not only provided for the native population but also migrants. 
Education can, therefore, help to reduce ethnic inequality and increase economic 
equality, independently on—or at least less connected to—ethnic origins (see 
Figure 2.10).
Figure 2.10 shows flat trends or dramatic decline, as in the United Kingdom 
and Poland, although to a lesser extent in the latter country, with Italy and 
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Figure 2.10 Expenditures on education
Source: Eurostat.
16 Eurostat also suggests the empirical definition of education. It includes: ‘pre-primary, primary, 
secondary and tertiary education, post-secondary non-tertiary education, education non-definable by 
level, subsidiary services to education, research and development education, education not elsewhere 
classified.’ See https://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Glossary:Classificat
ion_of_the_ functions_of_government_(COFOG).
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second decade of the twenty-first century, and France in the lead. Looking more 
closely, the decline in Italy takes place independently on the economic crisis. 
We can see that governments in crisis countries like Italy and Spain have not 
only started to disregard expenditures on health as a potential means to reduce 
the adverse effects of economic inequality, but they also reacted like this regarding 
education. Investments into future generations were not intensified and, conse-
quently, existing inequalities have not been addressed through expenditures on 
education.
The bottom line of these considerations on government intervention is that in 
countries which were most hit by the economic crisis, namely Spain and Italy, 
next to the maintenance of obligatory social protection, expenditures on health 
and education have been reduced. Both these sectors, however, can be identified 
as further possibilities for the governments to create more equality and, in the 
case of education, also to create opportunities for future generations and to 
reduce the effects of ethnic inequality. Thus, while guaranteeing more social pro-
tection, other aspects of the social state are reduced in these countries during or 
immediately after the crisis years. This is not the Polish case where especially after 
2015 other provisions are carried out.
So far, we have not analysed in detail the policies to fight poverty, decided and 
implemented by all our countries. In the first section above, we have analysed the 
Eurostat data on poverty, including the effects of social transfers. In this section, 
the data on expenditures for social protection that included the provisions to fight 
poverty. Here, we add some further reflections about those policies, paying atten-
tion to the main one, namely the basic or minimum income. This analysis is rele-
vant as the protracted Great Recession aggravated poverty and social exclusion in 
the countries under consideration, especially in Italy, Spain and, to a smaller 
extent, in the UK and Germany (see the data above). All the countries intervened 
on this thorny issue.17
When considering the minimum income, we should bear a few key points in 
mind: it is a complex and multifaceted measure; it is difficult to implement; its 
actual effectiveness in each country also depends on other measures of social pro-
tection; and, finally, though important, for a number of reasons it is usually not 
enough to lift all citizens out of poverty (see Fondazione Astrid and Rosselli, 2018).
We are not going to describe the different minimum incomes in the six coun-
tries here (see Crepaldi et al., 2017; Natili, 2019). We will just mention the modes 
of financing and governance and assess the adequacy and coverage, that is to say, 
the most relevant features in our perspective. Financing is from the central state 
in the UK, Italy, and Poland, from central and local authorities in Germany and 
also France, where however the state contribution is higher, and from local 
17 We are going to come onto this when developing our explanatory hypotheses (see Chapter 5).
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authorities only (Communidades Autonomas) in Spain. Governance is usually 
mixed in all countries with a dominant role of central authorities in the UK and 
of Autonomous Communities, complemented by local councils, in Spain. In 
Poland, the mixed formula is integrated by associations, the Catholic Church, and 
other organizations.
Based on the report by Crepaldi et al. (2017), Table 2.2 provides an assessment 
of the adequacy and coverage of minimum income policies in our six countries. 
Looking at the first column, the main reasons for the limited impact of the provi-
sion and the need to analyse it in connection with other social protection policies 
becomes immediately evident: not even in Germany is there a high level of gener-
osity. Moreover, in the years 2010–15, Spain and Germany remained stable in 
terms of impact on poverty reduction; the UK, France, and Poland even saw a 
reduction in that impact; and the only country that improved in a tough situation 
was Italy.
Regarding coverage, the minimum income is usually applied to every resident. 
In Spain, this has to be for at least six months in some region and up to five years 
in others. No citizenship is required, with the very partial exception in Germany 
(where only foreigners and their families not working in that country are 
excluded). As shown by Table 2.2, the coverage can be characterized by universal 
assistance. In other words, the schemes provide cash benefits for all eligible claim-
ants whose resources are below a specified income standard (France, Poland, the 
UK) or by categorical assistance, that is to say, the benefits are aimed at guaran-
teeing minimum resources to particular groups within the populations, such as 
the unemployed, the elderly, and the disabled (Germany, Spain, and Italy). 
Different benefits also characterize coverage and, except for Spain, are usually 
implemented at the national level.
As regards the minimum income and other welfare provisions, Italy and 
Poland deserve a short addendum. In fact, in Italy, a Support to Active Inclusion 
(SIA) has been in place since September 2016, to help families with specific needs 
in very deprived economic conditions. The amount varies according to family 
composition (from €80 for the one-member family to €400 for a family of five or 
more members). It has meagre coverage because of strict eligibility criteria, 
regarding families with multiple needs (young children, single parent, dependent 
people, or people with severe disability). In September 2017 Inclusion Income 
Support (REI) was approved to be implemented as from January 2018. Originally 
conceived as an alternative to the SIA, later it coexisted with it, and was designed 
to help families in deprived economic conditions (like the SIA) for a limited 
amount of time (18 months) with a monthly allowance ranging between €185 to 
about €539. From March 2019 the REI was replaced by Citizenship Income (RC) 
with a maximum sum of €625, and an average of €493, with a similar duration (18 
months), again to help families in needs. In 2020 the actual impact of this new 
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provision cannot be adequately assessed yet. However, according to the official 
data of the Italian National Institute for Social Security (INPS) by January 2020, 
such an income has been awarded to 1,041,462 families, involving 2.513,925 
 people (see INPS official data January 2020). It covers about 72% of people in a 
condition of absolute poverty (on this see also Chapter 4).
Poland is also the country where a meaningful change of government (2015) 
came about and was reconfirmed in 2019 as a result of a party program and 
elect or al campaigns by the Law and Justice Party (PiS), focused on building a 
‘Polish welfare state’ with additional and better social rights and income 
redistribution. The most well-known provision was a scheme, known as Rodzina 
500Plus (Family 500Plus) and approved in April 2016, which was a monthly sub-
sidy (about 130US$/120EUR) for each child to the family with more than one 
child. But the lower-income families received this help even if they had one child 
only. The budget for this measure reached 3.11% of GDP in 2017 with an increase 
of 75% of the budget previously (2015) devoted to family support. In May 2019 it 
was expanded to families with one child only without considering the income. 
The two goals of the measure were to achieve a higher fertility rate and reduce 
child poverty.




Germany Medium-low level of 
generosity (30–40 %)
categorical, network of benefits, subjective 
right, national.
Spain Medium-low level of 
generosity (30–40 %)
categorical, network of different benefits, 
subjective right, national and local level. 
Regional minimum income benefits are in 
majority qualified as individual or subjective 
right (i.e., Extremadura, Murcia)
France Medium-low level of 
generosity (30–40 %)
universal, network of different benefits, 
subjective right, national level.
Italy Very low level of 
generosity (under 20 %)
categorical, network of different benefits, 
subjective right, national level
Poland Very low level of 
generosity (under 20 %)
universal comprehensive subjective right in 
case of permanent benefit, discretionary in 
case of temporary benefit, national level.
United 
Kingdom
Medium-low level of 
generosity (30–40 %)
universal, network of different benefits, 
subjective right, national level.
Note: Countries can be divided into five groups based on the average generosity of their MI schemes, 
that is, how much this benefit allows households to reach the poverty line (set generally at 40%) (see 
also section 2.1, this chapter).
Source: Our elaboration on data and evaluation by Crepaldi et al. (2017, esp. chapter 5).
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As for Italy, the new and attractive decision provided a direct transfer in cash 
rather than public services. And, tellingly, Eurostat recorded an improvement of 
extreme child poverty (from 24.2% to 17.9% already between 2015 and 2016) and 
the family economic situation in 2018 (see Ciobanu,  2019). The other goal, 
increasing the fertility rate, failed.18 A second significant reform was the reduc-
tion of the retirement age since October 2017 from 67 for all (a decision of the 
former government) to 65 for men and 60 years for women voluntarily (in case of 
earlier retirement the amount of pension was lower). Many Poles use their right 
to retire earlier (only in October 2017, there were 100,000 applications) 
(Skrzypczak, 2017). A third relevant provision was the increase in the minimum 
hourly wage for employees on precarious contracts. This provision first adopted 
in May 2016 was subsequently improved and expanded (see also below).
Other measures included: the fiscal exemption for young people below 26 with 
an income lower than about €20,200 since August 2019 to retain young in Poland 
(Meredith, 2019); the pension Plus, that mainly consisted in the recognition of 
the 13th pension and a reduction of personal income tax and affected about 9.8 
million pensioners; a program to build cheaper houses/apartments; and the cre-
ation of a solidarity fund for supporting people with disabilities (2018).19 
Although the actual impact of the provisions was smaller than expected and 
declared by PiS leaders, the perceptions of citizens were very positive and laid the 
basis for the resounding electoral victories of 2019. Moreover, in the same vein, 
PiS set the doubling of the minimum wage (about €900), increasing public health 
expenditures, raising pensions and building transport infrastructures at the core 
of the successful 2019 electoral campaign.20
The connection between the empirical evidence analysed in this chapter and 
the political dynamics featured by the participation versus competition within the 
18 In 2019 a Polish think-tank published in an overall negative assessment of Rodzina 500Plus. 
Evaluating its actual impact until 2018, the authors affirm that: program is very expensive and eco-
nom ic al ly inefficient; has not been included in all family policy activities; a coherent vision of goals is 
missing; it has a negative impact on the labour market, as professional activity has decreased, in par-
ticular women; only some families are supported; in addition, high program costs mean a lack of 
resources in other more relevant policies ( esp. education and health care) and development programs 
(e.g., public infrastructure, including transport infrastructure, quality air) (see Magda et al., 2019).
19 Besides, an extension of the rights of the Social Dialogue Council, a legal amendment giving all 
workers the right to join trade unions, regardless of the type of a work contract (2018), and a decrease 
of the personal income tax (from 18% to 17%) up to an income of złoty 85.528—above this threshold 
to keep the same tax rate of 32%, since October 2019—were decided (Ministerstwo Finansów, 2020).
20 Of course, making the basic features of the Polish welfare state goes from the early 1990s up early 
this century, with the limitations that already emerged in the figures above in the chapter. The situ-
ation of the welfare state in 2015 is described by Sawulski (2017) who was wondering if there was 
adequate welfare at that moment. In this context, the reforms proposed by the PiS found attention and 
support. Let us also add that education reform was also introduced by the PiS, which proved to be a 
disaster and created chaos in schools. The expected increase in the minimum wage might only 
increase their frustration as the teachers’ salaries are subject to separate regulation. The sources of 
most of the provisions described in the text are the websites of the related Ministries.
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six countries will be addressed later in the book (see chapters  4 and 5). Here, 
however, it is worth emphasizing a counter-intuitive aspect that emerges from 
our analysis. The biggest European democracies at the centre of our research, 
despite being affected by the economic crisis, do not feature a disruptive pattern 
in the worsening of inequalities. No doubt, the economic crisis, the stagnation 
and the growth have been unevenly present across our countries, except for 
Poland. Overall, the European countries have been better off out the crisis only 
partially, and in relation with the effectiveness of the social transfer and the cap-
acity of the public or private organizations of playing a vital role in the production 
chain and in the investments to adapt and keep resilient across the decade 
2008–18.
Still, a further point seems to remain underestimated in the scholarship. The 
narrative endorsed in the public debate about equalities draw the lines of an 
alarmed society where citizens feel that they are facing deteriorated conditions—
and still more deteriorating ones—of daily life. Here, this has to be addressed 
concerning the objective picture provided by macro-economic data in the six 
democracies.21 This is the primary meaning of Table  2.3. It starts providing a 
more nuanced picture about the aspects of inequalities that seem to erode the 
capacity of our democracies to project themselves into a better future. Except for 
the UK, the perspective of social mobility is at the medium if not at the low level. 
In the same vein, the social mobility connected with the education—one of the 
most promising social elevators—is again at the medium level in France but low 
in the other countries. The empirical evidence summarized by Table 2.3, drawing 
from the OECD analysis of social mobility patterns published in 2018 and high-
lighted at the 2019 World Economic Forum, unveil stalemated societies where the 
opportunities eventually created after the crisis appear handy and reachable 
un even ly and unequally. If we complement this evidence with the digitalization of 
the societies, we find out a factor which amplifies the gap between citizens ex peri-
en cing a potential of mobility and citizens experiencing the impossibility of 
grasping such a possibility, notably in domains such as the new markets of digital 
services, the technological developments (OECD, 2019).
2.4  Ethnic Inequality and Immigration
In this section, we change our perspective. Ethnic inequality is not a new notion, 
but it was necessarily brought to our attention by the phenomenon of immigra-
tion, the consequent growth of cultural heterogeneity, urban diversity in our soci-
eties, and rising tensions within the countries with a different dominant ethnic 
21 In Chapter 4, the issue of the related perceptions and the reactions of political leaders will be 
addressed.



















































































































































































































































OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Inequalities 49
group. The consequence is cultural discrimination, and it is translated into 
another kind of inequality. This third inequality may overlap with the other two 
but maintain his own identity as a form of cultural discrimination against a differ-
ent ethnic group. Measuring this inequality is complicated and can also be based 
on perceptions because of his connection with the existence or not of ethnic dis-
crimination. Hence, it can also be analysed through survey data.22 Let us here 
limit ourselves to what is usually seen as the other big crisis that hit European and 
other countries in the early years of the twenty-first century, namely the so-called 
migration crisis (Parsi,  2018, chapter  4). As is known, the rise in the influx of 
refu gees in escaping from civil war, terrorism, torture, or terrible living condi-
tions, led to a substantial intensification of the debate on immigration, migration 
in general, and, consequently, ethnic (in)equality.
Migration has been shaping industrialized societies already for some decades. 
However, the most recent increase in the numbers accentuated the perception of 
it and the consequent debate, even if the total numbers have decreased. This has 
led to rising ethnic diversity in the composition of society. What is relevant here 
is that inequality emerges and increases when there are a dominant ethnic group 
and poorly integrated other groups. Without wanting to slip into stereotypical 
language, industrialized societies became more diversified concerning how 
 people look, their habits, religions, lifestyles, and opinions. In addition to this 
diversification, immigration also has effects on other forms of (in)equality: in 
terms of economic equality (see above), migration poses the risk of an increase in 
precarious working situations. From this perspective, the Eurostat data on active 
immigrants, that is, on the legal immigrants who found a job and at least from 
this specific point of view are more integrated and consequently also less eco-
nom ic al ly and socially unequal, suggest that in the European Union the average is 
around 64.9% (2018). However, Italy is the country with the lowest percentage 
(45.6%) of non-European active immigrants, and Poland the highest (77.9%) 
with Spain and UK are in an intermediate position, close to the average (re spect-
ive ly 64.0% and 58.8%), but Germany (46.7%) and France (47.5%) are closer to 
the low Italian percentage.
There is also a constant fear among populations that migrants might benefit 
too much from social protection and that, in a redistributive social system, a 
country’s native inhabitants would have to pay for social benefits for migrants. 
Ethnic inequality might have consequences for questions of gender equality too 
since it is assumed that not all (ideological or religious or other) traditions con-
sidered gender equality a virtue. The same holds for the recognition of different 
sexual orientations.
22 The issue of the definition and measures of ethnic inequality, in additions to the other ones, 
is  glossed over by the literature. Moreover, here only one facet, the one related to immigration, is 
considered.
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The discussion on migration has mainly become overshadowed by a massive 
market of opinions and (pseudo)facts. In order to discuss ethnic diversification, it 
is, therefore, necessary to start from the facts. First, it is impossible to define ‘eth-
nic’ (in)equality, because we would need a measure of ethnicity. Since, among 
other reasons, political correctness does not allow for such an operationalization, 
we use a proxy here: this very merely is the ratio of arriving immigrants to the 
overall population. This is not the general ratio of people with a migration back-
ground, which would also be challenging to assess a person who looks different 
from the majority population, but holds a national passport, might be considered 
a ‘migrant’, although he or she is a native citizen of his or her home country. We 
simply consider the ratio of those who arrive newly in a given country, weighted 
by the number of inhabitants in that country. It is a proxy for a dynamic change.
As can be seen (Figure  2.11), overall, there is continuity in the data. While 
most of the curves are flat, there are two peaks: one in Spain around the year 
2006/7, and, most famously, the large number of migrants which Germany 
accepted during the migrant crisis in 2015 and its immediate aftermath.23 Note, 
however, that these statistics can only tell us something on legal migration. The 
quite low Italian figures might also be due to a certain proportion of illegal and 
clandestine immigration. For an empirically sound appraisal of the migration 
waves on the state of the equalities, we should recall that migrants have been 
moving across the European countries—including the associated countries in 







2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Germany Spain France Italy Poland United Kingdom
Figure 2.11 Ratio of newly arriving immigrants on the population24
Source: Own elaboration based on the Eurostat data.
23 It is worth remembering that Germany, together with Sweden, hosted half of the total Syrian 
asylum seekers (GER Statistics, 2018).
24 We limit our discussion to the years after 2002 in order to be able to use the European Social 
Survey (ESS) data afterwards. As is well known, ESS data is only available from 2002 onwards.
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differently in the different countries since then also concerning the citizenship 
policy each country carried out.
In brief, pure immigration data tell us that Spain around the year 2006/7 and 
Germany around the year 2015 saw a specific rise in inequality in that higher 
than usual numbers of migrants had to be integrated into the societies. Apart 
from these two peaks, the similarity in the percentage values is striking: the six 
countries under consideration seem to be characterized by very similar patterns 
of immigration. It must also be mentioned that the curves usually stay between 
0.5% and 1% of the added population through newly arriving migrants. The dis-
cussion about migration is thus based on rather low percentages.
In Figure 2.12, we focus on a broader phenomenon (also for the period under 
consideration), than that of the new immigrants, that is, on the ones labelled in 
official statistics as ‘international migrants’, expressed in absolute values.25 The 
figure allows us to get two main points of information: (a) the intensity of the 
phenomenon in the different countries with the variation range that sees 
Germany at one extreme, with more than 12 million migrants in 2017, and Poland 
at the other pole, with just 640,000 migrants; United Kingdom still with 8,840,000 
and France with 7,900,000, Spain 5,950,00, Italy 5,910,000 always in 2017; (b) the 
current trend, which in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom is on the rise 
25 According to the United Nations Population Division, an international migrant is someone who 
has been living for one year or longer in a country other than the one in which he or she was born. 
This means that many foreign workers and international students are counted as migrants. 
Additionally, the United Nations considers refugees and, in some cases, their descendants to be inter-
national migrants. For this interactive feature, estimates of the number of unauthorized immigrants 
living in various countries are also included in the total counts. On the other hand, tourists, foreign-
aid workers, temporary workers employed abroad for less than one year and overseas military person-
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Figure 2.12 International migrants by country (1990–2017)
Source: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/interactives/international-migrants-by-country/
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
52 Equality, Freedom, and Democracy
(albeit with different intensity), while in Italy and Spain it shows a slowdown in 
recent years if not a slight reversal; in Poland where the negative trend goes on. 
So, the picture we get sees our countries divided into three groups with a series of 
consequences we will return to in this chapter and later (see Chapter 5).
Beyond the reference to the general trends affecting our six countries, a short 
reference has to be made to the humanitarian crisis that has characterized the 
Mediterranean in recent years. That crisis had a profound impact on the percep-
tion of public opinions and on the programs of political parties (especially the 
populist ones).26 According to data provided by the UNHCR, in recent years 
migration flows toward the EU Member States with coastal borders on the 
Mediterranean have progressively reduced, from around 363,000 in 2016 to 
172,000 in 2017, to a little more than 139,000 in 2018.27 In 2019 (1 April) total 
landings in the EU amounted to around 11,200, of which 524 were in Italy, 4,866 
in Greece, and over 5,546 in Spain. To these figures over 1,200 arrivals by land in 
Spain and over 2,500 in Greece have to be added. According to the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO), in 2018 about 635,000 applications were regis-
tered in the Member States, of which 593,000 in the first instance, registering a 
decrease of 10 per cent compared to 2017. The European Commission notes that 
in 2018, for the sixth consecutive year, Germany received the highest number of 
applications, more than 130,000, followed by France, with more than 116,000 
applications. In 2018, Italy received approximately 54,000 applications for asylum. 
In January 2019, member States recorded about 59,000 asylum applications, of 
which 52,500 were submitted for the first time.28
Migration as such is only one aspect of the (in)equality discussion. For the 
analysis quality of democracy, how the population reacts to migration is much 
more salient. Perception data tell us whether the rather low percentages reported 
above are considered a threat and, thus, how far the population of the individual 
countries considers the level of ethnic inequality (via migration) to be acceptable, 
desirable or even a problem. We will, therefore, shift our attention to perception 
data from the European Social Survey (ESS). Currently, eight waves of the ESS are 
available, in two-years rhythms between 2002 and 2016.29 All the survey ques-
tions touched upon people’s readiness to accept people who look different or who 
are poor. However, even if this readiness exists, it might still be that the effects of 
such migration are evaluated negatively. The reason behind this could be that 
people consider migration to be necessary, but not automatically beneficial for 
26 For the information here see the related Report if the Deputy Chamber, April 2019, at http://
www.camera.it/temiap/documentazione/temi/pdf/1105644.pdf?_1555278797350
27 Of them, 25,000 entered via ground, about 7,000 in Spain and 18,000 in Greece.
28 According ‘UNHCR, in 2019 (1 April) the number of people who died or are considered lost in 
the Mediterranean Sea is 288.
29 Note that Italy only participated in 2002, 2004, 2012, and 2016 waves so that data for Italy is 
limited to those years.
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their own countries as well, or at least associated with difficulties in integrating 
migrants.
A first ESS question asks whether migration made the country ‘a worse or bet-
ter place to live’. This is evaluated on a ranking between 0 (worse place) to 10 
(better place). This different scale makes it rather difficult to compare the result 
with the opinions discussed above. We decided to consider all values between 6 
and 10 as positive approval. However, unlike the scales used for the ESS questions 
illustrated above, this question (and the next ones) contains a middle category 
(5), which is very popular among the respondents. However, we do not consider 
the middle category a proxy for a positive opinion about the effects of migration. 
Therefore, while being indicative, we should not fall into the trap of directly com-
paring the results to what we have discussed above.
As far as this question is concerned (see Figure 2.13), we also have a general 
increase of the values, and the trend is also negative in Poland and Italy (2012: 
30%; 2016: 22%). As before, the German curve becomes flatter with the migration 
crisis of 2015. However, there are two differences when it comes to the effects: 
first, although the general trend of a decline is confirmed for Poland, the values 
for the most recent years are like the other countries. In a certain sense, while 
Polish respondents were more enthusiastic about the positive effects of migration 
in the early 2000s, their opinion on this has become more moderate and thus 
more like the other countries under consideration. However, a second significant 
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Figure 2.13 Impact of immigration on the country as a place to live
Source: European Social Survey.
Question: Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other 
countries?
Values and categories: 00 = Worse place to live -> 10 = Better place to live, 77 = Refusal, 88 = Don’t 
know, 99 = No answer
Values chosen here: 6–10
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respondents in the years for which we have data) are much less enthusiastic about 
the positive effects of immigration than the respondents in the other countries.
The picture becomes more differentiated if the question is asked concerning 
benefits for the economy (see Figure 2.14). This graph allows for a contextualiza-
tion with the help of the section above (2.2) where economic (in)equalities were 
discussed. The United Kingdom and Germany were defined as being not much 
affected by the economic crisis as far as selected indicators of economic (in)equal-
ity were concerned, and, indeed, the curves show an apparent increase, which 
most recently has been rapid as well. This could mean that more economic equal-
ity and a lower level of affectedness by an economic crisis is also a helpful context 
for a positive evaluation of migrants’ effects on the economy.
Regarding some indicators, France is identified as a country which underwent 
more economic inequality over time, while, for other indicators, it shows a simi-
lar trend, but to a much lesser extent. In Italy and Spain, the two countries most 
affected by the economic crisis, with repercussions in terms of economic (in)
equality, the years of the crisis and the years of the migration crisis indicate a 
trend towards a lower approval of positive effects of migration on the country’s 
economy. This demonstrates the interconnectedness between the two crises and 
thus, the two dimensions of equality. Finally, the Polish trend seems to be less like 
the findings for economic (in)equality, but more in line with the general trend 
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Figure 2.14 Impact of immigration on the country’s economy
Source: European Social Survey.
Question: Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live 
here from other countries?
Values and categories: 00 = Bad for the economy -> 10 = Good for the economy, 77 = Refusal,  
88 = Don’t know, 99 = No answer. Values chosen here: 6–10
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look at the differences in time it also shows how Germany, the UK, and Poland 
are the cases with a better perception of the impact.
Another frequent interpretation of the effects of migration concerns cultural 
aspects (see Figure  2.15). This includes all the questions about multi-cultural 
societies, parallel societies, and shared and different values, which are usually 
discussed in a very emotional mode. First, approval rates for the enrichment of 
the effects on culture are generally at higher levels than those of the effects on the 
economy. People seem to be more positive about cultural enrichment than about 
positive effects on the economy. Furthermore, the trends are not so dissimilar 
from the question about effects on the economy, as far as most of the countries 
are concerned. The Polish trend is again confirmed. Nevertheless, the sudden 
change in the evaluation of the economic effects in Spain around the crisis 
years 2006/7 cannot be observed at similar levels when it comes to the effects 
of culture. From a similar perspective, this also seems to be the case for France to 
a smaller extent.
The last two survey questions indicate that there is a difference between the 
perspective on the economic effects of migration and the cultural effects. A 
straightforward calculation can illustrate this difference. Calculating the ratio of a 
positive approval of cultural aspects divided by the positive approval of economic 
aspects shows to what degree cultural aspects are more positively evaluated than 
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Figure 2.15 Impact of immigration on the country’s culture
Source: European Social Survey.
Question: Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people 
coming to live here from other countries?
Values and categories: 00 = Cultural life undermined -> 10 = Cultural life enriched, 77 = Refusal,  
88 = Don’t know, 99 = No answer
Values chosen here: 6–10 
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difference in the approval of cultural effects and of economic effects. None of the 
values is smaller than 1, which means that in all the countries in the years under 
consideration, the approval rates of cultural enrichment have always been higher 
than those of economic advantages.
Starting with Germany and the United Kingdom, we can see that the dom in-
ance of cultural approval is declining. While this might appear indicative of a less 
positive evaluation of the cultural effects of migration, it is much more probable 
that the positive trend in evaluating the economic effects is behind this trend. At 
least in the German case, this might be a combination of general economic well-
being (and thus a positive approval of migrants who contribute above to the low-
salary sector) and perceived anxiety about cultural changes induced by the greater 
numbers of immigrants in the most recent years. Something similar can be 
observed for Poland as well, where the cultural benefits become less and less vis-
ible concerning the positive economic effects. Spain, and to a lesser extent France, 
demonstrate how there was a fall in the approval for positive economic effects of 
migration. Indeed, if migration is seen as an advantage for the country, then this 
happens in terms of cultural enrichment rather than in terms of the economy. The 
suspicion can reasonably be that this might be due to Spanish respondents worry-
ing about their economic possibilities and therefore being sceptical about poten-
tial positive effects of immigration on the economy.
Regarding ethnic (in)equality, we can conclude:
• Apart from very selected peaks, immigration has remained mostly stable 
over the years under consideration. What is more, if weighted by the popu-
lation, immigration numbers are also broadly similar between the countries 
discussed in this book. This means that ethnic equality, as such, has not 
undergone significant changes over the years.
• People’s evaluation of migration has seen a significant change. Generally, the 
trend is towards higher approval rates of migration. Ethnic differences seem 
to be more accepted than at the beginning of the century.
• Poland is a clear exception to this, and mainly since 2012, there has been a 
substantial decline in the acceptance of migration.
• Cultural enrichment is generally more appreciated than positive economic 
effects. For the countries hit by the economic crisis and for which we 
observed a negative development of economic equality in section  2.1, 
namely Spain and Italy and to a lesser extent France, the recognition of posi-
tive economic effects of migration suddenly declined with the economic 
challenges these countries had to face. This suggests the preliminary conclu-
sion that there is a clear intersection of the two questions of economic and 
ethnic equality, above all in cases and at times when the level of problems is 
high. When there is a crisis, the two topics of ethnic and economic equality 
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cannot be considered separately from each other. The question of whether 
this means that migrants or refugees are blamed for economic problems can 
certainly not be answered with the data available to us, but there is no ques-
tion that the general public connects these issues.
2.5  Initial Concluding Remarks
When looking at (in)equality in general, we should consider that this is a particu-
larly multidimensional concept. In all probability, then, a summary cannot refer 
to all aspects in all countries but can only emphasize patterns important for our 
subsequent discussions. First, it would be helpful to make some observations 
about trends independently from the crisis. As regards economic aspects, there is 
a trend towards more inequality in most countries. Italy and Spain perform worse 
than the other countries, while France and Germany do better. Poland shows a 
trend towards more equality since early on in this century. In terms of social (in)
equality, expenditures on health and education decrease in Italy and Spain with 
the onset of the crisis. The United Kingdom shows a sharply declining trend in 
education, a more moderate but still declining expenditure on social protection 
and more recent decline in health as well, which once was the pride of that sys-
tem. Thus, overall it is becoming slightly more unequal over time.
In other words, the economic crisis has been bringing about changes regarding 
equality in some countries, but less in others. It is essential to add that, although a 
note of caution is necessary (see above and Karamessini and Rubery, 2014), the 
economic crisis did not have an evident impact on other characteristics, such as 
gender (in)equality or generational (in)equality, if these aspects of (in)equality 
are seen from an economic perspective. As mentioned above, under conditions of 
economic recession in the advanced economies, social rights are partially pro-
tected through ‘automated stabilizers’. For example, when firms are compelled to 
close, unemployment increases and, consequently, tax revenue is also reduced, 
the expenditure on social protection (subsidies, income support, and other meas-
ures) increases. In this sense, the leaders of the crisis countries had no necessity of 
being reactive. However, this reaction has not been equally successful in all coun-
tries, as far as the policy goal of increasing equality is concerned. Moreover, when 
measures of social protection were intensified, this sometimes also entailed a 
reduction in expenditures for ‘softer’ aspects, such as health and education.
As for ethnic aspects, immigration has remained stable over time. 
Consequently, ethnic equality has not changed seriously. Apart from small excep-
tions, and in contrast to what public opinion in the late 2010s seemed to suggest, 
the general public appeared to accept ethnic diversity increasingly. Poland is an 
exception: especially after 2012 the acceptance of immigration sharply declined. 
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When looking at both dimensions simultaneously, we can observe that rising 
ethnic inequality also has effects on opinions about migration, in particular, its 
economic effects. During the economic crisis, ethnic and economic equality 
could not be thought of as being separated from each other. The general public 
connects the two issues: with migrants and refugees being considered responsible 
for economic problems. Especially in Spain and Italy, but also in France, the rec-
ognition of the positive effects of migration was obfuscated by the economic 
challenges.
Third, it is worth reversing the perspective and differentiating our findings for 
countries. Germany seems to have survived the crisis in the best possible way. 
There is also a clear picture for Spain, but on the other end of the scale, since this 
country seems to have been heavily hit by the economic crisis, at least in terms of 
(in)equality. As for the other countries, there are a few observable patterns, which 
we discussed earlier in the chapter, but they are less systematic than in Germany 
and Spain. The crisis also hit Italy, and this is particularly evident when looking at 
the data on the risk of poverty. The worsening of the other economic indices 
came even before the crisis. Poland is a deviant case in many respects since eco-
nomic equality has increased over time, while the acceptance of migrants has 
decreased (unlike the other countries). We can assume that Poland, during the 
period of observation, reached a situation in which the post-communist legacies 
have lost their importance and that these inverse trends are resulting from a late 
adaptation.
To conclude briefly, when matching the six countries on the three kinds of 
inequality the results are mixed and there is some inconsistency between an 
equality and another one within the same country. High scores or improve-
ments on economic equality30 are not necessarily matched by corresponding 
scores or trends on social or ethnic equalities. On economic equality, the best 
performers are France and Poland, followed by Germany (see Figure  2.1). 
France is also at a relatively high level on social end ethnic equalities. However, 
Germany presents the worst results among them, and Poland is among the 
worst performers on social equality but complemented by evident growing 
trends. In this country ethnic equality is not relevant, having adopted closure 
policies on immigration (see, e.g., Figures 2.8–10). For Poland, the worsening 
of the gender pay gap should also be mentioned. The UK, Italy, and Spain are 
relatively the worst ones on economic equality, especially if we add unemploy-
ment and risk of poverty (see Figures 2.4 –2.7). However, the UK is relatively 
30 We can here recall that in the economic literature, the analysis of inequality and the mobility of 
incomes and wages are considered complementary. It follows that a society with a high level of income 
mobility would make inequality more tolerable (Krueger, 2012). Some authors considered growing 
inequality and stagnation of income as a precondition for the economic crisis (Rajan, 2010).
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better on health and education despite a declining trend; Italy is the worst on 
education but at an adequate standard on social protection and health; Spain 
is low or very low on all three indicators of social equality, but better on 
immigration. If despite what affirmed above about the complexities of the 
equalities and the inconsistency, we make an effort of substantial simplification, 
the less unequal democracies seem to be France, Germany, and the UK. Poland 
follows very closely if the positive trends of the last years are considered. Italy 
and Spain are the worst. Let us now analyse the other crucial dimension in a 
democracy—freedom(s).
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Freedoms
Leonardo Morlino and Daniela Piana
3.1 The Interplay of Two Policy Waves
As mentioned in Chapter  1, if any ideal has been widely recognized as the 
 cornerstone of democracy, it is freedom. Beyond the different and diverging 
 perspectives adopted to analyse the conditions that make possible a functioning 
democracy, liberal scholars have been united in saying that without freedom, 
democracy cannot exist. There is, therefore, a broad consensus that freedom is 
foundational to a democratic regime (see, e.g., Andersen et al., 2014). This core 
notion of liberal democracy has received little attention in the debate on the 
causes and effects of the economic crisis (European Council,  2016, 2017; 
Eurobarometer,  2015, 2016). Research into citizens’ perception also fell short 
when it came to casting light upon the state of freedoms.
The international debate during the first two decades of the twenty-first cen-
tury, which refers to the economic crisis and the subsequent actions governments 
were expected to take, touches predominantly on the worsening of equality rather 
than the restriction of freedoms. In a way, the frame through which the crisis and 
all the remedies adopted to respond to it entered into the international narrative 
and into policy assessment exercises, focused on reducing inequalities and 
expanding the opportunities for inclusive growth (OECD, 2013, 2017; European 
Commission, 2009, 2014). Besides, citizens’ perceptions seem to match the tones 
and topics of official political discourse.
Therefore, if not overlooked, individual freedoms have certainly been con-
sidered as an ‘acquis’. However, this affirmation has to be downplayed if we refer 
to the most recent years, specifically from 2015. Since then, the increasing alarm 
connected with the boost of international terrorism prioritized issues relating to 
the protection of public order and civilian safety as opposed to the protection of 
individual freedoms. The waves of migration experienced by the European 
Member States, with greater intensity by the ones facing the Mediterranean Sea, 
called for targeted measures as well. The interplay between anti-terrorism legisla-
tion and migration policies is far from being consensual and uncontended. 
However, the impact of the transformations on European democracies, as a result 
of the pressure of these two different and yet interacting phenomena, proved to be 
highly disruptive for the protection and scope of individual freedoms.
Equality, Freedom, and Democracy: Europe After the Great Recession. Leonardo Morlino, Oxford University Press (2020). 
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This is not the whole story. As will become apparent, the urgent need to 
re assess the state of affairs regarding the protection of individual freedoms has 
been refreshed by the vast debate following the adoption of the European regula-
tion for data protection, adopted as recently as May 2018. Beyond the formal 
dimensions of the regulations, which prompted extensive analyses by legal  scholars, 
there was the protective turn taken by the European legislation. It is aimed at 
meeting a demand of protection exacerbated by the 2018 scandal of a British con-
sultancy firm (Cambridge Analytica); the growing influence of fake news; and the 
burgeoning practice of data mining and profiling, which cast a sombre light upon 
the capacity of citizens to keep their private data under their control.
In the analysis here, a quantitative approach complements a qualitative one in 
order to point out, first, the overall trends displayed by individual freedoms in 
France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the UK and, second, the evolution of 
freedoms under conditions of (1) legislative and regulative reforms; (2) public 
expenditure rationalization; (3) expansion of new tools of governance such as 
digital platforms and apps; and (4) reshaping of national borders about the phe-
nomena of international terrorism and illegal migration. In conducting this ana-
lysis, the chapter refers to several cross-time series of data (see Table  3.1), 
complemented by an in-depth focus on the reforms adopted in each country after 
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the economic crisis.1 As for the normative measures adopted by national 
 governments under, first, the pressure of the economic crisis and, second, the 
pressure arising from the new waves of illegal migration, human trafficking and 
inter nation al terrorism, we refer to the European Commission country report 
data set on the Growth and Stability Pact, complemented by data from national 
official documents and several semi-structured interviews with change agents 
serving in domestic institutions. To trace the trend and uncover the turning point 
of the state of freedoms in the countries considered in our research, the analytical 
framework detailed in the first chapter will be briefly recapped here concerning 
the three components of the concept of ‘freedom’.
The empirical analysis carried out in the following pages tries to respond to 
three key questions:
 1) To what extent and how was personal dignity, most notably protection 
from torture and humane treatment in prisons, subjected to change 
between 1990 and 2018?
 2) To what degree did civil rights, specifically the right to a fair trial in a rea-
sonable time frame, the freedom from religious association repression, the 
right to freely dispose of ownership and property rights, and the right to 
free movement, undergo a change in their scope and intensity between 
1990 and 2018?
 3) Is there any change in the scope and the channels through which political 
rights were exercised between 1990 and 2018?
Scope and intensity are both considered. In this chapter, we refer to the broad-
ening of the spaces through which citizens are inclined to exercise their rights. 
Indeed, the upheaval wrought by web-based transactions and the increasing use 
of virtual spaces to voice opinions and communicate in the political sphere has 
had an underestimated impact on the scope of rights. By scope, we mean the set 
of types of actions which may be opted for by citizens. Intensity is a more trad-
ition al measure, which indicates the degree of protection of freedoms.
3.2 Personal Dignity: Unexpected Alarm
Protection from torture and inhuman treatment is one of the pillars of inter-
nation al policies focusing on human rights enforcement and, more specifically, 
1 On this, the chapter considers the 2007–18 timeframe. A methodological caveat underscoring 
assets and liabilities of the datasets we referred to is essential for the readership of this chapter. Some 
of the dataset, such as V-Dem, integrate objective and expert data. This latter may be sensitive to the 
increasing alarm related to the acute crises of international terrorism and borders control/migration 
governance. However, qualitative analysis of the actions undertaken in the six democracies comple-
ment, support, and strengthen our view, notably the overall assessment of a trend toward more se cur-
ity and less freedom. Chapter 6 better develops this.
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the key topic on the agenda of the Council of Europe Committee (CTP). Since 
1982 country visits by the CTP have been carried out under the mandate of the 
European Commission, both in terms of judicial cooperation and human rights 
and fundamental freedoms protection. In the same vein, within the scope of 
actions carried out by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United 
Nations are committed to keeping the political attention of governments at a high 
level, including those serving in advanced democracies, and to elaborate guide-
lines and reporting documents on the agendas adopted at the national level to 
address the wide range of torturing or inhuman treatment behaviours. While an 
international quantitative data set does not exist as a common ground for inter-
nation al policy-making in this sector, the Varieties of Democracy dataset pro-
vides clear insight as to the trends featured by the national standpoints in terms of 
protection from torture (see Figure 3.1).
The figure illustrates the trends of the six democracies over a long time. The 
countries diverge in the pathways they follow. During the 1990s they all increased 
protection of individual freedoms from potential inhuman treatments, whereas 
after 2011 the strength of repression translated into stricter intervention in 
 prisons and pre-trial phases. This seems to be particularly marked in the UK and 
Germany. For reasons that shall be highlighted later (see Chapter 4), the 2000s 
proved to be fairly significant in terms of strengthening institutions devoted to 
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Figure 3.1 Freedom from torture (1990–2018)
Source: Varieties of Democracy dataset, 1990–2018.
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human dignity are disclosed and pursued. In Poland, the Ombudsman for 
Citizens Rights was complemented by the Ombudsman for Children in 2000, 
whereas in 2006 the British government launched a strategy of fundamental 
rights protection in close connection with the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC) (the Equal Act dates to 2006). The EHRC was provided 
with particularly strong prerogatives, such as investigating and assessing public 
officers’ behaviours in terms of compliance with the EA. If the behaviour is not 
compliant, the EHRC can pursue an officer in front of judicial authority. The year 
2001 saw the establishment of the ICC, the German Institute for Human Rights, 
with responsibilities for monitoring and assessing.
Although in the 2000s there was the adoption of institutions whose mission is 
to subject public officers to strong public and institutional accountability about 
compliance with the normative provisions of human rights, the episodes of vio-
lence perpetrated by States offer cause for alarm. This is highlighted by the UN’s 
Committee Against Torture, in the case of Spain, Poland, Italy and, in the specific 
case of the treatment of migrants, in France.
The focus on migrant treatment deserves more detailed consideration (CAT, 
2006, 2010). Reductions in protecting conditions, which testify to a worsening of 
treatment behaviours, has been witnessed especially about the living conditions 
for migrants and refugees in hotspots (Bauböck,  2003). As stated in Chapter  1 
(see section 1.1), we decided to include in our analysis those who live legally in 
the country. Moreover, one of the inspiring hypotheses that justifies the extension 
of our observation of living conditions in the hotspots is that freedoms are sensi-
tive tools. Reductions of them cast a dark light not only upon those target groups 
for which the reduction has been formally and legally designed, but also for all 
other people insofar as they share the status of ‘human beings’. For those reasons, 
a concern is raised by the living conditions and the treatment handed out by pub-
lic officers toward those persons that are directly targeted as refugees and related 
to the migration policies.
A couple of examples support our reasoning. The combination of anti-terrorism 
measures and migration policies has strengthened border control protocols 
within the Schengen area. The European Agency for Fundamental Rights recently 
launched an alert to keep a watchful eye on the increasing risks of spill-over 
effects triggered by policies adopted at the national level to tackle illegal migra-
tion. The Agency ‘highlights the increasing risk of arbitrary detention and 
addresses effective return monitoring’ (EAFR, 2018, p. 137). In many countries, 
according to the Centre for European Policy Studies, although the Schengen 
agreement is still holding, customs authorities apply the same measures regard-
less of the origin of the individual being checked. The same principle holds in the 
case of those individuals that are subjected to pre-trial detention or pre-repatriation 
detention. In both cases, the treatment protocols have undergone a measurable 
deterioration. Moreover, reports pointing to patterns of arbitrary detention 
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emerged from the different EU Member States, as the following three examples 
show. In mainland France, the organization La Cimade noted that, since 2 
October 2017, instances of judges overturning immigration detention decisions 
have increased to 41%—compared to 30% in 2016. The French Public Defender 
of Rights also criticized the greater use of administrative detention in cases of 
families with children in an irregular situation. In Spain, the authorities started to 
hold migrants in facilities other than formal immigration detention centres (FRA, 
2018, p. 138).
To the effect that migrant policies do not undermine the fundamental rights 
entrenched in national constitutions, counterarguments do not hold up when 
practices and de facto situations are carefully taken into consideration. According 
to key institutional actors, such as prefects in France and Italy, preventive measures 
go hand in hand with stricter implementation policies, which are mirrored in 
comprehensive behavioural patterns, notably in detention institutions. Explaining 
factors are informal and organizational. Legal provisions ensuring the protection 
of human dignity are entrenched in the constitutional frameworks of the six 
democracies considered here. Besides, the introduction of strict controls and limi-
tations for those individuals who are hosted or seized in hotspots or detention 
structures also entailed spill-over effects into the overall quality of living  conditions 
and the professional attitude of the officers serving in these structures.
A concomitant phenomenon to the one described above is the deterioration of 
living conditions in prisons. According to penal statistics published by the 
Council of Europe, all European detention structures are close to the upper ceil-
ing of their holding capacity. The incarceration rate is mainly influenced by the 
length of the sanctions and the type of punishment. It has been growing, with 
more intensity in Central and Eastern European countries. Overcrowding 
remains a severe problem for several members of the Council of Europe. Of the 
six democracies observed in our analysis, it seems to be particularly acute in Italy 
and France: Italy with 109 prisoners against 100 places available and France with 
117 against 100 places available seem to represent the worst cases in the sample of 
our research. This trend has been strengthening since 2009, despite policies 
adopted to keep overcrowding under strict control. In 2013 Italy adopted a proba-
tion measure aimed at reducing the number of inmates in prison for less serious 
crimes. In 2009 France adopted new legislation for reoffending, whereas Italy 
reformed the maximum-security norm. The same pattern, namely more severe 
measures for serious crimes and probation for minor crimes and juvenile justice 
policies, is discernible all over Europe. This follows a dual logic of action. On the 
one hand, prisons are overcrowded, and the detention rate turns out to be unsus-
tainable in the long term; on the other hand, the more value-oriented approach, 
which reassesses the impact of detention upon the quality of the post-detention 
lives of inmates, offers compelling reasons to opt for probation and works by 
engaging in social interaction instead of detention.
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As for the quality of life in prison—that is, an indicator that relates directly to 
respect for the dignity of those people whose freedom has been deeply affected by 
authoritative public acts (such as the criminal penalty executive order)—the 
Council of Europe estimates that ‘European prisons are on average close to full 
capacity’. This is partly due to the increasing incarceration rate, which rose from 
115.7 to 117.1 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants from 2015 to 2016. This rate had 
previously fallen every year since 2012 when it was at 125.6 prisoners per 100,000 
inhabitants. Despite the measures taken by several countries to expand the scope 
of probation, the average length of detention rose slightly to 8.5 months. 
According to the 2016 SPACE I report, the number of square metres per prisoner 
stood at 7.8 in France, 9 in Italy, 9.9 in Spain, and 3 in Poland.2 This has seen a 
deterioration in Italy since 2015, with minor improvement. It was brought about 
by the measures adopted by the government to reduce the number of crimes sub-
ject to the detention penalty.3 Detention institutions have been under the spot-
light also because of the treatment given to people in pre-trial detention. In 2017 
Italy and France were condemned by the ECtHR for violation of the right to be 
protected from any form of inhuman treatment. Both cases related to pretrial 
detention treatments. Poland has been condemned for four cases brought before 
the court.4 In 2018 the French government was charged before the Constitutional 
Court for violation of individual freedoms regarding the actions of police officers 
enforcing the administrative executive order in the context of the 1 May protest.
Overall, from 1990 to 2018, the trends displayed by the analysed countries in 
terms of violence perpetrated by public officers (police in particular) show two 
turning points. Until 2001 we observe a significant improvement, with the cre-
ation of new institutions or the decision to strengthen existing ones which have, 
among their tasks, responsibility for monitoring and assessing respect for human 
rights. Later, especially in the years 2004/2007, the index used by Amnesty 
International signals a deterioration in the level of State violence, which became 
more severe in 2015–17 (Gibney et al., 2015; Amnesty International,  2017).5 
Therefore, beyond the specific trajectories displayed by the domestic systems con-
sidered about the six biggest European democracies, the variation that the ana-




5 Some scholars enter into a ranking exercise based on the data we refer to in our analysis. See, e.g., 
Tebaldi, 2017, p. 198. We intentionally avoid this approach since the specific context of the countries is 
disregarded by ranking them. In the case of Spain, for instance, which comes first in the ranking of the 
countries, we need to consider the interaction with the ETA phenomenon. At the same time, in 
Germany, which ranks last (and therefore scores as one of the best countries) we need to consider that 
domestic terrorism has not been experienced over the two decades we analyse. Overall, ranking is 
based on a comparison that ignores historical factors which should rather be considered to achieve a 
better explanation of the cases.
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countries experienced a change in the intensity and the scope of transformations. 
Ultimately, these transformations are mirrored by the statutory laws passed and 
entered into force over the last five years (2015–20) where the prerogatives of the 
police and the officers operating in the security sectors have been strengthened 
and expanded. This process has gone so far as to touch the provisions regulating 
the authorization for public events (Stirn, 2019).
In the case of Poland, a more specific and detailed description of the changes 
undergone by the state of the matter in the field of personal dignity protection 
must be provided. As clearly outlined in the next section, the potential de teri or-
ation of the personal dignity does not only stem specifically from the reduction of 
the statutory provisions and the institutions entrusted with the responsibility of 
implementing the norms that Poland incorporates, together with all other coun-
tries that are members of the Council of Europe—via the European Convention 
for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms—and the European Union. A fur-
ther source of personal dignity erosion comes from the weakening and hollowing 
processes undergone by the institutions holding the prerogative of enforcing the 
rule of law and sanctioning the violations of the rights entrenched into the 
European legal order (Sadurski, 2019, p. 156).
3.3 Civil Rights: A Portrait in ‘Chiaroscuro’
Civil rights protection also underwent a significant transformation. Figures 3.2 
and 3.3 show the trends displayed by the freedom of domestic mobility and for-
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Figure 3.2 Freedom of domestic mobility (1990–2018)
Source: Varieties of Democracy dataset, 1990–2018.
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movement is less affected than foreign movement. This relates to the strategy 
adopted at the European level to put on hold the Schengen provisions ensuring 
free movement across national borders within the European area, whereas within 
national territories guarantees of physical movement remain almost unchanged. 
On the other hand, Poland is the country where freedoms of movement protec-
tion have suffered the most due to the recent changes in the constitutional 
framework.
This notwithstanding, economic mobility increased from 2009. According to 
the European Annual report (2017, p. 12): ‘While the UK hosts the largest num-
ber of EU-28 movers who arrived during the past ten years (1.8 million recent 
movers), Germany has gained considerable importance as a destination country 
during the past years . . . annual inflows of EU citizens into Germany increased by 
over 250% between 2009 and 2015, while in the UK they increased by 60% (simi-
lar to the EU-level increase) [. . .] Spain and Italy are still the most important des-
tination countries after Germany and the UK but have not regained their 
attractiveness from before the crisis. Inflows to both countries were still lower 
than in 2009, particularly in Italy where inflows were only half the size than in 
2009. Spain seems to be slowly recovering, with inflows increasing compared to 
2014, but inflows to Italy still decreased.’ Besides, from a more general point of 
view, the restrictions to the freedoms enjoyed by non-EU citizens are at the origin 
of spill-over effects in the reshaping of domestic legislation, notably the one which 
applies to the responsibilities and prerogatives of the customs authorities.
Even though foreigners enjoy less freedom of movement than national citizens, 
in the last two years all the countries—and Poland with even more prominence—
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Figure 3.3 Freedom of foreign mobility (1990–2018)
Source: Varieties of Democracy dataset, 1990–2018.
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a wide range of administrative measures to prevent terrorism and of judicial 
 prerogatives to sharpen the investigating capacity of the prosecutorial authorities. 
This has assumed a more prominent magnitude in France and the UK (Piana and 
Molinié,  2018) whereas it has been less stressed in Spain. As we will see in 
 section 3.5, Poland followed a different path, which is effectively singled out by 
Sadurski (2019, p. 158): the Police Act [amended in 2016] ‘gives the police and its 
agencies access to internet data, including the content of communications, under 
court orders (for up to three months, but without a requirement of necessity or 
proportionality), or to metadata without the need for court orders’.
Civil rights entrenched into the procedural and penal codes have a positive 
trend in terms of both the time frame and mechanisms to access the justice sys-
tem. The length of proceedings has been reduced, under pressure from the peer 
review of the Commission Européenne pour l’Efficience des Systèmes Judiciaires 
(CEPEJ) and the EU DG Justice, with the increasing awareness of the negative 
impact that a lack of efficiency in the judicial sector has upon the economic devel-
opment of the country (OECD, 2015, 2017).
For access to the justice system, the period 2007–18 was profoundly marked by 
two concomitant and mutually reinforcing trends. On the one hand, national 
governments promoted several policies to multiply the services offered to the liti-
gants. Even more critical, they committed to reduce the scope of the judicial 
mechanism of dispute settlement in favour of a non-judicial mechanism, notably 
the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR), in those sectors that relate 
to family law, commercial law (small claims), and property rights (small claims). 
On the other hand, in Italy and Spain, the revision of the judicial map reduced the 
number of courts. In the UK access to justice has been strengthened through 
extensive use of digital tools, whereas in France and, to a lesser extent, in 
Germany, the courts adopted a wide range of organizational solutions to lower 
practical or physical barriers undermining equal access to courthouses. The 
enforcement procedure remains problematic in Italy and Spain. After the judicial 
decision, the length of the enforcement of the executive order issued by the judge 
goes beyond thirty days and, in particularly complex cases, even three months.6
The measures regarding the scope and the effective enforcement of the right to 
a fair trial are, in some cases, related to anti-terrorism legislation. This is particu-
larly evident in the case of France. The shift from the Etat d’urgence toward ‘nor-
malized’ legislation to fight against terrorism and organized crime in France 
represented the most extreme case within the scope of the democratic rule of law 
6 In this analysis, we do not consider as an indicator of freedoms violation the number of cases that 
have been pursued before the European Court for Human Rights, sitting in Strasbourg. As other 
scholars have shown, this indicator comes short into casting light on the phenomenon it is supposed 
and often is expected to measure. Violations that can happen in the countries may be not pursued 
before the ECHR for several reasons, and the timing of the ECHR in meeting the demand of justice 
(with specific reference to art 5 and 6) does not offer a diachronic view of the violations themselves.
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(not without criticism, however). In France, new legislation concerning specific 
categories of prisoners, especially those convicted for offences relating to terrorist 
activity, was adopted in 2016, reinforcing the fight against organized crime, ter-
rorism, and their financing, and improving the efficiency and safeguarding of 
criminal proceedings. A further legislative intervention created a new article 
706-24-4 within the Code of Criminal Procedure, stating the length of remand 
detention for minors between sixteen and eighteen years old: (a) two years for the 
investigation of the offence of criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist 
organization; and (b) three years for the investigation of terrorist crimes of wilful 
attacks on life, the integrity of persons, kidnapping and sequestration, embezzle-
ment of means of transportation, management of a criminal association and 
criminal association aggravated. In Italy, there was a new piece of legislation con-
cerning specific categories of prisoners, as on 21 February 2016 the temporary 
provision provided for by the Law by Decree of 23 December 2013, which lasted 
two years, ended. This had been converted into law with modifications by Law n° 
10 of 21 February 2014, which provided for ‘Special early release’ (that is, a reduc-
tion of seventy-five days for every single semester of sentence served, instead of 
the forty-five days generally provided for by the Penitentiary Act). The ending of 
this provision entailed—and continues to entail—an increase in the total number 
of prisoners.
According to international watchdogs—notably Human Rights Watch—and 
NGOs operating in the countries considered here, the upsurge of xenophobic 
attitudes, reflected by an increasing consensus for far-right parties, is a compel-
ling reason to worry about the state of affairs regarding the protection of the free-
dom of religion. Several examples can substantiate the quantitative evidence. In 
France, the suspicion of religious activism has led to a troubling attitude of repres-
sion towards minority religious groups. ‘Sect’ members face discrimination. 
Muslims, Sikhs, and Jews are not allowed to wear religious head coverings in pub-
lic schools, and the government’s attitude has contributed to social violence 
directed at several minority religions. In early March 2004, the French legislature 
passed a controversial bill banning certain forms of religious attire in state 
schools. In line with recommendations made by a committee set up by President 
Jacques Chirac (2003), the law prohibits Muslim headscarves, Jewish skull caps, 
large Christian crosses, and other conspicuous religious ornamentation. The ban 
could apply to beards and bandanas considered religious. The measure has been 
widely criticized by Muslim, Jewish, and Catholic leaders both in France and 
internationally. While the bill enjoyed extensive support amongst the general 
population, thousands of people protested in Paris and other cities following its 
approval. Furthermore, new legislation was put forward in 2018 that would ban 
the wearing of headscarves in public. Muslim, Jewish, and Christian leaders have 
spoken out against the proposed legislation, and the Council of State, the coun-
try’s highest administrative body, has twice issued advisory opinions about the 
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legality of the legislation. Public debate on this issue had been exacerbated some 
years earlier, in 2009, when President Sarkozy said that burqas were ‘not welcome 
on French soil’. In 1996, a Parliamentary Commission on Sects, charged with 
assessing potential dangers to French society posed by religious sects outside of 
the mainstream, issued a report identifying 172 groups as sects. This report was 
followed by a negative article in Le Monde declaring that ‘something must be 
done about sects’. Measures have been taken by the French government to curb 
religious discrimination in the police force and local governments. In 2009 the 
National Consultative Commission on Human Rights released a report listing 
several new anti-discriminatory initiatives the government had taken. These 
included mandatory training courses for police officers of a certain rank.
In Germany, the Unification Church has also been singled out by the German 
government for discriminatory treatment. Furthermore, a law entered into force 
in 2016, preventing groups with an Islamic affiliation from gathering in public 
spaces without severe preventive checks and strict police control in the event of 
authorization being issued by the local authorities. In Italy, the 2005 Anti-
Terrorism Decree, and a similar anti-terrorism law passed back in 1975, make it 
illegal for people to hide their identity in public. In 2010 the city of Novara inter-
preted these laws to make it illegal for people to cover their faces with anything, 
including burqas, in public areas near government property. The Italian Senate is 
currently (2020) considering a bill to make ‘mental manipulation’ by new reli-
gious movements a crime punishable by a two to a six-year term. According to 
this bill: ‘Unless the action constitutes a more serious crime, anyone who, through 
personality conditioning techniques or other forms of suggestion practised 
through psychological or material means, puts someone in a continuous state of 
subjugation that would prevent or greatly restrict the freedom of self-determination, 
shall be punished by imprisonment from two to six years.’
The Spanish government followed a different path. Steps have been taken to 
integrate non-Catholic religious groups through the Foundation for Pluralism 
and Coexistence. The foundation provides funds to minority and religious groups 
to promote religious freedom and dialogue. The funds are used for cultural, edu-
cational, and social integration programmes (not religious activities). In 2004 the 
government approved legislation that mandates funding for teachers for Catholic, 
Islamic, Protestant, and Judaic instruction in public schools when at least 10 stu-
dents request them. The courses are not mandatory, but those who choose not to 
take the instructional courses are obliged to take an alternative course covering 
general social, cultural, and religious themes. The government does provide tax-
payers with the option of allocating a percentage of their income tax to the 
Catholic Church. This financing is also available for nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) but not for other religious entities. While there are no legal restric-
tions, some Muslim and non-Catholic Christian groups claimed that restrictions 
and policies at the local level inhibit them from assembling to practice their 
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beliefs. In 2010, four cities in the Catalonia region banned the burqa, niqab or any 
type of garment or article that would fully cover a person’s face in municipal 
buildings. The Popular Party (PP), then the country’s largest opposition party, 
proposed to the Senate plenary session a nationwide ban on burqas in all public 
areas. However, this measure was defeated in July 2010.
The last component of civil rights that needs to be considered here covers so-
called economic freedoms. This is a central notion in the liberal theory of democ-
racy. And it is also relevant for the constitutional theory of the rule of law. 
Property rights are deemed to be the entitlements an individual should be left free 
to decide upon, exchange, use, and enjoy under the conditions established by the 
law. Those conditions should eventually play the role of an impersonal and non-
intrusive boundary, demarcating the private sphere to which individual decisions 
about property rights and private economic goods belong. In contrast, in the pub-
lic sphere, the good that should be protected is the fairness and clarity of the sys-
tem of rules. Therefore, the economic freedom that we are going to assess in this 
chapter does not refer to limits set on economic freedom in terms of taxation. 
This would oversimplify our vision and our assessment and would not respond to 
the different models of democracy that citizens are ready to endorse in different 
EU countries (Kriesi, 2015; Morlino, 2011; and Chapter 1).
According to the Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index, whose main 
goal is portraying the capacity of countries to perform as a free market thanks to 
the degree of economic freedom citizens and companies enjoy, the six analysed 
democracies show a different performance (see Figure 3.4). The UK scores high—
the highest among the six—and performed worse in 2018 than in the previous 
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Figure 3.4 Economic Freedom Index (1996–2018)
Source: Heritage Foundation, Economic Freedom Index.
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increasing trend towards liberalizing individual economic behaviours, with a 
jump from 50 to 68.5 (in line with the market-oriented policies adopted by the 
country’s governments since the late 1990s). France belongs to the moderately 
free countries, shifting slightly from 64.4 to 63.9, right at the onset of the eco-
nomic crisis. Germany improved from moderately free to mostly free (69.8 to 
74.2 in 2018). Spain experienced a minor improvement within the class of mod-
erately free countries. In Italy, the trend for the protection of economic freedoms 
developed very poorly, touching its lowest point in the mostly unfree class in 
1997 and 2012, in correspondence to a few policies tackling the economic crisis.
If we unpack the index and focus on the two key indicators—property rights 
and business freedom—we notice that the burden of shifting up or down the 
overall economic index is on them. In Italy, for instance, both—and especially 
property rights—registered a considerable contraction in 2006/2007, but rose 
again in 2017; in Poland they increased after 2010; in Spain, economic freedom 
does not feature a significant change in the two decades, though business free-
dom fell in correspondence to the boost of the first wave of austerity policies 
(Morlino and Raniolo, 2017) (see Figure  3.4). Unpacked macro index analysis 
provides an insight into the actual freedom enjoyed by citizens to trade their 
en title ments and to exchange goods and services in the market. Despite a definite 
improvement—long terms trend—since the mid-1990s during the last five years 
and more consistently over the last two years the state of the matter of the six 
democracies in terms of business freedom features a negative trend: from 94 to 92 
in the UK, from 89 to 83 in Germany, from 87 to 81 in France, from 81 to 66 in 
Spain, from 88 to 71 in Italy, and from 70 to 65 in Poland. In Chapter 6, we try to 
understand that trend, but across the biggest democracies in the European Union, 
it reveals that economic freedom and an essential component of this, business 
freedom, were decreasing.
Let us now consider economic freedom in terms of the capacity of individuals 
to plan their decisions and to rely on a predictable set of rules. As argued in other 
contexts (Piana, 2015, 2017), uncertainty is more detrimental to freedom than 
some specific arrangement of the market/State balance or model of governance a 
society may be inclined to adopt. From this point of view, the right of undertak-
ing an economic activity, as an investment or a transaction, features a different 
trend in the countries we are focusing on here. According to the Doing Business 
reports, published yearly, the average time frame to enforce contracts shifted in 
France from 390 in 2004 to 395 in 2018; in Germany from 403 in 2004 to 499 in 
2018; in Italy it was 1390 in 2004 and regularly decreased down to 1120 in 2018; 
in Poland it went down from 1000 to 685; in Spain it remained roughly the same 
(510 days); and in the UK from 404 to 437. Property registration has been speeded 
up in France, from 41 to 3.5 days; in Germany from 22 to 10.5 days; in Italy from 
23 to 6.5; in Spain from 138 to 13 days; in the UK very minimally from 6 to 4; and 
in Poland from 63 to 37 days. This positive trend should be interpreted against 
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the backdrop of the massive investment made by all governments on digital pro-
ced ures to file the documents requested to start a business as well as to the simpli-
fication agendas that have been promoted by the European Commission in the 
field of public procurement and market regulation (Radaelli, 2015).
Besides, the indicator of insolvency resolution also provides useful insights 
into the evolution of economic freedoms. The time frame and the costs of resolv-
ing insolvency did not change in the six countries. The rate of recovery after an 
episode of insolvency improved to a particularly significant degree in Italy, 
France, and Poland, even though the Italian case ranks much lower (64.6%) than 
other countries, such as Germany (80.6%) and the UK (85.2). Finally, to register a 
property a French citizen now spends half the number of days than she was 
requested to spend in 2004, an Italian citizen two-thirds of the days requested 
before the crisis, a British citizen half of the days that she needed to spend before 
the crisis, whereas in Germany and Spain we do not observe any significant 
change. Despite these positive trends, the Annual Report on Economic Freedom 
published by the Fraser Institute highlights an increasing number of regulative 
constraints on property sales in France (the number doubled between 2004 and 
2017), in Italy from 7.3 to 8.6 on a scale of 1–10, in Poland, from 4.5 to 9.2, slightly 
decreased in Germany, basically stable in the UK and Spain. So, to conclude, it 
seems that despite the increase of efficiency, the freedom to decide upon one’s 
entitlement did not change accordingly. The public administration might be less 
burdensome, but citizens experience constraints and limitations that do not stem 
from a lack of administrative capacity, but rather from the number of regulative 
actions that exist.
Overall, between 1990 and 2018 civil rights saw minor changes, which unfolded 
at a different pace and in a different direction. For different reasons in the coun-
tries analysed (see also Chapter 4), there was a revival of normative production in 
civil rights and, more specifically, of functional and organizational protections. 
This statement holds for civil rights, economic freedoms included. Especially in 
the case of economic freedoms, the worst moment of the crisis had passed over, 
and a slow reduction of the economic recession was on the way after 2015. 
Figure 3.5 provides a general picture of the trend by complementing the right of 
association with the right of expression in the six countries. The figure shows that 
in some countries after the economic crisis, that is, already since 2011 there are 
relevant negative changes. That shrinking of rights affects Poland in a dramatic 
way (see section 3.5), but also can be seen in all other countries we consider.
3.4 Political Rights: More Public Spaces, Fewer Freedoms?
If civil rights display, on the whole, a tension between efficiency and freedom, 
political rights have been transformed in a different and no less counterintuitive 
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manner. Freedoms relating to the organization of public events, manifestations, 
and protests in public spaces have been rebalanced by the recent regulations 
adopted by national governments to ensure public order and civilian safety after 
the terrorist attacks in France, Spain, and Germany in 2015–17. The new regula-
tive acts concerning public order have strengthened the monitoring capacity of 
surveillance devices, the scope of action of the investigative services, and the con-
straints set up to impede the escalation of disorders in crowded spaces, such as 
stadiums, squares, and others. This securitization has also affected the preroga-
tives of local authorities and government representatives (such as prefects in 
France, Spain, and Italy).
If we stick to common sense, the last twenty years have witnessed an increase 
in the spaces and possibilities offered to citizens to exercise their political rights. 
Of course, no one expects that traditional rights closely connected with the core 
business of liberal democracy—such as the right to vote,7 and the classic civil 
rights that are mostly politically relevant, such as the right to express dissent, the 
right to create associations and to voice opinions in public, the right to 
7 In our countries there is no basic change in this right except in the Italian case. The crux of the 
matter is to have an enhanced vote or not, that is, the possibility of choosing the parliamentarian and, 
at the same time, indirectly the government. This is the case of France, Poland, the United Kingdom, 
and basically of Spain because the Spanish proportional electoral law (PR) has a high effective thresh-
old in the translation of vote into seats. This limits the extent of proportionality so that its effective 
working is not too different from that of a majoritarian system. The changes of electoral laws in Italy 
toward a mix system basically provided this enhanced vote between 1993 and 2005 (but especially 
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Figure 3.5 Civil Liberties Index (1996–2018)
Source: Varieties of Democracy dataset 1990–2018.
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information, and the freedom of press—to be challenged, still less undermined in 
the age of the Internet. For several reasons, among which we should not down-
play the importance of the experiences of ‘deliberative’ or ‘participative’ democ-
racy opened up by technological innovations and social networks driven 
mobilization (Papadopoulos, 2016), a common-sense view of one of the founda-
tional aspects of political rights, freedom of expression and association, suggests 
we can be positive about the impact of the Internet. However, the situation we can 
depict in 2018-19, based on the empirical evidence we have at our disposal 
regarding the transformations experienced by the traditional building blocks of 
political rights, demands a more nuanced and less optimistic view.
A first quantitative assessment is made possible by the Varieties of Democracy 
dataset. Between 1990 and 2018 the six biggest European democracies suffered a 
contraction in freedom of association, especially in those types of association that 
refer directly to a religious group or a religious affiliation (see Figure  3.6). In 
France, a similar legislative response received the support of most of the elite, 
who agreed on the urgent need to prevent the risk of an escalation of the conflict. 
In Italy, public events can obtain administrative authorization only if they comply 
with a few strict conditions, most of which relate to new public order and col lect-
ive security provisions (Gabrielli ministerial decree, 2017).
As for the freedom of press, the annual reports published by Freedom House 
show a fall in the rankings by all the countries considered here: France moved 
from 21 to 26; Germany from 16 to 20; Italy from 29 to 31; Spain from 22 to 28; 
the UK from 19 to 25; and Poland from 22 to 34. In some cases, the limited avail-
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Figure 3.6 Religious organization repression (1990–2018)
Source: Varieties of Democracy dataset, 1990–2018.
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open media sector, reveal the process of a hollowing out of the formal provision 
in principle ensuring the freedom of the press and the freedom of access to infor-
mation. In contrast, the evidence shows that citizens have been accessing alterna-
tive sources of information to a decreasing degree, especially over the 2015-18 
years. In this context, we are facing a paradox. In the digital age, after two dec-
ades—and in some countries, such as the UK, even more—of dematerialization, 
digitalization of the public sector and the concomitant extension of the op por tun-
ities offered to citizens to get free access to information, national governments 
moved in the opposite direction.8 They have been strengthening the control exer-
cised over information and the use of new virtual spaces to share, exchange, and 
exploit information. The set of legislative measures introduced turns out to be 
complicated and is not openly defensive of freedom of information (Council of 
Europe, 2017).
The most critical aspect of political rights is, however, represented by the right 
to citizenship. The waves of migration and the rise of international terrorism 
exacerbated defensive attitudes, the latter consequently becoming a fertile breed-
ing ground for illiberal or xenophobic opposition to the extension of the rights to 
political participation and citizenship for people of foreign origin. In France, nat-
uralized status is granted only to those who are judged to have integrated into 
French society (i.e. by language skills and understanding of the rights and respon-
sibilities of a French citizen, to be demonstrated during an interview at the local 
prefecture), and who show loyalty to French institutions.
German citizenship is based primarily on the principle of ius sanguinis. In 
other words, one usually acquires German citizenship if a parent is a German citi-
zen, irrespective of place of birth. Significant reform to the nationality law was 
passed by the Bundestag (the German parliament) in 1999 and came into force 
on 1 January 2000. The new law makes it somewhat easier for foreigners who are 
resident in Germany on a long-term basis, and especially their German-born 
children, to acquire German citizenship. An individual who is ordinarily resident 
outside may be naturalized as a German citizen if he/she can demonstrate enough 
ties with Germany to justify his/her naturalization.
In Spain, nationals of Ibero-America, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Portugal must be natural-born citizens of their respective countries. 
In other words, individuals who acquire the nationality of one of these countries 
by naturalization would still have to live ten years in Spain before applying for 
nationality by residence. In 2012, the Government of Spain approved a measure 
allowing Sephardi Jews to obtain Spanish nationality automatically by naturaliza-
tion, bypassing the residency requirement explained above. Applicants must 
8 Our analysis does not cover the new wave of rights that have been debated and defined concern-
ing the Internet, notably the right to oblivion. On this see, for instance, Dermott (2017) and 
Leask (2019).
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provide certification from the Federation of Jewish Communities of Spain to 
accredit that she or he is Sephardi.
Naturalization as a British citizen is at the discretion of the Home Secretary, 
who may grant British citizenship to anyone they ‘think fit’. Although the Home 
Office sets out official requirements for naturalization, they may waive any of 
them or may refuse citizenship to a person, even if they meet all the requirements. 
However, applications for naturalization are normally granted if the requirements 
are met. The requirements for naturalization as a British citizen depend on 
whether one is the spouse or civil partner of a British citizen. Overall, some dis-
cretionary room for manoeuvre is left to executive authorities to decide whether 
to grant citizenship status through naturalization. This has even found its way 
onto the agenda of judicial institutions, especially supreme courts. They had to 
deal with specific cases of naturalization being refused on the grounds of ‘not 
complete adherence to the values of the State’.
Disentangling the time frame through which political rights variations are 
detected and depicted seems to be crucial. If we go back to the empirical evidence 
presented in the tables and figures, for those rights directly related to citizenship, 
as naturalization, authorization to enter a country and to benefit from its goods, 
services and rights, the years after 2015 have been deeply marked by the experi-
ences of anti-terrorism legislation and the harshening of the barriers raised by the 
country authorities to the reproduction of the daily habits of groups from abroad. 
Even more prominently, the wave of new technology that impacted European 
economic, social, and political systems called for a new wave of legislation aimed 
at strengthening privacy protection, but also public control of the Internet. We 
will presumably appreciate the consequences of this tension with the insights of 
the coming years. In this vein, the warning statement of the Freedom House 
heading the Freedom on the Net report of 2019, wraps up in few words the 
reason ing unfolded in this chapter: ‘what was once a liberating technology has 
become a conduit for surveillance and electoral manipulation’.9
3.5 Subverting Freedoms: An Excursus on Poland
To sum up, the reasons for the changes in individual freedoms in the countries 
considered in our analysis lies in the interplay between efficiency, transparency, 
and security. Each country has pursued a specific path to combine these three 
goals, except for Poland, where the constitutional harbours of liberal democracy 
have been challenged and subverted. In short, first, in July 2017 the European 
Commission recalled Article 7.1 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the 
9 https://freedomhouse.org/
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new retirement provisions constituting a threat to the independence of the 
 ju di ciary. The case was then referred to the CJEU in December 2017. This conflict 
went on until 2 July 2018 when an infringement procedure was initiated by the 
European Commission to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court, 
because of a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland. In September the case 
was referred to the European Court of Justice (CJEU), which in December 2018 
issued a final order imposing interim measures to stop the implementation of the 
Polish law on the Supreme Court. As reported by the international press, ‘the pro-
cess is not formulaic. Two-and-a-half years have passed since the European 
Commission launched a probe into the rule of law in Poland. Last December, it 
triggered Article 7, citing a “clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law” in 
Poland’ (The Economist, 2018).10 On 3 April 2019 the Commission launched a 
new infringement procedure ‘to protect judges in Poland from political control’, 
giving the Polish government two months to respond. In this conflict there were 
other occasions of clashing and at least other two rulings by the CJEU. Thus, the 
Polish case represents a radical, unexpected and dramatically insightful experi-
ence of the subversion of freedoms.
Consequently, as also seen in the figures above, the Polish case is marked by 
the recent dramatic worsening of the freedoms scores, especially for the indica-
tors of the freedom of the press, freedom of association, civil freedoms, and free-
doms of mobility. The manipulation of democratically designed and functioning 
institutional tools perpetrated by the Polish governing elite since 2017 hit the 
scope and the solidity of the individual rights’ protection, both in terms of formal 
provisions and substantial actions to put these provisions into motion.
Several reasons can explain the light cast upon Poland over the last twenty 
years, as the country experienced the transition to democracy, consolidated the 
institutions of the rule of law and thereby joined the European Union (Sroka, 2017; 
Sadurski, 2019). Scholars have long highlighted the front-running position of 
Poland in the path from a non-democratic regime to the democratic rule of law. 
Backed up by the long-standing tradition of constitutional theory and constitu-
tional law(Wyrzykowski, 1998), Polish institutions moved ahead towards a set-
ting where fundamental rights were articulated in a range of constitutional 
provisions to protect individual freedoms, even more promptly than for social 
rights and welfare provisions. If any meaning can be attached to such a simplified 
view, Poland embodied the more liberal and procedural model of democracy in 
the area, whereas Hungary, immediately after the democratic transition, took the 
path of strengthening equalities (van Hüllen and Börzel, 2013). In this respect, 
the role of the constitutional courts and other actors of the judicial branch has 
been repeatedly underlined. These are elements that relate to the institutional 
10 https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/03/how-the-eu-is-fighting-to-protect- 
the-rule-of-law-in-poland
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legacy and offer good grounds to consider Poland as a cross-checking test against 
two recurrent hypotheses. The first one suggests that the economic crisis drives 
the crisis of democratic institutions. The second suggests that it is because of the 
weak embodiment of individual freedoms in the architecture of the State that the 
new EU Member States are taking the road towards the subversion of the demo-
cratic rule of law (see Sadurski 2019, chapter 7).
It is worth starting from the end of the story. As recalled above, on 3 April 
2019, the European Commission referred to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union Poland to protect Polish judges from political interference. On 2 July 2018, 
the European Commission had already opened an infringement procedure 
against Poland for the approval of the statutory law addressing the institutional 
status and the appointment mechanism of the Supreme Court. There were also 
the subsequent dissenting statements adopted by judicial networks and consulta-
tive bodies operating within the umbrella of the Council of Europe—notably the 
Venice Commission—for the incremental and relentless attack perpetrated by the 
Polish incumbent elite against the independence of the judiciary and the pro ced-
ural provisions protecting individual rights into the trials (especially in the crim-
inal procedures).
There are several legislative interventions made between 2015 and 2018 and 
impinging upon four types of freedoms, i.e. freedom of the press, freedom of 
association, freedom before the judiciary, and individual dignity. These two last 
components of the liberal freedoms are directly related to the governance of the 
court system. The judicial reforms were initiated in December 2015 with the new 
law on the functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal. The judicial appointment 
mechanism has been radically transformed to ensure that judges serving at the 
constitutional tribunal are not strong enough to hold the other branches of the 
State accountable and answerable to the principle of the rule of law 
(Sheppele, 2017). As also recalled by Grzeszczak and Karolewski (2018): ‘one of 
the more controversial aspects of the law was the decreasing of the mandatory 
retirement age for the Supreme Court judges from 70 to 65 years (and for the 
female judges to 60 years) effective on July 4, 2018’.
In the report adopted by the International Human Rights Watch, the erosion of 
individual freedoms, resulting from the legislative measures adopted in the field 
of the freedom of press, association, and speech, is also highlighted with alarm. 
Dissent has been restricted in terms both of space and means. The report points 
to the impact of freedoms restriction in seven fields. They are interference with 
the independence of the judiciary and the administration of justice; dismantling 
of all guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of expression; counterterror-
ism measures that weaken fundamental rights and due process and unlawfully 
target Muslims and foreigners; restrictions on women’s reproductive rights; limi-
tations on the right to free assembly; interference with civil society and freedom 
of association; and violations of the rights of asylum seekers.
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According to the Venice Commission, as reported by the Human Rights Watch 
in 2017:
The PiS government has jeopardized the independence of the judiciary and the 
administration of justice by introducing legislative changes that seek to give the 
executive control over the hiring and dismissal of judges at all court levels and 
would effectively remove some sitting judges from their positions. The govern-
ment has impeded the functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal, responsible 
for reviewing the compliance of laws with the constitution including fundamen-
tal rights guaranteed therein, by refusing to implement several of its judgments 
since November 2015, and further politicized appointments to the tribunal by 
failing to recognize duly appointed judges to the Tribunal while appointing its 
preferred candidates instead.
If combined, these measures have undermined the independence of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, which is an important check on abuse of power by the 
government and critical to the protection of democratic institutions and human 
rights.11
The government also introduced legislation that would allow the executive to 
remove all common court presidents, justifying this decision based on an ad hoc 
and still compelling narrative accusing chief justices of inefficiency and lack of 
professionalism (Sadurski,  2019, chapter  5). At the same time, the government 
sought to introduce legislation that would force judges to retire from the coun-
try’s supreme court, unless the executive approved for them to continue in office. 
President Andrzej Duda vetoed this statutory law. The veto proved to be an act of 
weakness or tactic. Some weeks later, the government made a new proposal that 
still allowed the forced retirement of approximately 40 per cent of the supreme 
court’s judges. The government also adopted amendments to the Act on the 
National Judicial Council, the body responsible for overseeing courts and 
appointing judges, that would allow the legislature, rather than fellow judges, to 
appoint the judicial representatives to the Council. Second, legislative changes 
introduced by the ruling PiS party have also curtailed media freedom. New media 
laws, among other things, allowed PiS to replace the management of public ser-
vice media, and establish a new media regulator called the National Media 
Council with politically appointed council members.
The government has introduced counterterrorism provisions that put human 
rights at risk. These measures grant extraordinary surveillance powers to the 
Internal Security Agency (ISA) without effective judicial review, allowing the ISA 
11 https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/24/eroding-checks-and-balances/rule-law-and-human-rights- 
under-attack-poland
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to target foreign nationals in Poland for surveillance, and enable courts to authorize 
the detention of terrorism suspects for up to two weeks before being charged. 
They also enable authorities to block websites without prior judicial authorization 
and increase the number of exceptions under which improperly obtained 
 evidence can be admitted at criminal trials.
Equally alarming, the government approved changes to the legislative pro ced-
ure, enabling it to give priority to government-approved bills and ban counter-
arguments or dissent addressing governmental legislative decisions. These 
measures are likely to limit future protests critical of the government. Legislative 
changes introduced or proposed by the government could hamper the work of 
civil society organizations. For example, the government is seeking to change the 
process whereby public funds are distributed to non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) at the national level. If it succeeds, civil society organizations that chal-
lenge government policy could be denied government funding. Civil society 
organizations told Human Rights Watch in April 2019 that they had already 
ex peri enced significant and unexplained delays in receiving agreed government 
funding. NGOs also fear that expanded surveillance and website-blocking powers 
could affect them. Finally, Polish border guards routinely deny people access to 
the asylum procedure at the Poland-Belarus border and instead summarily return 
them to Belarus, in violation of EU and international law. Authorities have 
ignored binding European Court of Human Rights’ orders to halt summary 
returns of asylum seekers to Belarus. A proposed amendment to the asylum law 
would allow for the automatic detention of all asylum seekers in closed transit 
zones. The electoral turnout of the legislative elections held in October 2019 reaf-
firmed the on-going situation of threats and attacks toward the judiciary. Besides 
the legislative intervention on the retirement age of the magistrates—which 
touched since 2015 the judicial staff—and the disciplinary sanctions issued 
against judges and magistrates proving non-compliant attitudes toward the 
ex ecu tives, it is now the turn of the relationship between ordinary judges and 
higher ranked justices, mostly appointed based on their political loyalty, to be in 
the focus of the rule of law subversion.
3.6 Initial Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have analysed freedoms under three more specific classic cat-
egor ies—personal dignity, civil rights, and political rights—focusing on different 
sub-dimensions and indicators and tracing the related trends in the six countries. 
Overall, for personal dignity, when considering violence perpetrated by police, 
there is a significant improvement until the very beginning of the twenty-first 
century, with the strengthening of existing institutions and the creation of new 
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ones. Later, the index of Amnesty International displays growth of State violence, 
mainly in 2015 –17.
As regards civil rights, national movement is less affected than foreign 
 movement. Movement within the national territory remained unchanged over 
these years, while the Schengen provisions ensuring free movement across 
national borders within the European area were subjected to broad and intensive 
scrutiny. Especially in Poland, freedoms of movement protection have suffered 
the most from the recent change to some constitutional rules. Moreover, all coun-
tries—but especially France and the UK—saw restrictions on freedoms of mobil-
ity due to a set of administrative measures aimed at preventing terrorism. As for 
access to the justice system, all governments have made various efforts and intro-
duced provisions to improve the situation, though some problematic issues 
remain, especially in Italy and Spain. The protection of the freedom of religion is 
stable, although as mentioned above there are several differences among the 
countries on how this right is effectively guaranteed, and the indicators on reli-
gious repression detect this (see Figure 3.6). Finally, we should highlight the con-
straints of economic freedom. Despite a more efficient public administration, 
citizens continue to experience limitations, basically due to the number of regula-
tive actions that have to be performed. This is even stronger in terms of impact on 
the individual lives of citizens and companies when we consider more specifically 
a part of the economic freedom, notably business freedom.
As for political rights, we should first recall that the largest European democra-
cies suffered a contraction in freedom of association, especially as regards reli-
gious associations and the expression of rituals, cults, habits and socio-cultural 
behaviours directly related to ethnicity, religion, and nationality. Second, the free-
dom of the press declined as well. The precise data we mentioned above leave no 
room for doubt, ironic as it is in a digital era. Even more tellingly, there has been a 
decline in citizens’ access to alternative sources of information. Third, the right to 
citizenship was affected by the waves of migration and the rise of international 
terrorism. These phenomena brought about defensive reactions and paved the 
way for a broad and easily politicized opposition to the extension of the rights to 
political participation and citizenship for people with foreign origins.
Overall, during the years examined here, except for Poland and Italy on the 
freedom of the press, there would be no justification for serious concerns about 
the degree and the scope of freedoms enjoyed by citizens. However, the graphs in 
the previous sections testify to an evident decline in the level of freedoms’ protec-
tion, especially after 2015. Thus, the data for the years 2016–18 show that some-
thing new and worrisome happened in all democracies, even those that are 
considered advanced and consolidated (see, e.g., Freedom House, 2018). This is 
especially so for the protection of individual freedoms, which have been affected 
by new legislation adopted in the countries in the field of anti-terrorism, 
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cyber-security, migration, and data protection. A range of normative and 
 organizational tools was adopted to respond, albeit with a differing pace and 
intensity, to the challenges faced by domestic systems after the economic crisis. 
The combination of the two waves of reforms and policies has as yet remained 
mostly underexplored terrain. This trend does not feature any discontinuity or 
exception even in the specific case of the United Kingdom, where the Home 
Office Hostile Environment Policy, set up by Theresa May in 2012 in her capacity 
of Home Secretary, also testifies in terms of the reorganization of the public sector 
offices the above-mentioned trend.
Strong evidence for the overall worsening of freedoms, even though nuanced 
in some countries and for some specific aspects, as highlighted in the empirical 
analysis above, also emerges from the last World Justice Project report, which 
clusters eight synthetic indexes to detect the state of affairs regarding the way the 
rule of law is put into motion. Poland shows the most worrying deterioration, 
notably in terms of fundamental rights (the WJP index incorporates the indica-
tors considered here, namely freedom from torture, freedom of movement, free-
dom of expression, access to information, and access to justice).12 The magnitude 
of the contraction of freedoms that can be seen when looking in detail at the 
trends displayed by media self-censorship, an alternative source of information 
and freedom of religion is even more significant than the evidence provided by 
the V-Dem dataset.
If we try to provide a brief comparative overview of the state of affairs in terms 
of freedom protection for the six democracies from 1990 to 2018, there is no 
doubt that the most worrying picture is given by Poland, in terms of the decline 
of the indicators we selected, except for religious organization repression. There is 
a relative stability in all other cases with low and high. However, the key aspect to 
put at the core of our analysis is the timing when considering all the freedoms as 
we did in this chapter. Thus, coming back to the same main dimensions and indi-
cators we examined above, the freedom from torture declines especially since 
2010 in all countries, Germany and Italy included; the two freedoms of mobility 
(the domestic and the foreign ones) follow the same timing with Poland and the 
United Kingdom to be flagged; the civil liberties more complex index, which 
includes freedom of association and freedom of expression, has also been declin-
ing in the same years, and more dramatically since 2015, especially in Poland. As 
to the extent of repression of religious organization, it also shows an increasing 
12 The World Justice Project elaborates a Rule of Law Index encompassing different dimensions of 
the democratic rule of law. Some are specifically operationalized with indicators pointing to the state 
of the art of freedoms. In some crucial cases, these freedoms are the ones we consider in this chapter. 
The data set is available at https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law- 
index-2017%E2%80%932018.
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trend especially since 2012 and more dramatically after 2015 in all countries, Italy 
excluded. The economic freedom index only with all details mentioned in the text 
(see above) seems relatively more stable. Consequently, in addition to explain the 
differences among the countries, the obvious question is understanding if that 
timing is the conjunctural convergence of different events in the different 
 countries, a more long-term process reaching a tipping point, or both phenomena. 
In the next chapters, we will attempt to reply to this question by providing 
 explanations for these differences together with the general trend (see the next 
chapter and Chapter 6).
















































































































































































































































































































































































Leonardo Morlino, Mario Quaranta, and Francesco Raniolo
4.1 The Next Step
The first chapter laid out the theoretical framework of the research by referring to 
the key concepts and goals. The subsequent two chapters analysed characteristics, 
dimensions, and trends in the implementation of the two democratic values, 
equality and freedom. What immediately emerged from the two empirical chapters 
are the difficulties of explaining the phenomenon. This is the real challenge. In doing 
this, we cannot forget that, in addition to the detected realities, in our analysis, 
the perceptions are also essential and, indeed, the perceptions can even shape 
reality. Thus, the next step is looking at those perceptions and related attitudes.
This brings to check, first, what are the levels of disaffection toward democracy, 
if citizens do cherish the two democratic values, and if they are relevant or very 
relevant to them also for their assessment of democracy.1 In other words, we 
ought to know, first, in general, how disaffected the citizens are, and then if the 
quest to implement freedoms and higher equalities is something more than the 
abstract, utopian goal of a few philosophers, intellectuals, upper-class élites and 
radical chic dreamers. If there is a genuine and widespread demand for such free-
doms and equalities among all social groups and citizens in a country, it makes 
more sense to try to single out explanations and related mechanisms in the imple-
mentation of those values. Moreover, even if the demand to implement those val-
ues does exist, be it weak or strong, it is crucial to check if the intermediary 
political actors, that is, party leaders with their militants and activists, respond to 
that demand by making commitments to implement them.
Consequently, relying on existing survey data and research into parties (see 
below for details), this chapter will check what the levels of disaffection are, ‘what 
1 In a methodological perspective, we frame the explanatory factors by referring to the so-called 
Coleman’s Boat. With this expression we mean the links between different levels of analysis (macro, 
see chapters 2 and 3; meso and micro, see chapters 4 and 5) and their interactions as a general model 
of social explanation. Besides, we will see how the implementation of this explanatory scheme will add 
a further role of meso factors (parties, movements, leaders). See also Chapter 6.
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people want’ about equality and freedom and ‘what are the commitments’ made 
by party leaders and parties on the two values. This is not yet an explanation of 
the modes and degrees of how the two values are implemented. However, it is a 
first necessary step to assess what we mentioned above, namely the salience of the 
perceptions and if the implementation of those values is not only the request of 
small elites, but it also is more widespread among the people. We will also do this 
by looking at the changes of attitudes over time and in the different countries, also 
in relation to the Great Recession.
4.2 Disaffected Democracies?
We start with the satisfaction that the public opinions of our six countries show 
for democracy. This is considered a classic indicator of widespread legitimacy or 
institutional loyalty and, in general, of perceived responsiveness (see Morlino 2011, 
chapter 7). Thus, we start analysing these data under the assumption that satisfied 
attitudes implicitly imply that the normative demands on freedom and equality 
are also met when there are positive or very positive assessments of their democ-
racy by the citizens.2 Figure 4.1 illustrates the data for the six countries and gives 
us a general picture on three relevant pieces of information: a) the trend over time 
of satisfaction towards democracy; b) the relative variance among the six empirical 
cases; and c) the presence and allocation of the anomalous values  (the lowest) in 
the considered time frame.
2 The meaning of this indicator has been discussed at length already years ago as it started to be 
used by the Eurobarometer Surveys since the early 1970s. See, e.g., among several others, Morlino and 
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Figure 4.1 Satisfaction with democracy in six European countries (1992–2019)
Source: Eurobarometer data.
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If we take an overall look at the trends of citizens satisfied with democracy 
during the period considered (1992–2019), a first aspect is that four out of six of 
the cases examined are above the threshold of 50% of positive responses; and two 
of them, Italy and Poland, are ‘democracies with dissatisfied citizens’ or ‘disaf-
fected democracies’, to reference the title of a famous work by Susan J. Pharr and 
Robert Putnam (2000). The average for satisfied citizens is 47% for Poland until 
2018 and is growing in 2019 when satisfaction with democracy jumps to 65%. In 
Italy, it is as low as 33%.3 However, the level of satisfaction has grown in that 
country since the 1990s, with a peak of 54% in 2006. At the end of the second 
decade of this century, Italy remains one of the European countries where 
citizens’satisfaction with democracy is the lowest.
A second general aspect is a variance in the answers, measured by the standard 
deviation, which reaches double figures in four cases—17.20 for Spain; 13.00 for 
Germany; 11.20 for Italy; and 10.50 for Poland—while in France and the United 
Kingdom the values  of standard deviation are respectively 8.00 and 5.50. 
Comparatively, therefore, Italy is one of the countries with the lowest satisfaction 
with democracy.
If we turn from synthetic values  (averages and standard deviation) to the 
trends over time and the distinctiveness of the different countries, three different 
patterns emerge. These can be illustrated by connecting these data (intensity and 
trend) with those on inequalities. Let us start with the most evident and positive 
pattern. First of all, Figure 4.1 suggests that Germany and Poland are assimilated 
by having a growing trend of democratic satisfaction, which takes the former to a 
72.2% rating of satisfied citizens in 2018, and 71% in 2019. Consequently, 
Germany is confirmed as the country with the highest satisfaction rate for democ-
racy. The significant increase compared to 35% in 1994 should also be stressed. 
Poland with 59% in 2018 (compared to 29% in 2004) and above all the surprising 
result of 2019, 65%, also shows a high growth in citizens’ satisfaction with democ-
racy, that praise the welfare policies of PiS government since 2015 (see Chapter 2) 
and do not care about the ‘illiberal’ governmental decisions (see Chapter 3). As 
Garton Ash (2019, p. 176) recalls, for all those who support the winning PiS liber-
alism is ‘an ideology of the winners, far away in the big cities’. The United 
Kingdom can be added to this group as it shows an almost constant trend of satis-
faction, with an average of 59.3% for the whole period and a standard deviation 
of 5.5, which is not at all consistent with the trend for the three components 
(economy, social, and ethnic) of equality. To this, it should be stressed that almost 
11% of growth in the UK occurred between 2018 and 2019, which seems to give 
empirical support to the dramatic Brexit more than to anything else. In other 
3 The figures for Italy are relatively stable, if we consider the low degree of satisfaction recorded by 
the Eurobarometer surveys starting from the first survey in 1973 (the percentage of satisfied respond-
ents then was 27%, and ten years later it had fallen to 20%).
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words, it seems not to be related to the issues that affect the other countries and at 
the same time show how dominant the Brexit issue is.
The second group of countries (Spain, Italy and France) presents a curvilinear 
trend: satisfaction with democracy is low at the beginning of the considered 
period, then it grows before subsequently falling again. In Spain and Italy, there is 
another rise at the end of the period. This is so also in France, where the percent-
age of satisfied arrives at 54% (2019). The first two countries are the ones where 
economic inequalities are higher, also as long-term processes. However, it is with 
the economic crisis that social differences widen considerably. Remember that 
the crisis is also a catalyst for the anti-migrant cultural orientation growing in all 
three countries (see section 2.3).
Since this is a comparison among different countries that covers a considerable 
time (over twenty years), an excellent way to grasp the specificities of the different 
cases is to look at the salience of the outliers,4 which we consider here to be at the 
lowest satisfaction rates. These ‘deviant’ values  are concentrated in the 1990s, with 
nine cases among the different countries in less than a decade and an overall aver-
age of 39.5%, while, until 2018—that is, in almost double the period—we still find 
nine lower values, but with an average of 52.9% satisfied. Instead with 2019, all 
our cases show an increase in satisfaction with democracy, except Germany (see 
Figure 4.1).
Besides, a general overview points to a more complex pattern when consider-
ing the trends of the inequality indicators, and not only from the perspective of 
public opinion. In particular, the deviant cases tell us a lot about the relationships 
between the effectiveness and legitimacy of different democracies (see also 
Lipset 1960), and how these two dimensions influence each other. The ‘crisis of 
democratic legitimacy’ phase occurred in Italy substantially in the early 1990s, 
while in France and Spain they can be detected during the years immediately fol-
lowing the economic crisis. In short, in Italy, the decline of satisfaction is a long-
term phenomenon that substantially reflects the crisis of a ‘consensual democracy’ 
(see next chapter, Table 5.1), while in Spain and France it is the deterioration of 
economic performance that fuels the decline of democratic legitimacy. In this 
perspective, the cases of Germany and the United Kingdom, which have been 
showing higher levels of satisfaction, seem to be less significant, while Poland has 
shown a positive trend over the past fourteen years. At this point, for all our 
countries it is also reasonable to suppose that there is a meaningful association 
between greater dissatisfaction with democracy and ‘protest potential’, a situation 
that favours the formation and success of new ‘political entrepreneurs’ (leaders 
4 This draws on a methodological proposal by Mair (2013, p. 26), who affirmed that, as regards 
 climate phenomena in the analysis of electoral behaviour, we should proceed h‘by laying less stress on 
the trend as such, and by drawing attention instead to the patterns that are visible in the timing and 
frequency of the peak values’.
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and parties). Thus, we expect that the greater the dissatisfaction with democracy, 
the higher the probability that political and social forms of protest will develop 
and that mainstream parties will be punished in elections. This is the critical 
condition of possibility for the appearance of new parties, either neo-populist or 
anti-establishment. As we have seen, to some extent this situation is present in all 
our cases but is particularly evident in Italy, Spain, and France.5
4.3 What People Want
In this section, we will illustrate the state of public opinion about the importance 
of freedom and equality in the countries of interest. Of course, this overview is 
dependent on data availability. Surveys do not always include questions that 
capture attitudes towards freedom and equality and, if they do, the items are not 
always appropriate. Another problem concerns data availability over time (and 
for the countries of interest). Nevertheless, here we can provide an overview that 
overcomes these problems. To do so, we use the European Social Survey (ESS) 
and European Value Study (EVS) data.
First, we use data from the 6th round of the ESS (2012). This round includes 
a particular module on ‘Understanding and evaluations of democracy’, which 
addresses how citizens consider and make sense of elements of democracy. 
Consequently, the module includes questions which allow us to assess what 
 citizens think about freedom and equality. Of course, the items included in the 
module are only a partial representation of what the very complex concepts of 
freedom and equality are (see Chapter 1). The data presented here should, there-
fore, be seen as proxies of general attitudes towards freedom and equality.
To begin with, in Figure 4.2 we show the percentages of reply to the question as 
to whether in a democracy everyone should be free to express their political views 
openly, even if they are extreme ones, in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom. We can see that the percentages are quite high across 
the countries we consider. However, there is also some variability. The highest 
values can be found in France and in Poland, where 85.15% and 86.29% of 
respondents, respectively, think that everyone should be free to express their 
opinions. Then, we find Italy and Spain, where the percentages are very similar 
(about 80%). Further down the rankings are Germany and the United Kingdom, 
where the values are about 72%. Thus, this first, expected finding shows that free-
dom of expression is a highly accepted principle among the public in the six 
countries, even if the opinions are radical or far from moderate.
5 Such dissatisfaction brought about euro-sceptic attitudes in some cases. The results of the refer-
endum on Brexit (2016) are a clear illustration of this.
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Given that it is hard to find opposition to this feature of democracy, the ESS 
module proposes to ask to what extent it is essential in a democracy that everyone 
is free to express their political views openly, even if they are extreme (on a scale 
from 0, not at all important, to 10, extremely important). We report the distribu-
tion of the responses in Figure 4.3.
We can see that in Poland 46% of respondents think that it is essential that 
everyone is free to express their political views openly, while 43% in Germany, 
40% in Italy and Spain, 34% in the United Kingdom and 29% in France feel the 
same way. Therefore, we can note a basic change of position vis-à-vis the previous 
question, although a considerable proportion of respondents in the countries still 
view this element of democracy as a necessary component of it. Moreover, if we 
consider the other top response categories (i.e., 7–9), we can say that most citi-
zens in the six countries do not doubt that freedom of expression is a core feature 
of democracy.
As seen in Chapter 3, another side of freedom in democracy regards the press. 
When the press is free, this acts as a constraint on elected officials and governing 
bodies and provides information to citizens so they can make their political 
choices and form opinions. The ESS module of democracy includes an item 
measuring how important it is for democracy that the media are free to criticise 
the government (on a 0-10 scale). Therefore, the role attributed to the press is to 
act as a check on government actions. Figure  4.4 shows the distribution of 
responses on this item, revealing some significant differences between countries. 
In all the countries the distribution is quite skewed to the right, yet in some of 
them, this is more evident than in others. For instance, we can see that in France 
and the United Kingdom 27 and 33 per cent, respectively, of the samples think 



















Figure 4.2 Opinions on freedom of expression (% of respondents)
Note: Percentage of respondents who think that it is best for democracy that everyone is free to 
express political views openly, even if they are extreme, in the six countries.
Source: ESS-6. Design weights applied.
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that freedom of the press is fundamental. By contrast, the percentages are much 
higher in the other four countries. In Italy, the percentage is 40, in Germany and 
Spain it is 47, while in Poland it is 50.
Another element of democracy that is included in the ESS module regards 
freedom of opposition. This element is considered to be part of the more general 
dimension of electoral competition (see Ferrin and Kriesi, 2016), as it refers to 
whether the opposition can challenge the incumbents in a fair, competitive election. 
However, it can also be used to assess whether citizens hold a liberal view about 
how political parties, and in this case opposition parties, should behave in the 
electoral arena. Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of the responses to an item 
measuring to what extent respondents think it is essential for democracy that 
opposition parties are free to criticise the government (on a 0–10 scale).
Figure  4.5 presents a similar scenario to Figure  4.4. The percentages for the 
‘extremely important’ response category are lower in France (31%) and the United 
Kingdom (36%), and higher in the other four countries. In Germany, for instance, 
it is about 53%, while in Poland, Spain, and Italy the figures are respectively 45%, 
41%, and 40%. Overall, this overview shows that freedom is a principle that is 
highly regarded among the citizens of the six countries we consider in this study. 
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Figure 4.3 Importance of the freedom of expression (% of respondents)
Note: Distribution of responses to the item measuring to what extent it is important for democracy in 
general that everyone is free to express their political views openly, even if they are extreme, on a scale 
from 0 (Not at all important for democracy in general) to 10 (Extremely important for democracy in 
general).
Source: ESS-6. Design weights applied.
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indicate that France and the United Kingdom are the countries where citizens 
seem less ‘attached’ to the elements of freedom taken into account. However, we 
should also mention that this reasoning applies because we consider the ‘extremely 
important’ response categories. We followed this approach as this response cat-
egory may well represent citizens’ orientation that those are elements which are 
‘necessary’ for democracy (see Kriesi et al., 2016; Quaranta, 2018).
We can now move on to what citizens in the six countries think about equality. 
As mentioned before, by using the ESS module on democracy, we can capture a 
good, albeit partial snapshot of citizens’ orientations. This is the case because the 
items considered cannot fully measure this complex phenomenon (see chapters 1 
and 2). Nevertheless, the items we have to allow us to provide a salient overview of 
the six countries. We can start with an assessment of a formal aspect of equality, 
that is equality before the law, which we mentioned in Chapter  1 as a possible 
dimension of political equality and is considered a ‘cornerstone of liberal democ-
racy’ (see also Kriesi et al.,  2016, p. 77). For this reason, we would expect the 
majority of citizens to regard this aspect as essential. In Figure 4.6, we show the 
distribution of the item measuring to what extent respondents think it is essential 
for a democracy that courts treat everyone the same.
We can see that the percentages relative to the highest categories leave no doubt 
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Figure 4.4 Importance of the freedom of media (% of respondents)
Note: Distribution of the responses to the item measuring to what extent it is important for democracy 
in general that the media are free to criticise the government, on a scale from 0 (Not at all important 
for democracy in general) to 10 (Extremely important for democracy in general).
Source: ESS-6. Design weights applied.
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which is consistent with the previous analysis on freedoms. The highest percentage 
is found in Germany (85%), followed by Poland (82%), Spain (78%), Italy (75%), 
France and the United Kingdom (60%). This element of democracy refers to a for-
mal conception of equality that is a constitutional provision. Citizens are therefore 
used to the idea that equality before the law is a standard component of liberal 
democracy.
In contrast, as regards equality, which is identified with social justice and is the 
central aspect in our analysis (see chapters 1 and 2), it might be useful to show 
whether differences are present across countries. The ESS module includes two 
items that may be suited to this goal. The first one more directly captures the 
dimension of social equality, which refers to the principle that citizens should 
have similar levels of wealth and that inequalities should be absent if democracy 
is considered equal. Figure 4.7 reports the distribution of the respondents who 
think that it is essential for democracy that the government takes measures to 
reduce differences in income levels.
The figure shows that social equality is not considered necessary by most 
respondents in three countries—the United Kingdom, France and Germany—
where less than 50% of respondents consider the reduction of income differences 
to be extremely important. By contrast, in Italy, Poland and Spain, the percent-
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Figure 4.5 Importance of the opposition’s freedom of criticizing (% of respondents)
Note: Distribution of the responses to the item measuring to what extent it is important for democracy 
in general that opposition parties are free to criticise the government, on a scale from 0 (Not at all 
important for democracy in general) to 10 (Extremely important for democracy in general).
Source: ESS-6. Design weights applied.
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Figure 4.6 Importance of the equality before the law (% of respondents)
Note: Distribution of the responses to the item measuring to what extent it is important for a 
democracy in general that courts treat everyone the same, on a scale from 0 (Not at all important for 
democracy in general) to 10 (Extremely important for democracy in general).
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Figure 4.7 Importance of government action to reduce economic inequality (% of 
respondents)
Note: Distribution of the responses to the item measuring to what extent it is important for democracy 
in general that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels, on a scale from 0 
(Not at all important for democracy in general) to 10 (Extremely important for democracy in general).
Source: ESS-6. Design weights applied.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
Demand and Supply: Citizens and Leaders 97
Spain, which are countries where the economic crisis was particularly severe, and 
Poland, a country with relatively low levels of wealth, show higher percentages 
might be indicative that in these countries contextual conditions unrelated to the 
economic crisis are at play when considering cross-national differences in orien-
tations towards equality.
The ESS also includes a slightly different item compared to the previous one: it 
does not mention whether the reduction of income differences is essential for a 
democracy, but merely the extent to which the respondents agree with whether 
the government should reduce differences in income levels. The interesting aspect 
of this item is that it has been included in all European Social Survey (2019) 
rounds, and consequently it allows us to evaluate whether views have changed 
over about fifteen years (2002–16).
Figure 4.8 shows the percentage of respondents who agree or strongly agree 
with whether the government should reduce differences in income levels in the 
six countries over time. We can see that changes in the preferences for the role of 
government in reducing income differences occur only in France, where prefer-
ences clearly decline over time, and in Germany, where instead preferences spread 
among a larger part of the surveyed population. In France, there is a drop of 
almost 15 percentage points over the whole period (with an increase in the last 
years), while in Germany the increase is of about 15 percentage points. In other 
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Figure 4.8 Agreement on government action to reduce economic inequality (% of 
respondents)
Note: Percentages of respondents who agree or strongly agree with whether the government should 
reduce differences in income levels. The values on the x-axis represent the year of the ESS round.
Source: ESS 1-9. Design weights applied.
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countries the changes are more subtle but are nonetheless present. In Poland, 
there is a drop of preferences over the whole period of about 10 percentage points, 
while in Spain and the United Kingdom preferences increase respectively by 
about 5 and 4 percentage points. In Italy, instead, there is a positive change, from 
about 79% in the first round to 85% in the last one. A further aspect to note is that 
the levels across countries in such preferences are different: lower in the United 
Kingdom and Germany, and higher in the other four countries.
The next item we consider measures to what extent it is essential for democ-
racy that the government protects all citizens against poverty. This is empirically 
linked to the previous one as it indicates a preference that minimum standards of 
wealth should be ensured for the population and, as a consequence, if this aspect 
is pursued, then income differences should be lower (but see Chapter 2 on this). 
Therefore, we might expect a similar scenario to the previous one. The distribu-
tion of this item is shown in Figure 4.9.
We can see that the percentages of those who think that the governmental 
protection of citizens from poverty is a necessary element of democracy are 
much higher compared to the previous items we considered. In the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany 47%, 50%, and 51% of respondents, respectively, 
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Figure 4.9 Importance of government action against poverty (% of respondents)
Note: Distribution of the responses to the item measuring to what extent it is important for democracy 
that the government that the government protects all citizens against poverty, on a scale from 0 (Not 
at all important for democracy in general) to 10 (Extremely important for democracy in general).
Source: ESS-6. Design weights applied.
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Spain, the percentages are much higher (65%, 68%, and 72%). Therefore, an 
important and revealing consistency between the across-countries pattern when 
comparing opinion about equality and those about poverty is empirically 
confirmed.
At this point, we should also consider how citizens balance the importance of 
freedom and equality. To do this, we use the EVS dataset. EVS has a question ask-
ing respondents whether they agree with two statements: (1) whether the 
respondents consider ‘personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can 
live in freedom and develop without hindrance’; and (2) whether the respondents 
consider ‘equality more important, that is, that nobody is underprivileged and 
that social class differences are not so strong’. This question is repeated over time, 
although it does not cover more recent years. Nevertheless, it allows us to assess 
whether orientations change between 1999 and 2008 (or 2009 for Italy). We 
report the results in Figure 4.10, where we show the percentages of respondents 
who think that freedom is more important than equality, that equality is more 
important than freedom, and that neither of the two is essential.
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Figure 4.10 Opinions about relative importance of freedom and equality (% of 
respondents)
Note: Respondents who consider freedom as more important than equality, equality more important 
than freedom, and neither of each.
Source: European Values Study. Weights applied.
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There are three elements to analyse. The first is the relative importance of free-
dom vs equality; the second regards the differences across countries; and the third 
the change over time. We can see that in France, the share of respondents who 
think equality is more important than freedom is larger than the share of those 
who think the opposite. In this context, we can see that the importance of equal-
ity over freedom increases over time. In contrast, if we look at Germany, we can 
see that freedom is viewed overall as more important than equality. However, 
between 1999 and 2009, the share of respondents who think equality is more 
important than freedom grows substantially (from 30.8% to 48.3%). In Italy, there 
is no change, and equality seems to be more important than freedom. The op pos-
ite is the case for Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom: changes over time are 
minimal, and freedom is seen as more important than equality. Regarding overall 
differences across countries, in the United Kingdom and Poland, we find the 
highest shares of respondents who value freedom more than equality, while Italy 
is the only country where equality is seen as more important than freedom. 
Overall, the data show that between 1999 and 2008/9 changes in these opinions 
are subtle, except in France and Germany, and that respondents place more value 
on freedom than on equality.
If at this stage, we try to single out the meaning of these data about the two 
key values from a citizen point of view, we can reach some very preliminary 
conclusions.
First, the opinions about the salience of the two values are political context-
dependent and time-dependent. The existing political differences between coun-
tries suggest the salience of political context. The salience of time neatly emerges 
from Figure 4.9, where we can see differences of attitudes between the end of the 
twentieth century and ten years later, at the beginning of the Great Recession. Ten 
years later, we can see an evident growth in attention to equality, which is eco-
nomically sensitive, in all countries except Poland, the only European country not 
to have been hit by the economic crisis.
Second, when comparing Figures  4.7,  4.8, and  4.9, we realize that although 
opinions about the two values, and consequently their salience in a democracy, 
may change, they are not at all volatile and show some resilience. Consequently, 
political elites have to pay full attention to them, and to changes in them.
Third, as all the figures from 4.2 through to 4.7 provide a snapshot of the opin-
ions in the middle of the crisis (2012), we can prima facie see the impact of the 
economic crisis in Italy and Spain with the highest scores on equality, the relevant 
but more balanced scores for two other countries, i.e., France and United 
Kingdom, and the Polish result confirming the domestic context-dependence of 
those numbers. Figure 4.11 presents the overall salience of the two values again, 
having left aside the items presented in Figure 4.2, in order to avoid an overlap 
with the item in Figure  4.3, and in Figure  4.6, which are not relevant for the 
 reasons mentioned above. Thus, the percentages of respondents who give the 
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highest scores (=10), and are indicated in this figure, are the averages respectively 
of the three leading indicators of freedom (importance of the freedom of expres-
sion, importance of the freedom of media, importance of the opposition’s free-
dom to criticise) and of the two main indicators of (in)equality (importance of 
government action to reduce economic inequality, importance of government 
action against poverty).
Fourth, although the results of Figure  4.10 and Figure  4.11 are not strictly 
speaking comparable as they are based on different data sets, at least some clues 
about people’s reactions to the crisis emerge. The second survey was conducted in 
the middle of the Great Recession (2012), while the results that are presented in 
Figure 4.10 relate to the very beginning of the crisis when there was not a percep-
tion of it yet. We should also add that considering freedom and equality as alter-
natives is not correct, and in fact, the European Values Study adopts the expression 
‘priority of ’. With these limits in mind, we can see how in Italy and Spain, the 
priority for equality was already present, but the economic crisis magnified it. 
Thus, the hypothesis about the catalysing effect of the crisis that we discussed in 
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Figure 4.11 Overall opinions on freedom and equality in the six countries
Note: Freedom represents the average of the percentages of respondents who say that is extremely 
important (= 10) for democracy that that everyone is free to express their political views openly; that 
the media are free to criticise the government; that opposition parties are free to criticise the 
government. Equality represents the average of the percentages of respondents who say that is 
extremely important (= 10) for democracy that the government that the government protects all 
citizens against poverty; that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels.
Source: ESS-6. Design weights applied.
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divided country. In France, the change of priority comes before the crisis. In 
Germany, the change in priority is more moderate, and in the 2012 survey it 
remains the only country where freedom is relatively more important; finally, in 
2012 Poland shows an inversion in comparison to 2008 by going back to the result 
of the 1990s, with equality having the priority.
Finally, although conceptually we disentangled equality from poverty (see 
Chapter 1), the data discussed here show an evident connection between them. 
All three countries (Italy, Poland, and Spain) with higher scores on equality (see 
Figure 4.7) also display higher scores on the importance that government pro-
tects all citizens against poverty (see Figure 4.9). The other three countries show 
lower scores on both issues consistently.
4.4  What Parties Commit To
We complement our overview on how the public sees freedom and equality with 
another one focusing on how political parties consider these two democratic val-
ues. In doing so, we can assess the extent to which actors representing citizens in 
the electoral arena incorporate into their platform issues regarding freedom and 
equality. In order to carry out this assessment, we use the data of the Manifesto 
Project (Volkens et al.,  2019). This dataset includes information on aspects 
regarding freedom and equality in party manifestos. To check the reference to 
freedom, we use an indicator capturing favourable mentions of freedoms, such as 
freedom of speech, thought, press, assembly; of freedom from state coercion in 
the political and economic spheres; of freedom from bureaucratic control; of the 
idea of individualism. To check references to equality we use an indicator captur-
ing favourable mentions of the concept of social justice and fairness for all people, 
such as special protection for underprivileged social groups; removal of class bar-
riers; the need for the fair distribution of resources; the end of discrimination 
(e.g., racial or sexual discrimination).6 We can thus use both scores to assess 
where parties lie in a two-dimensional space made up of freedom and equality 
and see how the importance of the two elements of democracy changes over time. 
We restrict the analysis to the major parties, which are classified as socialist, 
social-democratic, liberal, Christian-democratic and conservative, from 1990 to 
the latest year available for each country. At first, we use the aggregate scores for 
all parties included, by country and year. The parties are listed in the Appendix.
Figure 4.12 shows the average positions of all parties according to their stance 
on freedom and equality in the six countries considered from 1990. Starting with 
France, we can see that at the beginning of the period of observation both 
6 See the codebook of Manifesto Project (online).
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freedom and equality get few mentions; later, mentions of both ones substantially 
increase (1997). In subsequent years, mentions of freedom become much fewer, 
and those of equality also decrease, but to a lesser extent. In Germany, by con-
trast, mentions of freedom and equality increase over time, though the increase is 
more evident for equality than for freedom. In Italy, the outlook seems less 
straightforward. We can see that mentions of freedom increase between 1992 and 
1996, while those of equality seem to decrease. In subsequent years, mentions of 
freedom drop and remain low, while those of equality become much more fre-
quent, although with a reduction in 2018. In Poland, changes appear to be limit ed, 
and both dimensions seem to decrease over time. Instead, in Spain mentions of 
freedom and equality seem to change in parallel over time. The picture for the 
United Kingdom indicates that the mentions of equality increase more than those 
of freedom.
To give a more precise picture of the relevance of freedom and equality in party 
programmes, Figure 4.13 shows the scores considering the two largest parties in 
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Figure 4.12 Salience of freedom and equality in the programmes of main parties, 
since 1990
Note: Average mentions (percentage) of freedom and equality in the manifestos of main parties 
(socialist, social-democratic, liberal, Christian-democratic and conservative).
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project.
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movements over time are quite similar, but in some cases, are more visible. For 
instance, in Italy, the increases in the mentions of equality are more significant 
when considering the two largest parties, although there a consistent contraction 
of them in the last elections. In contrast, the changes towards more mentions of 
equality are more limited in Spain or Germany, though visible. At this point, dis-
tinguishing between the two largest parties becomes a relevant issue.
If we break down the mentions by party families, the scenario changes substan-
tially. Figure 4.14 (a and b) shows the mentions of freedom and equality by eco-
logical, socialist, social-democratic, liberal, Christian-democrat, conservative, 
nationalist, agrarian, ethnic, and single-issue parties (when present) since 1990. 
The most evident differences with the outlooks we provided above are that the 
changes in the mentions of equality are more extensive. However, if we focus on 
countries and party families, the situation is much more nuanced. In France, 
socialist and social-democratic parties seem to follow a similar path: they both 
display an increase in mentions of equality over time, but the mentions then go 
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Figure 4.13 Salience of freedom and equality in the programs of the two largest 
parties, since 1990
Note: Average mentions (in percentage) of freedom and equality in the manifestos of the two largest 
parties (according to vote share).
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project.
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freedom remain mostly unvaried. Liberal parties show an increase in mentions of 
equality between 2012 and 2017. The same is true of conservative parties, while 
their mentions of freedom increase before falling back to previous levels. In 
Germany, the socialist and, to a lesser extent, social-democratic parties, increase 
mentions of equality in their manifestos. Instead, the liberal parties increase men-
tions of freedom but not those of equality. In Christian-democratic parties, there 
are no changes in the mentions of either freedom or equality. In Italy, socialist 
and liberal parties are those which show the most considerable increase in the 
mentions of equality. The mentions of freedom in the manifestos of conservative 
Figure 4.14 Salience of freedom and equality in the programs of parties by party 
family, since 1990
Note: Average mentions (in percentage) of freedom and equality in the manifestos of parties: panel a) 
ecological, socialist, social-democratic, liberal, Christian-democratic; panel b) conservative, 
nationalist, agrarian, ethnic, special issue).
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project.
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and Christian-democratic parties change, but there is not an upward trend. In 
Poland, the mentions of both freedom and equality remain unchanged among 
Christian-democratic and conservative parties. Instead, the mentions of equality 
among liberal and social-democratic parties increased until 2005 but then fell 
back to previous levels. In Spain, the mentions of equality in the manifestos of 
socialist and social-democratic parties increase over time, while those of freedom 
barely change little. By contrast, the mentions of both freedom and equality in the 
other two-party families have remained unchanged. Finally, in the United 
Kingdom, there is an increase in the mentions of equality among  social-democratic, 
liberal and conservative parties, while, unexpectedly, the mentions of equality 
decrease among socialists, which are represented by Sinn Féin, but the opposite 
ironically happens to Labour (social democrats). Mentions of freedom increase 
among the latter party and among the Liberal Democrats.
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To compare the public opinion data analysed in the previous section with the 
data discussed here is methodologically inappropriate. However, overall, the vari-
ations that emerge within public opinion are roughly mirrored by the party pro-
grammes, and again the Great Recession is a good litmus test when considering 
the relatively greater attention to equality. Of course, additionally, the different 
attention to freedom and equality of different parties mirrors the divisions within 
society when acting politically, and as we well know (see, among others, Karvonen 
and Kuhnle, 2000; Boix, 2007), the divides are usually shaped and strengthened, if 
not created, by party leaders.
4.5  Taking Stock to Go Ahead
To sum up what we learned from the analysis carried out in this chapter and to 
lay the bases for searching the explanations of characteristics and level of imple-
mentation of our two values, our key finding to recall is: the changes, the levels, 
the characteristics of the demand and elite supply of the two values are highly 
context and time-dependent. More explicitly, we can consider the salience of pre-
vious historical trajectory, as it can be seen in the case of Poland, or the contin-
gent economic situation, as it can be observed in the countries most hit by the 
Great Recession, and in some of them followed by stagnation. The salience of 
other factors is not excluded. However, citizens demand and party supply are 
more powerfully and directly detected by pointing to these two macro-factors. 
Additional analysis may suggest more exhaustive results, as we will see in the next 
three chapters.
This partial finding shows that in the middle and long run there is a steady 
consistency between people attitudes and leader actions, on the one hand, and 
social, economic, cultural reality, on the other. Consequently, despite the possible 
strong differences between reality and perceptions of it and despite the probable 
manipulative role of political leaders, who can emphasize and consequently make 
stronger and in some case radicalize the attitudes of the people, in the middle run 
and when we draw a less detailed picture, the requests of equality and freedom 
are consistent with the existing socio-economic-cultural reality. Of course, we 
cannot take for granted that the reality is the ‘engine’ and the perceptions follow. 
We should accept and take in consideration that the opposite may be much closer 
to what happens: this is the case when attitudes shape the reality.
A second, related remarks suggested by the difference in terms of volatility/
resilience between attitudes and realities. The demand of people and party supply 
of equality and freedom can be more or less volatile as reactions to the changes 
and uncertainties brought about by the economic situation, as recalled above, or 
other factors, such technological changes, industrial organization developments, 
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working conditions changes, economic mobility and the whole existing structure 
of external opportunities. However, in general, attitudes and party positions are 
usually more volatile vis-à-vis more resilient, even if relatively changing, realities.
Finally, up to now, the empirical evidence suggests that the demand for imple-
mentation of the two values seems to follow different logic and different paths. As 
mentioned above, the questionnaire of the European Values Study correctly does 
not present the two values as an alternative but asks if there are priorities between 
freedom and equality. However, the effective implementation of the two values 
may affect each other. We come back to this issue in Chapter 8.
What this discussion and the related findings are pointing to is the responsive-
ness seen from a more realistic perspective. In fact, on the one hand, the consist-
ency between people attitudes and leader actions refer to the ways elite actors 
respond to the demand of people and how people react with high, low or no satis-
faction. And in this the volatility of people attitudes and the leading or even the 
manipulative role of elite should also be taken into consideration. On the other 
hand, there is the effective implementation of the policies people want and the 
leader commit to. This process should be better understood in its entirety. Thus, 
explaining how the two values have been implemented in the different countries 
is the obvious next step. In Chapter 5, we start by looking at the domestic ex plan-
ations for inequalities. And in Chapter 8 we come back to the responsiveness.
Appendix
Appendix Table 4.A1 about here Table 4.A1: List of parties
Country Family Parties
France Socialist French Communist Party, Left Front, Left Radical Party, 
Indomitable France
Social-democratic Socialist Party
Liberal Radical Party, Republic Onwards!, Union of Democrats 
and Independents
Conservative Union for French Democracy, Rally for the Republic, 
Union for the Presidential Majority, Democratic 
Movement, Union for a Popular Movement, New Centre, 
Centrist Alliance, The Republicans
Germany Socialist Party of Democratic Socialism, The Left. Party of 
Democratic Socialism, The Left
Social-democratic Social Democratic Party of Germany
Liberal Free Democratic Party
Christian-
democratic
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
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Italy Socialist Communist Refoundation Party, Democratic Party of the 
Left, Party of Italian Communists, Democrats of the Left, 
Rose in the Fist, Civil Revolution, Left Ecology Freedom
Social-democratic Pannella List, Italian Socialist Party, Italian Democratic 
Socialist Party, Pannella-Reformers List, Pannella-Sgarbi 
List, Italian Renewal, Olive Tree
Liberal Italian Republican Party, Italian Liberal Party, Daisy—
Democracy is Freedom, Di Pietro List—Italy of Values, 
Democratic Party, Democratic Centre, Civic Choice
Christian-
democratic
Christian Democrats, Italian Popular Party, Pact for Italy, 
Democratic Alliance, Christian Democratic Centre, 
White Flower, Union for Christian and Centre 
Democrats, Union of the Centre
Conservative Go Italy, New Italian Socialist Party, House of Freedom, 
People of Freedom, Brothers of Italy—National Centre-
right, Labour and Freedom List
Poland Social-democratic Democratic Left Alliance, Democratic Party, Independent 
Self-governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’, Labour Solidarity, 
Democratic Union, Union of Labour, Coalition of the 
Democratic Left Alliance and the Union of Labour, Left 
and Democrats
Liberal Liberal-Democratic Congress, Polish Beer-Lovers’ Party, 
Union of Real Politics, Polish Economic Programme 
(Large Beer), Freedom Union, Movement for the 




Christian Democratic Labour Party, Centre Citizens’ 
Alliance, Party of Christian Democrats, Movement for the 
Republic, Catholic Electoral Action, Electoral Action 
‘Solidarity’, League of Polish Families
Conservative Law and Justice
Spain Socialist United Left, Popular Unity, We can
Social-democratic Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party








Social-democratic Labour Party, Social Democratic and Labour Party
Liberal Liberal Democrats
Conservative Conservative Party, Ulster Unionist Party




Leonardo Morlino and Francesco Raniolo
5.1 Starting from the Research Questions Again
Chapters 2 and 3 gave us a picture of existing inequalities and freedoms, 
together with the related trends. Chapter  4 added an analysis of attitudes of 
citizens on these values and the proposals of parties with some final consideration 
at the end on the consistency between the two levels, realities and perceptions 
of them and the related responsiveness. In this and the following chapter, we 
ask what the domestic political actors and the institutional factors that affect 
inequalities and freedoms in the countries of interest are. Hence, within the 
framework of the quality of democracy (see Morlino 2011, chapters 7 and 8, 
and here Chapter 1) the questions we need to address are if and how specific 
dimensions or aspects of the rule of law, electoral accountability, political 
 competition, participation and responsiveness contribute to the improvement 
or worsening of (in)equalities and freedoms. If there is a change, how did it 
happen? If not, what are the main emerging explanations for the different 
 pictures we have outlined?
In replying to these questions, we are going to show the differences within 
the same countries over time and also the differences among the countries. 
Our aim is to identify the principal domestic explanations for the results 
regarding the two phenomena under scrutiny. For this empirical assessment, 
we follow the methodological approach discussed at the end of Chapter 1. We 
also accept the danger of simplification as, provided it does not betray the 
analysis, we assume that it offers a more vivid and focused explanation of the 
phenomena.
In this chapter, we will mainly consider the institutional arrangements and the 
role of actors related to political participation and competition as explanatory 
factors of (in)equality. In Chapter 6, the attention will turn to explain the charac-
teristics and evolutions of freedoms still from a domestic perspective. Chapter 7 
will look at ‘external explanations’ of both equality and freedom.
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5.2 What Affects Inequalities and Why
As we saw in section 4.2, public opinions of the six examined democracies have 
mainly internalized the relevance of equality and freedom, despite the distinct 
relative differences among the different cases. Nor is this cause for surprise, con-
sidering that, except for Poland, in most of Europe entire generations have been 
living under democratic rules for more than seventy years. At the beginning of 
the third decade of the twenty-first century, democratic principles are taken for 
granted. It is equally fair to affirm that the values-objectives have been absorbed 
by the institutions that characterize the political and economic systems,1 and by 
the consolidated administrative practices that follow from it. This is particularly 
evident in the analysis of social protection spending, which as will be recalled is 
one of the indicators associated with the second dimension of equality, that is, the 
social (in)equality. About this, in Chapter  2 we saw that all the governments 
reacted to the changes in (in)equalities induced by the economic crisis. In par-
ticular, Figure 2.8 made it clear that social spending also increased in our democ-
racies between 1995 and 2018, even if only moderately (see Chapter 2).
As already anticipated, the general trend to maintain social equality despite the 
crisis can be explained, at least partially, as the product of the ‘automatic stabiliz-
ers’ highlighted by Krugman (see Chapter 2). More generally, this is an issue that 
was investigated by diachronic studies of public policies and, especially, by the 
so-called ‘programme approach’ (Rose, 1984) and by the literature on policy leg-
acies (see Rose and Davies, 1994). In this analytical scheme, the expansion and 
functioning of public apparatuses are explained based on the ‘inertial force of the 
commitments undertaken’ (Rose, 1984, pp. 90–7). The weight of the pre-constituted 
commitments (of past decisions) is such in terms of entities and automatic func-
tioning, but also for the generation of specific vested interests, including those of 
interest groups benefiting from public policies (Pierson,  1994, pp. 39–50). The 
simple fact is that a substantial amount of ‘public expenditure is not controllable, 
[...] unless we intend to proceed to the repeal on a large scale of laws and codes’ 
(Rose, 1984, p. 92). Moreover, once institutionalized, these laws and codes enjoy 
the super-protection of the judiciary and even of the constitutional courts, with 
the rights deriving from them for the beneficiaries.2
What has been affirmed so far only in part explains the changes to pol icy-
making in our six European democracies regarding the redistributive policies to 
1 The great sociologist William Graham Sumner (1906) stated that institutions consist of ‘concepts’ 
(values, ideas, interests) and ‘structures’ (apparatuses, procedures) aimed at realizing the former in the 
real world. In this sense, as emphasized by Mary Douglass (1986), institutions incorporate prejudice.
2 A complementary perspective considers the growth of social spending as a response to new social 
risks. On the distinction between ‘individualization of risks’ (market solution) and ‘socialization of 
risks’ (welfare solution), see Di Palma (2011) and, more in general, the classic work by Karl 
Polanyi (1944).
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combat inequality, not to mention the differences between our cases. In a 
sense, the reference to automatic stabilizers accounts for a necessary change 
that reflects the mostly sticky and rigid (inherited from the past) disposition of 
policy programmes in the democracies that interest us. In short, it is a partial 
(explanatory) picture in a dual sense. First, the structural factors that constrain 
the choices and processes of the actors are manifold and arise at different levels of 
generality; nor can they be reduced to the inheritance of policies and automa-
tisms incorporated into the administrative procedures and laws associated with 
the programme approach.3 Second, if limited to this level of analysis, the political 
change would be largely impossible, except in adaptive forms. Political conflict 
itself, aimed at capturing votes, offices and policies, would lose meaning. 
Moreover, as we have seen (Chapter 2 and, in particular, Figure 2.8) differences 
between our cases persist.
For these reasons, we choose to follow another analytical path, prompting us 
to distinguish two sets of causal ‘factors’ (or independent variables). At the first 
level, we find contextual factors that lie in the background and institutional fac-
tors. Later on, we will operationalize these aspects by introducing the ‘varieties 
of capitalism’ and ‘models of democracy’, with their connections and conver-
gences. In both cases, these are structural (or ‘push’) factors that strongly con-
strain policy choices, or the meeting between voter demand and political supply 
(see section 4.2). At the second level of analysis, we find the strategic (or ‘pull’) 
factors that bring about specific choices on the part of actors, the intertwining 
alliances between them, and the rules and resources that constrain them in con-
crete choices. At this level, the opportunities for representation and success that 
open up for political ‘entrepreneurs’ who are innovative and challenging in their 
ability to achieve competitive advantages (for more on the neo-populist parties, 
see below) also become relevant. This two-level analysis, contextual factors and 
actors present in the field, is referred to as the double filtering process by Elster 
(see Chapter 1).
However, let us introduce between these two levels of analysis—the first, struc-
tural, the second, strategic—an intermediate area that is useful to give an account 
of the limits that policies relating to inequality can encounter in different national 
contexts. Here, we refer to budget constraints. If the growth of social spending, 
within certain limits, can be seen as the result of automatic stabilizers reacting to 
a fall in production and, therefore, in tax revenue or other phenomena, such as 
the growth of unemployment, it is also fair to recognize that budget constraints 
reduce governments’ room for manoeuvre, even dramatically.
3 Another interpretation of the growth of spending and, therefore, of debt can be found in the fact 
that the political economy of advanced societies has to cope with similar problems of social regulation 
and problem solving associated with new social risks.
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If, consequently, we shift our attention to the institutional constraint 
 constituted by the amount of public debt, the evolving pattern that emerges from 
Figure  5.1 is rather evident. In 2008 there was a clear divide in the trend: the 
Great Recession has been an expansive factor of the debt everywhere. This is 
mainly due to the collapse of GDP and, consequently, to policies adopted by 
 governments to support some critical sectors, such as the banking industry, and 
due to the triggering of the automatic mechanisms of social protection that we 
mentioned. Here, however, we find a contradictory aspect. In any case, its 
increase—especially if conditions of economic growth and the competitiveness of 
industrial or other companies are weak—ends up constituting one of the most 
severe limits to the implementation of social rights and protection from new 
social risks, as in the case of the inclusion of measures such as the basic income.
For our argument, which concerns the trend of inequality and the possibility of 
contrasting it through policy choices, it may be useful to dwell on the main cross-
national differences. Indeed, the anomaly of Italy and the clear polarization 
between this country and Germany and Poland stand out. In the space of about 
ten years (2008–19) the Italian public debt, calculated as a percentage of GDP, 
went from 102% to 133%; while in Germany it fell from 65% to 57% and in 
Poland from 46% to almost 10 points more, and back to decline (47%). The situ-
ation in the other three countries is relatively more differentiated, but as of 2019, 
their debt varies between 99% (France), 96% (Spain), and 87% (United Kingdom).
Besides, these data must be read together with the data we presented in sec-
tions 4.2 and 4.3, which describe a substantial ‘congruence’ between voter 
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Figure 5.1 Gross debt as percent of GDP in six European countries (1990–2019)
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2019.
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Recession that started in 2008,4 despite the methodological limitations highlighted 
there (see Chapter 4). What is more, already in section 4.2 (see Figures 4.6, 4.7, 
and 4.8) significant differences emerged among the citizens of our six democra-
cies regarding the perception of the importance of social equality and the policies 
for reducing differences between income. In particular, both of these aspects were 
more strongly felt in Italy, Poland, and Spain. Of course, let us stress that we are 
mentioning here the agenda-setting by party leaders and the party programs we 
discussed in Chapter 4, not the effective policies carried out in those countries.
5.3 Factors at Play: Context and Institutions
When looking at the institutional dimension, the starting point is to ask what the 
best constitutional pattern is about shaping redistributive majorities and promot-
ing social rights. Is it the consensual arrangement or the majoritarian one? In 
other words, does the way demands are expressed and integrated through inclu-
sive processes (consensual pattern) or more exclusive processes (majoritarian 
pattern) make a difference in terms of resulting equality? The implicit question 
here is whether there are institutional arrangements that can account for the 
structure of inequality with its three dimensions (economic, ethnic, and social) in 
the six democracies examined here, and, consequently, which can influence redis-
tributive and anti-poverty policy-making and, more generally, inequalities. We 
should add straightaway that to answer these questions it is necessary to broaden 
the framework of the analysis beyond political institutions (patterns of democ-
racy), and to look at the characteristics of economic institutions (varieties of 
capitalism).
We should not forget that democracy is also a regulatory (or governance) 
mechanism of a socio-economic structure that has become a variant of the 
 market economy or capitalist system (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017, p. 85).5 This 
regulatory aspect aimed at correcting market failures is particularly evident in 
the case of the inequality following the falsification of what Stiglitz (2016, 
pp. 3–4) called the ‘high tide theory’, or rather a specific version of it, which has 
been spreading since the 1980s: ‘the resources given to the rich would be filtered 
(trickle-down) to the rest of the population’. If we look at the economic system 
and its inter depend en cies with the democratic system, we can identify four 
4 With the typical language of the structural-functional perspective, Almond and Powell (1978) 
spoke of a ‘thesis of synchronization or balance’ between citizen input and output of the political sys-
tem. The regime is unstable if there is no balance between the two dimensions, there are new ques-
tions, growing dissatisfaction and protest, or insufficient resources.
5 This aspect has sometimes been conceptualized with regards to the relations of autonomy/control 
between civil society and the economy (Morlino, 1998), and in the debate on the varieties of capital-
ism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003).
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‘regulatory-institutional arenas’ (see Burroni, 2016, p. 15): the system of production 
and credit, the labour market, the welfare policies and the industrial relations.6 
These arenas are based on the principle of ‘institutional complementarity’ (Hall 
and Gingerich, 2009) as the patterns or models of capitalism, similarly to what 
happens for the patterns of democracy, tend to integrate, and are based on the 
logic of convergence between the different institutions that compose them.7 This 
integration gives an internal coherence so that countries with a coordinated 
economy have a structure of industrial and union relations, a corporate govern-
ance, a credit system and welfare institutions that mutually reinforce each other.
Our analytical proposal is, therefore, to integrate the perspectives of compara-
tive political economy and comparative politics.8 This enables us to give an 
account of the variety of institutional economic and political structures, that is, 
the variety of capitalisms (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and the patterns of democracy 
(Lijphart, 2012).9 We can thus more readily identify the causal factors of context 
that affect the intensity and variance of equality or, from a different point of view, 
how such a variance affects the ‘life chances’ of women and men living in our 
societies. On the first side, Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguish three varieties of 
capitalism. First, we have liberal market economies, associated with the so-called 
Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism, and we can certainly place the United Kingdom 
and, more generally, the United States, Australia, and Canada in this category. In 
this first group, economic growth and competitiveness are associated with high 
levels of inequality. Second, we find the coordinated market economies, which 
refer to the so-called Rhine pattern and include Germany (from among our 
cases), as well as Austria, Holland, and Switzerland. This model presents an inclu-
sive growth that can reconcile the competitiveness of companies, employment 
levels and the reduction of inequality (social market economy). The third pattern 
is made up of hybrid or mixed economies, and the cases to include are France and 
the Southern European countries.10 This solution, however, appears unsatisfactory 
6 Among the many aspects considered in the various regulatory arenas, some attention should be 
given to the role of trade unions in the various industrial relations systems, both in terms of unioniza-
tion rates, which are relevant in the United Kingdom and in Italy, and in terms of con sult ation and 
inclusion of trade unions in policy-making, which are relevant in Germany, but also in Spain and 
France (see Crouch, 2015). However, this salient aspect will not be explicitly addressed here as it is 
included in the models of capitalism (see Table 5.1).
7 As regards the working of the convergence mechanism among the dimensions that characterize 
the quality of democracy, see Morlino (2011).
8 On this analysis, see Trigilia (2017).
9 This mix of political and economic institutions characterizes what are known as ‘real-existing 
democracies’ (Schmitter, 2011). A meaningful analysis of the role of institutions is carried out by Lane 
and Ersson (2000).
10 There is a strong association between varieties of capitalism and welfare regimes. Thus, the 
Conservative welfare regime is mainly found in Continental Europe; the Liberal welfare regime is in 
Anglo-Saxon countries; the Social democratic welfare regime in Scandinavia; and the Assistential wel-
fare regime in South European countries (see Esping-Andersen, 1990). This and other classifications 
highlighted the difficulty of defining empirically the French case. It has been included into the con tin-
en tal model, but also into the Mediterranean one. This case, however, is characterized by a high 
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in the light of a large political economy literature, distinguishing more ac cur ate ly 
within this pattern between the French case, to be included in the coordinated 
market model or in a continental model with a strong presence of the State, and 
Spain and Italy characterized by low competitiveness and high in equal ity. Finally, 
Poland belongs to a post-communist pattern which shows sustained economic 
growth.11
As for the patterns of democracy, we refer to the well-known analysis by 
Lijphart (2012). Accordingly, democratic structures reflect two distinct principles 
aimed either at concentrating decision-making power in the government (major-
ity or competitive democracies) or spreading it among different institutions (con-
sensual or negotiated democracies).12 Each of these two fundamental principles 
influences all the features of a democratic regime, which can be grouped into two 
sets, one regarding the ‘executive-parties dimension’ and the other concerning 
the ‘unitary or federal dimension’.13 It is hardly necessary to note that the second 
set of institutional arrangements is particularly important for Germany and Spain 
(see Colomer, 2008). If, instead, we limit ourselves to considering the ‘system of 
government’, our cases can be placed along an ideal continuum that, based on the 
veto players (the less majoritarian the system is, the more relevant the veto play-
ers are), still goes from France to the United Kingdom, Spain, and Germany of 
the ‘democracy of the chancellor’, Poland and, finally, Italy.14
In Table 5.1, we tried to place our six empirical cases in the space of attributes 
derived from the intersection of economic and political factors. As seen in 
Chapter  2, the economic context is not irrelevant to the intensity of inequality 
and the trend over time. Nevertheless, what does ‘not irrelevant’ mean? 
Furthermore, above all, what place do the institutions have in our framework? 
economic productivity, the crucial role of the state and, until the 1980s, by the centrality of conserva-
tive parties and the strength of left-wing opposition.
11 For a more in-depth discussion, see Burroni (2016) and Trigilia (2017).
12 A different way of conceptualizing what is said in the text is to analyze the democratic regimes 
according to the number and salience of the veto players or veto rules that influence policymaking. 
Thus, consensual democracies have many veto players, which ultimately favours the status quo and 
limits policy change. Differently, majoritarian democracies are characterized by not having or having 
a few veto players (Tsebelis, 2002).
13 The first institutional set includes the following dimensions: (1) single-party or coalition cabinet; 
(2) dominance of the executive over the legislature, or equilibrium between the two powers; (3) num-
ber of parties and significant party system issues; (4) majoritarian or proportional electoral system; 
and (5) pluralistic or neo-corporative composition of interest groups. The second includes (6) degree 
of unitariness or federal decentralization; (7) strong or weak unicameralism or bicameralism; (8) a 
rigid or flexible constitution, to which the author adds another two aspects concerning; (9) the role of 
central banks; and (10) constitutional courts. A further separate dimension could be (11) the degree 
to which instruments of direct democracy, such as the various kinds of referenda, are used in 
that regime.
14 In Table 5.1, the position of Germany among the ‘consensual democracies’ must be explained 
with reference not so much to the electoral system but the federal structure and the system of inter-
medi ation of interests of the neo-corporative type, although softened during the second decade of the 
twenty-first century.
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Here, we consider the institutions (varieties of capitalism and models of 
 democracy) as ‘conditions of possibility’ (Mounk, 2018; see also Elster in Chapter 1), 
that is, as context factors that make specific policy outcomes more probable, in 
terms of ‘redistribution’ and/or ‘efficiency’ (see Tsebelis, 1990), or of equality and 
freedom.15
Institutions affect decisions and the type of policies (outputs) more directly, 
while their influence on factual situations (outcomes) is more indirect, sometimes 
even random. What connects the two levels, institutions and outputs/outcomes is 
a complex set of intervening variables: from the designed reforms with the 
accompanying rhetoric to their implementation and the stickiness of the bureau-
cracy, to factors that bypass the control of political actors—such as automatic 
 stabilizers (see above) or other structural factors (i.e., demographic phenomena, 
composition of the labour market, business behaviour, technological changes).
With these cautions, let us go back to the issue of the probability of institu-
tional contexts to influence social wellbeing. This occurrence is more favourable 
when it is associated with economic growth and the competitiveness of the 
productive and welfare sector, that is, a situation concerning Germany and 
15 The redistributive institutions are rules that transfer resources and, consequently, power from 
one social or territorial group to another. The institutions of the ‘efficiency’—in the Paretian sense—
create an equilibrium of all actors in a system of exchange.





















































Notes: (*) Semi-presidential democracy; (°) Federal democracy. Italy and United Kingdom are 
parliamentarian democracies with unitary states and different levels of regionalization. For Italy the 
period 1994–2011 refers to the first elections with a mixed proportional-majoritarian electoral law 
and to the resignation of the Berlusconi government (2011), before the Monti technocratic 
government (2011–13); the period 1948–92 to when there was the proportional electoral law. In 2017 
a new proportional was approved and implemented in 2018. For more on the outcomes (last row), see 
the analysis in Chapter 2.
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France.16 For these two countries, we should also take into account their historical 
and ideological legacies with related policy consequences. As is known, between 
the two systems there is the meaningful difference that the function of regulation 
and coordination in Germany tends to be carried out by concertation among 
interests while in France the bureaucracy and the State tradition plays a crucial 
role. Besides, both countries have a substantial segmentation of the labour market 
and a dualism of the welfare regime that fuels a categorical fragmentation and 
might have sustainability problems. However, the data we saw in Chapter 2 (see 
esp. Figure 2.1) highlight how France and Germany show a clear trend towards 
greater equality, despite more recent partial uncertainties in Germany.
To these two countries, we can also add Poland, a case of the ‘phoenix effect’, 
that is, a case of growth following a previous deconstruction of the political and 
economic system (collapse of the Soviet system) and its replacement with eco-
nomic institutions and inclusive, competitive policies. Indeed, Poland has high 
economic growth, which leads to a reduction in the level of economic and social 
inequality. The trends of the United Kingdom are declining concerning economic 
and social equality. However, it should not be forgotten that its position among 
the ‘liberal market economies’ structurally favours the individualization of new 
social risks and, therefore, increases the likelihood of inequality. The ‘mixed 
economies’ of Southern Europe, Italy, and Spain, are very differentiated vis-à-vis 
the ‘coordinated market economies’. Here, it seems that the determining factor is 
constituted by the structure of the economic system—with the four regulatory 
arenas mentioned above—and by its interrelations with the democratic system. 
These aspects are even more evident in the Italian case, where over time, the eco-
nomic configuration is associated with both patterns of democracy. That is, Italy 
is a consensual one until 1992; then with quasi-majoritarian features, albeit not 
irreversible (Morlino,  2014), until 2018, although with the Monti technocratic 
cabinet (2011–13) and, later on, with the elections of 2013, there was a crisis of 
bi-polarization (i.e., the possibility of an alternation in government between two 
parties or coalitions of parties) leading to post-elections cabinets.
In any case, for both Italy and Spain the majority pattern does not seem to 
work under the effects of the economic crisis and its medium- and long-term 
consequences. This is one of the most critical pieces of empirical evidence of the 
analysis in the performance of democracies. More precisely, and in general, in the 
Mediterranean variant of capitalism, a situation of ‘insecurity without competi-
tiveness’ prevails (Burroni, 2016, p. 173), and it is complemented by low growth, 
the weakness of trade unions, dualism in the labour market (with precarious-
ness), clientelism and ineffectiveness of the public bureaucracy. This last aspect 
regarding the bureaucracy has been labelled the ‘informal State’ (Sotiropoulos, 
16 As said above (see fn10), by some scholars, France is classified a hybrid economy, together with 
Italy and Spain. By others, it is inserted in the continental capitalism group, along with Germany.
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2004) or ‘distributive State’ (Ferrera, 2016). In these two countries, social cohe-
sion appears to be at risk, which fuels a general sense of insecurity similar to the 
situation in Greece. The impact of the Great Recession was more profound in 
precisely these countries. This was not only because the productive sector and the 
international competitiveness of companies were weaker, but also because the 
strict budget constraints that came into force with the treaty of Maastricht 1992, 
and the austerity policies imposed after the 2008 crisis, made the adoption of 
redistributive policies (the ‘providence State’) limited and in eff ect ive. The data we 
discussed in Chapter 2 confirm that since 2008 the growth of inequality has been 
greater in Italy and Spain than in the other countries, the situ ation of social pro-
tection spending has been worsening, while in Italy there has even been a consid-
erable growth in the risk of poverty. To these con sid er ations, we can add those 
relating to the ‘demand’ of national public opinions (see section 4.2). In this 
regard, we have seen the decisive shift in attention of the public opinions of our 
democracies towards equality. This mainly happened in Spain and Italy, and also 
in Poland since at least 2012, according to the data we have (see Figure 4.11).
The lesson we can draw from the points we have made so far is that political 
institutions are relevant but not decisive. Economic structural factors come first. 
However, the outcomes in terms of inequality are not predetermined. To quote 
Milanovic (2016, pp. 72–4), ‘it is this interplay between, on the one hand, these 
determinative economic forces, and, on the other hand, political and social 
forces. . . . The increase in the mean income that we observe is only a proxy for the 
economic forces at play; the change in inequality that we observe is the product of 
both these economic forces and political decisions.’ Moreover, a ‘naïve “economi-
cism” that looks only at the forces of supply and demand is insufficient to explain 
movements in income distribution. It is also wrong to focus only on institutions. 
Institutions and policies work within what economics allows: they are, if one 
wishes, “endogenous”... They break out of that framework only in exceptional 
cases of “political voluntarism”, which holds that it can dispense with economic 
limitations. But this seldom happens in capitalist societies and even less often (or 
never) in capitalist and democratic societies’.17 Thus, in our perspective, which 
focuses on equality, coordinated economies with or without majoritarian democ-
racies tend to have redistributive policy solutions and tend to correct in equal ities. 
Differently, competitive economies complemented by majoritarian political solu-
tions tend towards ‘subtraction’ (of resources and rights), or a winner-take-all 
17 The answers that democratic institutions and their leaders give to specific political and policy 
problems in the short term also depend on the history of their institutions and the interdependencies 
between the different types of institutions (in our case, economic and political ones). Indeed, as 
already stated, institutions tend to reflect a ‘convergence’ and consistency between underlying 
principles.
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game (Hacker and Pierson,  2010), which increases inequalities.18 Different 
 solutions provide relatively more uncertain results.
The analysis carried out to this point is not complete. We still have to deal with 
another aspect. As we saw in chapters 1 and 2, we ‘unpacked’ the root-concept of 
(in)equality in three components: economic, social, and ethnic. So far, we have 
left out the last one and referred only to the first two. However, we can now 
 integrate this third component into our analysis. As the data on immigration and 
citizens’ perceptions of the phenomenon (see section 2.3) show, we know that: (1) 
immigration has remained mostly stable over the years covered by our research 
(except for very selected peaks); (2) there is a clear intersection of the economic 
and ethnic equalities, above all in cases and moments when the level of crisis is 
high. This is the case of Italy and Spain, and, with less intensity, of France, while 
Germany and the United Kingdom have been more inclusive, although in recent 
years the cultural effects of immigration have been creating concerns in those 
countries as well. Poland is an exception to this. Since 2012 there has been a 
substantial decline in the acceptance of immigration (see also below).
If we link what we stated in Chapter 2 and the analytical framework (institu-
tional political and economic arrangements) we discussed in this section, it can 
easily be deduced that among democracies the majoritarian ones have a rather 
critical relationship with ethnic equality, concerning citizens’ perception, the gap 
between the evaluation of economic and cultural effects of immigration, and 
‘paranoid’ mobilization against foreigners.19 This is partly the result of the institu-
tional structures which, as we have seen, seem to magnify social tensions rather 
than absorbing them. If this is so then the political and social polarization, and 
the extent of it, are the critical factors. In this frame, the strategies of leaders and 
parties, both the new and traditional ones, see—to quote an expression by 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970)—in the ‘mobilization of prejudice’ a chance to maxi-
mize their earnings in terms of vote and office seeking. The ‘winner takes all’ logic 
produced by majoritarian institutional rules is compounded by the mental repre-
sentation of ‘us vs them’, thereby activating a vicious circle. The outcome is the 
growth of a ‘pernicious polarization’ (McCoy Somer,  2019) that bounces back 
into society from the political-electoral process.20
If we look at our cases, the salience of the migration issue derives either from 
the consequences of the economic crisis (Italy, Spain, and France) or from basic 
ideological orientations (Poland). In this context, the United Kingdom has a 
18 A variant of this type of reasoning is offered by Iversen and Soskice (2008), who show a strong 
correlation between proportional electoral systems, coalitions or leftist governments and redistribu-
tive policies.
19 We refer here to the work by Richard Hofstadter (1963).
20 Besides, as noted by Alessandro Pizzorno (2012, p. 212), for the complexity of economic policies 
and the inability of the voter to assess their meaning and scope, issues (and policy objectives) of iden-
tity or even morality can be more easily evaluated (because they solicit emotions).
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hybrid position, probably reflecting a longer (colonial) history of ‘multi-ethnic’, 
but divided society. Finally, Germany’s greater openness to immigrants is associ-
ated with the international competitiveness of the ‘social market economy’. It 
must also be said that, especially in the post-crisis phase of 2008–14, the cultural 
effects of migration began to raise concerns in the public opinions of the six 
countries (see Chapter  2, section 2.3). Our democracies have a neo-populist 
political offer that became stronger in the second half of 2010, with a continuous 
tension between people mobilization on an issue basis (social protest) as well as 
on identity (defence of borders). We will develop this distinction below.
5.4 The Relevant Actors: The Neo-Populist Challenge
If now we switch to the analysis of actors, we can recall that in the previous 
chapter we analysed inequality (and freedom) as a crucial content of real 
democracies with reference to citizens’ demands (section 4.2) and to the political 
party offer (section 4.3). More generally, comparative explanations for the 
 electoral success of new protest parties (or neo-populist parties) may emphasize 
one or another of three elements, or their intertwining: (1) the demand-side role 
of voters’ attitudes and actions; (2) the supply-side strategic appeals of parties 
and also of political leaders; and (3) the institutional rules of the game 
(Norris, 2005). We now return to this in order to illustrate the two hypotheses 
that we will discuss in this section.
First hypothesis: Independently of the available resources, if there are a more 
profound dissatisfaction and the consequent emergence of salient protest parties, 
there is a corresponding, adaptive institutional responsiveness with a possible 
consequent improvement of social rights and lowering of inequalities (see below, 
sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.4.3).
Second hypothesis: The stronger the leftist incumbent parties are, the better the 
implementation of social rights and the lower the inequalities will be (see below, 
section 5.5).
To check the first hypothesis, at the centre of our analysis, we place the inter-
mediate explanatory factors (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017, p. 39). This operation 
entails an epistemological and methodological choice aimed at finding the causal 
mechanisms of connection between macro-variables (dependent and independ-
ent ones). Micro factors can only give this link. They are, first of all, the individual 
orientations (specific evaluation attitudes) of women and men towards democ-
racy and the central institutions of political representation. In short, it is a pol it-
ical culture in one of its possible meanings. As will be seen in the next section, we 
chose to look at the degree of satisfaction/dissatisfaction of citizens concerning 
the functioning of their respective democracies. In this case, at least in our view, if 
positive, ‘satisfaction’ should be considered as the best indicator of perceived 
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responsiveness and, therefore, of legitimacy.21 Additional behaviours could be 
vote abstention and voting for protest parties rather than for mainstream parties. 
To quote Hirschman (1970), we can see this set of attitudes and behaviours in 
terms of the decline of ‘loyalty’ towards traditional parties and representative 
institutions in general; of ‘exit’, that is, the abandoning of the electoral market in 
the long term or the abandoning of traditional parties in the short term; and of 
‘voice’, namely as an appeal to the protest vote.
5.4.1 The New Protest Parties
Clarification is now needed. The trend of inequality seems to constitute (see 
Chapter 2) a structural aspect of advanced capitalist societies, partially mitigated 
by the institutional characteristics (see section 5.3) of capitalist systems and by 
models of democracy (see Table 5.1) and made sustainable by capacity produc-
tion of individual countries and their placement in the ‘international value chains’ 
(Giunta e Rossi, 2017), but also in the structure of the mobility of incomes and 
wages. In this context, the economic crisis with its specificities—intensity, propa-
gation, duration—has ‘opened the relationship system’ and represented a window 
of opportunity for innovation and political change.22 A direct consequence is the 
emergence and success of protest movements and populist or, in any case, new 
parties. This, however, is only one aspect of the mechanism due to the trans form-
ations of capitalism and the economic crisis (macro-micro-meso: structural 
 conditions-dissatisfaction-alternative mobilization). Starting from this point, 
another set of causal processes and interactions (micro-meso-macro) opens up, 
characterized by dissatisfaction and the spread of protest (social and political), 
which fuel the electoral success of neo-populist parties and their influence on the 
agenda of the incumbent governments in charge, even when they are not in 
 government. This opens spaces for redistributive policies, for combating new 
social risks and poverty, for guaranteeing social rights. In short, social cohesion 
climbs at the top of the agenda of governments even in conditions of weak, asym-
metrical growth (between countries and regions), of deterioration in the standard 
of living of citizens, and of a ‘secular stagnation’ (Jacobs and Mazzuccato, 2016).23
21 Here we can recall the classic distinction by David Easton (1965) between diffuse and specific 
support for the regime, which we could consider as mirrored by two types of legitimacy. The specific 
support/legitimacy can be closely associated with responsiveness.
22 Some factors to keep in mind in the action of this catalyzing effect include: the long-lasting 
decline of traditional political parties and dissatisfaction with representative institutions; but also 
more contingent factors such as the overlapping of crises starting from that of immigrants.
23 To the limited growth and the increase of inequalities (also due to the growing phenomenon of 
precarious work), Jacobs and Mazzuccato (2016) add the environmental crisis and the overheating of 
the ecosystem.
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As seen in Chapter 4, the dissatisfaction is in the background of the political 
choices and behaviour of voters. Here, we will limit ourselves to look specifically 
at voting for protest parties. Especially when there was an overlap with other 
 crises (immigrants, inter-state conflicts, EU foreign policy), the Great Recession 
worked as a ‘catalyst mechanism’ that strongly influenced the mobilization and 
competition models of the European democracies (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017). 
Overall, a convergence between a ‘security’ demand (both economic and cultural) 
and a ‘protest’ offer is favoured. Kriesi (2014) spoke of ‘protest populism’, which is 
characterized by:24
 (a) ‘the rise of new challengers in the party system’ (ibid., p. 368): they give 
voice to the ‘new structural conflict that opposes globalization losers to 
globalization winners’ (ibid., p. 369); during the second decade of the 
twenty-first century, in several European democracies, we have been wit-
nessing the appearance and in some cases the resounding success of new 
protest parties or populist (or neo-populist) parties, which are particularly 
effective in giving voice to the discontent and protest of social groups.
 (b) ‘the radical rejection’ of the political elite and mainstream parties (ibid.), 
with the parties of the traditional left and right government increasingly 
challenged by the new protest parties, while the political elites and institu-
tional (technocracies) lose legitimacy;
 (c) ‘the expansion of the conflict beyond the party system’ (ibid.) through the 
dissemination of nonconventional forms of political protest, such as 
 demonstrations, strikes and other forms of direct action.25
Here, we can include the phenomenon of the spread of unconventional partici-
pation, which was already putting down roots in the 1970s and has been talked 
about for some time as the ‘normalization of the unconventional’ (Fuchs, 1991). 
In recent decades, waves of protest, characterized by the emergence of social 
movements linked to globalization and to the transformation of capitalism itself, 
have also been shaking European societies. In particular, for our purposes, it is 
appropriate to distinguish between two cycles of protest: the wave of protests 
relating to the Global Justice Movement (GJM) of the 1990s, inspired by anti-
neoliberal and anti-globalization ideals; and the anti-austerity movements that 
sprang up in response to reactions to the 2008 crisis and its consequences in 
terms of restrictive budget policies, privatization, and the dismantling of welfare 
(Della Porta, 2015).
24 A further component of the protest is growing electoral abstention, though the trends vary in 
our countries.
25 A fourth possibility for the expression of dissatisfaction by voters is abstentionism, a sort of long 
term exit as the voter leaves the electoral market, while the protest vote can be considered a shortcut 
exit, as the voter remains in the market.
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Now, we can analyse the change that has been taking place in the format of the 
party systems of our democracies. Following Sartori (1976), these changes can be 
mainly grasped in the ‘format’ and ‘mechanics’ of party systems. Moreover, many 
indicators, such as voter turnout, electoral volatility, the effective number of par-
ties, the appearance of protest parties, would seem to suggest that political and 
electoral competition in European and Western democracies has been becoming 
increasingly centrifugal, and party systems themselves will be more ‘fluid’.26 Thus, 
the strategies of the actors in the field—of both the traditional parties and the 
new challenging protest parties—pursue or push voters towards extremes, with a 
consequent and increasingly ‘pernicious polarization’ (McCoy and Somer, 2019) 
of social relations as well, with fatal consequences for the quality of democracy. 
Our democracies are thus turning into ‘radicalized democracies’ (Morlino and 
Raniolo, 2017) or polarized democracies.
As we shall see later, in addition to the dissatisfaction, where this exists, 
 system-level polarization takes on importance in our analysis for two reasons. On 
the one hand, it reflects the emergence of neo-populist, protest parties, though we 
should also consider the strategies of mainstream parties, which may intention-
ally choose to radicalize electoral campaigns and relations with other parties and 
institutions (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). Among the possible examples, we can 
mention the relations between Berlusconi, the party oppositions and the magis-
tracy in Italy; the crispación in the relations between the Spanish Popular Party of 
Rajoy and the Socialist Party of Zapatero after the 2004 elections; and the referen-
dum on Brexit (2016) in the UK ‘invented’ by Prime Minister Cameron for pol it-
ical reasons that were inherent to his party. On the other hand, the growing 
systemic polarization reflects a society that is pervaded by tensions, resulting, for 
example, from the growth of inequality and the risk of a worsening of the eco-
nomic conditions of the middle classes. The mobilization of resentment and the 
social construction of the enemy—first, immigrants or internal minorities—readily 
follow, contributing to further polarization. In this context, the strategic dilemma 
of the parties between ‘preference-shaping (trying to convince voters to see things 
your way) rather than preference-accommodating (adapting your pol icies to their 
views)’ (Bale, 2010, p. 119) distinguishes populist parties and, generally, electoral 
parties, more oriented towards the accommodation.
The data presented in Table 5.2, calculated on the basis of an algorithm 
 proposed by Dalton (2008) for the distinct elections, seem to underestimate the 
26 In the new edition of his famous 1976 work, brought out to mark the 40th anniversary of its 
original publication, Sartori (2016,esp. chapter  8) emphasized the process of fluidization of parties 
and party systems in Western democracies and the possible consequences. About half a century ago 
such a phenomenon was a distinguishing feature of African politics but is now becoming a reality in 
contemporary Europe. Among our cases, Poland, but also Italy, display stable fluidization of the party 
system. For an analysis of the changes of party systems in Europe during the twentieth century, see 
Ignazi (2017). 
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effective polarization of the party system, and its radicalization,27 but they do give 
us two significant pieces of information. First, during the time we are considering 
there was an evident increase of polarization in four of the six democracies; while 
the trend is more controversial for Poland, where, however, there was a significant 
increase in the 2015 elections, resulting in a fluctuating diachronic trend. Second, 
France stands out as the political polarization tended to shrink there as an effect 
of institutional drives. However, this was not so for political radicalization, which 
may even be pushed by those same majoritarian institutions and is graphically 
reflected in the protracted protest of the gilets jaunes or yellow vests movement in 
2018–19. Third, the United Kingdom also displays the highest growth of polariza-
tion, from 0.29 to 0.41, revealing the radicalization of the Labour Party under its 
leader Jeremy Corbyn after the years of moderation under the leadership of Blair.
To discuss the reasons for these complex changes would require an in-depth, 
specific analysis that would divert us from the goal of trying to explain the pres-
ence and transformations of the two objective values  of democratic regimes 
(equality and freedom). However, there is no doubt that much of the polarization 
or radicalization process is the product of the appearance and success of what we 
might call ‘new protest parties’ (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017, esp. chapter 4). In 
some of our countries, these parties immediately (or almost immediately) became 
relevant political actors. Following the ‘rules for counting’ suggested by Sartori 
(1976, pp. 121–5), they achieved a high ‘blackmail potential’ and even a ‘coalition 
potential’,28 but above all have been able to channel the potential for widespread 
27 Here, it seems necessary to recall the distinction between polarization and radicalization. The 
first implies that political competition takes place through aggregation around two poles (or coali-
tions), which are not necessarily radical (as was the case for many decades in the UK), while the rad-
icalization of political issues results in a distancing among policy proposals and disappearance of 
moderate positions (see Morlino, 1981, pp. 41–5).
28 ‘Coalition potential’ and ‘blackmail potential’ refer to ‘parties that have either a governmental 
relevance in the coalition-formation arena or a competitive relevance in the oppositional arena’ 
(Sartori, 1976, p. 123). This outcome is the product of several structural transformations and contin-
gent events—among which the 2008 economic crisis has a prominent place—which has significantly 
lowered the ‘entry barriers’ to the new parties (Raniolo, 2013).
Table 5.2 Polarization index in six countries (1992–2018)
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
France 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.34    
Germany 0.34 0.40 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.43 0.45   
Italy 0.41 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.49   
Poland 0.39 0.39 0.46 0.38 0.39 0.26 0.35   
Spain 0.41 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.46 0.53 0.55  na
United Kingdom 0.38 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.37 0.38 0.41   
Source: www.parlgov.org.
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dissatisfaction in society as a result of the economic crisis and, in some cases, of 
the worsening of equality (see Chapter 2).
To give an account of these changes, let us take a more general look at the 
European countries (see Table 5.3). It is easy to see (column 3) that the success of 
the new protest parties, challengers or neo-populists (but also simply of a new 
party such as LREM in France)—votes for which have been steadily growing 
since the early 1990s—was dramatic in the years following the Great Recession.29 
However, for a large part of the twentieth century the so-called ‘freezing proposi-
tion’ (Lipset and Rokkan,  1967, p. 50)30 was the rule and, accordingly, the 
European party systems presented a substantial continuity. The appearance of 
‘significant’ new parties was a rarity, as was the transformation of party systems. 
In a sense, the electoral markets of Western democracies have been fundamen-
tally stable. Electoral volatility would have become a crucial aspect of the new 
policy only starting from the 1980s and 1990s. The long-term perspective reveals 
how such volatility or instability is not an absolute novelty. Indeed, the electoral 
history of Western democracies shows a U-shaped pattern as high volatility was 
typical of elitist political systems of the nineteenth century. Later, there has been a 
long period of stability during the first half of the twentieth century, and a return 
to the high volatility during the last thirty years constituted a real opportunity for 
the emergence of new successful parties.31
From Table 5.3 we see that the 42 recorded cases—in some cases the same 
party has been counted more than once—are all related to elections that have 
been held since 2012 and where the parties won 10% or more of the vote (see the 
complete table in the Appendix, Table. 5.A1). In 26 cases the new parties won 
between 10% and 19%. In five cases the voting percentages far exceeded 20 points: 
the Freedom Party of Austria with 26% (in 2017), La République En Marche! with 
28.2% (also in 2017), SYRIZA with 27% (in 2012), and M5S with 26% (2013), 
while the Jobbik party in Hungary remained at 20% in the two most recent elec-
tions. There are also some even more striking results, with peaks of 37.6% in 
Poland with the Law and Justice (PiS) in 2015 and 43.6% in 2019, 35.5% in Greece 
with Syriza (in 2015), 32.7% in Italy (in 2018) with the M5S (Five Star Movement). 
But see also the case of Bulgaria were the right-wing party Citizens for European 
Development got over 30% in the three elections here considered. It hardly needs 
noting that three out of the four most successful cases are included in the 
democracies examined here. Moreover, as can be seen from the last column in 
29 More precisely, En Marche and Ciudadanos can be classified as ‘insider challenge to the incum-
bent political establishment’, as they are not characterized by the recurrent ideological features of neo-
populism, one of them being the anti-elitism.
30 That is, the party alignments of the 1960s reflected the socio-economic divisions or cleavages of 
the 1920s.
31 For the analysis of the U-shaped pattern see Mair (1997); for a more recent research on volatility 
see Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2017) and Emanuele and Chiaramonte (2018).
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Table 5.3 New and neo-populist parties: the European picture (2012–2019)  
(more than 10%)
Party Name Elec Year Votes (%) Seats Party name L-R Foundation
Year
Austria 2013 20.5 40 Fredom Party of 
Austria (FPÖ)
8.3 1949
  2017 26.0 51 – – –
  2019 16.2 31 – – –





  2014 32.7 84 – – –
  2017 33.5 95 – – –
Czech Rep. 2013 18.7 47 Action of 
Dissatisfied Citizens
6 2012
  2017 29.6 78 – – –
Germany 2017 12.6 94 Alternative for 
Germany
8.7 2013
Estonia 2019 17.8 19 Conservative 
People’s Party of 
Estonia
n.a. 2012
Spain 2015 12.7 42 Podemos 1.2 2014
  2016 13.4 45 – – –
  2019 14.3 42 Unidos Podemos 1.2 2014
  2019I 12.8 35   – –
  2015 13.4 40 Ciudadanos 6 2005
 2016 13.0 32 – – –
 2019 15.9 57 – – –
 2019II 6.8 10 – – –
 2019 10.3 24 Vox 8 2013
 2019II 15.1 52 – – –
France 2017 28.2 308 La République En 
Marche!
6 2016
  2017 11.0 17 La France Insoumise 1.2 2016




  2012 26.9 71 – – –
  2015 35.5 145 – – 2013
  2019 31.5 86 – – –
 2012 10.6 33 Independent Greeks 
(ANEL)
8.7 2012
Hungary 2014 20.2 23 Jobbik- Jobbik 
Movement for a 
Better Hungary
8.7 2003
  2018 19.1 25 – – –
Iceland 2016 14.1 10 Pirate Party 2.5 2012
Continued
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Table 5.3 (foundation year), 15 parties were established after 2008 in the context 
of the Great Recession.32 Finally, of these new political formations, ten are situ-
ated on the right or far-right (with LR scale values  equal to or greater than 7) and 
six on the extreme left (with values  less than 3).
Therefore, there is no exaggeration to claims that not only have the turbulence 
and uncertainty of the electoral markets and party systems become chronic in 
recent years, but also that citizens feel they are living through a real ‘historical 
crisis’ (Reynié, 2013; Mény, 2019). Such a crisis involves state institutions (first of 
all, those of welfare and security); the quality of representative institutions; and 
the relations between state and market. Some authors contend that the very sur-
vival of the political institutions of modernity, as we have known them in Europe 
for some centuries now, is now at stake.33
In Table 5.4, we limited the analysis to our six cases and included the main left-
wing political formations whose issues are more directly related to the equality 
dimension (see section 5.3). We also included right-wing formations, to consider 
all the parties that because of their placement and competitive strategies, have 
been favouring the polarization and radicalization of the related party systems.34
32 We excluded the League as the date of its foundation is 1991, despite the radical renewal it 
underwent in 2013 under the leadership of Salvini.
33 Yuval Noah Harari (2018) underlines the definitive crisis of the three ‘great narratives’ of the 
twentieth century (Fascist, Communist, and Liberal) and how the revolution of new digital technolo-
gies has favoured this. The radical changes at the international level are not without consequence for 
the analysis of equality, and are well analyzed by Parsi (2018).
34 For the distinction between polarization and radicalization see fn 27.
Table 5.3 Continued
Party Name Elec Year Votes (%) Seats Party name L-R Foundation
Year
Italy 2018 17.3 123 League of Salvini – 2013 (1991)
  2013 25.6 108 Five Star Movement 5 2009
 2018 32.7 225 – – –
Latvia 2014 16.6 17 National Alliance 8.2 2011
  2018 11.0 13 – – –
Netherlands 2012 10.8 15 Party for Freedom 8.8 2006
  2017 13.1 20 – – –
Poland 2015 37.6 235 Law and Justice 7.7 2001
 2019 43.6 235 – – –
Romania 2012 14.0 47 People’s Party—Dan 
Diaconescu
1.2 2011
Slovakia 2016 11.0 19 – – –
United 
Kingdom
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The data in Table 5.4 show a high differentiation of the electoral consensus for 
the parties in the various elections held over the twenty years, and in these cases, 
the averages are of little use. In the light of what was said above about the appear-
ance of significant new parties, it is better to consider the parties with relatively 
high percentages of consent. This criterion, however crude, allows us to allocate 
the political parties considered into three significant groups. In a first group, we 
find four parties, all above the threshold of 20 percentage points: LRM (28.20) in 
France, M5S (32.7%) in Italy, PiS (37.6%) in Poland and Podemos (21.2%) in 
Spain, at least until 2016. The picture in Spain changed with the 2019 first elec-
tions. Once again the coalition with the left (Unidos Podemos) was not successful, 
and the 14.3% is about 7 points lower than previous elections, putting the ‘elect-
or al cartel’ of protest in fourth place after the PSOE (28.7%), PP (16.7%) and 
Ciudadanos (15.9%) and immediately before the radical rightist Vox (10.3%), the 
real surprise of the last elections.35 In the 2019 second election, Unidos Podemos 
loses 1.5 points (12.8%), and Ciudadanos 9 (6.8%).
In the second group, there are parties with an electoral performance within the 
10–19% range. However, the picture is more differentiated for both variability of 
consensus and timing of the elections when the best results are won. In this group 
we find the Germans of AfD (12.6%), and of Die Linke (11.9% in the 2009 
elections);36 the French FN, with an average of 11.4% in all the elections, that is, 
above the 10-point threshold (except in 2007 when it received 4.3%); the 
Mélenchon movement, which obtained 11% in the last elections, a result that was 
similar to that of the Front de Gauche in the 1990s; the Italians of the Lega di 
Salvini (Salvini League) (17.4), but also the Alleanza Nazionale (National 
Alliance—AN), whose best result was 15.6% in 1996; and finally the Spanish of 
Ciudadanos  with an average of 14% in the last three elections and the British of 
the UKIP, who won over 12% in the 2005 elections. However, in the 2019 elec-
tion, the party led by Farage, i.e., the Brexit Party, only won 2%. A new entry is 
the Spanish right-wing and nationalist party Vox with 10.3% and 15% in the 
November 2019 election. Founded in 2013 after a split within the Popular Party 
(PP), Vox obtained 16.2% in the Andalusia regional elections in the autumn of 
2018. As we can see the trends seem positive especially for AfD, FN, Lega, and 
UKIP, all four of which we can label as right-wing populists (see below).
Finally, there is the third group of smaller parties that have not reached the 
10% threshold in any election and are mostly the parties of the radical left in Italy 
35 When we analyse Italy, it is perhaps appropriate to mention GoItaly! (FI) as well, led by 
Berlusconi, which carried significant weight in the polarization process of the post-1994 Italian pol it-
ical system (Morlino et al.,  2013). We need only add that in the time frame considered here FI 
obtained an average level of consensus of 24%. It has negative trend, and in the 2018 elections had its 
worst result (14%).
36 In the last ten years another protest party that has had some success at the state level, but less at 
the federal level, is the Pirate Party. Founded in 2006, it obtained its best result in the 2009 federal 
elections, with 2%, which was below the threshold for access to the Bundestag.
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(PdRC/RC, PdCI, Si) and Sinn Féin in the United Kingdom. To them, we can add 
two right-wing parties: the Fratelli d’Italia in Italy and the Kukiz’15 in Poland.
As seen in Table 5.4, in addition to the variability (over time and between the 
different cases) of electoral consensus, our six countries are distinguished by 
the presence of new protest parties. In particular, this is quite significant in 
Italy, Spain, Poland, and France. Except for Spain, in the other three cases, the 
new parties became governing actors after the outcome of the last elections. We 
will return to these countries later, linking the emergence of populist parties 
with two distinct components of equality (economic and ethnic). For now, if for 
the sake of clarity we recall the hypothesis we addressed earlier (if there are 
more profound dissatisfaction and stronger protest parties, there is correspond-
ing responsiveness with a possible consequent improvement of social rights and 
lowering of in equal ities), we can sum up our empirical results thus far. The 
growing dissatisfaction with democracy (particularly evident in Spain and Italy, 
but also in France) and the polarization of the party system (again quite evident 
in Spain and Italy, but also in Germany) established the conditions for the 
emergence and development of new protest parties. This occurred in Spain and 
Italy. Furthermore, in 2018–19, in both countries, there is a ‘bilateral opposi-
tion’ (Podemos, Ciudadanos and Vox in Spain; M5S and Lega, FdT in Italy). 
Moreover, until early September 2019, in Italy, the government was formed by a 
coalition between the M5S and the League. In France, instead, the crisis of the 
traditional parties has favoured the formation of a new technocratic party 
(LREM). A right-wing populist party has been successful and is also in govern-
ment in Poland (PiS), but in this case, as said, the prevailing ‘domain of identifi-
cation’ is of a sovereign, religious and anti-immigration type. In Germany, 
finally, the ‘great coalition’ between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats 
is increasingly weak in the face of the challenge posed in this case too by a 
 double opposition (AfD and Die Linke). Thus, overall, this analysis seems to 
confirm our first hypothesis: a greater dissatisfaction and the growth of new 
protest parties push incumbent leaders to be more responsive. Consequently, 
those actors push their democracies to be more respectful of social rights, and 
eventually less unequal.
5.4.2 Neo-Populism, Protest, and Political Consequences
Going back to the hypothesis on dissatisfaction, protest parties, and a cor res-
pond ing, adaptive institutional responsiveness (see above), it can also be em pir ic-
al ly checked by looking at the political consequences of the appearance of new 
protest parties. With some simplification, we can imagine four synchronization 
patterns, to quote Almond and Powell (1978), between demands from citizens 
and political responses, and a residual fourth one.
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 1. Spain (social and political ‘voice’): the social movement Indignados and the 
subsequent institutionalization through the formation of Podemos, which 
in alliance with the radical left proposes equality and redistributive and 
active citizenship policies; Unidos Podemos entered a governmental coali-
tion in January 2020;
 2. Italy (political ‘voice’ and anti-party sentiment): the M5S immediately insti-
tutionalized the protest against the ‘casta’, i.e., the establishment, formed a 
government with the League of Salvini after the elections of 2018 and 
another government with the Democratic Party since September 2019; 
M5S proposed forms of direct participation and not always coherent pol-
icies to fight poverty (in particular, citizenship income) (see Chapter 2 for 
further details);
 3. France (establishment reaction and social ‘voice’): the Macron presidency 
and the protracted protest of the gilets jaunes prompted the government to 
propose policies of assistance and support to calm social unrest and fight 
unemployment;
 4. Poland (nationalist loyalty cum distributive policies): the electoral success 
of the PiS favours the consolidation of nationalist and conservative 
 governments, with a distributive policy profile, profiting of favourable 
 economic conditions.
Let us add that in Germany and United Kingdom there are neither similar 
social and political protest movements,37 nor new distributive policies. Moreover, 
as we have seen, countries have different developments. In the first two countries, 
there has been a partial strengthening of the left, which had a subsequent (2019) 
decline in the UK with the Labour Party, while the Social Democrats were able to 
keep their votes and Die Linke became stronger in Germany.38 However, here 
there is a significant difference between Germany and the United Kingdom, 
which brings the latter closer to the other four cases. As already mentioned (see 
5.4.1), the ‘populist reaction’ has substantially affected our six cases, although 
remaining rather limited in Germany. In three cases (Italy, Spain, and Poland) it 
produced the appearance of new populist protest parties (see below), which on 
two occasions became incumbent. In two cases, the reaction was internal to the 
technocratic establishment and aimed at ‘modelling the preferences’ of the voters 
by introducing reforms (France), or more traditional and aimed at ‘matching 
their preferences’ (see Bale,  2010) with the protection of national interests 
through Brexit (United Kingdom).
37 We can only mention here the anomic urban riots and disorder that took place in different 
waves, for example, in the suburbs of London and of other important English cities in 2011.
38 For the electoral results of these parties, see Table 5.4. Let recall here that PiS is a party that 
complements traditional nationalist positions on the family and the community with strong welfare 
policies (see above and chapter 2).
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We can now look a little bit in-depth to these cases, all characterized by the 
preference-accommodating orientation of our parties, starting with Spain (for the 
role of governments, see section 5.5). In 2011, protest and social malaise resulted 
in the birth of the Indignados or 15M movement. At the heart of this ‘social uni-
verse in movement’ there was the demand for a more authentic participatory 
democracy and a revival of social citizenship. Using the slogan que se vayan todos 
and no nos representan, the main targets of the Indignados were the PP and the 
PSOE, the two main partisan actors in Spanish politics up to that moment. 
Podemos—we can, but also Po(wer) and demos(people)—took up these challenges 
in 2014, establishing an autonomy vis-à-vis the social movement.
Moreover, its opposition to the traditional parties, especially to the PSOE and 
IU, does not appear so absolute as to preclude the possibility of collaborations and 
coalitions, or of acting as a possible ally in a progressive government.39 In the 
electoral campaign for the 2015 general election, Podemos claimed its main 
ob ject ive was to defeat the PP in order to create a progressive government along 
with IU or with the PSOE (especially if it obtained more votes than the latter). 
Finally, in 2016, it participated together with IU in a single list (Unidos Podemos), 
but with a disappointing outcome. The two parties together lost votes in both 
absolute and percentage terms compared to six months earlier (–3.3%). There was 
a strategic dilemma between the aspiration to appear different from other parties 
and the need to collaborate. In fact, this interpretation seems the correct one if we 
look at the results of the last elections in March 2019. The coalition of the radical 
left Unidos and Podemos obtained 14.3% of the vote (7% less and 29 seats fewer 
than in the 2016 elections) and was overtaken by Ciudadanos with 15.9% (up 3 
points and 25 seats compared to 2016). However, the electoral success (April 
2019) of the extreme right Vox party, with 10.3% approval and 24 seats should 
also be mentioned. This competitive issue is also present in the November 2019 
elections, which pushed the axis of the Spanish party system to the right with the 
PP growing from 16.7% to 20.8% (against PSOE, which remains the first party 
with 28%) and above all, the success of Vox that wins 15.1% of votes, while both 
Unidos Podemos (–1.5) and Ciudadanos (–9.1) lose electoral support.
As for Italy, in the years of the crisis the spreading out of the protest seemed to 
be missing. Unlike other countries, such as Spain and Greece, in Italy there was 
no anti-austerity mass movement, with the result that social protest remained 
largely fragmented (Della Porta and Mosca, 2015). Here, the electoral-party chan-
nel remains dominant, through an electoral demand and an party supply that tend 
to ‘leapfrog over’ the mainstream parties.40 In this context, the M5S transformed 
39 Indeed, this happened after the municipal elections in Barcelona and Madrid (2015).
40 This happened in the 1980s with the phenomenon of the ‘leagues’ in the Northern regions, in the 
1994 crisis with the emergence of Forza Italia, and more recently, in the 2013 election, with the suc-
cess of the M5S and, in the 2018 election, also of Salvini’s League.
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the potential protest that existed in the society into a useful tool to enter and 
change institutions from the inside.
M5S was officially founded on 14 October 2009. The main objective of the M5S 
was to fight against the Republican political class, regarded as deeply corrupt and 
intent above all on protecting their privileges. On several occasions, Beppe Grillo 
said: ‘we will open up parliament like a can of tuna’ (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017, 
p. 67). In the political elections of 2013, M5S was the most voted party (with 
25.6%), but the centre-left coalition obtained the absolute majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies and only a relative majority in the Senate. The situation 
changed with the 2018 elections, when the M5S was the undoubted winner with 
32.7% of the vote, though this was not enough to give it a parliamentary majority 
to form a one-party cabinet. After lengthy negotiations, the M5S and the League 
of Salvini formed a coalition government, with the signing of a written ‘contract’ 
between the two parties. The policies supported by both parties are ‘distributive’, 
but in opposite ways: the M5S holds positions close to the radical left and sup-
ports a policy of fighting against poverty, unemployment, and privileges. At the 
same time, the League of Salvini is more focused on the reduction of taxes, anti-
immigration and competition between regions. In 2019 a governmental crisis 
ended with a new coalitional cabinet between M5S and Democratic party (PD), 
but at the same time the change from protest party to incumbent one had been 
bringing about an electoral decline.
Now we come to France. The 2017 French presidential elections were held 
between April and May, with eleven candidates competing in the first round, 
none of whom achieved an absolute majority. The second round included Marine 
Le Pen of the Front National and the young Emmanuel Macron, who presented 
himself as the leader of a ‘personal party’ expression of the French economic and 
institutional establishment, La République En Marche!41 and won the presidency 
with 66% of the votes. In the subsequent elections for the National Assembly, his 
party won 28.2% of the votes and 308 seats, becoming the leading party in the 
country. Although in his book Revolution, published in 2016, he defines himself 
as a leftist and a liberal, his politics can be defined as centrist with a marked 
techno crat ic profile.
About one year after the beginning of his mandate, in November 2018, Macron 
has been coping with a widespread social protest as a reaction to his reform pol-
icies, the movement of Gilets Jaunes. According to data from the French Ministry 
of the Interior, the first demonstrations mobilized over 280,000 citizens, a num-
ber that would drop significantly in the first months of 2019 to a few thousand 
demonstrators on the streets of Paris. After a few months of negotiations with the 
41 The conspicuous financial support the new party was able to collect for the presidential elections 
(about €3.7 million) highlights the role of the economic establishment in the success of Macron and 
his party.
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government, the leaders of the movement, which was rather fragmented 
 in tern al ly, did manage to get the French authorities to take measures to ‘appease 
social anger’.42 Notwithstanding this, the protest has been going on with more 
radicalized and on occasions violent expressions. For example, Paris suffered the 
longest uninterrupted strike of public transport in its history, from December 
2019 through January 2020 (about seven weeks).
Finally, in 2001 the Kaczynski twins founded the Law and Justice (PiS) party, a 
conservative and nationalist party in Poland. After a non-flamboyant start, in the 
2005 elections, PiS won 27% of the votes becoming the relative majority party and 
was able to have Lech Kaczynski, who died in a plane crash in 2010, at the presi-
dency of the Republic. Ten years later, the PiS became the dominant party on the 
Polish political scene: in the 2015 parliamentary elections, it obtained 37.6% (and 
235 seats out of the total of 460 in the Sejm and 61 in the Senate) and won the 
presidential election with Andrzej Duda. The success of 2015 was mainly due to 
broad public support for its expansive welfare programs and promises of greater 
economic equality. In the 2019 election, PiS had resounding success with 43.6% 
of votes.43 Thus, PiS remains the most popular party in Poland despite a string of 
scandals that seemed to erode the support and cast some doubts about the possi-
bility of retaining the parliamentary majority. However, the country’s sound eco-
nomic situation has allowed PiS to resort to distribution policies: ‘A person whose 
pockets are empty isn’t free’, Kaczynski, Poland’s de facto leader, told supporters at 
a party convention. ‘We are filling these pockets, within what’s possible.’ At the 
same time, the PiS presents a strongly identifying, nationalist, conservative and 
clerical program, contrary to gay unions, euthanasia and the liberalization of 
drugs. As Garton Ash (2019, p. 180) rightly stresses, ‘Law and Justice ideologists 
talked, tellingly, about “the redistribution of respect” and “the redistribution of 
dignity” ’, and in doing so the party gained the support of most of the Polish 
society.
As Hirschman (1970) observed, exit and voice act as feedback mechanisms 
capable of remedying the decline in the ‘performance’ of democratic institutions. 
On some occasions, this may imply introducing significant democratic in nov-
ations. In our case, the voice and loyalty, characterized by the four patterns pre-
sented at the beginning of this section, indicate an attempt by the challenging 
political elites (and the new protest parties) to successfully mobilize the dissatis-
faction and resentment of the voters and transforming them into promises of new 
representation with the consequent government actions. In this sense, respon-
siveness increases, even if at the expense of responsibility.
42 See the Breaking News of WallStreetItalia.com on the gilets jaunes.
43 And 52% of seats (235 out of 460). At the Senate PiS won 48 seats out of 100. But. on the one 
hand, there are four independents and, on the other, the Senate has a subordinate legislative power 
vis-à-vis the Sejm. It may reject or amend the bills passed by the Lower Chamber, but an absolute 
majority of the Sejm can overrule any rejection or amendment.
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5.4.3 The Neo-Populist Dilemma: Redistribution vs Identity
To clarify our analysis, we can now dwell on the differentiation between the types 
of neo-populism. From this point of view the Great Recession has worked as a 
catalyst mechanism in various directions and has favoured the formation of a 
more open and sensitive public debate agenda in the fight against inequality 
issues. The paradigm of the so-called ‘third way’ has been influencing the political 
competition between parties in Western Europe before the 2008 crisis. The ‘third 
way’, inspired by US President Clinton and the British Labour Party leader, Tony 
Blair, was the result of the search for an alternative or compromise between the 
liberal and Thatcherian economic policies of the right, and those of the left. The 
Great Recession changed the picture: ‘there is evidence that the Great Recession 
ended the neo-liberal convergence, i.e., parties distinguished themselves again by 
different economic positions’ (Bremer, 2018, pp. 31–2). As we saw in Figure 4.13, 
this shift of emphasis in party programmes and the issues of the electoral cam-
paign concerns all parties, even those of the centre-right. However, if we look 
beyond the general trend, characterized by an institutional isomorphism or the 
tendency (of institutions, political organizations or public policies) to take the 
same ‘form’, the same pattern, aimed at acquiring social legitimacy for the parties, 
we get a picture that helps to distinguish the radical leftist parties from the mod-
erate leftist ones. In particular, while the social-democratic parties tended to 
move more towards the left on issues such as the stance on the liberal economy 
and above all welfare (more precisely, the defence of it), they continue to be closer 
to the positions of the centre-right parties on fiscal policies and budgetary aus-
terity.44 At the same time, this ambivalence opens up a ‘competition space’ for the 
parties of the radical left as much as for the right-wing neo-populist parties.
At this point, some clarification is required. A distinction between right-
wing populist parties and left-wing ones has already been established in the 
literature—often with the addition of the adjective ‘radical’ (see, e.g., 
Mudde 2016).45 Here, however, we prefer to follow another typologization that 
absorbs the previous one and allows us to distinguish between open or inclu-
sive populist parties (left) and closed or exclusive populists (right).46 Elsewhere 
we have already proposed this distinction based on four criteria: ideology, 
44 Bremer (2018, p. 32) pointed out how, along with the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), the Italian 
Democratic Party (PD) has been one of the few large centre-left parties that ‘shifted to the right and 
adopted a more ambiguous position towards the welfare state during the crises’.
45 Table 5.3 indicates the placement of the different parties along the left-right divide.
46 Unlike what happens in Western Europe, the experience of the United States, Latin America, 
Asia and even Eastern Europe itself makes it necessary to include the parties of the radical left in the 
analysis of populism (Inglehart and Norris, 2016, p. 8). In the European literature of the 1990s, popu-
lism concerned far-right parties (Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007).
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communication style, organization-leadership model, and social situation of 
reference (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017, pp. 76–80).
Below we discuss this theme in greater depth. However, the distinction 
between exclusionary and inclusionary populism was made by Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2013). They also use it to distinguish not only different types of par-
ties but also two different traditions of populism in different areas of the world: 
the more inclusive one in Latin America and the more exclusive one in Europe, 
which is also more recent in its mass dimensions, i.e., since the 1990s. The two 
types of populism differ in the emphasis placed respectively on the ‘material 
dimension’, i.e., distribution of state resources (monetary or not-monetary); the 
‘political dimension’, the structure of opportunities for political participation; and 
on the ‘symbolic dimension’, which ‘essentially alludes to setting the boundaries of 
“the people” and, ex adverso, “the elite” ’ (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013, 
p. 164).
An interesting aspect that is useful for our discussion is that the two types of 
populism, even in their geopolitical characterization, clearly reflect two different 
dimensions: the socio-economic one associated with the problem of equality and 
poverty, and the cultural and security one relating to the problem of identity. In 
connection to the former, we can see a leftist or inclusionary populism or, better, 
a revendicative populism. In connection to the latter, a rightist or exclusionary 
populism or an identitarian populism.47 This distinction is only partly similar to 
the one made by Inglehart and Norris (2016). According to them, the positioning 
of parties differentiates left and right populisms for the main economic issues 
(market, welfare, individualism). And, in any case, populist parties are exclusionary 
or closed parties. In our distinction, exclusionary populist or right-wing parties 
are mainly ‘entrepreneurial identities’ or, if preferred, sovereigntists, nativists and 
communitarians. Although present, these aspects are not central to the inclusion-
ary or leftist post-sovereign populists.
In Table 5.4, we have indicated in bold the identitarian populist or exclusionary 
parties and in standard font the revendicative or inclusionary populists. However, 
the attribution of empirical cases poses a classificatory problem, as neither the 
M5S nor the Macron movement can readily be considered to belong to one of 
those two categories. The République en Marche! has the unusual traits of a top-
down or ‘president’s party’, with a strong technocratic and, at the same time, anti-
political connotation. The M5S has an ambiguous profile, which becomes even 
more apparent when we switch our attention from the cultural dimension (mainly 
connected to the issue of immigration) to its position on socio-economic issues.48 
Both are hybrid cases, and therefore we have indicated them in italics in the table. 
47 For an original perspective on the analysis of party position, see De Sio and Weber (2014).
48 Citizen income, approved in 2019, should be seen as part of a distributive policy. It is, however, a 
selective one, as restrictions are imposed on non-citizens (see chapter 2).
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But what is more interesting is that only in Spain, at least until 2019, is there a 
prevalence of inclusionary populists (Podemos and, in some features, Ciudadanos). 
In all other cases, identitarian and exclusionary populisms prevail.49
It is worth dwelling further on this distinction, because it has a strong connec-
tion with the distinction between economic and social (in)equality, on the one 
hand, and ethnic (in)equality, on the other (see chapters 1 and 2). It is also related 
to the different perception of the economic and cultural effects of ethnic in equal-
ity (i.e., immigration)—with the latter, as we have seen, becoming increasingly 
relevant in public perception of the democracies under scrutiny. Inglehart and 
Norris (2016, p. 3) already pointed out that an adequate explanation of populism 
must consider the interaction between two theories that emphasize economic 
inequality or the cultural backlash.
Moreover, our data allow us to state that while economic-social inequality 
 carries more weight in the Mediterranean countries and France, especially after 
the 2008 crisis, the other one is central concerning Poland and, more generally, to 
all the countries in the ‘Visegràd group’, which, besides Poland, includes the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. As we have seen from Table 5.4, all the countries 
we analysed are affected by a crisis of the mainstream parties and the success of 
new protest parties. This different (populist) political offer has taken the two paths 
indicated above: that of identitarian populism and that of revendicative populism.
Where the economic crisis has weighed most profoundly, the latter prevailed, 
and this was a situation that characterized Southern Europe, while in the other 
cases the former prevailed. In the first group of cases, the line of political conflict 
was characterized by the contrast between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ (security 
problem linked to economic and social inequality). In the second group, the con-
trast was mainly between ‘us and them’ (a problem of identity linked to ethnic or 
cultural inequality). The first mainly prevails in countries where the issue of 
immigration and the nationalist one are central, from France with the FN to Italy 
with the League of Salvini, the United Kingdom with Ukip, and, although to a 
more limited extent, Germany with the AfD and Spain with Vox. Podemos has a 
more revendicative profile and in part the M5S. In Poland, especially after the 
2015 elections and already before the 2019 elections, the PiS presents a distribu-
tive and identitarian profile, but with much less emphasis on immigration and 
higher centrality for the traditional conservative values.
As Mounk (2018) states, in all democracies the ‘rebellion’ against multi-ethnic 
democracy is the basis for the success of populist (identitarian) parties and, gen-
erally, the perception of immigration is a useful indicator of voters’ intentions. 
However, ‘we must also consider more subtle and indirect ways in which 
 economic anxiety and racial hostility could manifest themselves in our politics’ 
49 This does not mean that the positions of the inclusionary populists on economic and symbolic 
issues, opportunities for participation included, did not end up influencing the manifestos of the 
Christian-democratic and social-democratic ideological families, as well as the agenda of centrist and 
centre-left governments. For some reflections along these lines, see Mény (2019, Conclusions).
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(ibid., p. 129). The poorest or those affected by globalization and the economic 
crisis are not always the ones that vote for leftist populists and not always are 
communities that vote for right-wing populists ones where immigrants are 
 relatively more present. Insecurity and fears play a significant role in the real 
 situation, as does the ability of ‘political entrepreneurs’ to mobilize such powerful 
emotions for elect or al purposes.
As has already been pointed out, this different incidence of the two different 
components of inequality (see Chapter 2) is mirrored by the type of populist offer 
present in the different countries. On the one hand, the protest is mobilized 
against the worsening of ‘living standards’, as a consequence of growing in equal-
ities and the risk of relative and absolute poverty. In short, there is a fear of losing 
material resources and social status, with Italy, Spain, and France being part of 
this group. This explains the success of the M5S and Podemos, and in part of 
Ciudadanos. On the other hand, there is the fear of losing one’s ‘lifestyle’, the inse-
curity that comes from the dissipation of cultural heritage, and intangible and 
tangible assets  (Reynié,  2013). This time a question of meaning and identity 
comes into play, which is qualified by themes about sovereignty, security and 
anti-immigration. This seems to be the central aspect in Poland, but it has par-
ticular salience in other countries as well, such as the United Kingdom. After the 
Brexit, a resurgence of regional identities and a consequent much deeper conflict 
on those issues that are also relevant for the economic relations with the other 
European countries are very likely, and they will be compounded by the polariza-
tion and radicalization discussed above (see Table 5.2).
As stated, we are dealing with two distinct logics of populist party mobilization 
and action, revendicative and identitarian (or also inclusionary and exclusion-
ary). In some cases—in Poland, but also Italy and France—the electoral space for 
exclusionary or identitarian populism (a more traditionalist one in the PiS, a 
more sovereign oriented in the Lega, FN, UKIP and now Vox) reflects the exist-
ence of a specific ‘domain of identification’ (Sartori, 1976, esp. pp. 328ff) and of a 
historical cleavage (be it religious, ideological, or territorial), which is sometimes 
latent. However, as seen in the other cases—also in Italy concerning the M5S—
the success of populist parties has mainly been achieved as a consequence of the 
restructuring of the ‘space of competition’ (Sartori, 1976, chapter 10). This came 
out of the neoliberal convergence between parties, and with centre-left and 
 centre-right governments entering a crisis. It has also happened when it has been 
more challenging to implement governmental redistributive policies that meet 
citizens’ expectations (for example, due to constraints imposed by public debt, or 
international commitments).50 This aspect also shifts attention to the possibility 
of the policy change and the implementation of policies—as examples, we may 
50 Reynié (2013) identified the causes of the development of ‘nouveaux populisms’ in a few macro 
processes, such as demographic and migratory changes, globalization, the digital revolution, but also 
the exhaustion of public resources. To these, we could add climate change and the ecological crisis 
(see also Harari, 2018). We return to this below.
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think of the Syriza governments in Greece and of the M5S in Italy, both supported 
by a heterogeneous coalition with right-wing parties.
In this section, we started from the hypothesis that if there are more deep-
seated dissatisfaction and stronger protest parties, there is a corresponding, adap-
tive institutional responsiveness, with a possible consequent improvement of 
social rights and lowering of inequalities. The empirical checking of this hypoth-
esis required some intermediate steps. As we have seen (section 4.2), the growth 
of dissatisfaction with democracy fuels social and political protest, which among 
other things reinforces the polarization of the party system (section 5.4.2), also 
within society. This paves the way to the success of new parties able to mobilize 
voter resentment (section  5.4.3). Our six democracies, however, show different 
patterns as regards our hypothesis. In particular, in three cases (Italy, Spain, and 
France) this appears better supported.51
5.5 Stronger Left, Lower Inequality?
We can now check the second hypothesis we mentioned above, that is, the 
stronger the incumbent leftist parties, the better the implementation of social 
rights and the lower the inequalities. We begin by taking stock of the empirical 
evidence we have up to now. As we have seen, the inequality trends became more 
intense just after the Great Recession, although this does not entail that the grow-
ing inequalities have no structural and long-term roots (Gallino,  2011; 
Streeck, 2013). Indeed, from the diachronic perspective what emerges in all the 
OECD democracies, and in our cases as well, is a common process that reflects a 
growing incidence of inequalities, but with a limited variance within the different 
national cases; the two cases of Poland and Germany stand out when looking at 
our six democracies with attention (see Chapter 2). This process can be envisaged 
as a structural phenomenon, which is characterized by the transformation of 
capitalism, its financialization, the impact of the digital revolution and changes in 
the organization of labour. In this context, the Great Recession stands out as a 
‘moment’ when the contradictions of the ‘global’ economy (especially in the rela-
tionship with a democracy that remains anchored at a ‘local-national’ level) 
emerge virulently. However, let it be recalled that the crisis is also a conjunctural 
phase of ‘break-ups’ that overcome ‘constraints’ and explores new ‘possibilities’.
Nor should it be surprising if, as we saw in section 4.3 when analysing ‘party 
manifestos’, we realize that the changes in the mentions of equality are larger. 
51 In Poland, post-transition economic developments and a democracy where equality is gaining 
priority (see chapter 4) feed an ‘identitarian populism’. At the same time, in Germany and the United 
Kingdom the mainstream parties are resisting, even if challenged by ‘bilateral’ political protest (as in 
Germany) or by social discontent (as in the United Kingdom with the Brexit).
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However, if we focus on countries and party families, the situation is much more 
nuanced. Not only did left-wing parties but also Christian-democratic parties and 
even liberals and conservatives in the post-crisis years, pay greater attention to 
equality in their programmes. There are obviously significant differences in the 
outcomes. Conservative and Christian Democratic parties implement paternalis-
tic welfare states, which are less universalistic and attentive to gender gaps, and 
basically non-redistributive. As Huber and Stephens state (2001, see esp. chap-
ter 5, section 3, and Conclusion), the partisan politics is the main explanation of 
welfare state in the different countries also when considering the consequences 
about the levels of inequality. However, we only need look carefully at Figure 4.13 
to see the difference between left-wing and social-democratic parties, or also 
between the radical left and the moderate left (see, more generally, Watson, 2015). 
This is even more evident when the parties (especially the radical left ones) played 
a ‘relevant’ role, either because they had a salient ‘coalition potential’, that is, they 
were decisive actors in the construction of the governing coalitions, or because 
they had ‘blackmail potential’ (see fn 28). Consequently, for the blackmail poten-
tial, even if excluded from the government, they have been influencing the pol it-
ical process and the formation of the policy agenda of ‘friendly’, socialist or 
social-democratic cabinets. The case of centre-left governments in Italy in the 
1990s and 2006 is of particular relevance in this regard. However, as we have seen 
(chapters 2 and 4), in Italy economic and social inequality was more salient in the 
post-crisis period after 2013, while at the same time public perceptions of immi-
gration have become marked by more significant concern.
These observations encourage a significant analysis and reflection when we 
 consider the trend of votes for the left (moderate and of government) in the period 
examined and their impact on executives (types, orientation, duration). Thus, in 
Figure 5.2 we show the trends of the Gini coefficients (see Chapter 2 for the data), 
considered as a valid indicator of the distribution of income and, therefore, of 
equality/inequality, and the trend of votes for the left, considered in both the mod-
erate (and governmental) and radical (and opposition) component. This distinction 
between the ‘two lefts’, however, should not make us forget that in Italy and France 
the radical left has at times participated in the government of the country. In Italy 
this was the case in the centre-left coalitions of 1996–2001 and 2006–08, while in 
France it happened during the Jospin government of 1997–2002.
As already anticipated, the most relevant aspect is that the Great Recession 
represented a genuine watershed in terms of policy paradigms. In the pre-crisis 
phase, the parties of the moderate left essentially held ‘third way’ positions and, in 
the best of cases, tried to soften the neoliberal policies of their governments’ 
agenda. The leftist elite’s perception of being in a TINA (an acronym for ‘There Is 
No Alternative’) situation describes this state of affairs.52 In the post-crisis phase, 
52 See Bailey et al. (2014) on the governments in office during the crisis.
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the political agenda of the leftist executives and the programmes of moderate left-
ist parties became receptive to the themes (dear to the radical left) of redistribu-
tion and welfare and anti-austerity protection. This, however, is not enough to 
confirm our second hypothesis, because since 2008 we have been witnessing the 
inclusion of and support for equality and social rights by almost all European 
political party families (see Chapter 4).
The picture, which emerges from Figure 5.2, highlights, first, the existence of a 
duality between economics and politics. The Gini coefficient gives us a trend in 
the distribution of incomes that shows a low diachronic and synchronic variabil-
ity in the different countries. On the one hand, this seems to point to the  existence 
of structural phenomena reflecting social macro-transformations (globalization, 
financialization, the digital revolution, demographic changes) common to all 
capitalist societies. These may be the result of different ‘varieties of capitalism’, as 
mentioned above. From this kind of Marxist perspective ‘the anatomy of society 
must be sought in the political economy’. On the other hand, we see political sys-
tems showing their autonomy and dynamism and going far beyond structural 
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Figure 5.2 Gini Coefficient and vote for leftist parties (1993–2019) (%)
Note: The years on the abscissa are the electoral ones.
Source: Eurostat for Gini Coefficient and www.parties-and-elections.eu for votes to the parties.
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certain sense, if it is empirically correct to state that the economic crisis produces 
an ‘exogenous imbalance’, it is even more so to recognize that it also feeds an 
‘endogenous imbalance’. This is a political one and mainly involves the political 
offer (appearance of new parties, other alliances, the crisis of moderate parties) 
with all the consequent policy choices. The limits of a wholly economic theory of 
the growth of inequality and the need to complement a pol it ical theory are 
 central to the work by Hacker and Pierson (2010) on the United States and by 
Hopkin and Lynch (2016) on Western Europe. However, Hacker and Pierson 
warn that political theories based on ‘demand’—which they call ‘politics as electoral 
spectacle’—are much less effective than those based on ‘offer’—‘politics as organized 
combat’—which emphasize the role of public pol icies, organized interests and 
veto players.
If we now focus more on the detail of Figure 5.2, we can discern three patterns 
in the six countries, an indicator of the random trend and poor connections 
between the two phenomena. In Italy, Poland and, after the 2012 elections, in 
France as well, the left lost, both in its moderate and radical components. In Italy, 
even if we add the votes for LEU (3.4%) to those for the PD (18.7%) in the last 
elections in 2018, the picture does not change. The real winner of the elections 
was the M5S with 33%, which, however, cannot be labelled as a leftist party. In 
France, we can note that in the 2017 elections for the National Assembly, La 
France Insumise (FI) won 11%, while the PS was in free fall (22 percentage points 
down on the 2012 elections). Finally, in Poland in the last two elections (2015 and 
2019), the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) together with Your Movement (TR) 
received 7.6% and 12.6%. However, these outcomes do not seem to affect the 
structure of inequalities. In the examined period, Poland presented a significant 
growth and smaller economic and social (but not ethnic) inequalities. Italy saw a 
substantial incidence of economic and social inequalities and the risk of poverty. 
Moreover, France, albeit with discontinuity, displayed a progressive reduction of 
inequalities but later high social protest as a reaction to the governmental attempt 
of revising important welfare aspect, especially on pensions.
Differently, in Spain and the United Kingdom (but not in 2019), there was a 
growth in the main left party, if we look at the last elections. In the two 2019 (of 
April and November) elections in Spain, the Socialists got 28%, up to six points 
more than the previous elections (2016). However critical this may be in the 
elect or al history of the post-war party, the result allowed the PSOE to reverse the 
balance of power with the conservatives of the PP, although in the November 
election PP got 20.8% (+4.1 points). Even in the United Kingdom, Labour had a 
positive trend in the recent elections, after the significant successes of the 1990s 
and the decline in the 2010 elections. However, with the last elections of 
December 2019, Labour lost votes, going from 40% to 32%. Sinn Féin remained 
utterly irrelevant.
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Germany is the only case where the radical left (Die Linke) showed a positive 
trend. In the 2017 elections, it achieved its best result, 9.2%, while the SPD lost 
support (–5 percentage points on 2013), perhaps due in part to its protracted par-
ticipation in the ‘great coalition’ executives. However, once again, concerning our 
starting hypothesis, these trends give us contradictory results. In Spain, the 
hypothesis seems partially falsified, as the success of the moderate left is still too 
episodic, while Podemos, allied with the radical left, lost ground, and inequalities 
grew (as in Italy, it is confirmed negatively). The same seems to be the case with 
the United Kingdom, where Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party is growing, until 2017. 
With the last election, however, not only did it lose votes (–8 points) but it paved 
the way for Brexit. Only in Germany is the connection between votes for the rad-
ical left and growing equality confirmed, which is also explained by the weight of 
institutional contexts (coordinated market economies and ‘chancellor democra-
cies’ supported by neo-corporative agreements and federalism).
We can now move on to the morphology of governments (number, types, and 
duration), remembering that ‘entering government can provide opportunities for 
individual politicians [but also for political parties] to pursue their own goals ... 
controlling it provides the means of enacting public policy but also ways of 
strengthening the party itself ’ (Ware,  1996, p. 349). Finding a balance, often 
contra dict ory, between multiple reactive objectives in terms of the search for 
votes, office and policy is crucial for every party, especially if it is the incumbent 
one. In our case, in particular, a first question to ask is whether governments 
make a difference for the objective of equality (more generally, see Castels and 
Mair, 1984). In general, this question has been examined by analysing redistribu-
tive policies. Ultimately, the long-term empirical evidence (from the post-war 
period to the 1990s) shows ‘that political parties, and the coalitions they form, 
matter for redistribution – not just differences in preferences of electorates’ 
(Iversen and Soskice, 2008, p. 109). Specifically, the two authors warn that right-
wing executives (and coalitions of government) are less prone to redistribution. 
However, this outcome is also the product of the influence of electoral systems 
which, by defining the ‘incentive structure’ of political competition, favours cer-
tain actors (parties) rather than others and certain forms of ‘strategic coordina-
tion’ (Cox,  1997) rather than individual strategies. In this sense, a strong 
correlation emerges between PR, leftist coalitions and redistribution.53
If we now consider the time frame between the early 1990s and 2018 in the 
democracies we examined we see that there were 84 governments in that period:54 
53 It barely needs mentioning that the reference to the proportional electoral system confirms what 
we said above about institutional arrangements and consensual (or proportional) patterns of democ-
racy in creating a favourable ‘context’ for redistributive policies.
54 The democracy with the highest number of executives is France (20), closely followed by Italy 
and Poland (19), and then by Spain (10), the United Kingdom (9), and Germany (7).
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42% (36 in absolute values) on the right, 34% on the left (29) and just 14% (12) in 
the centre (see Table 5.5). In the last set, we have included Italian PD govern-
ments during the 2013–18 period with markedly liberal positions. If we keep this 
specification in mind, we can see that in all our democracies there is a prevalence 
of right-wing or centre-right governments, which have a higher capacity for dur-
ation than leftist governments.55 In the light of our hypothesis, this should sug-
gest lower attention to redistribution and welfare, and a greater focus on the 
market economy and rigour in budgetary policies.56
This first conclusion is reinforced by the fact that all our cases are among the 
majoritarian or quasi-majoritarian patterns of democracy with a mixed or liberal 
economy, except Germany (on the federal constitutional structure and the co ord-
in ated market economy) (see Table 5.1). This contextual situation increased the 
probability, at least until the economic crisis and in some instances after it as well 
(see the case of Italy), of convergence on the neoliberal policy paradigm. The 
‘Great Recession’ changed the pattern and prompted unexpected developments. 
To start, there was less stability in the executives57 almost everywhere after 2008, 
making the formation of governments more difficult and laborious: from the 
United Kingdom of the Lib-Con coalition of 2010 to the governments following 
the 2016 and 2019 elections in Spain to the more recent ‘grand coalition’ in 
Germany, and the governments in Italy after 2013 and especially after 2018. The 
English case is different after the last elections (December 2019). Moreover, as 
seen at beginning of this chapter, growing ‘ungovernability’ is compounded by 
the recalibration of the demand and the electoral offer around the themes of 
equality. This also gives a competitive advantage to leftist parties and, in general, 
to the new protest revendicative parties (see above), which emphasize themes 
such as redistribution, opposition to privatization and the free market, and the 
rejection of austerity policies.
The impact of the 2008 economic crisis has also affected the alternation pat-
terns of governments, their number and quality, partial or total (see Mair, 2006), 
as well as their ‘impossibility’. Let us start with the ideological orientation of the 
governments in office (see Table 5.5). In France and Italy conservative political 
forces were incumbent when the crisis began, that is, the Gaullists of the UMP in 
55 There were 39% of centre-left cabinets in our six democracies, characterized either by a one-
party cabinet (as in the case of Spain and the United Kingdom) or by more or less broad coalitions; 
41% of cabinets were centre-right or conservative. To these, we must add the four ‘grand coalition’ 
cabinets in Germany and the three technocratic cabinets and the one idiosyncratic one in Italy, 
namely, three technocratic cabinets (distributed over the first two decades of this century) and the 
‘yellow-green’ cabinet formed by the M5S and the League, a genuinely innovative ‘formula’ unprece-
dented in the democracies of Western Europe.
56 See Bremer (2018, p. 26) for this list of categories of economic issues.
57 The stability of the executives can be seen as the product of the cohesion of the government 
party/ies and the existence of appropriate institutional mechanisms (selective electoral systems and 
mechanical effects of the rules of ‘rationalization’ of parliamentarism or semi-presidentialism).
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France and the centre-right governments of Berlusconi in Italy, while in Spain 
there was a socialist government. In these three countries, the crisis favoured gov-
ernment changes, to the benefit of the socialist party in France (the Socialist 
President Hollande replaced the Gaullist President Sarkozy in 2012) and the 
Democratic Party in Italy. The Italian case is rather pertinent because after the 
resignation of the Berlusconi government in 2011 there was a return (after those 
in the 1990s) to a technocratic government led by Mario Monti (who received a 
vote of confidence of 87% from MPs), which prevented voters from expressing 
their position on the government crisis. Later on, we will see how elections would 
lose ‘decisiveness’ by failing to identify clear majorities (2013 and 2018), making 
it necessary to resort to coalition governments forged after the elections.
As for France, it should not be forgotten that this country has a semi-presidential 
form of government and that the big prize is, therefore, the presidency. The 
 elections in May 2017 marked the success of Emmanuel Macron, especially in the 
light of the constitutional reform of 2000, which, by making the duration of both 
the presidential and assembly mandate five years, favours consistency between 
the presidential majority and the parliamentary majority, and makes it likely to 
be the same. Indeed, the parliamentary elections of 18 June 2017 brought victory 
for the presidential party (La République en Marche!), which elected Macron with 
28% of the vote and enabled the formation of a cabinet led by prime minister 
Philippe. In both Italy and France, the parties of the radical left have been 
excluded from the government. In Italy, we must look back to the centre-left cab-
inets of the 1990s and 2006 to find the presence of these parties in government. In 
France, we need to go back to 1997, while in more recent governments the allies 
of the Socialists have been the Greens and the Radicals. Subsequently, in both 
countries problems in dealing with the economic crisis and several political scan-
dals aggravated the difficulties of the traditional parties, paving the way for the 
Table 5.5 Party ideologies and cabinets (1992–2018)
  Left  Centre Right Technocratic Idiosyncratic* Tot.
France 8   12     20
Germany 2   2   3 7
Italy 5 6 4 3 1 19
Poland 6 6 7     19
Spain 4   6     10
United Kingdom 4   5     9
Tot. 29 12 36 3 4 84
Note: (*) The three German ‘grand coalition’ cabinets and the Italian cabinet with the League and the 
M5S are included.
Source: www.parlgov.org.
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electoral success of political outsiders such as the République en Marche! in France 
and the M5S in Italy.
In Spain, the crisis favoured the conservative parties, at least until the first elec-
tions of 2019, when the PP polled just 16.7%, the worst result in its history. 
However, PP won 20.8% in the second elections of 2019. Electoral outcomes like 
these caused a weakening of the parliamentarians and lower cohesion of the 
executives. In fact, since the 2015 elections, it has become very difficult to form a 
cabinet. There have been repeated elections for the first time in the history of 
democratic Spain (in 2015, 2016 and the other two in 2019). The absence of par-
liamentary majority and a few scandals led to the early resignation of Rajoy and 
his replacement with the socialist government of Sanchez in 2018. Moreover, two 
challengers, Podemos and Ciudadanos, successfully emerged in these years. 
Podemos won local government elections in Madrid and Barcelona, but have dis-
appointing results in national elections, including the one in 2019, when it won 
14% of the vote compared to 23% in the 2016 elections. In both cases, it partici-
pated in the elections with a coalition with the radical left in the Unidos Podemos 
list. Furthermore, in these elections the electoral balance between Podemos and 
Ciudadanos has reversed: the latter’s share of the vote rose to 16%, compared to 
13% in previous elections. The parties of the radical left (IU) limited themselves 
to influencing the Zapatero governments (in 2004 and 2008) from the outside 
and, as mentioned, formed an electoral alliance with Podemos in 2016 and 2019, 
with disappointing results. However, the most striking result is the crisis of two 
new parties and success of a right-wing party, Vox in the November 2019 
elections.
Finally, Poland is a peculiar case with an alternation between two coalitions 
leaning on the centre /right side. Here, the centre governments formed in 2007, 
led by the Civic Platform, paved the way for the right-wing populism of Law and 
Justice (PiS), which complemented right-wing nationalist rhetoric with a left-
wing economic policy. They came into government in 2015, first winning the 
office of the President of the Republic (in August) and then, after their electoral 
success (in October), forming the executive. PiS’success is even more significant 
after the October 2019 elections, when winning 44% of votes (+ 6 points).
In the other two cases, there were no alternations. In fact, since 2007 the United 
Kingdom has been governed by six successive Conservative governments (two 
led by Cameron, in 2010 and 2015, two by May in 2016 and 2017, and two by 
Johnson in 2019). In these years there was a real crisis of bipartisanship repre-
sented by three exceptional events: the coalition government between the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in 2010 (for the first time since the 
Second World War); the anomalous success of the right-wing populists of the 
UKIP, which achieved its best result in the 2015 political elections, with close to 
13% of the vote; and the referendum on Brexit the following year (2016), called by 
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Prime Minister Cameron mainly for internal party political reasons and above all 
the tensions between Premier Johnson and Parliament (2019). By contrast, 
Germany, with its ‘chancellor democracy’ has shown itself to be the most stable 
system, although in the 2018 elections the two main parties had the worst results 
in their recent history. The 2009 elections were followed by three Merkel-led gov-
ernments supported by the ‘Grand Coalition’ between the CDU/CSU and the 
SPD, though the difficulties in forming new governments have grown. However, 
the most striking fact of the most recent elections is the success of the AfD, the 
third national party in electoral strength.
As seen, in three cases (France, Poland and Italy) the economic crisis favoured 
a ‘turnover in the elites’, with neo-populist parties sweeping into power. However, 
at this point, the differences are interesting. In Poland, what counted most was the 
problem of national and religious identity—the challenge of the cultural dimen-
sion that is shared by other members of the Visegrad group. In France, the 
response to the crisis of the traditional parties (Socialists and Gaullists) was the 
technocratic populism of the Presidency. In Italy, the ‘political voice’ led the M5S 
to electoral success and to enter the government in alliance with the League. In 
the other cases (Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom), governments 
remained controlled by the mainstream, albeit increasingly weakened, parties. In 
a certain sense, it is as if the economic crisis has made evident a characteristic 
feature of democracies: ‘the fatigue of being in government’ and the consequent 
punishment of the governments in charge as a result of a negative ‘economic vote’ 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013; Giuliani and Massari, 2018). Besides, the suc-
cess of protest parties is the answer to the question regarding ‘responsiveness’ to 
national electorates aimed at mitigating the worst outcomes of the crisis, starting 
from the growth of inequality, unemployment and poverty. As we have seen (sec-
tions 4.2 and 4.3), equality is not only central to the orientation of voters and 
public opinion, but it has become a ‘key’ theme of all political families, albeit with 
significant differences. This resulted in a reactivation of the left-right cleavages if 
the pre- and post-crisis periods are compared (Morlino and Raniolo,  2017, 
Figure 3.5), and restored centrality to the parties of the radical left in the electoral 
competition. In particular, this was the case of Die Linke in Germany, and 
Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise in France (Table 5.3). The role of parties also 
vividly emerged in the agenda-setting, because the themes of redistribution in 
favour of the losers of globalization, the protection of social rights, citizenship 
income and Social Europe—though the green agenda could also be added—are 
now central issues in public debate.
Let us now return to the success of revendicative populism. It seems that the 
political formations of protest are only partially able to channel a dissatisfied and 
increasingly radicalized electorate. Indeed, we should ask ourselves whether 
redistributive majorities are possible (with populist governments). As we said 
about the salient cases (France, Italy, and Poland), only the second one is salient 
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here, with the ‘yellow-green’ coalition government between the M5S and the 
League. In abstract terms, the success of a redistributive coalition depends on the 
ability to combine multiple strategies: (1) difficulties and problems can always be 
attributed to strong powers; (2) neo-populists can favour a constant polarization 
and radicalization of political competition; (3) they can develop a communica-
tion strategy of ‘proximity to the people’; and (4) finally, they can resort to specific 
instruments, such as the penetration of the State, mass clientelism or intolerant 
measures towards critics (Müller, 2016, pp. 60ff). However, there is no doubt that 
in these cases, the dilemma of responsibility (international, technical, constitu-
tional) vs responsiveness (towards voters, the people) encounters considerable 
political and feasibility limits. Moreover, though feasibility may prevail in the 
short term, in the long term there may be a dramatic political backlash (see 
below).58
Besides, the difficulties of revendicative or inclusionary populism open up two 
possible paths. In some cases (such as Spain with Vox and Italy with the League of 
Salvini, but also Poland with Justice and Law, and the UK with Premier Boris 
Johnson) it leaves room for identitarian or exclusionary populism (see above). 
Protesting against the effects of the economic crisis is taken over by sovereignty 
demands, welfare protection and territorial chauvinism (as in the case of 
Catalonia in Spain or the Veneto and Lombardy in Italy). In Poland, all this led to 
an attack on existing constitutional control and accountability mechanisms—with 
the consequent 2015 reforms that limited the independence of the media and the 
constitutional court (see chapters 3 and 6). The other road is that of the electoral 
recovery of moderate parties. In the case of the Spanish elections of 2019, there 
was the success of the PSOE, until then considered the main loser in the crisis, 
with the return of a centripetal competition aimed at capturing the median, mod-
erate voter. However, it will take some time before we achieve a better under-
standing of the evolution of such complex processes.
There remains the fact that never has the tension between ‘responsibility and 
responsiveness’ (Mair, 2009), financial compatibility and distributional responses, 
or short- and long-term responsiveness (see Morlino and Quaranta, 2016) been 
so great as in the case of the governments of the left (and centre-left) or, indeed, 
of the ‘idiosyncratic’ governments (in Italy, France and, in some respects, Poland) 
of the post-crisis period—conditioned by austerity policies induced by the EU 
and budget constraints. This dilemma is not entirely new to leftist parties. In a 
sense, it is part of their history. It had already characterized the evolution of the 
socialist, social-democratic and labour parties that have entered the ‘government 
orbit’. Analysing the British Labour party, Drucker (1979) distinguished between 
the ‘party ethos’, linked to its history, underlying values and original constituency, 
58 See also Pappas (2014), who analyses the case of Greece.
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and the ‘doctrine’, relating to coherent positions on specific issues and policies. 
Between these two components, there may be some tension, for instance, when 
the party accepts the challenge of government and therefore refers to the more 
general electorate and not just to specific sectors of it.59 In terms that are familiar 
to political science, we could say that every party is forced to balance distinct and 
divergent objectives related to vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking 
(Strøm, 1990), merely having to balance what the party says it is (because of its 
identity) and what it does (because of the necessity of competition). This dilemma 
may turn into a tension between the two objective values  of democracy, freedom 
vs equality, or in their convergence, so that the deterioration of one may bring 
about the deterioration of the other (see Chapter 8) and limit redistributive and 
egalitarian policies.
The presence and spread of protest, sometimes even with violent connotations, 
is a challenge to the democratic system seen in its function of regulation and 
mediation of conflicts and social tensions. As we have seen, a high potential for 
dissatisfaction and protest represents an opportunity for new leaders, and neo-
populist and anti-establishment parties, to emerge and consolidate. This function 
of anchoring from the new protest parties captures a somewhat paradoxical 
aspect that puts political parties at the centre of democracies, but parties that are 
different from those of the past. If, in addition, we look at the ‘contents’ of democ-
racy, the new parties push directly (when they are in government) or in dir ect ly 
(influencing the public and the decision-making agenda) to shift the focus of 
policy-making towards redistributive policies aimed at creating conditions of 
greater equality. In any case, the protest/exit, to quote Hirschman (1970), becomes 
a ‘remedy for the crisis’ of efficacy and legitimation of democracies. Despite dif-
ferences, this mechanism seems to fit all our cases. However, as we have seen (see 
also Chapter 4) the radical left is certainly not the only political family that articu-
lates the theme of equality. At the same time, to the extent that redistributive pol-
icies prove ineffective or difficult to implement, or where a specific domain of 
identification exists, the way is clear for symbolic policies of an identitarian and 
sovereign nature.
5.6 Summing Up
We can now try to gather the strings of this chapter by summarizing the most 
salient empirical results in six points.
59 In this regard, Drucker (1979) identifies three components of the ‘left’, which may correspond to 
a similar number of phases: the egalitarian Marxist-style ‘ethics’ that is characteristic of opposition 
parties, the Social-Democratic-Labour one, still linked to the social groups of reference and, finally, 
the more open ‘democratic reformist’ one typical of leftist governmental parties.
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 1. First, we started with the question as to whether there are institutional 
arrangements that can account for the structure of inequality (with its 
three dimensions: economic, ethnic, and social) in the six democracies 
examined here. Despite the complexities and necessary distinctions, the 
primary reply is that, for equality, the consensual democracies with 
 coordinated econ omies tend to have redistributive policy solutions and to 
correct in equal ities. By contrast, majoritarian democracies with competitive 
 economies tend to play a winner-take-all game, which increases inequalities.
 2. About ethnic (in)equality, the salience of the migration issue derives either 
from the consequences of the economic crisis (Italy, Spain, and France) or 
from basic ideological orientations (Poland). In this context, the United 
Kingdom has a hybrid position, probably reflecting a longer (colonial) 
 history of ‘multi-ethnic’, but divided society. Finally, Germany’s greater 
openness to immigrants is associated with the international competitiveness 
of the ‘social market economy’.
 3. With the Great Recession, the presence of new parties and populist parties 
became a distinguishing aspect of our six countries. The emergence of 
populist parties is connected with two distinct components of equality: 
economic and ethnic. However, greater dissatisfaction and the growth of 
the new protest parties pushed the incumbent leaders to be more respon-
sive and, consequently, based on the demands of the actors, prompted 
democracies to become more respectful of social rights and less unequal, 
taking into account the available resources.
 4. We distinguish between a revendicative populism (leftist or inclusionary) 
and an identitarian populism (rightist or exclusionary). Identitarian popu-
lism mainly prevailed in Poland—but has a specific salience also in other 
countries: from France, with the Front National to Italy with the League of 
Salvini, the United Kingdom with UKIP and above all with Boris Johnson, 
and, to a more limited extent, Germany with AfD, and lastly Spain with 
Vox. Revendicative populism became politically and electorally relevant 
where the economic crisis was felt most, a situation that characterized 
Southern European democracies. The two types of populism, however, 
have different effects on the responsiveness, the former is more closely 
related to the needs of redistribution fueled by the economic crisis, while 
the latter reacts to the fears brought about by the identity crisis and the 
loss of social status.
 5. The relationship between the vote of the left parties (moderate and radical) 
and the trend of inequality shows a rather random connection. It is 
 possible to identify three patterns. In Italy, Poland and, after the 2012 elec-
tions, France, both the moderate and radical components of the left lost. 
However, these outcomes do not seem to affect the structure of inequalities. 
By contrast, in Spain and the United Kingdom, there was a growth in the 
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main left party (if we look at the last elections), while in Germany there is 
only one case where the radical left (Die Linke) shows a positive trend. 
However, once again, to our starting hypothesis, these trends give contra-
dictory results (see section 5.5). The consequence is that those redistribu-
tion pol icies are central to government programs but are to be transformed 
into effective public policies.
 6. Ultimately, we have identified three patterns, also considering the role of 
governments. First, in Spain social protest preceded the formation of a 
protest party which, in alliance with the radical left, sought to influence 
the agenda of governments led by the PSOE. Second, in Italy, the M5S 
channelled the protest against the political elite, came to government 
together with the League of Salvini (2018), and proposed policies to fight 
poverty and accepts the League’s sovereign line. However, in 2019 the cri-
sis of the M5S-League cabinet unfolds in a new governmental coalition 
between M5S and Democratic Party. Third, in France, a brand-new party 
asserted itself, and in response to the intense protests of the ‘yellow vests’ 
proposed only partial measures, and indeed the protest is still going on in 
early 2020. Finally, in Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland, there 
are no relevant social movements, even if there are anomic forms of pro-
test (not to mention Islamic terrorism). Besides, at the level of party repre-
sentation, in the first two cases, leftist parties prevail (without forgetting 
the salience of identitarian populists), while in Poland those of the right 
do.60 In all these cases, ‘the fatigue of being in government’ emerges all the 
more when the country is in a situation of weak economic growth, which 
makes redistribution more difficult.
60 However, in the last 2019 election, the social democratic party almost doubled the votes.
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Appendix
Table 5.A1 New parties, neo-populist parties: the European picture (2012–2018)
Party Name Elec Year Votes (%) Seats Party name L-R Foundation
Year
Austria 2013 20.5 40 Freedom Party of 
Austria
8.3 1986
  2017 26.0 51    
  2013 5.7 11 Team Stornach 6 2012
Belgium 2014 3.67 3 Flemish Block 9.6 2004




  2014 32.7 84 –    
  2017 33.5 95 –    
  2014 7.28 19 National Front for the 
Salvation of Bulgaria
8.7 2011
  2017 9.31 27      
  2017 4.26 12 Volya—Will 6 2007
  2014 5.69 15 Reload Bulgaria   2014
  2013 7.30 23 Attack 5.5 2005
  2014 4.52 11 –    
Croatia 2015 4.19 1 Human Shield 8.7 2011
  2016 5.92 8 –    
  2015   3 Croatian Labourists—
Labour Party
7.1 2010
  2015   3 Croatian Party of 
Rights dr. Ante 
Starčević
8.7  
Czech Rep. 2013 18.65 47 Action of Dissatisfied 
Citizens
6 2012
  2017 29.64 78 –    
  2013 6.88 14 Dawn of Direct 
Democracy
7.4 2013
  2017     –    
Germany 2012 8.6 64 The Left 1.2 2007
  2017 9.2 69 –    
  2017 12.6 94 Alternative for 
Germany
8.7 2013
Denmark 2015 20.58 37 Danish Peoples Party 8.2 1995
Estonia 2015 8.1 7 Conservative People’s 
Party of Estonia
  2012
  2019 17.8 19 –    
Spain 2015 12.7 42 Podemos 1.2 2014
Continued
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  2016 13.37 45 –    
  2019 14.3 42 Unidos Podemos 1.2 2014
  2015 13.4 40 Ciudadanos 6 2005
 2016 13.0 32 –  
 2019 15.9 57 –   
 2019 10.3 24 Vox 6 2013
Finland 2015 17.65 38 True Finns 6.6 1995
 2019 17.50 39 – – –
United 
Kingdom
2015 12.65 1 United Kingdom 
Independence Party
7.8 1993
France 2017 28.21 308 La République En 
Marche!
6 2016
  2017 11 17 La France Insoumise 1.2  
  2012 13.6 2 Front National/
National Rally
9.7 1972
  2017 13.2 8 –    
Greece 2012 16.79 52 Coalition of the 
Radical Left (SYRIZA)
2.9 2004
  2012 26.89 71 –    
  2015 35.46 145 –   2013
 2012 6.97 21 Peoples Association—
Golden Dawn
8.7 1980
  2012 6.92 18 –    
  2015 6.99 18 –    
 2012 10.62 33 Independent Greeks 8.7 2012
  2012 7.51 20 –    
  2015 3.69 10 –  
Hungary 2014 20.22 23 Jobbik- Jobbik 
Movement for a Better 
Hungary
8.7 2003








117 – 6.5  
Iceland 2012 7.2 4 Citizens’ Movement 6 2009
  2013 5.3 3 Pirate Party 2.5 2012
  2016 14.1 10 –    
  2017 9.2 6 –    
Italy 2013 4.08 18 (Northern) League 8 2013 (1991)
  2018 17.3 123 –    
  2013 25.55 108 Five Star Movement 5 2009
 2018 32.7 225 –   
Latvia 2014 16.6 17 National Alliance 8.2 2011
  2018 11.0 13 –    




Party Name Elec Year Votes (%) Seats Party name L-R Foundation
Year
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Lithuania 2012 7.31 12 Order and Justice 5.3 2002
  2016 5.55 8 –   2002




  2018 8.28 4 –    
Netherlands 2012 10.8 15 Party for Freedom 8.8 2006
  2017 13.1 20      
  2017 1.8 2 Forum for Democracy 7.4 2016
Norway 2013 16.3 29 Progress Party 8.7 1973
  2018 15.2 27 –    
Poland 2015 37.58 235 Law and Justice 7.7 2001
Romania 2012 13.99 47 People’s Party—Dan 
Diaconescu
1.2 2011




  2016 11.0% 19 –   2011
  2016 8.64% 15 Slovak National Party 7 1989
  2012 44.41% 83 Direction—Social 
Democracy
3.8 1999
  2016 28.28% 49 –    
  2016 8.05 14 Kotleba—People’s 
Party Our Slovakia
8.7 2010
Slovenia 2018 4.17 4 Slovenian National 
Party
4.7 1991
Sweden 2014 12.86 49 Sweden Democrats 8.7 1988
  2018 17.5 62 –    
Switzerland 2015 29.4 11 Swiss People’s Party 7.3 1971
  2015 1 2 Ticino League 8.7 1991
Source: The table includes only parties which won at least one seat in parliament. Electoral Results, 
Seats, L-R (Döring and Manow, 2019). For 2018 and 2019 elections, own elaboration. Where 
otherwise indicated the parties were selected following Van Kessel (2015). For the Estonian and the 
Latvian case see Braghiroli and Petsinis (2019), for La France Insoumise, Gerbaudo (2018), for 
Podemos, Vittori (2017), for Vox, Turnbull-Dugarte (2019). Forza Italia is excluded from the ‘populist 
party’ category. Malta, Cyprus and Portugal have no significant populist parties in their political 
systems.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 08/09/20, SPi
Equality, Freedom, and Democracy: Europe After the Great Recession. Leonardo Morlino, Oxford University Press (2020). 





Leonardo Morlino and Daniela Piana
6.1 What Affects Freedoms and Where?
As seen in Chapter 3, despite lying outside the core agenda of all political institutions 
committed to fighting the economic crisis, the individual freedoms of EU citizens 
did experience a significant change. In the chapter, we offer a comparative over-
view of the changes, including an overall gloomy picture for Poland. The empirical 
analysis shows an evident decline in the level of freedoms’ protection since 2011 
and more since 2015. Consequently, at the end of that chapter, we addressed two 
questions: how to explain the differences between the countries and how to 
account for the timing of the decline in the different rights.
In many respects, the past three decades have been marked by the increasing 
importance attributed to the ‘enabling’ conditions of the exercise of citizenship 
(European Commission, 2017; Chapman et al., 2020). If, in addition, the Great 
Recession negatively impacted on individual chances of achieving better conditions 
of living, scaling up across social classes and retaining a middle-range standard of 
life for themselves and the close community, the rhetoric emphasizing the poten-
tially greater freedom offered to European citizens never stopped being recalled. 
The rationale behind this reasoning is simple and convincing. European citizens 
enjoy a wide range of rights entrenched in a multi-layered constitutional setting 
(Pernice, 2001; Weiler, 2015; Sandulli, 2018). Among them, the freedom of move-
ment, both physically and concerning economic entitlements (freedom of capitals), 
and freedom of information, play a key role (Gomez et al., 2018). By promising a 
better exercising of freedoms as a genuine consequence of the introduction of 
devices that decrease the costs of access to information and opportunities,1 opin-
ion leaders and policymakers echoed in a highly positive manner the ideals of 
1 Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the comments made by scholars on the conse-
quences of Brexit focus specifically on the risk of deterioration of the freedom of mobility, one of the 
first and most recalled dimensions of the European citizenship.
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being freer to grasp new chances in life and to hold power under control, ignoring 
the economic and social inequalities.
To adequately spell out the sort of explanations we are looking for, let us recall 
that citizens adhere to the ideal, deeming freedoms to be key components of a 
sound and well-functioning democracy (see also Chapter  4, section 4.2). 
However, countries differ when one considers the relative role assigned to free-
doms and equalities and the sensitivity shown towards reducing one or the other. 
At the individual level, a citizen may not have a clear idea as to the potential 
impact specific norms—which are introduced in the pursuit of security (both in 
the physical and virtual world), transparency, and efficiency—may have on their 
individual freedoms. In many cases, the aggregate effect of these norms only 
becomes strikingly evident afterwards. In this respect, the change in freedom is 
more surreptitious than the change inequality. This cognitive gap is mainly due to 
the core nature of freedom and the consequent nature of freedom-sensitive meas-
ures adopted by domestic institutions. Unlike equality, which is directly experi-
enced by groups of citizens in terms of the benefits of social rights, freedom may 
be reduced as a side, and non-intentional effect of measures whose declared goal 
is not to reduce freedoms. In general, political debate centres on the ‘reduction of 
public insecurity’, the ‘simplification of administrative machinery’ and ‘the reduc-
tion of the costs of accessing information and opportunities for mobility’. For citi-
zens, none of these goals is subject to contention. It is also hard to avoid endorsing 
the importance of all of them.
6.2 The Rule of Law Compound Hypothesis
In this vein, our first hypothesis to account for the differences among the coun-
tries regarding the personal dignity and all civil rights refers to the rule of law 
(see Chapter 1 and Morlino, 2011, chapter 7) as a decisive feature in strengthening 
or undermining the protection of individual freedoms. The individual assessment 
of the rule of law is easily affected and diverted by the priority granted to collective 
goals that are perceived by citizens as urgent, such as security and surveillance. 
The more fluid and complex society is becoming, the more the quest for rules and 
controls profoundly affects people’s lives. In a nutshell, the core of the legitimacy 
of rulers—with domestic policymakers at the national and the subnational level 
playing a crucial role in direct connection to the life of people—has to be assessed 
against the satisfaction and the trust citizens feel concerning the capacity of those 
rulers to deliver key public goods, rules, information, security and control.
In this respect, we can easily understand how our explanation can be devel-
oped consistently with the four dimensions of the rule of law.2 They are, first, the 
2 The salience of the rule of law already emerged in Chapter 4. In this chapter, the survey results 
about the evaluation of citizens on the importance of equality before the law—a cardinal principle of 
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effectiveness of the government in orchestrating and ensuring the production of 
public goods in a setting where administrative procedures are promptly enforced; 
second, the role of the anti-corruption strategy, which relates to the perceived 
transparency and integrity of the public machine; and, third, the compliance of 
the public order to fundamental rights, which may take the shape of civilian con-
trol of the army and police. In the countries that endorsed a liberal view of the 
raison d’état (Chevallier,  2017), this sub-dimension acquires particular signifi-
cance if operationalized in terms of the capacity and willingness of the police and 
the prosecutorial functions to comply with the fundamental rights provisions. In 
our analysis, the weight of this sub-dimension rose in the aftermath of the surge 
in international terrorism in 2015. Besides, a fourth dimension needs to be 
included in our analysis, that is, the degree of modernization of the judicial sys-
tem, which is directly related to the capacity of the courts to settle disputes effi-
ciently and effectively. This will be illustrated below.
We can now provide an overview of the first two sub-dimensions through the 
worldwide governance indicators dataset (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2).3 The highest 
level of government effectiveness is in the UK and Germany, while Poland and 
Italy score worst. Spain and Italy saw the worst drop during the years of the Great 
Recession, between 2007 and 2013, with a better performance in Spain than in 
Italy in climbing back some points over the last four years. Anti-corruption pol-
icies stand as stable pillars of the rule of law in Germany and the UK, followed at 
a slightly lower level by France, whereas in Spain, Poland, and Italy they score 
very low.
The overview offered in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 shows many important points 
for further analysis. First, the rank of each country is significant in terms of the 
rule of law and, consequently, of the impact of the rule of law on freedoms. 
They are more sensitive to the level of governmental effectiveness and are 
 clustered in the second sub-dimension, notably civil rights. Beyond the trends, 
which show a varying degree of decline in the six countries at the time of the 
Great Recession and the policies adopted to rationalize and contain the public 
debt, the capacity of each democracy to regain the previous level is mirrored in 
the trend of the freedoms that are more closely related to the machinery of the 
State—economic freedom, fair trial, and privacy protection. However, the most 
the rule of law—support our claim. As stated here, there is a relatively high impact of the rule of law 
on the overall procedural and substantial dimensions of democracy. This is due to the role played by 
the rule of law as an overarching principle, and also to the historical significance that this tenet gained 
among the citizens.
3 The worldwide governance indicators II dataset operationalizes governmental effectiveness as 
capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of 
its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies; the control of corruption as captur-
ing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. For more 
on the methodology used, go to https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home.
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Figure 6.1 Governmental effectiveness in the six democracies (1996–2018)
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators II, 1996–2018 (the data are available every two years 
between 1996 and 2002, and then yearly).
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critical result that these figures highlight is the weak resilience of those countries 
that feature a poorly developed capacity to steer policy-making processes, 
especially in terms of transparency of the rules system and effectiveness of rule 
enforcement. Both of them are closely connected to the rule of law dimensions 
considered here. In a way, even though Italy and Spain adopted a vast array of 
policies and measures to tackle the recession, the lack of adequate and predict-
able machinery for rule enforcement jeopardizes the final impact at the level of 
regaining freedoms.
A further point is worth stressing. The last wave of administrative reforms, 
which injected a massive amount of technological innovation into the public 
administration in the drive for both efficiency and transparency, did not achieve 
the expected outcome. Within our framework, this was due to the paradoxical 
mechanism that is triggered in all cases of State-targeting reform. As Jon Elster 
(2012) rightly stated, to repair the ship in the middle of the sea, a democracy 
needs to be endowed with a firm steering capacity. Only stable States managed 
their reforms effectively. This has been the case in Germany, the UK, and France 
regarding those aspects that impinge upon personal dignity and economic free-
doms, even though in France the reduction of some rights must be linked to the 
increasing alarm created by international terrorism.
We need now to add a few remarks about the trends of the third sub-dimension, 
that is, the compliance of public order with fundamental rights. This has been 
covered by an increasing number of international watchdogs warning about the 
escalation of the securitization of the advanced democracies. According to the 
Human Rights Watch reports covering 2015–18, all the countries experienced a 
reduction in individual guarantees in correspondence to the collective request for 
stronger prevention in the fight against terrorism. In France, this came together 
and concomitantly with the adoption of the Etat d’urgence regime (Stirn, 2018; 
Commaille, 2018). In the UK and Germany, there has been a stronger and more 
in-depth control of the public space. Less intense is the pervasiveness of public 
forces in the private sphere, even though the reaction against the Cataluña seces-
sion exploded into the upheaval of more severe sanctioning of individual behav-
iours preventively deemed to be dangerous as regards the maintenance of public 
order (Bosco, 2018).
As for the fourth dimension, the role played by the modernization of the just-
ice system needs to be assessed in strict connection to the rise of fair trial guaran-
tees and will be analysed below. If we now make explicit the link between the data 
presented in Chapter  3 and the domestic factors mentioned above, we need to 
highlight that the pattern of influence exercised by the sub-dimensions of the rule 
of law is differentiated and depends on the type of freedom considered. For 
instance, for some specific aspects of freedom, the first two sub-dimensions 
(see above) matter relatively more than the other two.
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The rule of law is a Janus notion, mirrored both in the mechanisms of rights 
protection and in the mechanisms of checks and balances. In our framework, 
these aspects are covered by the dimensions of the rule of law stricto sensu and 
inter-institutional accountability.4 The functioning of the courts is vital in both 
ways, and a change in the protection of civil freedoms may have—as it did in 
the six democracies analysed here—an effect on the balance of power.5 This is 
crucial to gain a better understanding of the case of Poland. In this country, 
both governmental effectiveness and control of corruption experienced a posi-
tive trend. One might expect this to lead to an improvement in the degree of 
freedoms, but this is not the case, especially after 2015. This stems from the 
combination of the rule of law and inter-institutional accountability, notably 
concerning the aspects directly related to the independence and the capacity of 
the courts. In Poland, the rule of law institutions, which are expected to play 
an overarching role in a constitutional democracy, has been undermined or 
their prerogatives hollowed out. This explains the reduction of the scope of 
freedoms, clustered under the third sub-dimension, political rights, together 
with the right to a fair trial, which belongs to the second sub-dimension in our 
framework.
In the six democracies analysed here the rule of law as an overarching principle 
was substantially challenged only in Poland, after the reduction of constitutional 
guarantees previously enjoyed by the judiciary and the attacks against the over-
sight institutions. Data focusing on the independence of the high courts capture 
in a single picture the shrinking of the constitutional guarantees to ensure the 
independence of the judiciary in Poland and shows that the rule of law, intended 
as an overarching principle, has been deeply eroded. A critical turning point 
came in 2017, when the government got the green light of the parliament for a set 
of measures that reduce and undermine essential freedoms, such as freedom of 
association and the freedom of alternative sources of the press. Economic free-
doms have not been eroded. However, in the context of the enforcement of the 
property rights and more generally of the protection of all individual economic 
entitlements, the hollowing out of the judicial impartiality is expected to have an 
impact on the effective implementation of all fundamental freedoms. The eco-
nomic dimension of citizenship is included.
4 For an analysis of the interplay between the modernization of the court system and judicial inde-
pendence, which together are a bridge between the rule of law stricto sensu and inter-institutional 
accountability, see Piana (2013).
5 Its overarching function gives the rule of law a privileged position among the procedural dimen-
sions of liberal democracy. This brought a few scholars to state that democracy does not exist without 
proper respect for the rule of law. More demanding theoretical positions would claim that the rule of 
law should be respected not only de jure but also—and above all—de facto. See Voigt and Hayo, 2003; 
Russell, 2010; Guarnieri and Piana, 2011.
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6.3 The Additional Explanatory Steps
To better understand the changes in the three types of freedom that we con sidered 
as empirically relevant, we have to consider three other hypotheses that capture 
three domestic explanatory mechanisms. They are:
 1) the paradox of the illiberal turning of more information into less freedom 
when we focus on the freedom of information;
 2) the paradox of the illiberal turning of more rules into less freedom when 
we focus on economic freedom, the freedom of religious association and 
freedom of movement;
 3) the improvement of civil rights and protection of dignity, notably because 
of the modernization of the judicial systems and penitentiaries.
To illustrate these mechanisms, we need to start with the following questions:
 a) Who are the actors that are prominent proponents of the policies analysed 
in Chapter 3? What are the functions and positions held by the potential 
beneficiaries of these policies, once we focus on public institutions—the 
State—as an arena where policy proponents are acting upon expected posi-
tive payoffs in terms of power, legitimacy, influential situations and offices?
 b) Who are the key players active in vetoing or pushing for the process of rule 
implementation?
These questions stem from an extensive literature about the links between the 
State structure and the functioning of democratic processes. In our framework 
(see 1.2) the State structure includes at least two dimensions, the rule of law and 
inter-institutional accountabilities. Bearing this theoretical perspective in mind, 
we propose an explanation by pointing out, first, the role played by the agency of 
the rule adoption,6 and, second, the role played by veto rulers in the process of 
rule implementation.7 Veto rulers are acting alongside the process of rule 
6 By rule adoption we mean the formal adoption of the normative device that creates an arena and 
room for manoeuvre for policy implementing players. This is to refer to EUCLIDA (Morlino, 2011, 
chapter  6) and for a specific set of applications, Morlino and Magen (2009) and Morlino and 
Sadurski (2010).
7 By veto rulers, we mean actors that are situated in a favourable condition to put into motion veto 
rules (see the notion used in Morlino and Piana, 2014). The concept of the veto ruler is crucial to our 
analysis. It moves away from the concept of the veto player used in Tsebelis, 1990, by introducing a 
dynamic and process-oriented perspective. Veto players are precise nets in the Tsebelis model: they 
are activated in a dichotomic manner (either they veto, or they do not). In our view, the role played by 
actors unfolds over time and does not obey deterministic patterns of behaviour. Veto rulers may use, 
interpret, reshape, drift, or layer rules. In this respect, they do not merely activate a veto. One may see 
in this view a micro-foundation of the different patterns of institutional change that are outlined in 
Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, chapter  2. The case of Poland shows that vetoes may not necessarily 
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implementation by adopting several different strategies, which encompass 
resistance, the hybridization of rules, layering, reshaping, interpretation, and sub-
version. Indeed, fragmented public institutions are highly inclined to veto or set 
constraints on rule implementation, even though there is no necessary relation-
ship between a high number of decision-makers and the high probability of veto-
ing, as seen for instance in the case of the Netherlands (Mak, 2008). The worsening 
of individual freedoms’ protection and enacting scope appeared as an illustration 
of non-intentional and perverse effects of collective or individual initiatives taken 
for entirely different (and differently framed) reasons. A range of policies pro-
moted to increase efficiency and transparency, adopted in the name of equality of 
access, created unexpected reasons for challenging individual freedoms. This is 
not due to the content of the policies, but instead to the type of instruments. Some 
of them have the potential for new freedoms (and news dangers to freedom) to be 
ruled.8 What matters for our purpose is the explanation of the divergences, based 
on the qualitative and quantitative evidence, among the countries and within the 
same country in different periods.
6.3.1 The Paradox of More Information, Less Freedom
The first step to explain the transformations of individual freedoms is considering 
the paradox of the freedom of information. Access to and use of information, 
notably concerning the public sector and the flow of data, determined by or 
related to the citizens/public institutions interface, have been increased by a con-
comitant chain of events. First, the push towards a more efficient and more trans-
parent public governance in the European Member States and other advanced 
democracies at the beginning of the 1990s and through the following two dec-
ades. Moreover, second, the disruptive wave of technological innovation creating 
favourable conditions for the fast and cross-bordering flow of data and informa-
tion in a much more marked way than ever before. The state of affairs in terms of 
easy access and decontextualized use of information has been a strong reason to 
justify high expectations of freedom widening. The implicit assumption was that 
function as protection of the checks and balances equilibrium. For instance, President Duda exercised 
his veto on the package deal that the government decided to reduce the independence of the judiciary, 
but the statutory law put forth by the President himself did not per se ensured the judicial independ-
ence by all means (Sadurski, 2019, p. 108).
8 This point is made more evident when Poland and Italy are compared. The content of the 
 pol icies—what their purpose is—becomes significant only under conditions of the rule of law subver-
sion, i.e., when the policies do not comply with the overarching principle of the rule of law. Our main 
argument here regarding the relationship between the normative overloading and the scope deflation of 
freedoms is related to the institutional methods of doing things, notably of doing the mise en oeuvre 
of the rules adopted.
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freedom of choice is mitigated by a shortage of information made available to 
decision-makers—even more critical if they are citizens and laypeople—whereas 
more information leads more or less directly to better choice and more freedom 
(Zuboff, 2018). Criticisms addressed by Zuboff toward the paradoxical outcomes 
triggered by the promise of more freedoms through the Web-based expansion of 
options of actions, both as a private and public actor, is today endorsed by the 
majority of scholars (see also Floridi, 2019).
If technology and technological potential are considered as exogenous factors, 
IT growth is expected to be homogenous across the six countries. In all the six 
countries, individuals with a house connected to the Internet have been increas-
ing. This is in both number and use intensity (OECD,  2018). For instance, in 
2017, 80% of the population in France had an Internet connection; the figure was 
close to 84% in Germany, 76% in Poland, and 84% in Spain. Italy and the UK 
stand at opposite poles along a continuum of constant growth in connectivity. 
The former covers 63% of the population, while the latter has reached 94%. 
Furthermore, the diffusion of technology, with several waves of ‘going digital’ 
reforms (World Economic Forum, 2015), impinges deeply and widely upon the 
public sector.
A combination of a few datasets focusing on different, but related, aspects of 
the technological development in the public sector and its consequent impact on 
the interaction between citizens and institutions, allows us to highlight three 
points. According to the data collected by the World Economic Forum and by the 
Open Data Barometer, from 2013 to 2017 the European biggest democracies 
developed a comprehensive governmental strategy to open dataset to citizens in 
order to create favourable conditions for more transparency and accountability 
(OECD, 2019).9 The promise of more freedom is tacitly accepted as the principled 
idea driving this change. The International Technology Union portraits a much 
more nuanced situation. In the countries where a vision of technology, based on 
the premise that more openness of data and information leads directly to more 
freedom, had been endorsed, the importance of ICT in the government’s vision is 
higher. At the same time, the number of norms (i.e., laws) adopted to deal with 
ICT dimensions—such as security of data storage, privacy protection of access and 
data entry, transparency and anti-corruption of public procurement pro ced ures—
also increases (see also ITU, 2019).
9 The Digital Government Initiative of the OECD has been carrying out a meta-analysis of the 
governmental strategy in the field of ICT applied to public sector and open data. The sources of infor-
mation contributing to building the OECD overview include the World Economic Forum, the Open 
Data Barometer, the Open Data Maturity Assessment of the European Union, the Open Government 
Index. The different sources considered did not adopt a standard methodology. This is the reason why 
we cannot elaborate on a synthetic index or a macro index merging the different indicators here con-
sidered separately. However, from a qualitative perspective, the patterns the countries follow accord-
ing to the different sources of data converge.
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On top of the growth of ICT, as a leverage to change the public sector, 
 complemented by the implementation of standards of efficiency, transparency, 
and effectiveness, more normativity emerged in the realm of e-government. The 
regulative density of the ICT policy sector is also amplified by the external pres-
sure—normative and political—exercised by the European Union and, especially, 
by the European Parliament. Two examples show the different actions undertaken 
by the European institutions, in coincidence or as a reaction to more recent cases 
concerning the fairness and credibility of ICT-based communication and social 
media enterprises. European regulation in the field of data protection and digital 
development represents a common ground for all six democracies. In the same 
vein, the European directive on copyright protection intervenes to regulate with a 
common baseline a field where the right entitlements of the private actors operat-
ing in the media market could lead to the potential erosion of the economic bene-
fits expected from a successful media R&D investment.
These last two external inputs disclose a complex interplay with several other 
inputs coming from the external actors promoting the ‘going digital’ drive in the 
public sector. Over the last two decades, the ideal of a lighter, less expensive and 
more efficient State has dominated the international stage (World Economic 
Forum, 2019). Technology and digital transformation appeared a viable way to 
achieve three goals at the same time: transparency, standardization, and efficiency 
in the public sector. The ultimate positive achievement of shifting public or gan-
iza tions toward the dematerialized management of document delivery, filing and 
tracing is that of enabling citizens and economic actors in terms of easier access—
more freedom to access information, regardless of citizens’ initial assets in terms 
of education or economic resources—and faster response. However, the pattern 
of change varies from one country to another, showing a worsening in Italy, 
Spain, and Poland, but not in the UK, Germany, and France. And this entirely 
consistent with the picture on civil right proposed in Chapter 3.
Moreover, if we postpone the analysis of Poland, Italy and Spain may be 
 understood in similar terms. However, we immediately see different patterns of 
inter action among the players when we zoom in on the dynamics displayed by 
the actors. Both countries have been working on a comprehensive agenda of 
 public administrative reforms, pushing actively in the direction of a more accessible, 
readable, efficient, and effective interface between citizens and institutions. 
Digitalization played a key role in this respect, both as a policy goal and as leverage 
for change, triggering several related effects and policy strategies. Spain intro-
duced a first and comprehensive wave of policies aimed at injecting a massive 
number of IT-driven tools into the public sector from 2008. Under pressure 
from European institutions and international actors—such as the OECD and the 
IMF—a strong commitment of the incumbent government in Madrid was to 
implement a project for light State machinery. Gaining political consent for this 
was easy, but the implementation process turned out to be much less smooth. For 
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instance, if we look at the degree of homogeneity of this process in the autonomia 
we detect sharp discrepancies not only between one autonomia and another one 
(Verzelloni, 2018), but also between the pursued goal and the actual results. To 
access public institutions, citizens have to overcome substantial barriers, such as 
digital illiteracy. More significantly, in several sectors, the digital agenda has 
remained on paper, due to the veto and the inertia of local institutions.
In Italy, the model adopted seemed more successful at first sight. In 2014, a 
concerted drive to promote the digital agenda was launched by the Department 
for Public Governance, operating within the frame of the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers, and the Ministry for Finance and the Economy. In several 
occasions, the head of the Department received an endorsement for a multi- 
 sectoral agenda, reflected in the final adoption of the agentification way of 
strengthening and embedding the digital agenda beyond the ups and downs of 
governmental destinies (see the assessment of the European Commission, 2017). 
Consequently, several actions were taken. The electronic signature and the clus-
tering of personal data into digital and dematerialized support—in the health sec-
tor, for instance—investment in infrastructures and the information technology 
architecture across the ministries. Despite the significant investment, however, 
the opportunities opened for people to access, in an easy, user-friendly way, infor-
mation concerning administrative proceedings and public procurements remains 
sectoral and fragmented. This is due to the existence of strong veto rulers oppos-
ing inter-sectorial operability—such as the health-education-justice interface—
and effective dialogue between local and central institutions. At the same time, 
however, the most substantial experience and a prominent leadership concerning 
the data protection law, which has been most influential at the European level in 
the development and drafting of the European Regulation of Data Protection, has 
come from Italy.
The cases of Spain and Italy offer strong reasons to consider the actors, who 
were key promoters of the policies adopted in the field of IT regulation at the 
domestic level, as an influential more in-depth explanatory factor. However, a 
further aspect is worth highlighting to fully understand the scenarios in the six 
countries when we focus specifically on IT and freedom. The diffusion of policies 
aimed at transforming the public sector under the e-government paradigm—also 
because of the strong pressure of international organizations and the EU—did 
not bring about an improvement in privacy protection. According to Privacy 
International,10 in 2007 the countries included in our analysis did not rank among 
the virtuous cases. Out of the six, France and the UK scored the lowest. The situ-
ation, as portrayed in 2007, underwent a significant evolution in the subsequent 
decade, notably concerning the diffusion of digital technologies and Web-based 
10 https://privacyinternational.org/. Privacy International is a charity based in London, committed 
to fighting for the right to privacy.
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public information actions (see Vaccari and Valeriani, 2018). Disinformation and 
propaganda disseminated online have been poisoning the public sphere. The 
unbridled collection of personal data has broken down traditional notions of 
priv acy (Freedom House, 2018). Even in democracies with a high level of digital 
literacy, it is often hard to distinguish between trusted sources from one’s own 
community and information created by a fake-news factory (Freedom House, 2018). 
Freedom House remains critical about the freedom of the press in Italy and lately 
in Poland and, more generally, about the freedom that the public authorities allow 
for individual actions taken through Web-based platforms and social networks. All 
the countries, Poland excluded, have adopted specific legislation to adopt in-depth 
surveillance strategies covering social network communications and transactions, 
as well as making provisions for investigating institutions to use personal data and all 
data generated through the net if there is a charge or suspicion of collaboration 
among international criminal organizations.
Evidence provided in Chapter 3 and reinforced by the reports adopted by the 
Global Technological Index and the OECD analysis of digital government, singles 
out the paradoxical effect engendered by the digital revolution in terms of 
 individual freedoms. Governments increased control on the Web, concerning 
surveillance measures to combat international terrorism as well as about increas-
ing warnings from international and supranational organizations on the risks for 
personal data when inserted and exchanged on the Internet. In Italy, a new bill 
approved in June 2017 mandated the government to regulate hacking for criminal 
investigations, but it raised concerns among privacy groups about the lack of 
adequate safeguards (Freedom House, 2018). Meanwhile, Italy has been discuss-
ing its regulation of hacking powers for law enforcement investigations, and in 
June 2017 approved a law mandating the government to regulate the use of 
malware for such purposes. Italian and international non-governmental or gan-
iza tions, as well as the UN Human Rights Committee, have raised concerns 
about international human rights standards of legality, necessity, and propor-
tionality. Concerns have also surrounded Italian companies’ involvement in 
the cyberweapons trade, and the lack of transparency in the way export licenses 
are granted.
Moreover, according to the latest report published by Freedom House, national 
governments have adopted several measures to increase censorship on the Web. 
For instance, in 2016 the German government adopted the Social Network 
Enforcement Law, ‘which aims to curb the dissemination of hate speech, terrorist 
propaganda, and fake news on social media, and to establish substantial fights 
against social networking companies for failing to remove flagged criminal 
content from their platforms. In the same vein, a new law regulating the conduct 
of the Federal Intelligence Service has raised concerns for attempting to legalize 
thus-far illegal surveillance practices that could potentially affect German citizens 
as well as foreign journalists.’ A similar path has been followed in the UK. In 
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November 2016, the controversial Investigatory Powers Act 2016 reformed the 
legal framework governing the surveillance powers available to law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies, undermining privacy. As a result, ‘internet freedom 
declined in 2017 as the Investigatory Powers Act (IP Act) authorized a range of 
surveillance powers, including some bulk surveillance of individuals who are 
not the targets of criminal or national security investigations’ (Freedom on the 
Internet in the UK, 2017).
In Italy, the political attention devoted to ‘fake news’ emerged with greater 
urgency than in the other countries considered in our analysis. Following a con-
stitutional referendum campaign marked by allegations of disinformation and 
fake news, political parties and actors have been advocating for various solutions 
to tackle the phenomenon, including a controversial proposal to impose fines and 
prison sentences on those behind fake news reports. Amidst growing scrutiny 
over surveillance software sales to government agencies and repressive regimes, 
Italy took some steps to limit the export of surveillance technologies to countries 
with poor human rights records (see also above). A similar pattern is displayed by 
France, where the legislative decrees passed in 2016 and 2017 to tackle the risk of 
radicalization impinged upon the powers granted to the services de renseigne-
ments to investigate on the Internet.
A common trend in France, Germany, and the UK is represented by the pol it-
ical commitment of the incumbent authorities after 2016 to set up stronger mech-
an isms of surveillance against the ‘fake news’. In Italy and Spain the emphasis is 
on access to information for all, even if jeopardized by the diffusion of veto rulers. 
In the other three democracies—Poland is excluded and will be analysed as a case 
apart—the focus is on protecting citizens (and voters) from fake news, the pollu-
tion of political competition and the (potential) undermining of the capacity of 
citizens to be free in their choices. Different models are adopted according to the 
different arenas and the leading actors operating in the three countries. In France, 
the jurisdiction granted to the CNIL—the National Commission for Information 
and Freedoms—has been expanded, especially after the presidential campaign to 
fight fake news in a determined and wide-ranging manner. In Germany, we 
observe a trend towards an endogenous regulation of the information handled by 
the political parties and above all by the Stiftung, i.e., the actors involved on the 
front stage of political communication and the evidence-policy agenda setting. In 
the UK parliamentary scrutiny of the serious case involving Cambridge Analytica 
led to a wave of information retrieval following criticisms of information 
providers.
If assessed against this comparative analysis, the case of Poland turns out to be 
more peculiar and dramatic. In the same vein as the previous wave of liberal pol-
icies, Poland followed by opening to both IT-driven administrative reforms and 
the extensive use of digital technologies in the private life of citizens. In some 
respects, it appears to be the most liberal case together with the UK. However, in 
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2016 liberal guarantees began to be dramatically subverted, deeply and substantially 
undermining the very possibility for freedom to be enacted and put into motion 
in both the public and private sphere. The subverting trend had a peak in 2017, 
with the reform of the media sector, the high degree of public surveillance 
 introduced alongside the enhancement of ad hoc committees vested with special 
prerogatives to fight corruption, scrutinize officers and purge media regulative 
bodies. All this deeply undermined the liberal features of Polish democracy 
(Freedom House, 2018).
To sum up, on the one hand, the massive injection of technology has triggered 
a much higher level of mobility and a more extensive range of options for citizens 
to exercise their economic freedoms and their freedom to express their opinion, 
to express themselves, to move and to get informed. However, on the other hand, 
it has also allowed potentially illegal, unethical and undemocratic behaviours to 
creep into space, which is not subjected to the same intense legal protection found 
in the material world. Kara Swisher (2018, . . ..) rightly claims that IT platforms 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and others, were ‘destined to become a template of all 
humankind, the digital reflection of masses of people included the bad ones’.
An occasional but also deeply revealing event is worthy of further con sid er ation. 
The abuse of information deriving from the GAFAM companies perpetrated by 
Cambridge Analytica did not just accelerate the regulatory measures adopted by 
the European Union over the last two years. It cast a sombre light on the genuine 
relationship between political freedom—and notably the freedom of speech and 
freedom of information—and technological development. The suspicious attitude 
endorsed as a reaction to the scandal should not be taken as a malaise of our 
Zeitgeist (Deloire, 2018). Instead, it is the tip of the iceberg in a much more com-
plex interplay between the demand for more information, the lack of trustworthy 
intermediation in information production and distribution on the Web, and the 
structural limits which accompany the more intense use of IT in citizens’ 
daily lives.
For our discussion, this point deserves some additional consideration. The lib-
eral vision, which grants to the freedom of information a key role in ensuring the 
quality of democracy—at least of the procedural model of democracy as it has 
been promoted and defined by the founding father of the liberal theory—takes 
for granted that information is produced based on a mechanism of inter medi-
ation where media press companies and journalists’ associations play a role. For 
decades and, in some case even centuries, the combination of a pluralist variety of 
information complemented by the existence of intermediaries created—as in the 
United Kingdom—favourable conditions for providing citizens with a good 
source of data and information on the public and the power elite.
The disruptive effect of the Web is amplified by the massive erosion of all inter-
medi at ing capacities of the actors who transact across the Web. Data can be 
stored by them and storage can be hacked. Access—for instance, to the exercising 
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of an individual right—is already a way to trade-off and lose power on the Web, 
without getting back in exchange the possibility of holding the actors who exploit 
this power accountable. Efforts by regulators to catch up and address the lack of 
guarantees that comes with the digital sphere is somehow falling short in terms of 
enforcement capacity and freedom protection. To come to an only partial conclu-
sion, technological development as a viable path toward a better public sector 
represents a competitive and redistributing arena where actors vested with insti-
tutional responsibilities were hollowed out or empowered dependently on the 
position and the capacity they displayed in handling the new digital world. In 
some cases, the agentification opened a new space for new actors—such as inde-
pendent authorities—as in Italy. In other contexts, the executive branch took over 
and gained a stronger role in promoting, shaping, and maintaining ICT policies, 
as in France. Countries like Poland experienced a weakening of the media and 
growth of ICT, with even weaker intermediation in the production and diffusion 
of data and information.
6.3.2 The Paradox of More Rules, Less Freedom
As already mentioned, the transformations catalysed by the massive IT penetra-
tion into public and private organizations called for more normative actions, which 
have been undertaken at both the supranational and the domestic level. This 
 happened in some cases in the wake of critical events. In other cases, it came out 
together with a large wave of standard-setting. The relationship between more 
technology and more freedom will be explored not only for the (less effective 
than expected) empowerment of citizens but also for the upheaval of IT regula-
tion (Lessig, 2006; Sunstein, 2017; Solove, 2006).
In Chapter  3, the turning point marked in 2011–12 and even more in 2015 
attracted attention to the point of addressing a precise question on the timing also 
at the beginning of this chapter (see above). The Great Recession triggered a chain 
of institutional, political, socioeconomic, and cultural events, and provided a 
strong impetus towards a more efficient and better performing public sector 
(Alesina et al., 2019). Despite the widespread debate casting dark shadows on the 
actual effectiveness of the austerity paradigm,11 the first wave of reforms impinged 
upon the machinery of the State through a vast range of normative measures. 
11 The austerity approach, which has been dominant during the late 2000s and the early 2010s, may 
be defined as a paradigm, following Sabatier (1998). Austerity included both principles and strategies, 
as well as normative ideas legitimizing an approach to the public sector and a strong focus on eco-
nomic growth together with the quest for the rationalization of public expenditure. Regardless of the 
stance taken afterwards against the austerity approach, for the analysis of democratic transformation, 
the dominant focus on equality has been intentionally pursued and justified. Less explicitly, European 
democratic leaders focused their policies on the protection of freedoms.
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These left a deep and wide trace of normative activism, which impacted 
 significantly on the number of rules regulating the economic and the social 
spheres of citizens’ lives. Examples include new provisions on taxation, labour 
laws and social security packages. The combination of this legacy, i.e., a denser 
normative framework, with the injection of massive doses of IT, resulted in an 
increased functional demand for control to ensure cybersecurity, privacy and 
regulative compliance on the Web and within the immaterial structures providing 
public services. IT, therefore, acted as a catalyser for a reduction in freedom, 
under conditions of normative hypertrophy. The interplay between, on the one 
hand, the legacy left by the wave of post-austerity reforms tackling public sector 
inefficiencies and, on the other, the wave of measures adopted after 2011 and later 
also as part of the fight against terrorism, created potentially favourable condi-
tions for a demand for more technological security and stricter control on the 
part of the public sector. These concomitant factors partially eroded the scope of 
freedoms, in all the democracies here analysed, except for Poland, which once 
again followed a different path.
The salience of the turning points we refer to in our explanatory approach 
must be assessed in two respects. First, the turning points in the dynamics of free-
doms correspond to a functional reshape of political priorities in reaction to a 
common challenge. In 2011, finally, after a protracted intergovernmental ne go ti-
ation, a consensus on the priority of tackling international terrorism was reached. 
consequently, countries authorities unfolded different strategies, depending on 
the degree of their involvement in the international military initiative. In this 
respect, the UK is very telling. Freedoms enjoyed by citizens have been put under 
intense pressure already in 2011, much more than in other countries, such as 
France, which has expanded its anti-terrorism strategy exponentially in 2016 
after the Bataclan attack (November 2015). Second, there is an interdependence 
effect, already singled out in our analysis, between equality-oriented policies and 
the indirect impact they had on freedoms. This has become evident most notably 
from 2015–16 onward. Thus, in a nutshell, the 2011–12 and 2015–16 periods 
have been marked by comprehensive domestic strategies addressing the mech an-
isms of control. This happened, earlier, in terms of custom and mobility and, after-
wards, of cyber-security, Internet freedom and ICT uses in general. Consequently, 
the European Parliament in a Resolution adopted after 2011 mentioned the urgency 
of a country-monitoring process to ensure that the security policies do not restrict 
the freedoms and fundamental rights of European citizens.12
From the functional point of view, which focuses on the ‘tasks’ performed by 
democratic procedural dimensions, and consistently following the trans form ations 
12 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The 
EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges/* COM/2010/0386 final */. 
We come back to this issue in Chapter 7.
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undergone by all EU democracies, each of our six countries saw an increasing 
demand for rulemaking and rule adoption in the sectors that were most pressed 
by the novelties and consequences of exogenous challenges: public order, migra-
tion, technology and the upheaval of a digital dimension in the private and public 
life of citizens. The request was for more rules to ensure more protection for citi-
zens, which can be linked and assessed against the impact that it has on people’s 
freedom. The worsening of freedom, discussed in Chapter 3, shows instead that 
more rules and more regulations do not necessarily allow more freedom. On the 
contrary, under specific conditions, more rules turn into less freedom.
To empirically support this hypothesis, we need to introduce some clarifications. 
Liberal theory has traditionally been keen to argue that freedom comes when 
rules are strict, predictable and formulated as boundaries rather than commands. 
In other words, rules have to set up a playing field where individual actors are left 
free to act under conditions where the normative framework is fair, impersonal 
and impartial. A more sophisticated view proposes a more nuanced attitude. An 
opposite relationship does not link rules and freedoms. Under conditions of high 
uncertainty and high risks, more rules play the role of ensuring a reduction in the 
asymmetry of information and power among the players and, ultimately, guaran-
tee the sustainability of public goods, such as quality of information, quality of 
administration, quality of the environment. This vision is deeply embedded in the 
paradigm that has inspired the most recent wave of norms.
A further distinction also needs to be made. When using the concept of 
‘rule’, we should distinguish between statutory laws and administrative decrees. 
Scholars have explored in depth the reasons behind the shifts in patterns of power 
distribution within the European Member States. A regulative turn was followed 
by several feedbacks and adjustments, which, however, did not restore the cen-
trality of the legislative branch in the overall process of rule adoption (Laffan, 
2017). In many respects, statutory norms have been replaced by executive-centred 
measures stemming from the regulatory function performed by the governmental 
agencies, notably in policy sectors that clearly call for the prevention of uncer-
tainty and risk (Ongaro and Van Thiel, 2017). In the same vein, most of the pres-
sure exerted by European institutions during and in response to the crisis fell on 
the executive branch, especially about rationalization of the public budget.
The specific hypothesis we suggest here is that the growth of rules aimed at 
protecting citizens from the risks and uncertainty compound by the economic 
crisis, the waves of migration (with the subsequent expectations of less security 
and less public order) and the digital turn experienced by public institutions and 
public life in general, does not result in growth of the scope of freedoms. The 
opposite takes place. In order to empirically support this statement, we first need 
to analyse the rule adoption rate in the six countries. In the UK the adoption of 
statutory laws slightly decreased over the period between 1999 and 2014 and then 
increased, but without reaching the level of 1999 (33 in 1999; 25 in 2006; 23 in 
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2014; 27 in 2018).13 In France, the number of lois organiques and ordonnances 
totalled 119 in 2008; 110 in 2011; 100 in 2013; and 99 in 2014. In Italy 329 bills 
were adopted in the sixteenth legislature (2008–13), whereas during the period 
2001–12 the number of adopted decrees was very high, exceeding 1000. If we 
observe Spain and Germany, we see that while in Spain the norms adopted by 
the Cortes increased during the period immediately after the crisis, in Germany 
the number of statutory laws adopted by the Bundestag remained almost stable. 
However, the Lander acquired a more extensive range of competences, notably in 
fields such as the environment, social and economic development, and education. 
In general, in countries that experienced an increase in rule adoption, we also 
observe a reduction of freedoms. This is especially critical in Italy and France. In 
Poland too, we can observe a growth in the normative productivity of the legisla-
tive branch: from 247 in 1989–91, to 894 in 2001-05; and 952 in 2007–11. It is 
important to note, however, that the normative production is related to the 
rationalization and modernization of the State in response to the economic crisis. 
However, in the case of Poland, it is the consequent stage of a long process of 
reform, which affected the public sector since the adoption of the constitution 
in 1997.
In general, if we follow the OECD outlook on regulation, which covers a broad 
spectrum of rule adoption processes deployed in all policy sectors within the 
scope of the regulation (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2005; Koop and Lodge, 2017), we 
detect a first, albeit partial, explanatory condition. The six countries considered in 
our analysis show a mild degree of convergence towards the adoption of a method 
of simplification in the rule adoption process, which stems from the introduction 
of the regulative impact assessment—even if it takes different forms in the differ-
ent countries. In France, despite the lack of a fully-fledged consultative turn in the 
process of rule adoption, some mechanisms were set up at government level to 
reduce the complexity of the norms, with a middle range degree of positive 
results (OECD, 2018) achieved over the last three years. In Germany, a mechanism 
of simplification of all processes of rule adoption—for the most part in the field of 
statutory laws—has been in place since 2000. Considerable improvement is 
shown by external assessment and an internal shift in the clarity and the ex-ante 
certainty of the normative framework (OECD, 2018). By contrast, Italy lags far 
behind the other five democracies considered here in introducing an effective 
mechanism of ex-ante quality assessment of the normative framework. There are 
several reasons for this, among which the lack of a cohesive culture of inter-
ministerial cooperation plays a key role. Compared to Spain, which introduced a 
new scheme of regulative impact assessment in 2009, the Italian case seems to be 
the worst in our sample of countries. This is the exact opposite of the UK. In this 
13 UK Parliamentary Statistics.
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country, the legacy of the simplification and rationalization of the normative 
framework is in place and embedded within institutional practices. A specific fea-
ture needs to be considered about Poland, where 40 per cent of rule adoptions, 
stemming from parliamentary bills, are not submitted to any preventive check in 
terms of simplicity and potential impact. Governments have engaged recently in a 
broad strategy aimed at tackling normative redundancy and complexity, both of 
which have been deemed crucial factors in impeding countries from boosting 
their economic growth and creating durable social and economic development. 
The widespread of the methods is illustrated in Table  6.1 through the OECD 
evaluation of regulative norms. It testifies the shared awareness of the hyper-
trophy of the norms adopted mainly in the 2000s, and even more dramatically 
around the years when public budget schemes were scrutinized, regulated and 
rationalized to react to the debt crisis in the Eurozone.
At this point, we can start disentangling the different factors that explain the 
non-linear relationship between rules and freedoms. We can point out three 
 factors regarding the extension of the rule adoption process, which reaches high 
levels in some countries, notably in Italy and France but to a lesser extent in 
Germany, and which remains within a relatively limited range in the UK. In those 
countries with more rules intervening in the socioeconomic life of citizens, the 
three factors that play a role are: (1) the method—which may be more or less 
inclined to keep the normative framework as simple as possible; (2) the potential 
stalemated rule implementation related to the number of veto rulers a country 
has; and (3) the degree of continuity behind the electoral turnover and the change 
of governments.
We have already touched on the issue of the ex-ante regulative impact assess-
ment and the related capacity of domestic government agencies to ensure the 
clarity and simplicity of the laws. However, to explain the perverse rationale of 
change that led to the growth in rules and at the same time the deterioration of 
freedoms, we need to consider the number of veto rulers who are active in the 
Table 6.1 Governmental capacity in ensuring certainty, predictability, and 
simplicity of the rules
Country Primary  
laws RIA
Date of  
introduction
Relationship to the 
OECD average
France 2.5 2013 In the average
Germany 3 2000 Above
Italy 2 2006 Below
Poland 2.3 2015 Below
Spain 2 2009 Below
UK 3.5 2001 Above
Source: OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook, 2018, country sections.
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rule implementation processes and the degree of continuity of the electoral 
results. These factors affect the six countries in our analysis to a different extent. 
Veto rulers represent a core feature of domestic institutional designs: actors hand-
ling veto powers are allowed and requested to perform as vetoes according to 
these rules. For instance, this is the case of the constitutional courts, whose juris-
diction in terms of legislative scrutiny and judicial review may be strengthened 
or weakened by the possibility, or the lack thereof, of directly seizing control of 
the court from the citizens, foreseen in the law, for an individual case. However, 
veto rulers are not only of a formal shape. In some contexts, actors whose role is 
stra tegic or instrumental to the implementation of a normative measure—for 
example, in the legislative departments of ministries or in agencies entrusted 
with the responsibility of ensuring the transparency and accountability of the 
policies—perform as facilitating or inertial factors vis-à-vis the linear unfolding 
of the processes of rule implementation. If not embedded into a cohesive system 
of governance, this has an impact on freedom. The obstacles that enter the overall 
picture may decrease the predictability and certainty of the normative framework 
set up for social and economic actors.
Moreover, effective rule implementation is strongly influenced by relationships 
between politicians and high ranking civil servants, which are regulated accord-
ing to the mechanism of the spoil system in some countries—as in the UK—or 
according to the mechanism of a strong, institutionally embedded and largely 
independent esprit de corps—as in France. Therefore, about the pattern displayed 
by the country the continuity of rule implementation depends on the degree of 
administrative cohesion and the limits set up—more or less informally—to con-
strain the potentially disruptive action of veto rulers situated along the route of 
the implementation process running from the executive branch to the territories.
From this point of view, the six cases diverge and offer a promising sample to 
check the empirical adequacy of our comparative explanation. First of all, if we 
place our countries along a continuum going from a minimum number of veto 
rulers to a hypothetical maximum number of them, we can immediately detect 
that the most substantial distance is between France, on the one hand, and Italy, 
on the other hand, with the UK, Poland, Germany, and Spain, in this order, occu-
pying varying positions along the continuum. Specific examples of patterns of 
rule adoption and rule implementation can illustrate this point. In 2016, after the 
shock in France due to the escalation of terror attacks, the incumbent govern-
ment activated normative provision no. 55/1955, known as ‘état d’urgence’, which 
suspends individual freedoms in specific cases of suspicion, grants extraordinary 
prerogatives to the executive to strengthen control over the domestic territory, 
shifts the balance between the prosecutorial and the judicial authorities within 
the penal procedure. Following the institutional tradition, the government bill 
was assessed by the Council of the State, in its capacity as the guarantor of individual 
freedoms. The institutional cohesion of the French system in this circumstance is 
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well explained by the vice president of the Council of the State: ‘we ensure the 
durability of the constitutional democracy and we allow exceptions up to the 
point of not falling into an irreversible pattern of change. While we are able to see 
reversibility freedoms are safe.’14 The rule of law principle is not suspended 
despite the strong derogations law 55/1955 introduces. The stronghold is repre-
sented by the embedded culture of the institutions, which is endorsed by high 
civil servants. Such a culture pervades the high levels of the State across the 
different branches—within the executive, the Council of the State and in the 
local administrations. In 2017, after the presidential election, a strong endorse-
ment of the Council of the State happened to be explicitly in favour of the sus-
pension of the état d’urgence by means of a bill that reformed the penal 
procedural and substantial laws for terrorist acts and entailed specific measures 
impacting on freedoms.
A different case, but still showing a high degree of continuity, is represented by 
the UK. At the time of the Brexit referendum, a point was made about the role to 
be played within the British system by the European Convention on Human 
Rights, as European case laws implement it. It is up to the Supreme Court of the 
UK to provide a new and balancing doctrine to protect individual freedoms 
regardless of the ups and downs of the Brexit process. However, the final agree-
ment and the position endorsed by the British government in the context of the 
Brexit seems to open a new scenario, where the guarantees entrenched into the 
transnational legal order enforced through the CJEU are discontinued (Pech and 
Kelemen, 2019). Germany and Spain must be qualified with additional caution 
since veto rulers are also institutionalized within the structures of a strongly 
decentralized State. In this respect, at least initially for Spain, which then went 
through a deep crisis (see below), veto rulers experienced a rebalancing mech an-
ism in the decentralization.
The same differentiation seems to characterize our countries when considered 
for the degree of electoral turnover. This is closely related to the professionalism 
of the public sector, the circulation of the administrative elite, the role played 
by the so-called oversight institutions. The function of such institutions is to 
maintain conditions of high stability and predictability for the systems of rule 
implementation, to avoid the potential overruling of the incumbent political elite. 
Again, France seems to be in first place in terms of continuity. Even in instances 
of deep discontinuity in the political elite, the higher echelons of the public 
bureaucracy play a firm and unquestioned role as a stabilizing factor across the 
process of rule implementation. The same holds for Germany and the UK. A 
completely different scenario is unfolding in Italy, Spain, and Poland. In Italy and 
Spain, the high level of veto rulers is accompanied by a high degree of systemic 
14 Interview to the vice president of the Council of the State, May 2016 and November 2016; and 
interview with officials serving in the Secretary-General of the Government, April 2016.
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discontinuity in the State bureaucracy. Moreover, the burden of responding to the 
demands of its citizens is left on the shoulders of the judiciary.15 In Poland, the 
overruling effect of the political majority, mastered with a muscular attitude by 
the incumbent party leaders, concerning the constitutional guarantees of judicial 
independence, media pluralism and the autonomy of agencies, such as independ-
ent authorities and the central bank, has to be considered as a sort of ‘meta’ level 
of discontinuity. In Poland, however, the number of veto rulers has decreased 
radically. Now, it is concentrated in the hands of just a few rulers.
Binary comparisons can also suggest relevant insights. It is worth taking Germany 
and Spain as examples of countries where subnational institutions do manage an 
extensive repertoire of prerogatives in key fields, such as taxation, regulation, and 
administrative procedures. After the long and relentless strain placed upon the 
rationality of the costs/benefits of the public sector administrative machinery, in 
2014–15 the macroeconomic indicators started to signal a slight easing of the 
recession or a revival of domestic growth. In 2016 and 2017, despite the different 
paths taken by the governments in facing the crisis—and despite the different 
contexts in which the governments were operating in terms of the depth of the 
crisis—both countries introduced a wave of reforms to increase the competitive-
ness of the domestic system and reduce the sunk costs for economic investments. 
However, in Germany, the involved actors did not play as veto players, especially 
in the field of taxation reform, where the Landers opted for a standard method of 
taxation to avoid domestic dumping. An opposite path was taken in Spain where 
the autonomia represented not only a potential arena for veto rulers but followed 
a conflictive path with the centre. This went as far as to promote the secession of 
Cataluña in 2017.
In the two countries, oversight institutions such as the supreme courts played 
an opposite role. In Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht took a strong stance 
in favour of German sovereignty before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in the specific context of the Fiscal Compact concerning the implementa-
tion of the European Stability Mechanism (Sinha, 2018). At the same time, the 
court also promoted a mechanism of proportionality in the reconciliation of dif-
ferent interests and positions represented by the Landers during the long process 
of transformation of the economic setting in the approximately thirty-year period 
analysed here. In the case of Spain, the Tribunal Constitutional assumed a prom in ent 
role of judicial activism, in what can be properly described as a ‘meta-pol it ical 
arena’, created by the referendum for the Cataluña secession.
The role played by veto rulers is highlighted in the case of the UK when we 
consider the pathway to the reforms of the State and the subsequent strategy 
enacted by different institutions to handle the crisis ensuing from Brexit. The UK 
15 This seems to be also confirmed by the OECD Economic Outlook and the Regulation 
Assessment, published in 2015 and 2017.
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started to address the cost/benefit ratio in the functioning of the administration 
long before the stimulus provided by the economic crisis. A strong legacy of 
performance-oriented strategies had already existed in the country since the early 
1990s (Flynn, 1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017). In late 2010, however, a more 
focused set of actions was adopted, with a focus on education, health, and justice. 
In this last sector, an IT-driven package of actions introduced a new model into 
the court system, based on functional differentiation and multiple tracks to 
dispute settlement (Mania, 2015). After 2015 the country was hit by the wave of 
effects relating to the growth of migration and the concomitant escalation of 
international terrorism. Many measures were taken to prevent terrorist acts, 
especially in terms of penal procedural reforms (Molinié and Piana, 2018). More 
dramatically, the referendum, promoted by the incumbent government to elicit 
the preferences of citizens regarding European membership, plunged the country 
into an unexpected condition of high normative uncertainty. In this context, the 
UK supreme court played a key role in ensuring the continuity of the fundamen-
tal guarantees of freedoms at the level of the European standards by elaborating 
(through an interpretative strategy) a new doctrine on article 50 of the Treaty 
of Lisbon.
With the differences highlighted above, the combination of factors that should 
be integrated into an explanatory model reflects its potential as a set of variables 
catalysing a change once it relates to the relevant policy sector. Many measures 
taken to reduce inefficiencies and increase growing capabilities in the public 
sector—such as the reduction of human resources, the retraining of personnel, 
the introduction of e-government technologies and tools, the recentralization 
of critical functions and structures, cost monitoring and cutting—profoundly 
impacted the scope of public institutions and the re-configuration of interactions 
between citizens and public institutions. Moreover, the waves of migration and 
the threat of international terrorism have both paved the way for citizens’ accept-
ance of large doses of control, privacy reduction, mobility limitation and public 
order enhanced strategies.
A further specific point has to be made when analysing Poland. Instead of 
reforming specific policy sectors or specific dimensions of the public governance 
and, indirectly or even not intentionally, of affecting the state of the freedoms 
enjoyed by citizens, the Polish government attacked directly the provisions that 
immediately relate to some key liberal rights, such as the freedom of speech, free-
dom of association, freedom of press. To explain this change, we need to take a 
different analytical angle and consider a systemic level of change, where the elite 
reshapes or disrupts the architecture of the democratic constitutional setting.
The counterintuitive situation of the freedoms, as they emerge, reshaped and 
transformed, after the years considered in our analysis (1990–2018), is even 
more telling if assessed against the demands and the concerns European citizens 
have recurrently expressed. For the specific topic analysed here, the scope and the 
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degree of protection enjoyed by freedoms, citizens seem to be much more concerned 
by their security than by their liberty of action. In this respect, the policies 
adopted by different governments over the period considered have encountered 
very little resistance when oriented straightforwardly towards securitization, the 
enhancement of the intelligence services, increased control and the hardening of 
the limitations set up to prevent public order risks (see Chapter 3, section 3.2). 
This state of affairs ultimately comes as a surprise. An opposite narrative has deeply 
marked the first two decades of this century. It depicted a ‘promised land’ with a 
big increase in the opportunities for citizens to move, choose and to opt in or out 
concerning the spaces that are traditionally pivotal for the democratic freedoms. 
These include market, national territory and private life. This narrative is closely 
linked to the new waves of social habits, hypermobility and hyper-connectivity, to 
the point that scholars have called for a new way to interpret the relationships 
that citizenship has with freedom. Indeed, freedom has recently been described 
as the ability to navigate through life (Sunstein, 2019).
6.4 Civil Rights, Protection of Dignity, and  
the Improvement of Justice Systems
The state of freedoms would be wreathed in dark shadows if we did not consider 
the third piece of evidence resulting from the analysis of Chapter 3. As mentioned 
in the introductory section, civil rights, most notably those relating to how citizens 
interact with justice systems and the mechanisms of judicial sentencing—included 
the penitentiary—testify to a different and more positive trend. About the terms 
of access to justice, enforcement of the right to a fair trial in a reasonable time 
frame, and certainty in the execution of the trial, Chapter 3 shows that in the time 
covered by our analysis there was a decisive turn in all six countries, albeit with 
differing degrees of success and reversibility. To explain this positive trend, we 
need to refer to the external inputs, to see why domestic actors made the differ-
ence in the path followed by the policies adopted to improve the trial timeframe 
and the access to justice, with a consequent explanation of the differential degrees 
of reversibility of the positive results achieved in the six countries.
For almost a decade, European institutions have been grappling with the titanic 
enterprise of defining a core set of concepts, principles and goals which have a 
high probability of being accepted by all the member States, despite their cultural 
and institutional differences. The norms shaped through this process belong to 
the ‘soft law’. Despite their variegated nature—encompassing several different 
sub-types of normative tools—one can safely argue that soft laws are not legally 
binding. Therefore their capacity to impinge upon institutional decision making 
is intimately related to the will of actors to endorse these norms as normative 
principles or behavioural models. Soft laws include guidelines for how a court 
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should be managed, benchmarks fixing the reasonable timeframe of a trial at the 
first instance and at the appeal, models of IT-based case management, models of 
judicial training, models of judicial governance, guidelines and recommendations 
about the interaction between the courts and the media, the courts and the 
society, the judge and the prosecutor. This growing set of inputs is non-legally 
binding, since European institutions—neither the EU nor the Council of 
Europe—have jurisdiction over the organization of the State of their members. 
The roots of the ‘soft’ nature of these inputs lie here.
The idea underpinning this analysis can be summarized as follows: the admin-
istration of justice is a public sub-sector and should be held accountable for its 
capacity to deliver an effective service to users—citizens—and of its capacity to 
allocate money with strict instrumental rationality. The remedies suggested come 
from best practices utilized in the more advanced countries—countries that rank 
high in court efficiency –and from the development of common standards, which 
serve as common transnational reference points to assess the quality of national 
and sub-national judicial offices. Judicial offices respectful of the quality of justice 
should be efficient in delivering judicial decisions in due time and be transparent 
in the way they manage their resources. They should also introduce a comprehen-
sive package of IT instruments to facilitate information processing and public 
communication. In this view, the principled ideas inspiring the institutional 
design should be transparency, predictability, efficiency and effectiveness.
The 2000s were distinguished by increasing attention towards the moderniza-
tion of the court systems, and their efficiency and performance in responding in a 
timely fashion to citizens’ demand for justice. Two waves of judicial policies 
ensued, in France in 2002 and 2008, in Italy in 2006 and 2012–16, and in Spain in 
2007 and 2017. All the interventions—the adoption of which was closely linked 
to the time frame of the balance between the political majority and minority 
(the less popular reforms were adopted by the strongest majorities or by those 
under pressure from the European Union, as was the case in Spain)—were 
directed towards speeding up trials and making them more readily comprehensible 
to lay people, without over-stretching the budget for justice. This caution not-
withstanding, the data collected by the CEPEJ between 2010 and 2018 indicate 
that a slightly increased budget was allocated to the justice system in France and 
Italy, and there was significant growth in the resources injected into the justice 
system by the Polish government, most notably in 2017. Managerial policies, 
driven by intensive injections of IT and a reduction in the number of courts, 
impacted in dir ect ly upon the patterns of interaction between the executive and 
the judicial branch (see below).
More specifically, two indicators deserve further attention. They are the budget 
variation over the years considered in our research and the variation in the 
human resources operating in the justice systems. Despite the severe constraints 
preventing governments from increasing spending in response to the rise in the 
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number of trials, a shift within the public expenditure scheme seems to have 
occurred in all six democracies. This followed a convergent trend towards a rela-
tively more significant part of budgetary resources coming from fees paid to 
access the system, while the government allocated a relatively smaller proportion 
of the budget. New institutions created in the UK (the Supreme Court set up in 
2006 and operating since 2009), and Italy (the Judicial School set up in 2006 and 
operating since 2013) received an autonomous budget. In all the countries 
pro ced ural reforms were introduced in the second half of the 2000s, aimed at 
reducing access to the second level of jurisdiction or enabling appeal courts and 
supreme courts to adopt standardized models of file management. A parallel 
transformation has been taking place in institutions charged with maintaining 
public order. After 2001 there was a remarkable increase in the resources allo-
cated for surveillance and the intelligence services. Such increase followed an 
upsurge of international terrorism, almost following a reactive scheme of policy. 
A further and even more capillary growth of the public budget earmarked to 
boost public order organizations can be noted in the aftermath of the 2015 terror-
ist incidents in France.
The paradoxical effect engendered is due to the concomitant decrease in the 
quality of regulation, which distinguished all six of the democracies analysed here, 
especially during the 2000s, according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
II.16 The quality of regulation is closely related to the rule of law. The judicial 
branch becomes an enforcement agency, which implements the norms, elaborat-
ing them via the case laws resting on the normative framework that applies to 
each instance. The deterioration of the normative framework, enabling public 
officers and judicial staff to serve under conditions of predictability and stability, 
triggered what scholars have described as a functional compensation of the judi-
cial branch, which has been heavily overloaded with the task of filling the gap 
between the norms and the socio-economic reality—elicited by the litigations.
In the case of Italy, the rule of law shows a related evident decline, resulting in 
an institutional conflict between the judicial and the executive branch. If the 
hyper-visibility of the judiciary seems to have damaged the trust citizens had 
toward the impartiality of the judicial system, the overloading of the ordinary and 
administrative courts—shown by the increasing number of ECHR violations 
under article 6 (excessive length of trial)—exposed the civil justice system to 
harsh criticism, both in the country and from the EU. Spain experienced a similar 
path of changes, which impinged upon the capacity of the judiciary to deliver.
Overall, the higher demand for justice and the increased visibility of the poor 
performance of the courts brought about a propensity toward a higher politiciza-
tion of the judicial branch, which is detrimental to its perceived impartiality and 
16 https://databank.worldbank.org/source/worldwide-governance-indicators
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impersonality. In the countries characterized by a diffuse legitimation of the rule 
of law, the independence of the courts has not been challenged. This might be 
explained with the overstretching intervention of the supreme courts, which in 
several cases had been affecting critical and vital dimensions of democratic life, 
such as the balance between the centre and the territories, the division of compe-
tences between the branches and electoral law. Judicial constraints on executive 
activity saw a minor reduction in France and Germany, while they remained at 
the 1990 level in Italy, Spain, and the UK. In Poland, in association with the wave 
of reforms adopted in 2016, the executive branch opted out of the perimeter of 
judicial constraints and the judicial review of regulative acts.
The non-legally binding nature and inspiring principles of the external inputs 
defining and promoting a fair trial—with the enriched notion we have described 
here—act as a policy window mechanism at the domestic level, where actors may 
intervene and take the lead on ‘quality’ oriented reforms. The comparative ana-
lysis comes in here. In the six countries, we observe different paths concerning 
the different actors promoting the policies. In the UK, a proactive domestic 
style emerged from the early 1990s onwards, experiencing a boost in 2000 with 
the introduction of a Chancellor-promoted strategy of quality monitoring. In 
Germany, the indicators for the trial timeframe have never undergone a signifi-
cant deterioration. The two-level structure of governance maintained this. In 
Spain and Italy, the pivotal actors are at the level of the courts and only secondar-
ily of the political centre. In Spain, we observe a significant shift in the agency. In 
the first stage, the minister of justice acted as a frontrunner in the adoption of a 
range of tools respectful of European standards. In Italy, the High Judicial Council 
only took over in a second stage, in connection with a phase of political instability 
before the 2018 elections. In France, the justice quality reforms were launched 
under the Sarkozy presidency and have been reinforced during the Macron 
presidency. Poland has taken a different path. While for two decades the Polish 
judiciary adopted a very modernizing agenda and was a precursor in the region 
in terms of IT-based tools, during 2015–18 the entire architecture of an impartial 
judiciary has come under pressure and has ultimately been subverted by an over-
qualified majority supporting the cabinet.
6.5 Summing Up
In this chapter, we moved on from the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3 
on the freedoms the citizens enjoy in the six countries, and we have been analys-
ing both structural and agency-centred variables as explanations. Once we have 
considered the micro-level of analysis, where the behavioural strategies of pol it-
ical players unfold, we adopted a thick notion of situated rationality, where play-
ers and notably veto rulers act based on the strategic consideration of the expected 
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payoffs but also in relation to their cognitive and cultural attitudes and dispositions. 
The case of Poland is very telling in this respect. The incumbent government 
engaged since 2017 into an accurate, comprehensive, and incremental strategy of 
the subversion of rules entrenched into the constitutional provisions held by that 
time for all players. In fact, the Polish incumbent leaders shaped, mingled, and 
made several torsions of the rule of law according to the specific view they were 
ready to endorse (see Koncewicz, 2018; Sadurski, 2019).
We unpacked the notion of ‘freedoms’ alongside the analytical framework pre-
sented in Chapter 1, in particular based on three clusters of indicators relating to 
three significant dimensions: personal dignity, civil rights, and political rights. A 
curious feature of those freedoms is worth recalling here. Limiting some of them 
seems easier for the incumbent leaders and the justifications given are more read-
ily accepted. We mentioned 2011–12 and also 2015 as significant moments when 
some specific freedoms worsened (see Chapter  3 and the beginning of this 
 chapter). The years 2011–12 are when the European member States—in different 
manners and with different degrees of commitments—engaged in the first range 
of security policies to fight international terrorism. The year 2015 is remembered 
for the terrorist attack in Paris and the reactions not only of the French govern-
ment but also of all the other European governments. The broadly accepted tenet 
is that security comes first and can constrain any kind of freedom if necessary 
for a protracted period. This is the case even when the purported threat does 
not come from a potential terrorist attack but from supposedly dangerous 
immigration.
In summing up the principal explanations we propose for the trends and 
level of the three freedoms, we need to remember first of all the role of the rule 
of law with regards to governmental effectiveness, the control of corruption, 
and the compliance of public order with fundamental rights. Besides, we also 
mentioned two specific mechanisms and one evolution in the protection of 
 personal rights. The two mechanisms are the paradox of more information and 
less freedom and the paradox of more rules and less freedom. We also focused 
on economic freedom, freedom of religious association, freedom of movement, 
and improvement of protection of dignity because of the modernization of the 
judicial systems and the prisons. Earlier in the chapter, we have illustrated the 
impact of those mech an isms in all six countries and the different results. Let us 
recall here that the two mechanisms are different, but that the creation of new 
rules—not necessarily more rules—is an essential inner feature of the first 
mechanism too.
Moreover, we need to accept the fact that contrary to our expectations the 
much-vaunted wave of technological development did not translate into an 
improvement of individual freedoms, especially for privacy protection, freedom 
to access information and freedom of movement. Once again, this first paradox is 
even exacerbated in its undermining effects on the degree of freedoms. This is 
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even more so when interacting with the second paradox, which stems from the 
non-linear relationship linking rules and freedoms. The increasing productivity 
of normative agencies, especially at the dawn of the economic crisis and in the 
aftermath of the diffusion of IT-driven tools in the public sector, did not trigger—
at least not in all the countries—a linear process of freedom protection.
As we know, the media and pluralism of information are considered critical in 
helping individuals to make conscious choices and ensuring the possibility of 
shedding light on rulers’ behaviour and filling the gap between the asymmetry of 
information that marks the hiatus between rulers and ruled. Today, however, 
social media and the Web have reshaped their impact on democratic qualities. 
Despite the undeniable advantage of being provided with a potentially infinite 
range of information and being able to access a spectacular plurality of sources of 
information, citizens easily fall victim to what is now labelled as fake news. 
However, it would be correct to call it biased and not cross-checked information. 
The cases analysed here seem to prove the significance of the quality of inter-
medi at ing media enterprises. The foreign dissemination of false information 
seems to affect the UK more than the other five democracies we have considered. 
Poland also turns out to be a victim of the government dissemination of false 
information. In Italy, social media have a substantial impact on disconnecting 
citizens from the institutional sources of information (Freedom House,  2018). 
Overall, the Web is ill-prepared to cope with the risks of the biased information 
available on the Internet. Freedoms are expected to be protected by strong regula-
tions regarding data protection, privacy and access to information, and run the 
risk of being subverted by the overwhelming availability of data and information 
if a sound plural, and institutionally embedded system of media pluralism—not 
anonymous—is not in place.17
17 On this see also Chapter 7. We will come back to this crucial issue from another perspective, that 
of interinstitutional accountability, in Chapter 8.
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7.1 What Equalities and Freedoms Does the EU Bring?
‘More freedoms and equalities’ are the promises of European integration 
(Warlouzet, 2014). In a nutshell, this is the underlying narrative of the constitu-
tional trajectories traced by EU laws (De Witte, 2001). This promising perspective 
refers both to the present and to the future, which means that the European 
 influence equally guarantees all conditions ensuring freedoms and equalities. 
Entrenchment and consolidation of the related institutional conditions are in the 
scope of the EU. With different paces and paths, this has also been the narrative 
inspiring the bulk of the policies carried out by European institutions. Every sig-
nificant dimension of the freedoms and equalities, as operationalized in chapters 
2 and 3, falls into the scope of action of the EU. The Union impinges upon them with 
a wide range of policy tools, ranging from normative to cognitive inputs. On the 
‘demand-side’, i.e., on the side of the expectations of citizens and companies, the 
EU is expected to deliver more mobility, more opportunities and more homoge-
neous results among member States and regions (Ferrera, 2005; Caporaso, 2007). 
However, the gap between results achieved and outcomes promised represents 
slippery terrain for EU legitimacy, primarily if that legitimacy is assessed against 
an output-oriented set of criteria (Kriesi, 2013).
This chapter takes a critical stance toward a top-down view of the European 
influence on domestic political systems: the significance of external factors in 
determining domestic processes of change is here considered together with the 
different types of domestic factors with which the external forces interact. In this 
respect, the patterns of influences that are invoked to explain the changes in free-
doms and equalities are multi-level and principally pivot upon specific domestic 
procedural dimensions.1 This analytical approach is furthermore strengthened 
1 In this respect, the chapter follows up on the works by Morlino and Sadurski (2010) and Morlino 
and Raniolo (2017).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
186 Equality, Freedom, and Democracy
by a case-based empirical test, which proves in the two cases of Poland and the 
UK the differential combination of multi-level forces interplaying between the 
European level and the domestic level. This combination and the consequent pat-
tern of influences is at the core of our analysis.
From the historical point of view, freedom of mobility came first in the EU. The 
mobility of persons, capitals, and goods was deemed to justify the adoption of 
what was formerly the first pillar of EU law, using which domestic socioeconomic 
systems have been ‘unbounded’ and reframed into a transnationally regulated 
playing field (i.e., the single market). A further expansion of freedoms came with 
the adoption of the Schengen agreement, which was both politically sensitive and 
appreciated by the citizenry, as it established facilitated conditions for citizens 
willing to move across national borders. More generally, individual freedoms, 
which hold for citizens and, with an unusually high significance, for the economic 
actors, represented a drive for all the European member States to engage in a win-
win game. This is notably so in the establishment of free spaces of movement and 
exchange, which are based on reciprocity and, consequently, are sensitive to the 
constraints put on freedoms by at least one member State, notably the UK 
(see below).
When we consider equalities, EU laws have deepened the protection of social 
rights, such as the right to equal pay, the right to maternal leave, the right to 
healthcare services across the EU space and have triggered an evolution in EU 
social laws. In the same vein, minority rights, strongly protected at the level of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), entered the constitutional laws also 
through EU case law. This has been notably true in the case of the enlargement 
process involving the Central and Eastern European countries (Albi, 2005; 
Sadurski, 2005). However, the limited capacity of the EU to play an actual influ-
ence upon delivering both freedoms and equalities is highlighted by the case of 
Poland, which shows several critical aspects.
A relevant change in EU policies also needs to be mentioned. In 1990–2001 the 
EU—and the leading member States—unquestionably gave priority to the expan-
sion of freedoms and then to the entrenchment of the critical dimensions of 
equality into EU laws. Later, the priorities have been changing. After 11 September 
2001, the security sector became central (Jimeno-Bulnes, 2004); after 2007, the 
focus shifted to economic development; and after 2015 a number of new issues 
emerged, such as the regulation of the digital society and its interplay with cyber-
security (Carrapico and Barrinha, 2017), and the EU stance changed radically. 
Several measures have been adopted to keep borders under strict surveillance; 
consequently, to place many constraints on the freedom of movement; to raise the 
standard of control and surveillance; and to respond to the demand for safety and 
physical protection that the upheaval of international terrorism brought in 
many countries. Moreover, the austerity policies implemented by individual 
member states and the introduction of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
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Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), also known as the 
Fiscal Compact, represented a shift in the EU paradigm, caused first by the urgent 
need to give a clear and visible response to the debt crisis and then reshuffled by 
the emerging combination of Eurozone stagnation and the growing expansion 
of wealth distribution differentials—measured with the Gini Index, among 
other indicators.
In short, we may argue that external factors did have an impact on the trans-
formation of freedoms and equalities for two fundamental reasons. First, the sig-
nificance gained by the EU in the fields of freedoms and equalities did move in a 
positive direction during the 1990s but turned out to be a key factor afterwards in 
a different and more critical direction, notably with some restrictions. Second, 
even those significant dimensions that were not within the prerogatives of the 
EU—such as justice systems—have been addressed with non-legally binding 
inputs and, through these means, encouraged to engage in several innovation 
processes (Contini, 2018).
As for the mechanisms of influence that need to be considered, an overall 
assessment of the different inputs will provide a clearer picture. The ‘EU factor’ 
must be operationalized as a set of ‘external inputs’, comprising legally binding 
norms, cognitive inputs, political resources and non-legally binding normative 
tools. Each goes hand in hand with differential patterns of mechanisms im pin-
ging upon domestic factors (those considered in chapters 4, 5, and 6). Table 7.1 
presents those patterns, their targets and mechanisms.
The factors indicated in Table 7.1 belong to a multi-level and multi- dimensional 
set of explaining forces, among which some are external (European, for the sake 
of our analysis) in nature, while some are domestic and have been singled out in 
the previous three chapters.2 It is worth further clarifying the logical nexus that 
links the domestic to external mechanisms (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Radaelli, 
2005; Dolowitz and Marsh,  2000). In our view, European factors do not deter-
mine democratic changes (Börzel et al., 2012). They have neither a direct impact 
on freedoms and equalities; nor do they provoke a linear ‘top-down-conduced’ shift 
concerning the functioning of the domestic dimensions that we have considered as 
explaining forces in chapters 4, 5, and 6.
2 In this respect, we follow the analysis developed by EUCLIDA (Morlino,  2011, chapter  6). 
Accordingly, when considering European laws, compulsory rules and the consequent legally binding 
constraints can be less effective than moral suasion, socialization, or rule internalization, if they are 
inconsistent with internal policy drifts. Thus, the empirical evidence offered by one of the countries 
we analyze, that is, Poland, supports this conclusion on freedom protection. For example, in the first 
semester of 2020, the governmental interference on the civil rights and judicial independence, which 
are the pre-conditions to the actual protection of the right to the fair trial, was worsening. This is the 
lesson the Polish case confirmed: legally binding external mechanisms do not necessarily play the role 
of causal factors in driving internal processes of change or freedom entrenchment (but see also chap-
ters 3 and 6).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
188 Equality, Freedom, and Democracy
Table 7.1 Patterns, targets, and mechanisms of influence
  Target Mechanisms Dimensions 
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Our explanation lies within an actor-centred approach. In this vein, the 
European inputs gain significance in domestic democratic systems either because 
they reshape the arenas where policymakers are acting or because they influence 
the resources—political, material, and cognitive—handled by actors (see Chapter 4) 
in the different stages of the policy processes, i.e., adoption, implementation and 
internalization of the rules (Morlino and Magen,  2009). External factors inter-
vene and impinge upon the constraints/opportunities to act handled by actors, 
opening new policy windows and reshaping the mutual and reciprocal positions 
of policymakers and stakeholders. Accordingly, the external factors are considered 
here as structural variables rather than agencies. In other terms, we do not refer 
to the European institutions as actors at play. We refer strictly to the external 
inputs as the variation of the domestic arenas and the resources handled by 
domestic actors in the aftermath of the adoption of transnational and supra-
nation al rules. This analytic choice seems promising also in the cases of Poland 
and the UK. In these two countries, also in a dramatic way, domestic actors 
reframed their policies vis-à-vis the EU. In Poland, this reframing strategy meant 
the overruling of the European provisions to ensure the protection of fundamen-
tal, individual freedoms. In the UK, with Brexit, there has been the strongest and 
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most profound discontinuity of the interplay of the external-domestic factors 
ever experienced in the EU since its inception.
In this chapter, we will disentangle the external domestic interplays in the dif-
ferent policies that turned out to be crucial arenas during the almost thirty-year 
period considered in our analysis. We will assess the empirical evidence available 
to us by clustering types of inputs—namely, the first column of Table 7.1—and 
assessing the influence exercised by them all together upon freedoms and equal-
ities. We move away from a consolidated scholarship that is inclined to explain 
domestic changes in terms of a top-down process of influence exercised by the 
EU. Moreover, in the analysis that follows we recognize that the inputs listed in 
column 1 interact with the domestic factors as a set of constraints/opportunities, 
whose nature varies from a maximum degree of legally binding force (and there-
fore a high cost of non-compliance) to a minimum degree of legally binding force 
(and therefore a high level of flexibility and adaptability).
Consequently, the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 looks at how and 
to what extent EU inputs influence the significant dimensions of equalities. 
Section  7.3 is devoted to the assessment of the influence exercised upon the 
 significant dimensions of freedoms. Section  7.4 takes a more cross-sectional 
approach and assesses the interplay between the EU inputs that address freedoms 
and equalities concomitantly, notably in the context of the most recent wave of 
reforms: IT and terrorism, and the last cohesion budget scheme running from 2014 
to 2020. We will, therefore, consider a vast array of provisions, but our ana lysis will 
not fully cover all of them. Instead, the goal is to select those inputs that have more 
significance as intervening factors in the interplay with domestic variables.
7.2 EU Influence on Equalities
According to the Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, ‘human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity’ are the founding values 
of the EU. As stated in Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union, the EU 
‘shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice 
and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between gen er-
ations (…) and . . .[it]shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and 
solidarity among the Member States’. Therefore, it is safe to say that the principle 
of equality, encompassing both its connotation as non-discrimination and as soli-
darity, is a compelling content of democratic quality within the EU democratic 
space, in conjunction with the principles of human dignity and freedom. Equality 
is, in many ways, vital to European legitimacy and central to the European inte-
gration agenda.
This did not take the form of a ‘social Europe’ straight after the adoption of the 
first set of norms. At first, equality was protected in the European Union as a 
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formal entitlement before European law and, consequently, before the domestic 
laws integrating it. Later, during the 1980s and more predominantly during the 
1990s, the construction of a social Europe complemented the integration of mar-
kets. As further illustrated below, the EU and its policies have influenced the six 
countries considered in key, distinctive ways as far as equality is concerned. In 
order to avoid conceptual confusion, before discussing the implementation of 
equality at the EU level, it is necessary first to define its content as covered here. 
Following the approach presented in Chapter  2, the critical dimensions of the 
concept are (a) the distribution of resources and (b) social security and cultural 
rights. While the focus is on economic and social equality as a democratic quality 
and as a value to which every functioning democracy aspires, it is essential to 
remember that inequality in the economic realm, both ideal and empirical, 
inevitably shapes equality in the political sphere (Verba and Orren, 1985:19).
In the countries we consider, discussing the influence of the EU in shaping 
the implementation of equality, as defined above, mainly means asking our-
selves if and to what extent the EU has played a role in the reduction of welfare 
differences between member states. Acknowledging the fact that the most rele-
vant analytical approaches to the study of contemporary social inequalities 
adopt a multidimensional perspective (see Chapter 2 and Therborn, 2013), it is 
important to clarify from the very beginning that in the context of the EU, when 
dealing with (in)equality, we should use the plural form instead and refer to 
‘inequalities’. Following Dauderstädt (2018, p. 15, emphasis added), it is possible 
to enumerate at least ‘four different inequalities in the European context: (a) 
disparities between the EU Member States measured in terms of average per 
capita income; (b) disparities between regions of the EU; (c) disparities between 
households within countries; (d) disparities between households within the EU 
as a whole taking into account both inequalities, (a) and (c)’. However, in terms 
of democratic qualities, it is promising to recall our significant dimensions and 
analyse the interplay between domestic and external factors by coupling the EU 
inputs with the sub-dimensions of equalities, that is, economic equality and 
social equality.
In European policies, two mainstream principles seem to be relevant to our 
analysis: non-discrimination and mutual recognition. Notably, the first principle 
is entrenched in the European constitutional tradition as it relates directly to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and is explicitly elaborated in the cov-
en ant on social rights adopted by the Council of Europe and annexed to the 
ECHR. The second principle is more political. It stems from the so-called ‘Social 
Europe’ where a method of open coordination was adopted to cope with, on the 
one hand, the need of the EU to ensure a transnational space where rights 
attached to the welfare State are enforced and, on the other hand, the sovereignty 
of the Member States governing their models of welfare within domestic borders. 
The ideal of recognizing the entitlements gained within the domestic territories is 
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enacted into several policy sectors, among which health and education are the 
most prominent.
Keeping these remarks in mind, Table  7.2 offers a picture of the critical 
European inputs impinging upon the significant dimensions of equalities and 
covering an array of policy tools: normative, cognitive, and financial. Table 7.2 
was drafted by adopting a selective approach. One would be safe in arguing that 
all European norms have some impact on economic and social equalities. 
However, the methodology of our analysis does not aim to cover the entire scope 
of the potential influence of the European Union. Instead, it focuses on those 
inputs that have critically and significantly interplayed with the domestic factors 
recalled in chapters 4, 5, and 6.
If we narrow down the scope of the analysis and focus exclusively on the first 
line of the table, we must acknowledge that the economic equalities have been 
affected by domestic austerity policies. These policies were conditioned by the 
mechanisms established by the European Union to enforce the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP),3 and of course by the pressure of the markets. Given the 
prominent role played by the EU during the financial and economic crisis, it is 
reasonable to ask whether and to what extent the EU-level response can explain 
the trends highlighted above. As well known, the immediate response of the EU 
to the crisis was strengthening the rules of the SGP. In keeping with a ‘moralistic’ 
view of the crisis, according to which its roots lie in irresponsible spending by 
‘peripheral’ European countries, along with emergency lending facilities, several 
austerity-oriented structural adjustment policies were introduced. Consistently 
with the Maastricht Treaty, the path of convergence set out in the SGP kept the 
budget deficit to a maximum of 3% of GDP and government debt to 60% of 
3 In this respect, the semester monitoring strategy turned out to be the most effective mechanism 
of policy implementation.
Table 7.2 The matrix of external factors and domestic equalities
Dimensions of 
equalities
Aspects Foundational norms 
anchoring domestic reforms
External factors from the 







principle (Treaties and  
CJEU case laws)









Covenant on social rights
Anti-discrimination 
principle (Treaties and  
CJEU case laws)
Stability and Growth Pact
Health care directive
Bologna process and 
recognition of degrees
Mutual recognition of 
entitlement
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GDP. Since its inception, however, and until the crisis years, the SGP lacked 
eff ect ive enforcement mechanisms, apart from ‘peer pressure’, ‘moral suasion’ 
and a ‘no bailout clause’ contained initially in Article 104 (b) of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, which was meant to discourage fiscally irresponsible behaviours 
(Larch et al., 2010). Consequently, the SGP with the deficit rule was weakly 
enforced in the years before the crisis (de Haan et al.,  2004). It should also be 
recalled that Germany and France contributed to a relaxation of the enforcement 
of fiscal rules as well when, after exceeding the 3% deficit threshold, they clubbed 
together to reject a Commission recommendation aimed at imposing sanctions 
against them under the excessive deficit procedure (Ngai, 2012, p. 18).
To reinforce the EU’s fiscal ‘straitjacket’, in December 2011 five regulations and 
one directive (the ‘Six Pack’)4 were approved to reinforce the pre-emptive and 
corrective arms of the SGP. The Six Pack introduced new mechanisms, such as 
reverse qualified majority voting for deciding sanctions against non-complying 
countries and the ‘European Semester’, an annual cycle of macro-economic 
co ord in ation and monitoring of fiscal policies across member states with stand-
ardized deadlines. In March 2012, the TSGC was adopted. A key provision of the 
TSCG, which entered into force on 1 January 2013, was the commitment by its 
signatories to introduce a ‘debt brake’ into their constitution. Finally, two new 
regulations, known as the ‘Two Pack’,5 integrated some of the elements of the 
TSCG into EU law, reinforcing coordination and transparency in budgetary pol-
icies and providing for stricter surveillance for Eurozone countries. These reforms 
in the EU institutional architecture are essentially meant to keep Member States 
accountable to the EU ex-ante and ex-post regarding their public finances, includ-
ing social expenditures, which are one of the most important components of 
national budgets. Therefore, as De La Porte and Heins (2014) put it, these reforms 
represent an essential alteration of how the EU is involved in member states’ 
domestic affairs and national budgets in particular.
As highlighted in Chapter 2, social expenditure followed different trends in the 
countries considered. After the most critical year (2009), France and also Italy 
slightly increased their already relatively high social protection budget; Germany 
4 The Six Pack includes: (1) Regulation 1175/2011 amending Regulation 1466/97: On the strength-
ening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies; (2) Regulation 1177/2011 amending Regulation 1467/97: On speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure; (3) Regulation 1173/2011: On the effective enforce-
ment of budgetary surveillance in the euro area; (4) Directive 2011/85/EU: On requirements for 
budget ary frameworks of the Member States; (5) Regulation 1176/2011: On the prevention and 
 correction of macroeconomic imbalances; and (6) Regulation 1174/2011: On enforcement action to 
correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.
5 The Two Pack includes (1) Regulation 473/2013: On standard provisions for monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States 
in the euro area; and (2) Regulation 472/2013: On the strengthening of economic and budgetary 
 surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with severe difficulties con-
cerning their financial stability.
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remained stable; Spain increased and then stabilized the budget; Poland was 
aligning with Spain in an ascending trend; and the UK was going up and later 
down to keep under control expenditures. Moreover, since the beginning of the 
Great Recession, there is also a reduction in investments in education. This trend 
can be considered problematic, considering that prioritizing education ex pend-
iture would help reduce the other forms of inequality in the long run.
Starting with the two countries that were arguably affected most by the crisis, it 
should be noted that both Italy and Spain reformed their pension system and 
labour market policy between 2011 and 2012. Italy’s technocratic government, led 
by former EU commissioner Mario Monti, hastily passed a pension reform in 
autumn 2011 (Borella and Coda Mascarola, 2015), under pressure from the EU, 
on the one hand, and the financial markets, on the other. Spain started by freezing 
pensions in 2010 and then implemented a full-fledged reform of the sector in 
August 2011, which raised the retirement age and toughened up requirements for 
early retirement. This was then supplemented in 2013 with provisions restricting 
the index-linking of pension pay-outs (Rodríguez, 2013). It should also be men-
tioned that as a recipient of financial assistance to restructure its ailing banking 
sector in June 2012, Spain was subject to explicit and harsh conditionality (see 
European Council, 2012), which, though limited to the financial sector, inevitably 
entailed a high level of EU intrusion into Spanish domestic affairs.
Significant cuts to healthcare and education were implemented in both Italy 
(see also Jessoula and Pavolini, 2012) and Spain (see Gonzalez Begega and Del 
Pino,  2017). However, it should be mentioned that as far as education is con-
cerned, retrenchment in Italy had begun before the crisis struck, while in the case 
of Spain investments in education were drastically reduced from 2010 onwards 
(see Chapter 2). As highlighted by Pavolini et al. (2015), in the cases of Italy and 
Spain EU intrusiveness has increased and has played a more significant role in the 
last few years, not just because of the newly introduced mechanisms for fiscal sur-
veillance, but also through conditionality and backroom diplomacy (de la Porte 
and Natali, 2014).
Looking at the French case, Hassenteufel and Palier (2015) detect the align-
ment of welfare reforms in France with the recommendations made by the EU 
between the early 1990s and 2009. However, French policy-makers seldom men-
tioned the EU as the source of the guidelines, fearing this might fuel further criti-
cism of reforms already considered to be controversial. In 2009, France increased 
government spending to offset the impact of the crisis, which resulted in the 
 initiation of an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). While raising the level and 
dur ation of contributions, the pension reform subsequently passed in 2013 did 
nevertheless avoid a more radical overhaul of the system, going against the 
re com menda tions made by the EU (Carnegy,  2013). This shows that domestic 
bargaining is still the crucial mechanism behind reforms impacting on equality 
(Hassenteufel and Palier, 2015).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
194 Equality, Freedom, and Democracy
The case of Germany offers an interesting contrast with the two South 
European states discussed above. As argued by Blum and Kuhlmann (2016), the 
German welfare state was reformed most significantly before the crisis hit. 
Besides, the German economy bounced back very quickly after the 2009 reces-
sion, and throughout the Eurozone crisis negotiations, Germany spearheaded the 
‘northern’ coalition of ‘creditor’ states (Lim et al., 2019). Therefore, while it faces 
challenges like those of other mature democracies, namely potentially disruptive 
long-term demographic trends, the German welfare state did not come under 
direct pressure from the EU to reduce public spending on welfare.
Let us now consider the two non-Eurozone countries under examination, that 
is, the UK and Poland. Despite its traditional objective of maintaining full control 
over social policy issues and a general distrust about transfers of national sover-
eignty to the EU level, the UK was considered to be one of the four larger EU 
member states which is most likely to comply with EU social regulations and 
directives, once these are determined (Hantrais  2017, p. 3). At the same time, 
since 2010, its government has pursued austerity policies not only as a way of 
boosting the confidence of financial markets but also because of its neo-liberal 
ideological leanings (Ginaria and Mitton, 2016). It should be mentioned that citi-
zens’ dissatisfaction with the welfare state, as far as healthcare is concerned, was 
exploited to mobilize the ‘pro-Brexit’ vote (see Sottilotta, 2017; see also Becker et 
al., 2017). However, in the final Brexit Treaty, equality-focused clauses ended up 
being less prominent than those on the scope of the freedoms.
Since joining the EU, Poland has faced an overhaul of old economic structures 
and institutions as well as of public administration. Despite being subjected to 
the ‘Europe effect’, the promise of joining the Western club played as an external 
incentive to move forward in the implementation of a comprehensive agenda of 
reforms. EU membership allowed for successful integration into global and 
European trade and production networks. Democratic ‘anchoring’ (see Morlino, 
2011, esp. chapter 5) provided opportunities for interest groups to lobby in favour 
of higher social expenditure. Political parties adjusted their agendas to match 
European welfare standards, and the intention to counter fears of ‘social dump-
ing’ in other EU member states also underpinned relatively higher levels of 
social expenditure (Orenstein and Haas, 2005, p. 135). Focusing more specifically 
on the institutional conditions ensuring freedoms and equalities, the interplay 
between the process of setting up the oversight institutions and the process of 
adhering to the transnational institutions, such as the ECHR, turned out as a 
positive and virtuous circle (Wyrzykowski, 1998).
For the normative inputs impinging upon social equalities, the health care 
directive and the Bologna process are also worthy of consideration. Both are 
based on a principle of mutual recognition, whereby a fully-fledged transnational 
space emerges despite the domestic competence granted to the Member States in 
terms of education governance and healthcare system structure. The healthcare 
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directive on patient rights in cross-border healthcare, adopted in 2011, pushes the 
domestic government actors responsible for ensuring a minimum standard of 
health care services to engage with the implementation of the directive. This 
enhances cross-border mobility for those citizens who do not receive an adequate 
response to their demand for health treatments and diagnosis. However, in coun-
tries that proved more attractive—such as Italy, France, and Germany—thanks to 
a balance of competences and access opportunities, the actual challenge is repre-
sented by the institutional capacity of the system to handle an overload of demand 
for services (Enrichens, 2018). Over the last few years, this triggered increasing 
attention for performance assessment and the application of managerial tools to 
ensure responsive management of staff across health care departments.
The Bologna process launched cross-border mobility in the education sector 
much earlier than the mobility initiatives in the healthcare system (the Bologna 
agreement was enacted in 2000). The mechanisms facilitating the mobility of 
experts, students, and teachers proved particularly effective, even though the flow 
of human capital display a path dependence trend towards those countries where 
the labour market offers relatively more opportunities. In a way, then, by reducing 
the inequalities of chance among individuals in accessing the European education 
system, these mechanisms worsened the inequalities between countries in terms 
of the acquisition of the expertise of skilful and specialized professionals.
The last point relates to the role played by global or transnational factors, 
affecting the European Member States and the European institutions. Mention 
can be made of the most critical of all these factors: globalization. At the end of 
the twentieth century and first two decades of the new millennium, globalization 
understood as the set of ever-intensifying flows of people, capital, technology 
and information across national boundaries, has undoubtedly been a significant 
game-changer in terms of distributional justice. Consequently, a lively debate 
about its effects and implications has been going on for decades, revolving around 
questions which are crucially salient to the two qualities of democracies analysed 
here. These include the extent to which capital mobility and the globalization of 
supply chains have fostered ‘the substitutability of domestic labour across national 
boundaries, thereby aggravating the economic insecurity confronting workers 
[. . .] in addition to exerting downward pressure on their wages’ (Rodrik, 1997). 
That said, globalization in itself does not enable us—as a concept—to shed light 
upon the changes of our democracies without introducing a much more nuanced 
set of variables and factors. Globalization is a background phenomenon where 
processes of change are deployed (Graziosi, 2019; Shahzad, 2006).
While an assessment of the impact of globalization on freedom and in equal ities in 
the countries considered is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is essential to note the 
argument that the European Union may be an ideal arena for taking advantage of 
the benefits of globalization while at the same time paying attention to the needs of 
the ‘losers’ who are affected negatively by the phenomenon (Ferrera et al., 2017).
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7.3 EU Influence on Freedoms
Insight into the rationale of European integration would enable us to safely argue 
that deepening fundamental freedoms worked as the overarching principle in the 
first pillar of European policy design (Ruggie, 1982). The achievement of a level 
playing field for citizens and businesses where freedoms of movement are ensured 
for everyone, across and despite domestic borders, gives an idea of the scale of 
the great dream pursued and made real by the founding fathers of European inte-
gration (Wouters, 2018). Freedoms unfold in many respects and at many institu-
tional levels in the formal construction of the European constitution, ranging 
from the economic dimension (the movement of capital and goods), to the per-
sonal and civil dimension (the movement of persons). If we focus on freedom 
provisions introduced within the European architecture, the 1990–2018 time-
frame can be split into three phases. The first wave of freedom-oriented provi-
sions relates to the construction of the single market. The achievement of the 
single market in 1995 marked a milestone in the process of setting up a genuine 
supranational space regulated by the norms of what used to be the first pillar, 
notably market competition and recognition of entitlements and assets. In the 
multi-level game that the production and integration of European directives and 
regulations have set up over the decades, the role of European case law represents 
a safeguard and a ground-breaking mechanism to reshape the costs/benefits 
expected by domestic actors intervening in the field of freedoms, and to grant 
legitimacy to domestic institutions striving to expand the scope of freedom. In a 
nutshell, this is the story we can tell about the first decade of our analysis, from 
1990 to 2000. Member States were strongly encouraged to adopt domestic regula-
tory frameworks based upon EU first pillar laws, promoting deregulation, market 
competition and public-private partnerships in the field of services production 
and distribution.
The second wave, which started in 1999 with the Helsinki Council and ended 
in 2009 with the Stockholm Council, predominantly focused on the third pillar 
and the citizenship rights that stem from the enhancement of judicial co oper-
ation. Despite the need to overcome domestic resistance and institutional inertia, 
European lawmakers embarked upon a vigorous and innovative strategy to pro-
mote civil rights. This has gone hand in hand with a significant enlargement, with 
the promotion of guarantees of judicial independence and a fair trial representing 
a new and promising field to test and strengthen the capacity of the EU to play the 
role of a normative actor in the realm of judicial policies, rule of law enforcement 
and control of corruption. During the early 2000s, the rule of law entered the 
spectrum of European normative influence, through both legally binding norms 
and soft laws. Backed up by the Council of Europe, European laws gained ground. 
They reached a new milestone in the promotion of an EU method of civil rights 
protection, entrenched in the Charter of Nice and in various recommendations, 
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guidelines and standards dealing with the minimum standard that domestic 
 systems are expected to comply with in terms of the modernity of the court sys-
tem, transparency of regulation and control of corruption.
The principle of mutual recognition of judicial sentences, adopted in the mid-
2000s and enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, is just the latest and most formal step 
in a long series of actions within the European normative framework directed 
towards the Europeanization of both rule adoption and rule enforcement pro-
cesses. The decade that goes from 2009 to 2018 includes two turning points, 
which impacted upon the momentum and the pathways of freedoms’ protection. 
The adoption of a fitness check package on migration, which went hand in hand 
with more stringent customs controls and the restriction—after 2016—of the 
Schengen agreement provisions, testified to the reversibility of the regulatory 
scheme applying to cross-border mobility. The General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDRP) entered in force in 2018. The vote on this controversial provision to cope 
with the risks associated with the overwhelming diffusion of the web and subse-
quent individual profiling, cybercrime and opaque exploitation of personal data 
by business actors saw the EU shift from a privacy-based approach to a data-
mobility focus: ‘For decades, the EU has held high standards of data protection 
law. In April 2016, the EU adopted a new legal framework—the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)  and the Data Protection Directive for the law 
enforcement and police area. Fully applicable across the EU in May 2018, the 
GDPR is the most comprehensive and progressive piece of data protection legisla-
tion in the world, updated to deal with the implications of the digital age’ 
(European Commission, 2019).
In short, the European factors impinging upon individual freedoms made their 
appearances in different stages of the European integration process and are 
 coupled with different institutional agenda priorities: economic competitiveness, 
justice, security, and data regulation. Table 7.3 illustrates the matrix of external 
factors, the significant dimensions of the freedoms that are targeted by the 
European inputs, and the mechanisms operating at the interface between external 
and domestic factors.
It is worth noting that our analysis does not cover all the European inputs 
touching upon the freedoms of European citizens. As in section 7.2, devoted to 
European factors impinging upon equalities, in this section, we select and narrow 
down the focus in order to grasp the most significant aspects. The norms that 
relate to market competition and, more specifically, deregulation in the public 
service sector, the norms relating to the justice sector, including those that refer to 
Council of Europe recommendations, the norms that relate to the Schengen 
agreement and the new normative scheme addressing issues of data portability, 
data privacy protection and IT regulation are here relevant.
Let us start with the legislation about the functioning of the market. At a very 
general level, it has the following aim: ‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of 
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a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall 
be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect 
trade between the Member States’ (European Parliament, 2018).6 This has been 
deployed across the member States in some critical points, especially concerning 
the potential intervention of public authorities in critical industrial sectors, such 
as transport, infrastructure and public services in general. The differential impact 
of legislation in the six democracies analysed here should be assessed against a 
comparative appraisal of the capitalism they have developed since the Second 
World War. In France, for instance, the public holding in essential knots of the 
industrial economy has acted as a buffer, mitigating the impact of EU influence. 
On the opposite end of the scale, the UK was a frontrunner in the expansion of a 
liberal and market-oriented approach in public service production and delivery.
When deregulation swept across the EU, the Member States reacted and inte-
grated the external inputs in different manners, dependent on two domestic 
6 Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-002535_EN.html
Table 7.3 The matrix of external factors and domestic freedoms
Dimensions 
of freedoms
Aspects Foundational norms 
anchoring domestic 
reforms (entering into 
force with 
membership)*
External factors from EU 










on human rights and 
protocols
Justice and citizenship 
financial programmes














Regulation of the digital 
market Regulation of 
the public sector
Regional policy regulative 
principles
Anti-fraud regulation














European social fund 
(social dialogue between 




Note: *This is particularly important in the case of Poland, where the European inputs take the form of 
an external anchor concerning membership (Sadurski, 2005; Gwiazda, 2015).
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factors: government effectiveness and transparency in administrative procedures. 
Though this dates to the early 1990s, during the whole decade marked by the cre-
ation of the single market the relative position of the Member States started to 
depend also on their relative capacity to handle reform within the public sector. 
Economic freedoms came first as a potential target of impact, concerning the 
possibility for businesses to enter and exit markets, move across borders and, in 
short, fully grasp the benefits of the opportunities offered by the EU in an equal 
manner at the formal level. In this respect, the path dependence effect of the sin-
gle market period upon business freedoms in the six democracies is mirrored in 
the consequent capacity of the economic actors to cope with the reforms enacted 
during the second half of the 2000s about the regulatory constraints imposed by 
the EU austerity approach.
While most of the consequences of austerity are visible in the field of equalities, 
when it comes to freedoms, we need to recall the pressure exerted by the 
European Union to drive the rationalization of the public sector as the main 
avenue towards the reduction of public expenditure and the sovereign debt. 
Anti-corruption  pol icies—relating to the transparency requested by the new 
incoming regulation of the European financial programmes—and governmental 
effectiveness— relating to the e-government streamlining policy promoted by 
the EU, to the reorganization of staff serving in the public administration, and 
the monitoring of policy implementation deemed as a mandatory obligation at 
the EU level—emerged as pivotal domestic variables determining the pace and 
the ultimate results of the reforms inspired by the austerity approach. 
Therefore, it is relevant here to see to what extent and how the trends of the 
economic freedoms that suffered a decline during the austerity period have 
regained momentum subsequently in the six democracies. In this respect 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 (see Chapter 6) prove to be extremely significant, revealing 
that in the UK, Germany, and France, the domestic factors relating to the rule 
of law played a crucial and positive role, whereas in Italy and Spain they make 
sense of the relative loss that remains.
A more nuanced statement is necessary regarding the impact of anti-fraud 
regulation. The six democracies reacted to this external input depending on the 
strength and cohesiveness of their administrations. However, the degree of 
entrenchment of individual rights in the case of judicial enforcement played a 
significant role as a bulwark of freedom. Italy ranks high in this respect, even 
though the two domestic factors we have mentioned—governmental effective-
ness and anti-corruption—ranked lower than Germany, the UK, and France.
If we want to reply to the question as to how and to what extent European fac-
tors influence the freedoms connected with the citizens-justice relationship—
covering the entire chain of the justice system, from the access to the execution of 
civil and penal sentences—then we notice that in this respect soft law played an 
unexpectedly important role. In this domain, the most significant part of the 
European factors takes the form of soft law, i.e., non-legally binding inputs 
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providing domestic governments with a set of guidelines, frames and standards 
to set the policy agenda. These inputs empowered the change agents, who were 
engaged in the agenda-setting process at the national and/or the sub-national 
level. This explains the differential patterns of trend reversal we observe in civil 
rights, stable in the UK, France, and Germany, downgraded and then regained in 
Italy and Spain. However, the latter experienced a much more differential pace if 
we consider the sub-national trends, in the regions, featuring a very uneven pat-
tern of civil rights protection if compared to the protection enjoyed by German, 
French or British citizens. This aspect is of utmost importance not per se, but 
rather in connection to the growth of inequalities displayed by these two coun-
tries. In those contexts—such as the labour market and social protection—where 
citizens have filed a lawsuit to seek enforcement of their rights, the combination 
of a protracted justice procedure and the diffusion of poverty resulted in a severe 
default in terms of individual rights protection.
The effectiveness of the European influence in expanding the scope of free-
doms and then in deepening the entrenchment of this expansion in domestic 
constitutional and statutory provisions depends largely on the adaptability of 
domestic legal systems and the commitment of governments to the EU model. 
Legacies embedded within domestic institutional traditions also had substantial 
importance at that time. Accordingly, the UK resisted the integration of third-pillar 
provisions. However, the degree of civil rights remained at the level requested by 
the European standards, thanks to the concomitant contribution of the ECHR 
case law, which entered into the British system through the Human Rights Act 
and of the longue durée tradition of constitutionalism. In a different vein, in Germany, 
the strength of the public sector acted as a facilitating condition in the implemen-
tation process of EU law, even though the empirical evidence shows the German 
case to be one of light and shade concerning the degree of compliance with EU 
legally binding normative inputs.
Intense pressure was put on Poland during the period 1990–2000, correspond-
ing to the pre-accession phase. As regards the longue durée effect, it can be argued 
that the role played by the EU in defence of the independence of the judiciary in 
the country was effective before accession and extremely limited after that. 
During the accession phase, the Polish government was subject to membership 
conditionality, which unsurprisingly raised the costs of non-compliance with 
European norms. European laws have been incorporated into the domestic sys-
tem, and a few reforms have been encouraged through a vast array of policy tools, 
financial support, technical advice, political socialization and training included. 
Although the Polish system had a low starting point in comparison to the other 
five democracies we are considering here, the trend of the country in the provi-
sion of freedoms was positive and continued to grow until 2004.
Especially after 2015, there is a decline in the protection of individual freedoms 
that began and is essentially ascribable to the introduction of new legislation in 
the fields of anti-terrorism, migration, cybersecurity, and data protection. To 
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what extent were these developments influenced by the EU? It is difficult to 
 provide a conclusive answer to this question, but a few measures impacting on 
freedoms were indeed adopted by the EU in the first decades of this century, and 
therefore merit specific attention. Since 9/11, international terrorism and counter- 
 terrorism efforts have become an essential item in EU member states policy agen-
das. As discussed in Chapter 6, increasing inflows of migrants and inter nation al 
terrorism have paved the way for citizens’ acceptance of more invasive domestic 
policies in terms of control, surveillance and restrictions to the freedom of 
movement. For instance, France, Germany, and other Schengen area states 
reintroduced ‘temporary’ border controls, which in the case of France were based 
on ‘terrorist threats and situation at the external borders’, and in the case of 
Germany were due to ‘migration and security policy; land border with Austria’ 
(see European Commission, 2019).
Since 2001, domestic concerns about international terrorism have been reflected 
in several declarations and decisions made at the EU level. In 2005, the Council of 
the European Union adopted the ‘EU anti-terrorism strategy’, with the ostensible 
objective to ‘combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights and make 
Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security, and justice’ 
(Council of the European Union, 2005). The strategy is based on many decisions 
and directives whose legal basis is Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU (TFEU), which invests the European Parliament and the Council with the 
power to adopt directives aimed at ‘establishing minimum rules concerning the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions’ to fight serious crime, including ter-
rorism. Although there is no evidence of a correlation between arrivals of migrants 
and the increase in terror attacks in Europe or elsewhere (see for instance Forrester 
et al.  2019), a strengthening of the external borders and therefore further steps 
towards a securitization of migration has become part of the EU’s anti-terrorism 
strategy (see Council of the European Union, 2017). Therefore, it can be argued that 
the EU has contributed somewhat to the trends highlighted in Chapter 3, that is, a 
worsening of freedoms in connection with the ‘migration crisis’.
As for cybersecurity and data protection, it should be recalled that the EU has 
been a strong advocate of the ‘e-government paradigm’. Since its inception, this 
paradigm has not translated into stronger privacy protection. As mentioned 
above, the EU recently introduced an important change with the GDPR 2016/679 
(which entered into force in May 2018). This is reshaping how data are handled 
across virtually all sectors and industries. Its scope is extensive. It covers any type 
of data and is explicitly aimed at introducing a uniform approach for citizens’ 
digital privacy rights, as opposed to previous directives,7 which allowed some 
7 For instance, Directive 95/46/EC ‘on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data’, now repealed, and Directive 2002/58/EC ‘con-
cerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communica-
tions sector’, amended by the GDPR.
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leeway to member states and corporate actors (AEGIS Project, 2019). While the 
GDPR requires businesses to enforce higher standards for consumer privacy or 
face severe penalties and therefore is in principle a step forward in the correct 
handling of personal data and privacy protection, it has been criticized for 
hurting investment (at least in the short run) because it imposes high costs for 
businesses (Jia et al., 2019).
It is essential to observe that the discussion surrounding the GDPR resonates 
with a broader set of issues connected with the protection of citizens’ privacy vs 
the interference of public authorities for security reasons. An important decision 
made by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2015, the so-called 
Schrems case, had already highlighted the tensions existing in this field. The 
European Commission’s Decision 2000/520 established the EU-US Safe Harbour 
regime, allowing transfers of data for commercial purposes from the EU to the 
US. According to the Safe Harbour regime, the level of data protection and exist-
ing judicial remedies for individuals in the US were deemed to be adequate and 
equivalent to those guaranteed by the European data protection regime. In the 
Schrems case, however, the CJEU invalidated Decision 2000/520. The Court 
argued that it ‘does not contain any finding regarding the existence, in the United 
States, of rules adopted by the State intended to limit any interference with the 
fundamental rights of the persons whose data is transferred from the European 
Union to the United States, interference which the State entities of that country 
would be authorised to engage in when they pursue legitimate objectives, such as 
national security . . . [n]or does Decision 2000/520 refer to the existence of eff ect-
ive legal protection against interference of that kind’ (CJEU, 2015).
In order to comply with the CJEU decision on the Schrems case, the European 
Commission negotiated and finalized with the US Department of Commerce a 
new EU-US Privacy Shield framework. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the 
recent scandal involving the British consultancy firm Cambridge Analytica (see 
also Chapter 6), the framework has not satisfactorily resolved all the institutional, 
commercial and security issues relating the handling of personal data. In July 
2018, the European Parliament issued a non-binding resolution which ac know-
ledges some progress in this respect but ‘[t]akes the view that the current Privacy 
Shield arrangement does not provide the adequate level of protection required by 
Union data protection law and the EU Charter as interpreted by the CJEU’ 
(European Parliament,  2018a). Unless these concerns are resolved, the new 
Privacy Shield framework is likely to be challenged legally, just like the previous 
regime (see Monteleone and Puccio, 2018).
With regard to Poland, we already discussed in Chapter 3 (see section 3.5) the 
conflict between the European Commission and the Polish government. it is 
unlikely that Poland will face sanctions for violating the EU’s democratic prin ciples. 
While providing the Council with a tool to sanction member states 
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demonstrating authoritarian tendencies, Article 7 of the TEU requires unanimity 
(naturally excluding the member state whose policies are under discussion) to do 
so, and Hungary has already declared it will veto any such measures levied against 
Poland (see Hotham and Nacif, 2018).
As previously mentioned, in recent times a debate emerged over the possibility 
and indeed the desirability to provide the EU with an additional policy tool in the 
form of a democratic conditionality mechanism whereby the transfer of cohesion 
and structural funds can be blocked when member states fail to comply with the 
basic rule of law requirements (Halmai, 2018). The criticism that typically applies 
to the viability and effectiveness of economic sanctions, namely, the idea that 
blocking EU funding may harm the population rather than the government has 
also been raised in this respect (see, for instance, Hübner, 2017). Nevertheless, in 
the presence of persisting violations of democratic principles, including freedom 
of information, academic freedom, and the independence of the judiciary, as 
recently witnessed in Hungary and Poland, a cohesion/structural fund condition-
ality may constitute a more effective policy tool strengthening the weaker mech-
an ism established by Art. 7 of the TUE, although likely impacting of equalities in 
the target countries.
The Polish case proves the comparative weakness of the European factor 
 concerning the domestic dynamics. Once the membership conditionality ceased 
to be effective—after 2004—Poland’s democratic quality depends mainly on the 
strength of the self-enforcing mechanisms activated within the political system 
and in connection with the political elite and citizens’ perceptions. Despite the 
warning clauses and the advocacy played by transnational actors as to the relent-
less dismantlement of the guarantees of rule of law, Polish elites carried out a pro-
gressive hollowing out of the institutions by purging the staff, limiting the scope 
of action of the magistrates, replacing the highest-ranked judges, holding full 
control upon the media. If we also consider political rights, the domestic factors 
look largely dominant as they are directly related to the policies of citizenship.
As for the UK, the key issue is the EU impact on freedoms when assessing the 
disruptive potential of the Withdrawal Treaty adopted in January 2020. On this, 
we need to highlight two points.8 The freedom of mobility is going to be renegoti-
ated after the transition period, which the EU and the UK agreed (5 years). The 
articles 14 and 15, which touch the right of entry, exit, and the right of residence 
directly, are going to impact on freedoms dependently on the political decisions 
that will frame the regulative implementation norms. It seems that, according to 
article 23, the rights of entry and exit of workers will be subjected to a more solid 
clause of protection.9 The Treaty explicitly mentions all conditions that relate to 
8 Official Journal L 29, 31.1.2020, pp. 7–187.
9 Workers shall enjoy the right to enter and exit the State of work under Article 14 of this 
Agreement and shall retain the rights they enjoyed as workers there, provided they are in one of the 
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the actual exercise of the economic freedoms in the UK/EU exchanges of goods 
and services as well as in the mutual recognition of social security benefits and 
status. Because of the characteristics of normative provisions on freedoms, the 
restriction of those regarding the UK will have an impact on the EU side free-
doms as well. This is especially relevant in the relations between the UK and 
Cyprus and the UK and Northern Ireland, where the CJEU interpretation of the 
EU law will apply according to article 12 of the Protocol annexed to the 
Withdrawal Agreement.10
7.4 Cross-sectional Policies: Cohesion,  
Migration, Digital Market
Significant dimensions of equalities and freedoms have also been indirectly 
affected by three cross-sectional policies: cohesion, migration, and the digital 
market. Cohesion policy, mainly affecting equalities, aims to fill the gap between 
regions and sub-national units within the EU. Therefore, it does not directly tar-
get individual economic and social rights, even though the policy windows 
opened through the programmes of the structural funds create new opportunities 
for a professional qualification, structural investment, and technological in nov-
ation. The EU migration policy influences equality through cultural integration 
strategies enacted by the member States as a reaction to the European policy 
stream on migration and smuggling. As has been rightly highlighted, ‘starting off 
with the role of the parliamentary committee arena, it appears immediately clear 
its great interest for information upload and direct connection between actors 
operating at different levels. This is particularly the case of special committees 
such as the Parliamentary Committee of Control for the Enforcement of the 
Schengen Agreement (the Schengen Committee), the Parliamentary Committee 
of Inquiry into the reception, identification and expulsion system as well as 
into the migrant detention conditions and on the allocated public resources’ 
(Alagna, 2019). Therefore, the impact of the European migration policy may not 
be directly targeting individual equalities. However, countries that experienced 
an increasing incoming flow of migrants also had to bear an increasing demand 
for social services and social protection, such as housing, healthcare, integrating 
circumstances set out in points (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC, even 
where they do not move their residence to the State of work.
10 ‘In respect of the Sovereign Base Areas and in relation to natural and legal persons residing or 
established in the territory of those Areas, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union 
shall have the powers conferred upon them by Union law in relation to this Protocol and provisions of 
Union law made applicable by it. In particular, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have 
jurisdiction as provided for in the Treaties in this respect.’
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education. Finally, the promotion of the digital market influences individual 
equalities, especially in terms of the digital divide.
The EU cohesion policy cannot be expected to fulfil its objectives if the eco-
nomic and fiscal policies of the member states point in a different direction. The 
focus of the comparative study conducted throughout the book is mainly on 
equality within  six major European democracies. However, looking not only at 
policies that are meant to produce effects within the domestic realm but also at 
policies aimed at reducing disparities between member states and regions, will 
allow for more nuanced explanations to interpret the empirical results discussed 
in the previous chapters. Social and economic cohesion was first introduced as an 
explicit objective by the European Communities only in 1986 with the Single 
European Act (SEA). Indeed, this represented a novelty, signalling that member 
states no longer expected social and economic cohesion to spontaneously ‘ensue 
[. . .] from the functioning of the common market’, according to Article 117 of 
the Treaty of Rome, as automatic convergence in this sense had not taken place in 
the previous decades (Vandamme,  1992). The relevance of cohesion as a long-
term goal, rather than being merely ascribed to a redistributive principle, is based 
on the idea that growth in rich, export-oriented regions can be sustained and 
further enhanced if demand from less-developed regions is boosted, for example, 
by investing in the creation of infrastructures (Biehl, 1992).
At the time of the introduction of the SEA, the key policy tools used to pursue 
social and economic cohesion within the EC were two structural funds, the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund 
(ESF). In 1988, the European Commission, led by Jacques Delors, finalized, 
and the heads of government approved, the so-called Delors-I package deal. 
Accordingly, the budget of the structural funds for the 1989–93 period was 
 doubled (Manzella and Mendez, 2009), and the fundamental guiding principles 
of concentration (on specific objectives and regions), programming (in a multi-
annual perspective), partnership (with actors from all levels of governance) and 
additionality (meant to ensure complementarity between European and national 
efforts rather than a replacement of the latter) were laid out (Bachtler and 
Mendez, 2007). Subsequently, two crucial reforms took place in 1993 and 1999, 
respectively. The former should be framed in the context of the significant turn-
ing point represented by the Maastricht Treaty, which laid the groundwork for the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The accession, in the previous years, of 
new, relatively weak member states, namely Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, 
prompted the introduction of a new Cohesion Fund, functional to the promotion 
of the EMU convergence criteria. The so-called Delors-II package, agreed upon in 
December 1992, brought about a further doubling of the resources allocated to 
the cohesion policy of the European Communities. The ensuing Agenda 2000 
Package, setting the stage for the implementation of the structural funds in the 
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2000–06 programming period, provided for ‘budgetary stabilization’ rather than 
an increase in funding (Bollen, 1999).
This ‘conservative’ stance of member states on the cohesion policy can be 
explained in the light of several developments, which were taking place at the 
time of the negotiation of the package. They included the accession talks which 
would eventually result in the 2004 enlargement to ten new member states, but 
the outcome of which was still uncertain; the overall economic conditions, which 
had worsened compared to the early 1990s, especially in terms of unemployment; 
the general commitment to budgetary discipline because of the upcoming intro-
duction of the single currency (Manzella and Mendez, 2009). After the failure to 
ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the 2004 enlargement 
(followed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007), a new reform of the 
cohesion policy was initiated, with an inevitable shift in the focus of the cohesion 
policy to the new member states. It should also be noted that the reform of the 
cohesion policy was negotiated against the backdrop of the new ‘Lisbon agenda’, 
launched in March 2000 with the European Council in Lisbon, and sanctioning 
the commitment by EU member states to make the EU the world’s most competi-
tive economy by 2010 based on an economic, a social and an environmental pillar 
(European Council,  2000). Employment, economic reform and social cohesion 
thus became a ‘strategic goal’ for the EU, with the designation of convergence, 
regional competitiveness and employment, and European territorial cooperation 
as key guiding principles and a closer coordination with other EU policies 
such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy 
(Brunazzo, 2016).
With the Eurozone crisis and the ensuing Great Recession, in the absence of a 
common fiscal policy, the cohesion policy was used for anticyclical purposes, to 
support national economies, which were struck by the crisis. Its reform was 
 discussed in these years, in the context of the general negotiation for the new 
Multiannual Financial Framework. As further explained below, one of the key 
challenges that emerged during the negotiation of the new cohesion policy was to 
reconcile its objectives and practices with the new priorities set by the economic 
governance reforms introduced in the wake of the Euro crisis, considering that 
the Euro crisis resulted in a divide between pro-austerity and pro-solidarity 
member states (Wasserfallen and Lehner, 2017). Such a divide was inevitably mir-
rored by the positions of the EU member states vis-à-vis the new cohesion policy, 
which was finally agreed upon in December 2013.
A significant novelty was the introduction of so-called macro-economic condi-
tionality, which links the disbursement of payments to sound economic govern-
ance by national authorities, including the implementation of structural reforms. 
This novelty was controversial and sparked heated debate, with defendants 
emphasizing the need to boost efficiency and opponents arguing that such 
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conditionality would inflict a ‘double penalty’ on local and regional authorities, 
which, on the one hand, were not responsible for excessive national deficits and, 
on the other, would be penalized by a suspension of funding (Jouen, 2015, p. 3). 
According to its critics, this type of political conditionality would end up sanc-
tioning long-lasting political and economic disparities between member states, 
rather than creating a level playing field for states and regions as initially envisaged 
by the cohesion policy (Donati, 2017). Another type of conditionality was also 
discussed (but never implemented). Namely, introducing the rule of law require-
ments to pressure ‘illiberal’ EU member states could produce significant trickle-
down effects, considering for instance that a country like Hungary has reportedly 
received as much as 6–7% of its GDP as inflows from the various cohesion and 
structural funds in recent years (Pogátsa, 2017).
If looking at the resources on the cohesion policy over time, we can single out 
some general trends. One of them is the stabilization of the resources devoted to 
the cohesion policy at approximately one-third of the overall EU budget. In the 
1988–93 period, the budget devoted to the cohesion policy was €69 billion, repre-
senting 25% of the EC budget and 0.3% of the total GDP of the EC. Between 1994 
and 1999, the budget was €168 billion, about one-third of the EU budget and 
0.4% of the total GDP of the EU. In the 2000–06 period, the budget of the cohe-
sion policy was €213 billion for the EU, with a supplementary €21.7 billion for the 
10 new Member States between 2004 and 2006, accounting again for about 33% 
of the EU budget and 0.4% of the total GDP of the EU. The overall amount over 
the 2007–13 period was set at €347 billion, representing 35.7 per cent of the EU 
budget, and 0.38 per cent of the total GDP of the EU, and finally, between 2014 
and 2020, the cohesion policy was granted €351 billion, totalling about 32.5% of 
the EU budget (European Commission,  2008,  2014a). Therefore, a first critical 
element to consider when thinking about the effects of the cohesion policy is that, 
while it represents an essential share in the EU budget, the EU total budget itself 
is in turn only a small fraction—about 1%—of the EU’s GDP.
Due to its visibility, and thanks to the availability of data, the EU cohesion 
policy is under constant scrutiny. Nonetheless, assessing its actual impact over 
time and across regions is not an easy task, as epitomized by the fact that the 
relevant literature is replete with studies reaching contradictory conclusions (for a 
comprehensive review, see Polverari et al.,  2014). As Fratesi (2016) points out, 
there are several underlying issues, which prevent the production of accurate 
quantitative assessments of the aggregate impact of the policy. These refer to the 
critical aspects of the cohesion policy. They include the varying geographical 
scale at which analyses can be conducted and the difficulty of assessing spill-
overs; the breadth of the cohesion policy, which encompasses many other policies 
at the national and sub-national level; the complexity of economic geography’s 
multiple equilibria; the impact of eligibility criteria; the fact that despite the 
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additionality principle, in some cases European funding de facto replaces national 
spending; and possible gaps between committed amounts and actual expenditure 
due to lack of implementation. There are also methodological challenges, such as 
the difficulty of singling out the dependent variable for assessment, that of defin-
ing the time over which the policy is expected to produce an impact, how to con-
trol for all possible disturbance factors, and, in general, the selection of suitable 
econometric models (Fratesi, 2016).
In any case, the existing evidence supports the hypothesis, also confirmed by 
the case of Poland, as analysed in Chapter 2 above, that the new member states 
have grown faster than other member states, with overall income disparities 
between member states declining after 2007. However, disparities across EU 
regions within member states are increasing (see Dauderstädt, 2018). At the same 
time, inequality within some member states has been increasing, again, as shown 
by our case studies. This suggests that there is no clear-cut evidence of domestic 
redistribution effects of the EU cohesion policy.
It can, therefore, be concluded that considering the EU cohesion policy as a sig-
nificant influence on domestic (in)equality in member states would be  misleading. 
Besides, independently on its correct functioning, any positive re-distributional 
effect of the structural funds would be invalidated if other EU policies act in the 
opposite direction (Hannequart, 1992, p. 2). Therefore, in order to further inves-
tigate possible explanations for the trends highlighted above (see Chapter 2), it is 
necessary to explore the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the architecture of the 
EU’s economic and fiscal governance and its effects on the welfare state in the 
countries considered.
The inputs described in the previous two sections gained significance as exter-
nal factors influencing the domestic political systems during what we called in 
Chapter 6, the first round of reforms. Before and right after the onset of the debt 
crisis, the European Union was engaged in building a deeper enlarged Union 
(Rosamond, 2009; Grabbe, 2014). However, the years between 2013 and 2018 
were profoundly marked by three further challenges which had an unexpected 
impact on European institutions. The first phenomenon that suddenly shot to 
the top of the political agenda was migration and the outbreak of the so-called 
Arab Spring and its consequences. Although the geopolitical dimensions of the 
European strategy are not taken into consideration in our analysis, it is worth 
noting that the migration phenomenon triggered several reactions on the part of 
domestic political systems, which all share a common inspiring principle: raising 
security control. We connect here to the reduction of freedoms of mobility, which 
was analysed in Chapter 3. The revision of the Schengen agreement combined a 
further package of actions: border control, surveillance and intra-national con-
straints on mobility. Member States have reacted differently since the European 
competence in these fields is shared with them.
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A further field where European inputs are increasingly significant is the single 
digital market. ICT is not new as leverage for economic and social development. 
In many ways, technological innovations have been integrated among the goals 
promoted by the European financial programmes within Innova Europe or the 
structural funds. However, since 2014, the European policy on digital technolo-
gies has expanded in both the number of tools it deploys and the variety of 
actions. In 2015 European structural and investment funds were allocated to pro-
mote the single digital market as a priority. The year 2018 was a highlight in the 
process of deepening digital Europe. In April 2018, in keeping with the European 
tradition of rights protection, the GDPR was adopted as a reaction to countless 
events signalling the need for citizens to be protected concerning the portability 
and privacy of their data. In October 2018 the directive on copyright was also 
approved by the European Parliament and marked a milestone in laying the foun-
dations for a common approach towards common digital goods and digital intel-
lectual property.
7.5  Concluding Remarks
This chapter discussed whether and to what extent the trends highlighted in 
chapters 2 and 3 can be explained by looking at the influence of the EU. As for 
inequalities, a survey of the relevant literature shows that, in general, there is a 
lack of conclusive evidence on the impact of EU policies. However, on Poland and 
the UK, Table 7.4 offers an overview of the freedoms and equalities subdimen-
sions, and shows how the discontinuity of the EU/domestic interplay is going to 
impinge upon each of them. It also suggests that from a legal perspective, the 
European factor has an impact dependently on the type of political and institu-
tional interplay that characterizes each country. More explicitly, the usual state-
ment is that domestic politics matters. The analysis of our cases adds an important 
empirical development. The European norms provide domestic political elites 
with the opportunity to take advantage of those rules to carry out their agenda 
also at the domestic level.
Overall, for the six countries we analyse in the book, two main aspects have 
been highlighted throughout the chapter. First, although over the past few dec-
ades the EU cohesion policy has been allocated an increasing share of the overall 
EU budget, nonetheless the amount of resources which are devoted to that policy 
is still negligible (on average below 0.4% of the total GDP of the EU). Second, 
looking at the effects of the crisis and the impact of austerity measures, com-
pounded by significant reforms of the EMU institutional architecture (including 
measures such as the Six Pack, the Fiscal Compact and the Two Pack), the six 
countries under examination were affected to different degrees. Germany was 
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mostly immune to the crisis, and Poland even experienced sustained growth 
 during the crisis years. As a non-member of the Eurozone, the UK was affected by 
the crisis but retained its monetary sovereignty, and its commitment to austerity 
with a decline in social protection, health care and education cannot be directly 
traced to EU-level commitments. Despite the crisis and Eurozone constraints, 
France avoided a significant overhaul of its welfare system, while to a different 
extent (see Chapter 2) Spain and Italy experienced a contraction, especially in the 
sectors of healthcare and education. Therefore, the influence of external con-
straints was stronger in these two countries. In any case, the emphasis on fiscal 
discipline in the field of economic governance can be at odds with the objective of 
convergence between member states and arguably higher equality tout-court. At 
the same time, it should be considered that while Eurozone membership entails a 
commitment to fiscal discipline, as per the current institutional arrangements, 
the decision on which areas of public expenditure need to be reduced is still in the 
hands of domestic decision-makers.
As far as freedoms are concerned, a few key issues have been discussed. In the 
case of the possible ‘trade-off ’ between the need to guarantee security in the face 
of threats, such as domestic and international terrorism and citizens’ right to 
priv acy, the middle ground established by the current EU ‘Privacy Shield’ para-
digm leaves several problems unsolved. For this reason, further reform is expected 
to be implemented in this sensitive policy area.
Moreover, it is essential to mention that while the EU is founded on critical 
democratic values and principles, the mechanism put in place by Article 7 of the 
Treaty on the European Union to sanction possible violations of those values and 
principles has not been sufficient to stop the current democratic backslides in 
some member states, notably Poland and Hungary. Proposals to strengthen the 
Table 7.4 Polish and British dynamics on freedoms and equalities vis-à-vis the EU
dep. variables sub-dimensions  Poland  UK
Freedoms personal dignity restricted for citizens not limited for citizens;
possible different 
treatment for non-UK 
citizens
civil rights restricted for citizens;
economic freedoms 
untouched;
indirect impact in 
case of entitlements 
litigation
non restricted
economic freedoms, but 
reshaped for goods and 
services mobility
political rights restriction for citizens not restricted for citizens
Equality economic equality not restricted different treatment for UK 
vs non-UK citizenssocial equality not restricted
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sanctioning power of the EU by attaching democratic conditionality to the trans-
fer of cohesion and structural funds have been proposed and discussed, but so 
far, they have not gained enough momentum. In light of recent events, signifi-
cant changes may be on the way in this area as well. Among them, there is the 
recognition of the domestic primacy concerning the ‘identity’, which refers 
directly to the languages and the cultural stances endorsed by the member States. 
According to the most recent scholarship, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union has been keener to consider, among other principles inspiring the juris-
prudence, the identity argument (Claes et al., 2012). To sum up, the new scenario 
seems to depict a more nuanced predominance of the transnational provisions in 
terms of European freedoms and a reshaping of the domestic-European balance.
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Is There a Comprehensive Explanation?
8.1 Questions Still to Be Answered
The analysis in the previous chapters still leaves at least three questions 
un answered. First, are there any significant connections to highlight between (in)
equalities and freedoms in our countries? Second, is there any possibility of 
achieving a comprehensive explanation? If so, what are the domestic factors and 
actors that need to be considered and complemented with external factors and 
actors? Third, regarding the questions we addressed, are there alternative analyses 
and explanations? And if we compare our empirical conclusions with the existing 
literature on the topics we focused on, what is different and new? This chapter will 
try to reply to these questions in the next three sections.
8.2 Are (In)equalities and Freedoms Intertwined?
We can start with the question posed by the title of this section by referring to 
three aspects. First, from a normative point of view, different positions that con-
sider freedom as an alternative to equality have traditionally been present in 
political debate, even to the point of postulating that high socio-economic equality 
might harm individual freedom (see, among others, Nozick, 1974). At the same 
time, as mentioned in Chapter  1, there are several authoritative philo sophers, 
such as Rawls, Dworkin, Sen, and Nussbaum, who developed highly influential 
theories in which freedom complements equality. This position is entirely consistent 
with the new liberalism of Dahrendorf (1995) and others (see again Chapter 1).
Second, as stressed by Sartori (1987, p. 384), from an analytic perspective, free-
dom and equality or egalitarian democracy belong to different logical realms. 
Freedom ‘has a vertical impetus’ and equality ‘a horizontal urge’. Accordingly, 
‘liberalism pivots on the individual, and democracy on society’, with democracy 
in its crucial egalitarian dimension. Bobbio (1995, p. 8, see also Chapter 1) restates 
this point when stressing how the notion of freedom refers to the micro-level of 
democracy, whereas equality is a notion with a macro-oriented spirit. We might 
add, as Chapter  3 shows, that freedom can also be seen relationally, especially 
when viewed within the perspective of the effective conditions of implementing a 
right. As for equality, taking our cue from Bobbio, we endorse the view according 
to which equalities and inequalities are relations, thereby justifying the attention 
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devoted to the ‘potential losers’ and ‘potential winners’ of a crisis. As regards 
freedom, the triad understanding of this principle was advanced by Oppenheim 
back in the 1950s. The triad is between two agents and a specific (impeded or 
unimpeded) action. This provides a reason in our understanding of the empirical 
significance of freedom, as we shall consider the paradox of reshaping the triad, 
through the measures that intervene on one of the three sides, notably on the 
relationship between one agent and one action. Consequently, the other two rela-
tionships are redefined, between a further agent, the targeted agent, and the 
action (Oppenheim, 1961; Panebianco, 2004).
In this vein, it is worth recalling that, historically speaking, liberalism and con-
stitutionalism precede democracy: ‘liberalization’ precedes participation or inclu-
sion (Dahl, 1971; Zakaria, 2003). But it is not only a question of ‘conditions of 
possibility’, but also of ‘conditions of functionality’ or workability, as democracy is 
a ‘demo-power’ that can also become totalizing, and works as a ‘demo-protection’, 
or a set of constraints placed on power (McIlwain,  1947; Friedrich,  1963; 
Sartori, 1987).
Third, when analysing the quality of democracy from a quantitative perspec-
tive, empirical research reveals that among existing democracies, there is a sig-
nificant connection between freedom and equality. This is even more apparent 
when social rights are included in the notion of equality, as we did here. The 
analysis supported the conclusion that ‘basic freedoms influence, condition and 
presuppose equality’ (Morlino, 2011, p. 243). This is also confirmed by the ex plan-
ation of the failure of Communist regimes, not only in Eastern Europe, to imple-
ment equalities within a Marxist-Leninist ideology. Thus, the conclusion is: 
equality is only possible if freedoms are guaranteed and implemented. At the 
same time, it is also widely accepted that a few economic and social dimensions of 
equality, regarding education, health and standard of living, are key conditions 
for supporting freedoms and enjoying them. This interpretation is central to com-
parative historical political economy, as can be seen, for example, in work by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2009). According to them, ‘extractive economic insti-
tutions’, with the economic inequalities that they entail, favour absolutism 
(or  authoritarianism) at the political level and end up suppressing freedoms. 
Consequently, the main empirical conclusion is that the two macro-empirical 
dimensions ultimately strengthen each other and cannot be separated and 
regarded as alternatives within a democracy (ibid., Chapter 8). Figure 8.1 shows 
this kind of empirical relation.
Consistently with this third issue, Giebler and Merkel (2016) empirically check 
the two possible hypotheses: there is a trade-off between freedom and equality, so 
both principles cannot be maximized at the same time, or freedom and equality 
reinforce each other, and consequently, both can be maximized at the same time. 
Their conclusions confirm the results of the previous research mentioned above 
(Morlino, 2011, ch. 8). In fact, after checking about 50 countries, they state that 
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there is a negative relationship between socio-economic inequality and freedom, 
so that ‘(h)igher levels of freedom are associated with lower levels of socioeco-
nomic inequality . . .(and). . . . the evidence points to mutual compatibility’ (Giebler 
and Merkel, 2016, p. 599). Hence, the trade-off hypothesis can be rejected, and 
instead of trade-off, there is complementarity. There is also a positive effect of 
socio-economic equality on political freedom and ‘it seems that societies and 
political orders do not have to decide between the two principles but can pursue 
the maximisation of both freedom and equality’ (Giebler and Merkel,  2016, 
p. 602).1
What emerges from our research? If we remember the specific dimensions of 
equality and freedom, we considered (see Table  8.1), the analytic perspective 
mentioned above is consistent with our empirical results, but additional specifica-
tions are needed especially we go more in-depth with the qualitative analysis. Let 
us see. The explanatory analysis in Chapter 5 on equalities and in Chapter 6 on 
freedoms traced different factors. In this vein, no tension, conflict or trade-off 
emerges. This a crucial aspect of our analysis, and the question is: if there is 
no  straightforward tension among the different equalities and freedom and 
they  follow different explanatory paths, and if at the same time the two 
1 In their article, the two authors also check the connections between political equality and free-
dom, with similar results. The issue of trade-off is also analysed by Lauth and Schlenkrich (2018), who 


















































Figure 8.1 Freedom strengthens equality and vice versa
Source: Morlino, 2011, p. 243.
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macro-phenomena seem to be related mutually, what are the connecting 
mechanisms we should point to? For a better, more comprehensive explanation, 
we need to return to the actors and factors we discussed in the previous four 
chapters (chapters 4–7) and show how they are intertwined.
Starting from the survey data about the relevance, attention and demand con-
cerning equality and freedom (see Chapter 4), one observation springs out imme-
diately. In most of our cases (except in Poland, which was unaffected by the 
economic crisis) there was an evident growth of attention towards economic and 
social equality during the Great Recession, which prevailed over the attention and 
request for freedom. But per se this does not imply any trade-off or alternative. 
The issue was on what was more relevant for the citizens. In checking the replies 
the switching and change of attention are confirmed by the higher importance 
given by respondents in Italy and Spain, that is, by the two countries where equal-
ity was already a priority, and the economic crisis had a more profound impact on 
the citizens. The change within public opinion is also reflected by the changes and 
adaptation of party programmes because of the Great Recession in the countries 
most affected by it. In some contexts, as we have seen (see Chapter  5), this 
has  even led to the establishment of new parties or new political movements. 
Moreover, the different degree of attention towards freedom and equality is 
related to the context of the countries and the party families, which decide to 
exploit and consequently to deepen one divide rather than another based on cur-
rent opportunities. About this, in the UK we see, on the one hand, a decline of 
welfare expenditures, especially for education but also for health (see Chapter 2, 
esp. Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10) but, on the other hand, deeply divided citizens and 
contradictory results (see Chapter 4, esp. Figures 4.10 and 4.11)
When analysing the domestic explanations of equality and focusing on the 
politico-institutional arena (see Chapter 5), the first conclusion to be stressed—
and it is likely to be the most significant one—is that in our democracies, affected 
by economic crisis and subsequent, low economic growth or stagnation, egalitar-
ian policies are mainly accounted for by protest parties. In the UK this statement 
has to be complemented by the radicalization of the British Labour Party, which 
also scored poorly in the 2019 elections, hegemonized by the issue of Brexit. In 
fact, with the Great Recession, the presence of new parties and, mostly, of popu-
list parties became a distinguishing aspect of the six countries, the UK included 
Table 8.1 Complementarity rather than conflict
freedoms
equalities
personal dignity civil rights political rights
economic equality + + +
social equality + + +
ethnic equality + + +
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with Farage and the UK Independence Party (UKIP). Citizen dissatisfaction may 
follow different patterns in terms of the modes and timing of institutionalization 
(see chapters 4 and 5). However, the emergence and establishment of the new 
protest parties bring about a change of policies to favour lower social groups, with 
consequent higher responsiveness, albeit one that may be economically irrespon-
sible (Mair, 2009).
With all the differences we have already singled out (see Chapter 5), if the pro-
test party becomes incumbent, in a single-party cabinet or a coalition one, the 
attempt is made to carry out the policies they committed to. Consequently, the 
incumbent leaders, who are pressed by protest, promote consistent policies more 
respectful of social rights. However, we have also seen that, for the new protest 
parties, there are wide margins of ‘substitution’ between actual economic and 
social policies and symbolic identity policies (primarily anti-immigrant and 
chauvinist policies). In a sense, the difficulty of the ‘authoritative allocation of 
 values’, to quote Easton (1965), opens the door to the social construction of the 
enemy and the symbolic use of policies (Edelman,  1985). At the same time, 
the relationship between the vote of the left parties (moderate and radical) and 
the trend of inequality shows a rather random connection. Without going back 
to  the specific aspects emerging from each case (see again Chapter  5), in the 
countries we considered and other European countries the promotion of social 
rights is no longer a prerogative or a characterizing feature of the left but is also 
supported by rightist parties, populist or otherwise. This is especially evident with 
the French Front National and even more with the Polish Law and Justice (PiS). 
Ironically, we might recall that the alternation with the moderate and centre-right 
parties was institutionalized precisely when the leftist parties became less alterna-
tive in terms of policies, as happened with Tony Blair and the so-called ‘third way’ 
at the end of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century.
The additional conclusions regard the empirical results about the constitutional 
and economic structures and the impact of migration on ethnic in equal ities. Thus, 
consensual democracies with coordinated economies tend to have redistributive 
policy solutions and to correct inequalities, while majoritarian democracies with 
competitive economies tend to play a winner-take-all game, which increases 
inequalities (Lane and Ersson, 2000). However, what comes out with evidence in 
our cases is the prominence of economic factors. On the one hand, France, with a 
hyper-majoritarian constitutional arrangement, is also the democracy with better 
welfare, and in this vein with better social equality, complemented by a relatively 
higher economic equality. On the other hand, as seen in Chapter 5 (esp. Table 5.1), 
France is considered a coordinated market economy, like Germany.
Regarding ethnic inequality, there is an equifinality. Namely, the political rele-
vance and tension brought about by the migration issue can be explained by 
 people perception and reactions to the economic crisis (Italy, Spain, and France) 
or by simple ideological orientations without an economic crisis (Poland) to the 
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point that discussing this issue Garton Ash (2019, p. 164) speak of an ‘imagined’ 
problem, never a real one. In both hypotheses, the party actor is crucial in deep-
ening the divide, on the one hand, and in the policies carried out, on the other.
When revising the domestic explanations of freedoms (see Chapter 6), first, the 
most telling, meaningful explanation seems the role of the rule of law with regards 
to governmental effectiveness, control of corruption and compliance of the public 
order with fundamental rights. Moreover, we mentioned two specific empirical 
mechanisms and one evolution in the protection of personal rights. Thus, as 
regards the significant dimensions of freedom (individual dignity, civil rights and 
political rights), the three main empirical results are: there has been more infor-
mation, but this has not translated into more freedom; more new rules were 
passed, but this did not correspond to better protection of freedoms; finally, there 
is an improvement of protection of dignity because of the modernization of the 
judicial systems and penitentiaries.
Within this picture, all six democracies endorsed a positive vision of the digital 
turn, moved towards a set of reforms, injecting a massive amount of ICT-based 
organizational tools into public institutions, and engaged in the promotion of a 
‘better access’ to information frame in all the policies that stemmed from the ICT 
revolution. This notwithstanding, the six countries experienced the digital turn in 
different time frames concerning the timing of the economic crisis. Only did Italy 
and Spain link up ICT to the rationalization of public expenses. France endorsed 
an ‘egalitarian’ vision of e-government, while Germany and the UK, together with 
Poland, pursued a trend to boost economic growth. All the countries experienced 
the erosion of media intermediation and the upheaval of social media, with a 
peak of surveillance policies in the UK, in France, and later in Poland. The  reasons 
for this do not depend on the intrinsic nature of technology but are instead linked 
to the national political agency.2
A last significant result relates to the positive trend that all the countries feature 
in the justice sector—together with the entire chain of justice administration, 
from access to execution. Although several problems remain—including new 
issues of political radicalization in the prisons—the adoption of soft laws enabled 
domestic actors to promote judicial reforms and played a role as an anchor in the 
rule adoption and rule implementation process, with the dramatic exception 
of Poland.
To better understand the empirical results, we should also take into con sid er-
ation two further aspects. The first is the relative weight of the veto rulers and, 
concerning this, the degree of State cohesiveness emerging from our analysis. 
More fragmented State structures intervene in the pattern of rule implementation 
and end up by determining a contraction of the scope of freedoms—especially in 
2 For more on the consequences of the digital revolution, see Harari (2018) and, more generally, 
McQuail (2005) and Norris (2001).
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civil rights. Second, behind the improvement in the justice sector, but also ‘the 
more rules, less freedom’ notion, there is the actual implementation of the rule of 
law, as a necessary condition for guaranteeing freedoms. As is well known, this is 
the founding aspect of any liberal democracy.
Finally, when recalling the external explanations, which in our perspective is 
mainly the role of the European Union on the two macro-dimensions explored 
here (see Chapter 7), two empirical results deserve to be emphasized. First, as also 
supported by existing literature, there is no conclusive evidence for the impact of 
EU policies on the equalities of the six democracies. Overall, although over the 
past few decades the EU cohesion policies have allocated a large chunk of 
resources, especially in Poland, their total amount is still small in absolute and 
relative terms. Besides, when looking at the effects of the crisis and the impact of 
austerity measures, considering also the relevant reforms to the EMU institu-
tional architecture, only two countries, Spain and Italy, experienced a strong 
influence of external constraints, with a consequent weakening of some social 
rights that affected people in retirement and on health care. Second, as regards 
freedoms, the EU interventions to protect the privacy and the need to guarantee 
citizen security vis-à-vis domestic and international terrorism were significant 
and analysed for our countries (see Chapter 7).
Thinking over these empirical results, we have to acknowledge that there is no 
direct intertwining between the two dimensions when checking the domestic and 
external explanations both on freedoms and equalities. For example, while the 
politico-institutional explanations of equality include party actions, forms of par-
ticipation and party competition as key features, to explain freedom we have to 
refer to the rule of law as well as to broader phenomena also of a technological 
kind. In other words, we consider primarily different factors and actors.
At the same time, within the frame of the analysis of the quality of democracy 
(see Chapter 1), the immediate and strong tension that also emerges in our ana-
lysis of freedoms concerns the contradictory demands of citizens about both 
achieving security to cope with terrorism, domestic or international, and protect-
ing personal dignity and civil rights. However, ultimately, when the priority has to 
be decided, security comes first. This confirms the most classic and profound 
demand of politics since ancient time: assuring order and security, with all the 
consequences this entails, even terrible ones, in Europe and other continents 
(Panebianco, 2018). In this perspective, the French case examined in Chapter 3 is 
telling. More precisely, as we have seen (Chapter 3), the change in the freedoms 
since 2011 and later is due precisely to the need of security stemming powerfully 
from terrorist events in different areas, of course, France included. On this issue, 
if we are looking for an indirect connection between freedom and equality, this 
may be manifested in the growth of ethnic inequality. The separation of the immi-
grant ethnic groups the terrorists belong to is increased because of the fear for 
security, and this becomes culturally much more evident and perceived.
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The second relevant example we can offer concerns the consequences of migra-
tion in terms of an objective higher ethnic inequality, with possible related conse-
quences in terms of the effective guarantee of social rights, especially for recent 
immigrants. At the same time, the effective guarantee of civil rights for non-resident 
immigrants, often living in emarginated urban peripheries, is often weaker in the 
countries we considered. In the light of this, in Chapter 5 we also discussed the 
emergence and growth of identitarian populism, which is very strong in Poland, 
but also salient in France with the Front National, in Italy with the League led by 
Salvini and in the United Kingdom with UKIP. All of them became the relative 
majority party in the 2019 European elections, while the AfD in Germany and 
Vox in Spain achieved a meaningful presence.
The lesson that these two examples suggest is that to fully understand and 
assess the connections between freedoms and (in)equalities we need to operate at 
a higher level of abstraction, by also including in our analysis other key aspects 
characterizing a democracy, its effective working and its qualities. This is the next 
step, which we will embark upon in the next section.
8.3 Building an Explanatory Model
In research published in 2011 (see Morlino,  2011, chapter  8), one of the key 
empirical conclusions was the singling out of an internal, core mechanism in the 
democracies we analysed. We called it the mutual convergence of qualities, be it 
towards strengthening or weakening of all the different qualities. We observed that 
‘on the basis of a large body of literature, we can accept that all the qualities we 
analysed are ultimately related to economic aspects, the organization, and activ-
ism of civil society, cultural legacies, or other factors . . . In other words, we could 
affirm that our analysis was examining spurious correlations, and the actual 
explanations are elsewhere. However, even if we accept this point, that mech an-
ism, which emerged powerfully . . . exists and helps the deepening of democracy 
or to explain more in depth the worsening. In a nutshell, the core of the mech an-
ism can be traced within all the procedures that characterize democracy and 
influence the contents. What this analysis seems to reveal is that ultimately a 
democracy, possibly a consolidated one, acquires its inner logic that strongly con-
nects procedural aspects and substantives ones with regards to contents and 
results.’ (Morlino, 2011, pp. 247–8).
This kind of conclusion, however, is still dissatisfying for our purpose, which is 
to single out more specific and recurrent explanations of the two content dimen-
sions (freedom and equality) and their indirect connections. In that same 
research, when addressing this question, the results of the quantitative analysis 
were evident in pointing to five ‘super qualities’ that are relevant for both free-
doms and equalities, and two additional ones only relevant respectively for 
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freedoms and for equalities. The five driving aspects for both freedoms and  equalities 
are integrity, the fairness of the electoral process, plural and independent infor-
mation, competitiveness and responsiveness, measured by perceived legitimacy. 
Also, the role of non-conventional participation and protest strongly emerges 
regarding equality, and effective rights of participation are more relevant for free-
dom. On the ground of the data of that research, the variance explained was very 
high, and this conclusion is confirmed once again if we conduct the same analysis 
more in detail in Eastern Europe or Latin America (Morlino,  2011, p. 243; 
O’Donnell et al., 2004; Morlino, 2016).
When matching these results with the empirical analysis carried out in the pre-
vious chapters, the more specific aspect on protest, even under the institutional-
ized form of protest parties, emerged very strongly in Chapter 5; and the effective 
rights of participation were also mentioned, as they are embedded in the imple-
mentation of the rule of law we analysed in Chapter 6. The satisfaction/dissatis-
faction, detected through survey analysis, was presented and discussed in 
Chapter 4, as a reaction to the ways how policies to promote equality and fight 
poverty were pursued, but at the same time how freedoms were constrained and 
subverted in their implementation, also taking into account the priority of se cur-
ity against terrorism and immigration. This observation prompts an important 
methodological specification, which is necessary to grasp the connections we are 
trying to single out and to explain all their complexities: the same macro-factor, 
which includes different facets—here, in our research it is dissatisfaction—can 
contribute to explaining both the forms and the level of the three equalities and 
the three freedoms. Consequently, the resulting quantitative empirical connec-
tions between equalities and freedoms that we found in our 2011 research and 
other authors also confirmed was merely spurious. They are both explained by 
one of the different facets of dissatisfaction, often triggered and complemented by 
other factors.
As regards the four remaining super qualities, here the fairness of the electoral 
process is not relevant, as for consolidated democracies like the ones we studied 
there is almost no variance, and consequently it can be taken for granted, as a 
parameter, for all our countries. Of course, this was not the case in all the over 
fifty countries we analysed in 2011. Competitiveness is, on the contrary, very sali-
ent, and we have already analysed it in its more critical manifestations for the 
polarization of the party system,3 with the peculiar British results pointing to a 
high radicalization as well (see Chapter  5). Therefore, we need to devote some 
attention to the other two remaining aspects: integrity/corruption and plural and 
independent information. The first aspect is a sub-dimension of the rule of law 
and already emerged in our research about freedom (see Chapter 6).4 Now we can 
3 On Southern Europe, see Morlino and Raniolo (2017).
4 More generally on corruption, see, among others, Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) and Rothstein and 
Varraich (2017).
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ask why it is relevant for equalities. Especially, in recent decades, the second 
aspect, plural and independent information, has been more and more becoming a 
critical aspect of every democracy. This aspect came out indirectly with the first 
hypotheses on freedom and the widespread and enormous growth of informa-
tion, due also to the massive and rapid spread of the Internet and social networks 
(see Chapter 6). However, also about this aspect, the connections with equalities 
and freedoms have to be spelt out to make some progress in our entire analysis.
Corruption may be relevant for equalities in two different and very relevant 
perspectives. In terms of economic equality, distribution of resources plagued or 
deeply influenced by corruption at different levels and forms can affect all eco-
nomic allocation in the different economic sectors, and usually manipulates the 
results in favour of the wealthiest groups. In terms of social equality, which is 
grounded in social rights, only an impartial bureaucracy in the different domains, 
from education to pensions and healthcare, can make redistributive benefits 
effective and consistent with their objectives. If we recall Figure 6.2 here, it gives 
mostly expected results. If also matched with the levels of inequalities in the six 
countries (see Chapter  3, esp. conclusions), the results are also as expected. 
Overall, France, Germany, and United Kingdom are in a much better position on 
corruption and at the same time, despite a complex, uneven picture, are in a good 
position with social equality, much less on economic equality regarding the 
UK. When considering the other cases, the connections seem weak or very 
weak, even in terms of trends on the two dimensions. The visible, simple aspect 
is that many other relevant intervening variables can blur the results. Thus, the 
hypothesis about the connections between corruption and inequalities makes 
much sense but cannot be solidly supported by empirical data because other 
variables, idiosyncratic or not, are relevant or even more relevant (see also 
Chapter 6).
As for plural and independent information, a crucial subdimension of inter-
institutional accountability (see Chapter  1; Morlino,  2011, chapter  7), only can 
critical information show the reasons and the possibilities for revendicating or 
improving the economic and social situation to disadvantaged groups. In this 
vein, let us remember here, that in the perspective of inter-institutional ac count-
abil ity, the role of the parliamentary opposition is also very salient. Inter-institutional 
accountability emerges so strongly in our analysis because a democracy, with its 
norms and procedures, will very likely remain on paper if the incumbent authorities, 
that is, mainly the government, can avoid being controlled or being held 
accountable for their actions and decisions vis-à-vis other informed authorities 
(see also O’Donnell,  1998). Those authorities, with their oversight powers, 
whether parliament or the media, can make democracy more real and closer to 
citizens. More generally, we could also refer to the sphere of public opinion, with 
its original function of government control (Habermas, 1962), with the obvious 
connections with what happens in parliament or the media system.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
222 Equality, Freedom, and Democracy
Figure 8.2 shows the trends of inter-institutional accountability in our coun-
tries. This figure is highly pertinent for us. First, the data to create the figure were 
taken in correspondence to electoral years. For this reason, we see the Spanish 
line as a longer one: Spain had three elections in four years. To achieve a more 
appropriate measure of interinstitutional accountability, in addition to the media 
(media integrity), we included the checking role of parliament and compliance 
with the high court.5 Moreover, we can see an evident worsening trend in all the 
countries on this macro-dimension, with Spain improving at the end in more 
recent elections, maybe showing a way out of the Great Recession. Second, con-
sistently with the level of equalities, Germany and the UK are at the top of the 
figure. France is very close to the first two, and this is also consistent with the 
scores on equality. Although Spain and Italy are almost at the bottom of the figure, 
we find that Poland fares worst of all.6
5 For the subdimension ‘Effective Parliament’ the indicators include: Legislature questions officials 
in practice, Executive oversight, Legislature investigates in practice, Legislature opposition parties, 
Executive constraints. For ‘Media Integrity’: Critical print/broadcast media, Print/broadcast media 
perspectives, Media bias, Media corrupt, Media freedom. For ‘Compliance with the high court’, the 
indicator is given by the reply to the question: ‘How often would you say the government complies 
with important decisions of the High Court with which it disagrees?’. For the notion of interinstitu-
tional accountability, see Morlino (2011, chapter 7).
6 The salience of the media, in addition to the role of the parliamentary opposition, is emphasized 
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Figure 8.2 Interinstitutional accountability in the six European Countries 
(1990–2018)
Source: International IDEA data set.
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Furthermore, as we started discussing in the previous section, the vital inter-
play that links interinstitutional accountability to freedoms is dramatically testi-
fied by Poland. The accurate dismantling of a few constitutional rules (Sadurski 
2019, pp. 63ss) turned into a deep erosion of the defences against authoritarian 
backslidings. Thus, Poland has a growing relevant trend when analysing the meas-
ures of equalities, but very consistent flawed results on freedoms (see Chapter 3). 
Moreover, to confirm what we also stated above, when connecting freedoms (see 
chapters 3 and 6) with inter-institutional accountability, we can see a full consist-
ency in Germany, the UK, and France at the top of the figures and Spain and Italy 
almost at the bottom, surpassed by Poland, which is at the very bottom of this 
possible ranking. Here, the connections between low inter-institutional account-
ability and weaker freedoms seems a strong one regarding Poland, which is the 
country with the most relevant worsening of freedoms (see also Mounk, 2018, 
esp. 125ff).7 The most recent data of the World Justice Project (2019) also confirm 
this picture (see Table 8.2) by stressing the robust connections among the two sets 
of data (R2 = 0.86) with Poland at the bottom of a possible ranking on both values, 
Germany and also the UK with the best values, and Italy and Spain in between, 
but always related scores.
Moreover, the changes in accountability, especially between the judicial and 
the executive branch, marked the phase of the managerial policies enacted in the 
six democracies around the turning point of the adoption of austerity measures. 
They should also be connected to subsequent reforms to tackle international 
terrorism and the rise of cybercrime. In this respect, the strategies adopted by the 
six democracies again testify to a pro-security attitude, mitigated in the case of 
Italy only within the strict scope of prosecutorial action—the anti-terrorism 
7 For the essential aspects of accountability in Poland, but also in Spain, see Sroka (2017).
Table 8.2 Limited government powers vs fundamental rights in 
the six European countries (2019)







Note: For the set of indicators of fundamental right and constraints on 
government power, see Andersen and Piccone (2019)
Source: World Justice Project (2019), Rule of Law Index (2019).
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measures did not discontinue the procedural guarantees of a fair trial entrenched 
in the constitution. In general, however, the limits and the non-functioning of 
inter-institutional accountability is not only the outcome of specific policies but 
also reflects a specific vision of politics aimed at ‘empowering’ the government by 
shifting the constitutional balance towards this body.
To develop these observations, we take the next two crucial theoretical steps. 
The first is sketching a comprehensive model, as suggested by our analysis. The 
second is to explore what are the related specific patterns emerging for each of 
our six countries from our empirical analysis. The comprehensive model can only 
start from the growth of dissatisfaction or, more neutrally, from the level and 
characteristics of dissatisfaction in each moment in the analysed country. The 
reasons for such discontent are crucial to qualify it and may be the result of eco-
nomic crisis—in our cases, we are analysing the Great Recession—or of immigra-
tion, but also a profound technological transformation with social consequences. 
More precisely, while the insecurity produced by economic crisis or the fear asso-
ciated with mass immigration creates a subjective orientation that feeds dissatis-
faction and other emotional or irrational reactions, the digital revolution 
constitutes a facilitating mechanism in the hands of citizens, allowing for the 
‘immediate’ expression of dissatisfaction and resentment. The very characteristics 
of the Web encourage radicalization through the superficiality of communication 
that never receives a cogent analysis of the content, construction of the enemy, 
recognition of identity, expressive easiness of emotions (Dal Lago, 2017).
Thus, on the one hand, this phenomenon brings about a reshaping of political 
demand toward more equality, as seen in Chapter 4, or toward more freedom—
often specific freedom—or even towards stabilization of demands. On the other 
hand, it affects the offer developed by party leaders, with new or revised political 
proposals. In this changing context, a political entrepreneur can also exploit con-
tingent specific dissatisfaction to deepen it, to make it more persistent and build 
electoral success from it. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the extent of polar-
ization in the political competition shows the specific competitive pattern and, as 
is well known, a higher number of parties may also be at the origin of a deeper 
conflict and higher polarization, with additional radicalization that regards the 
distancing of policy positions among party leaders and the party.8 At the core of 
this phase, there is the shaping and reshaping of responsiveness. Namely, how 
political leaders, the incumbent and those in the opposition envisage and the 
incumbent ones implement the demands of the citizens, manipulated or not.
The different factors we mentioned in chapters 5 and 6, such as the intertwining 
between constitutional arrangements and types of capitalism, and the actors who 
8 On this issue, see Morlino and Raniolo (2017), who analyse the ‘radicalized democracies’, and 
Somer and McCoy (2019), who point out how ‘pernicious polarization’ endangers democracy, as a 
society is divided into mutually distrustful ‘us vs them’ blocks.
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may create a majority in favour of egalitarian, redistributive policies through 
either non-institutionalized or institutionalized protest are complemented by the 
indirect influence of European Union action (see Chapter 7). Moreover, they are 
influenced by the rule of law, especially concerning corruption and administra-
tive effectiveness. As seen earlier in this chapter, the level of inter-institutional 
accountability, above all regarding the media and their checking role, so crucial in 
every democracy in shaping public opinion, is also very relevant. Of course, the 
developments of information and the role of laws giving room to those veto 
 powers who can profoundly affect any decisions in the two domains we are con-
sidering (policies on freedoms and policies on equality) are additional critical 
elements of the picture.
We can now make the second step to understanding what kind of democratic 
patterns have been implemented in our countries. Grossly simplifying, we can 
sketch a sort of isosceles triangle. At the upper corner there is a balance between 
freedom and equality or a slight prevalence of one or the other. Consequently, we 
represent this solution as a convergence of them in the upper corner. This pattern 
is, however, characterized by an acceptably adequate implementation of those 
two goods (see Figure 8.3). If the higher level of dissatisfaction makes a balanced 
solution impossible or unsustainable, in looking for a consequent, better respon-
siveness there are only two paths. The first is a bottom-up response with the pro-
test where participation is central. In such a response, however, the role, also 
manipulative, of intermediary actors, protest movements or parties, is as central 
as the involvement of the people. The second is a top-down response, which pro-
foundly undermines the checking role of other constitutional bodies and the pos-
sibilities of effective opposition.
Thus, at the lower, not too distant corners, there are the patterns and the related 
cases where equality is relatively more salient with two basic possibilities. One, on 
the right, when looking at Figure  8.3, where protest participation is prevailing 
and is characterized by revendicative populism. Another one, on the bottom left 
of Figure 8.3, with a weaker and weaker inter-institutional accountability and cor-
respondingly more limited freedom. On the upper corner of the triangle, in add-
ition to better freedom and equalities, there are a better rule of law and more 
effective inter-institutional actors, such as the media and the high courts, who are 
the guardian of both freedoms and existing equalities. We can call this pattern a 
balanced democracy. When we switch to one of the two lower corners, we have 
protest democracy, where the stronger attention to equality is complemented by 
different possible types of protest, of a revendicative kind, a weak rule of law and 
a not characterizing interinstitutional accountability. On the other lower corner, 
there is higher relative equality, which is, however, complemented by weaker 
freedoms and above all the absence or, more realistically, the weakening of inter-
institutional guardians who were relevant in establishing democracy. This pattern 
can be labelled unchecked or, better, unaccountable democracy. However, there is 
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also a strong association between this pattern of democratic regime and ‘identi-
tarian populism’ (see Chapter 5), where anti-immigration reactions and national-
ism, the weakening of inter-institutional accountability, and stronger power of 
the executive hold together. Corruption may be present along the lower side of 
the triangle to reinforce both patterns.
If from the ideal types we switch to our real democracies, Italy implements at 
its best the protest democracy and Poland the unaccountable democracy. Italian 
democracy is characterized not only by the effort of promoting equality and at the 
same time by the impossibility of doing it because of a lack of resources and the 
inability to cut expenditures. It is also (a crucial point in our continuum) charac-
terized by a strong institutionalized protest by populists—in 2019 the electorally 
strongest ones in Europe—and the presence of veto powers, who ironically bring 
stalemate but also some support for inter-institutional accountability. There is a 
presence of corruption, but—as stated above—not as a characterizing feature of 
the pattern. In a much better situation in terms of economic and social equality, 
Poland was left untouched by the crisis and avoided the problem of ethnic equal-
ity by closing its doors to immigration. Moreover, after 2015 the new Polish gov-
ernment with PiS was able to weaken all the critical components of 




I-Institutional Accountability Revindicative Participation
weaker  higher
high polarization
unaccountable democracy protest democracy
Figure 8.3 The contemporary triangle of democracy
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included. In this vein, the Polish government implemented is a softened pattern 
that has been recurrent in other countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America.9 
The thrust of the leader’s discourse is straightforward and can easily convince 
people in need by promoting economic and social improvement of citizens’ lives 
with a higher consequent equality and wellbeing and at the same time creating 
the actual and legal conditions to have a free hand without the risk of being 
checked and blocked by the media and the constitutional oversight institutions.
Hence, looking for more responsiveness is complemented by enjoying less 
freedom, and the trade-off that from an analytic point of view and in most of the 
countries does not exist is the actual result of political manipulation. The leader’s 
goal and the related effective result is unchecked and unaccountable power. 
However, oversight and control of governmental power are one of the critical 
elem ents of every democracy, and without it, we are on the border with a non-
democratic regime. In other words, when a threshold of conflict and de teri or-
ation is exceeded, the crisis ‘in’ the democracy ends up paving the way for the 
crisis ‘of ’ democracy, that is, for the de-democratization (Tilly, 2007).
Because its salience well beyond the specific case, the Polish pattern deserves 
some additional consideration to understand better it and its potentialities in 
other cases. In the Polish case, the missing link between freedom and equality 
comes out explicitly when looking at declarations and above all actions of party 
leaders. In a political-cultural context where liberalism is the ideology of ‘the win-
ners, far away in the big cities’, as Garton Ash recalls (2019, p. 176), and a trad-
ition al, communitarian rightist ideology is relatively more successful, the new PiS 
government exploited that success with the egalitarian policies we mentioned in 
chapters 2 and 5. However, at the same time, PiS leaders carried out systematic 
policies to undermine the political control of the government by other consti-
tutionally relevant bodies, firstly the Supreme court. In 2015 PiS won an electoral 
campaign that complemented a commitment to distributive policies (see 
Chapter 2) with anti-immigration, sovereign position and traditional value refer-
ences. Once in power, the party was committed to being responsive by imple-
menting those promises. Such responsiveness toward the citizens seemed possible 
only if the checking of the government had been removed. This is a recurrent 
legitimating narrative also adopted in other countries by other leaders and par-
ties, especially the rightist ones, to justify their action. However, undermining 
those checking institutions and, consequently, the interinstitutional ac count abil-
ity implies bringing about limitation and weakening of freedoms, as seen for 
Poland (see Chapter 3 and above, esp. Table 8.2). Thus, the (indirect) connection 
between equality and freedom is entirely due to the actions of the leaders and 
their pursuing a freehand strategy. In a nutshell, to be more responsive, 
9 Regarding Latin America, O’Donnell (1994) spoke of ‘delegative democracy’ to account for the 
shift of power over executives and their leaders.
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eventually, the freedoms are affected, and the related democratic tenet, the pro-
tection of freedom, is severely undermined. In the end, as seen in the 2019 Polish 
election the reason for all this seems to give the incumbent leader the possibility 
of being confirmed in power without an effective assessment of his action. The 
end result is that the checking of the political responsibility of the incumbent 
leader by citizens and above all by oversight institutions is avoided. In this vein, 
the democracy becomes politically irresponsible by avoiding those controls.
Despite growing party polarization and the success of radical right, Germany 
belongs to the balanced democracy category and seems to have the possibility of 
maintaining a stable equilibrium between relative inequalities and the defence of 
freedoms, not undermined by a weak rule of law or inter-institutional ac count-
abil ity. Both are strong or very strong in all dimensions, media, and high court 
included. The other three countries are in intermediate positions in this triangle. 
Despite the strength of the rule of law, and, unlike Italy, weaker constitutional 
accountability with regards to the effective oversight powers of the high court, but 
compensated by active pluralist media, France is relatively close to Italy. In this 
country, equality has been better implemented than in other countries in the past 
years. Thus, when the government challenges it, the citizens’ protest is un avoid-
able also because of the actual high threshold of political access due to the hyper-
majoritarian constitutional arrangements. Thus, especially during 2018–19, we 
see an active protest with the Yellow Vests and an attempt of response reaction by 
the president, though still not at the level of the request of the protest movement.
Spain is also close to Italy. The anti-establishment protest party plays an 
im port ant role, but it is relatively more moderate and entered a coalition cabinet 
after 2019 elections. However, the most relevant problem of Spain is not captured 
by this triangle, as it concerns the open, vocal demand for secession on the part of 
Catalonia, which is one of its most important regions. We can argue that this is 
another form of protest, which took this path because of the historical legacy of 
the country.
The UK can be located in the upper part of the triangle, in between France and 
Germany with the high polarization as one of the most distinguishing aspects. On 
this, we should remember that a critical aspect of majoritarian democracy, as the 
UK is, implies the presence of widespread moderate opinion and parties to have 
the majoritarian institutions effectively working. If this is not so, as in the UK 
today, and especially after Brexit, the expected result is a worsening of democratic 
performance and the risk of secession following a parallel path to the Spanish one. 
The responsibility of the UK’s leadership, that is, of the Conservative Party leader 
David Cameron, for holding the (lost) referendum on Brexit in 2016 is beyond 
doubt. Moreover, at the end of the 2010s, the related debate is mon op ol iz ing the 
political arena and will seriously affect the future of the country. Let it be recalled 
that the polarization is complemented by radicalization (see Chapter 5) with the 
electoral success of the Brexit Party at the 2019 European Elections when a 
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proportional electoral law was in operation, and there had been shifting toward 
the left of the Labour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. The Brexit 
party won a relative majority of votes (31.6%, more than five million votes), with 
Labour at 14.1% and the Conservatives at 9.1% in third and fourth position, some-
thing unthinkable only a few years ago. What the prospects are for these democra-
cies above all, on the implementation of the two values, is a question we will 
address in the final concluding chapter. However, let us now compare the results 
of this analysis with what emerged in published research addressing similar issues.
8.4  Are There Alternative Explanations?
The question at the core of our research was illustrated at the beginning of 
Chapter  1. It referred to: ‘how and why has [. . .] the actual implementation of 
freedom and equality been changing in terms of its characteristics and extent in 
the first decades of the twenty-first century’. In other words, a key objective was to 
single out the specific democratic mechanisms that characterize that implementa-
tion, the connection we detected and the patterns of democracy that emerged 
from the research. To our knowledge, in the published literature, there is no 
empirical work that does precisely this. There are, however, works that address 
similar questions concerning equality only, freedom only or also the entire demo-
cratic regime. We will now examine the main ones and check differences and/or 
similar conclusions where these exist.
If we start from works that address the issue of the general perspectives of con-
temporary democracy, although this is not precisely our research question, there 
are a few pieces of research that are relevant for us and worthy of discussion. With 
some unavoidable choice, we can mention here at least the works by Crouch, 
Mounk, and Levitsky and Ziblatt. In his theoretical work (see also Chapter  1), 
Crouch (2004) defines contemporary democracies as ‘post-democracy’ and char-
acterizes them through a few aspects. They include a professional elite who select 
the issues and run the election by adopting a specific technique of persuasion; 
passive citizens; a growing role of interaction between elected governments and 
economic interests, which become more powerful; a decline of the worker class 
and unions, compounded by a weakening of egalitarianism. The main conse-
quence of this last feature is that the welfare state is focused on poverty instead of 
being a component of the universal right of every citizen. Although the research 
has initially been written several years before the Great Recession as an essay 
rather than with the support of specific empirical data,10 it has been relevant and 
received the attention of a broad scholarly audience. In our research, we did not 
develop an empirical analysis of interest groups, including unions. This would 
10 The first Italian edition came out in 2003 (Bari, Laterza).
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have meant conducting different research and writing another book with partially 
different goals. However, like Crouch, we also started from the dissatisfaction of 
citizens, who are not passive as described by him but active or very active through 
new protest parties, for example in Spain, Italy and also the UK, or through social 
movements and new parties as in France. Crouch describes sclerotic democracies, 
dominated by organizations of interest where citizen participation has lost its 
effectiveness. In this way, he captures one of the causes of the populist protest (see 
Chapter 5). However, overall, almost two decades after the essay was written, our 
analysis does not allow us to define our countries as post-democracies, despite 
the new phenomena that emerged over the subsequent two decades, also charac-
terized by different democratic patterns, as illustrated in the previous section.
Within the perspective of this research, two other works are more relevant. The 
first one is by Mounk (2018), who agrees with one of the key aspects of our ana-
lysis, the mechanism of mutual convergence: a democracy system is both liberal 
and democratic and is characterized by the protection of individual rights and at 
the same time the translation of popular views into public policies (see ibid., p. 
27). However, in Mounk’s view, this is the contingent result of a set of techno-
logic al, economic, and cultural preconditions. When these conditions are trans-
formed, liberal democracy starts ‘coming apart’, and two new regimes emerge. 
These are illiberal democracy, or democracy without rights—from our perspec-
tive, he is analysing populism and its impact on democracy—and undemocratic 
liberalism, or rights without democracy, in his words. Without going into the 
details of his analysis and the attention he pays to cases different from ours, 
Hungary included, we can emphasize two aspects. On the grounds of our research, 
the presence of freedoms and equality is confirmed in all democratic regimes, 
although in some years one of the two values may be implemented in a weaker 
way vis-à-vis the other one, due to the impact of some specific macro-event, such 
as the Great Recession or the waves of immigration (see esp. Chapter 4). Thus, 
despite the gradual disappearance of the results of contingent conditions in the 
years we analysed, the establishment of democratic institutions allowed them to 
achieve their autonomy and vested interests.
We cannot forget, however, that any change arising from new phenomena is 
also affected by the previous existing institutions. This affirmation is well known 
and largely accepted in political science (see, e.g., Pierson, 2000), despite the 
doubts raised by Mounk with his analysis of supposed deconsolidation of democ-
racy (2018, esp. chapter 3). Thus, if there is some empirical support for the divorce 
Mounk mentions, then a process of democratic deterioration has been starting, 
and gradually we are crossing the democratic threshold and entering a hybrid 
regime (see Morlino, 2011, chapter 3). We are not in that situation with Poland, 
though the danger does exist, as steps have been made along that path. Ultimately, 
illiberal democracy and undemocratic liberalism are oxymorons, which show 
that there has been a transition from democracy to a different kind of political 
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regime. What Mounk is showing is a possible trajectory of democratic deterioration 
and an eventual change of regime, which has nothing to do with established 
democracies.11
Among the books that have analysed democratic deterioration in recent years 
or, as more commonly stated, democratic backsliding and crisis (see, e.g., 
Kurlantzick, 2013; Runciman, 2018; or also Grayling, 2017), we should include 
one that is particularly significant by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018). Their research 
on democratic deterioration mostly focuses on the United States. This country is 
analysed in depth from both a historical and contemporary perspective. Following 
partially different paths, their conclusions mainly overlap with ours. We state that 
ultimately the analysis of inter-institutional accountability mostly accounts for 
how much freedoms are implemented, and eventually also equalities. They argue 
that checks and balances—that is, our inter-institutional accountability—are 
essential. Nevertheless, our sub-dimensions of interinstitutional accountability 
are the role of parliament and the media (see above). They focus instead on con-
stitutional rules only.
Levitsky and Ziblatt also clarify that those institutions, the formal ‘guardrails of 
democracy’, can work if supported by two informal rules, which are crucial to 
keeping a democracy working properly: mutual toleration and institutional for-
bearance. Mutual toleration is the acceptation by the competing actors that they 
have ‘an equal right to exist, compete for power, and govern’ and there is a ‘politi-
cians’ collective willingness to agree to disagree’ (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 
102). Institutional forbearance suggests that ‘politicians should exercise restraint 
in deploying their institutional prerogatives’, that is “avoiding actions that, while 
respecting the letter of the law, obviously violate its spirit “(ibid., pp. 8 and 106). 
These are procedural principles, which are strictly related and can reinforce each 
other: ‘(p)oliticians are more likely to be forbearing when they accept one another 
as legitimate rivals’ (ibid., p. 111). From the unravelling of basic norms of toler-
ance and forbearance comes ‘a syndrome of intense partisanship polarization’ 
(ibid., p. 167) characterized by a profound radicalization of the American pol it-
ical system. In the past few decades, these two informal rules already were or 
have been becoming extraneous to almost all democracies we studied, except 
Germany. However, in our work, we did not refer to these rules.12 We analysed 
the polarization of those democracies, also as an effect of the Great Recession and 
the waves of immigration. An additional point of overlapping is to consider 
11 The book is very rich and discusses other relevant issues, such as populism (see above and 
Chapter 5), but from our perspective, the critical point is the one discussed in the text.
12 If, on the ground of our knowledge of the countries, we can affirm, as we did above, that these 
rules were or became extraneous to most of our countries, there is an open question: in comparative 
research how do we solidly operationalize these two informal rules? In other words, what can be 
acceptable in single case study, when there is a profound inner knowledge of the case, even in an 
impressionistic way, cannot be done in comparative research. This is so, although research covers six 
cases only.
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‘se cur ity crisis as a game changer’ (ibid., p. 192). Primarily in Chapter 6, we dis-
cussed how the priority given to security became an essential element in under-
mining individual freedom.
Overall, the central lesson of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s book is that democracy 
works effectively if the regime can rely on the two informal norms mentioned. 
That is not the central lesson for us when considering our countries. The critical 
lesson suggested by our research, which has a different focus—the implementa-
tion of the two liberal democratic values—is the fluidity in implementation 
brought about by contingent events, but also the existence of some barriers to the 
deterioration of freedoms and equalities. The defence of both values lies in the 
existing formal rules being roughly implemented. This implies the existence of 
deteriorated democracies regarding some of our cases, especially Italy and Poland, 
which are experiencing a protracted period of danger.
In this perspective, the point of major disagreement with Levitsky and Ziblatt 
is the way they consider the protest. ‘Public protest is a basic right and an im port-
ant activity in any democracy, but its aim should be the defence of rights and 
institutions, rather than their disruption’ (ibid., p. 218). To comment on this 
statement a few points should be made. The success of protest parties in all the 
countries we analysed has been showing the end or the basic undermining of 
mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. Moreover, the continuous pol it-
ical action of these protest parties is not certainly characterized by the ‘defence of 
rights and institutions’. On the contrary, in several cases, it has been openly char-
acterized by anti-establishment and, in some case, also anti-system positions. As 
the origin of protest is usually a profound dissatisfaction with the existing pol it ical 
situation and the way democratic institutions work, it is not so easy to im agine a 
protest in defence of institutions. The simple fact is that the kind of protest that 
Levitsky and Ziblatt mention may be highly desirable, but empirical research and 
logic itself suggest that it does not exist in our contemporary democracies.
Another way of comparing our empirical conclusions with existing research is to 
look for work more specifically focused on equality or freedom. We can begin by 
selectively examining studies on equality. Here, of course, we are not interested in 
the outstanding work by economists, including, among others, Atkinson (1983 and 
2019), Stiglitz (2012), Piketty (2013), and Milanovich (2016). Besides, most of the 
issues analysed by these authors (and others as well) are also thoroughly discussed 
in Salverda et al. (2009). Nor are we interested in famous classics of political science 
that analyse political equality rather than economic, social or ethnic equality. We 
have already pointed to the reasons for this (see Chapter 1), though we recognize 
that those works are an essential part of our legacy (see, e.g., Verba et al.,  1978; 
Verba et al., 1995; and Schlozman et al., 2012), in addition to some rarer contri-
butions linking economic and political equality (see esp. Verba and Orren, 1985).
Our focus here is on singling out the critical political explanations of contem-
porary inequalities, especially in the six countries we considered. In this, we are 
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also supported by Bartels, who studied inequality in the United States and stated: 
‘politics also profoundly shapes economics’ (Bartels, 2008, p. 2).13 Although most 
of his key variables are parallel to ours,14 the empirical conclusions are un avoid-
ably different, as Bartels only focuses on the US democracy. In fact, for the key 
aspects that are explored, apart from the much richer set of data Bartels could rely 
on for the United States, both his research and ours focused on partisan politics 
and related polarization issues; constitutional arrangements (presidentialism vs 
different parliamentarian solutions); people priorities (moral values vs freedoms); 
and public opinion attitudes on equality and accountability mechanisms (eco-
nomic vs a broader political one).
Regarding the content and results of Bartel’s research, his reasoning is straight-
forward and compelling. First, the partisan variable complemented by the consti-
tutional arrangement is a key starting point: ‘The most important single influence 
on the changing of U.S.  income distribution over the past half-century’ is ‘the 
contrasting policy choices of Democratic and Republican Presidents’ (ibid., 
p. 29). Consequently, ‘(u)nder Democratic presidents, poor families did slightly 
better than richer families [….], producing a modest net decrease in income 
inequality; under Republican presidents, rich families did vastly better than 
poorer families, producing a considerable net increase in income inequality’ 
(ibid., p. 33) with linear patterns. Second, the key salience of partisan politics in 
improving or worsening economic inequality is confirmed by Bartels also when 
taking into account the analysis of economists, who stress how, from 1980 
onwards, the growth of inequality in the United States can be related to crucial 
structural changes in the American economy, including demographic shifts, 
globalization, and technology (ibid., pp. 60–1).15 Third, of course, this brings to 
the heart of the analysis the question of why middle-class and poor people vote 
for the Republicans. As an answer, the data seems to suggest that voters simply 
care about other things besides income and that at the same time moral values are 
increasingly prominent in American democracy (ibid., p. 86). But, fourth, there 
are three biases in the actual working of economic accountability that explain 
those behaviours much better. ‘First, voters are myopic, responding strongly to 
income growth in presidential election years but ignoring or forgetting most of 
the rest of the incumbent administration’s record of economic performance. [. . .]. 
Second, election-year income growth for affluent families is much more 
13 It can be added that in his important work Larry Bartels also explores the other direction of 
causality, how economics has been shaping politics in the United States. The research by Bartels fol-
lows and develops previous works by Hibbs (1987) and Hibbs and Dennis (1988).
14 Three chapters of the book are devoted to the analysis of three specific policies (the Bush tax cuts 
of 2001 and 2003; the campaign to repeal the federal estate tax; the erosion of the minimum wage), 
while we do not do the same here.
15 The issue of the impact of technology on democratic regimes, and the consequent changes, are 
not systematically addressed either by Bartels or by this research (but see Chapter 6). This is done very 
well by Boix (2019).
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consequential than income growth for middle-class and low-income families—
even among middle-and low-income voters. And third, voters are swayed by the 
balance of campaign spending between incumbents and challengers.’ (ibid., p. 
98). Each bias gives an additional advantage to the Republicans. Fifth, in connec-
tion with this, and with the support of several other survey data, Bartels shows 
how people have a poor understanding of what is at stake and how at the same 
time the political significance of economic inequality is lost on many Americans. 
Sixth, a consequence of all this is that when analysing the political actions of 
parliamentarians,16 we see that, on the one hand, people are confused about their 
interests, but racial and ethnic divisions are a significant obstacle to economic 
equality (ibid., pp. 295–8) and, on the other hand, the specific views of citizens, 
whether rich or poor, have less impact in the policy-making process than the 
ideological convictions of elected officials. The latter tend to ignore the prefer-
ences of the low-income class but are responsive to the views of affluent constituents, 
middle-and upper-income citizens. Thus, in conclusion, ‘political systems seem 
to be functioning not as a “democracy” but as an “oligarchy” ’ (ibid., p. 286), and 
in a democracy, the people can only accept or refuse the people who rule them.17
Although, as stated above, there is some parallelism between the variables used 
in this research and those chosen by Bartels, the empirical analysis goes in differ-
ent directions and yields different results. First, European parliamentarianisms 
are complemented by two-partyism or multi-partyism that set up a different 
institutional context vis-à-vis presidentialism. Thus, strong statements like the 
initial one made by Bartels (role of Republican and Democrat presidents) are 
hard to make in our cases, even if in chancellor democracies such as the UK, 
Germany, and Spain, the prime minister and the executive power are strong. 
Second, as also seen when analysing freedoms (see Chapter 4), there is no doubt 
that citizens may have priorities other than income equality, and similar biases to 
those detected by Bartels, which limit economic accountability, can be detected. 
However, leftist parties in Europe and protest movement of the kind we described 
above and in Chapter 5 do not allow us to affirm that the political significance of 
economic equality is lost. At the same time, it would not be possible to state that 
the lower classes are not represented. Without denying the oligarchic feature of 
our democracies, in our cases, party traditions and new protest parties do not 
allow us to follow Bartels along this path.18
The specific bibliography on equality is very rich, and other works were also 
cited in chapters 2 and 5. However, to avoid an excessively cumbersome analysis, 
16 The data Bartels analyses regard senators.
17 Some of the key themes of this book, especially regarding unresponsiveness and determinants of 
electoral behaviour, are further developed in Achen and Bartels (2017).
18 This is not the place to critique this research, but ultimately the reasons why the lower classes are 
not represented are taken for granted. Some discussion of this would perhaps have additionally 
improved a rich and important book.
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we can turn now to works on freedoms. As mentioned already, during and imme-
diately after the recession, scholarly work maintained as a significant issue the 
crisis of democracy triggered by the rise of new losers and new demands to access 
power arenas. Therefore, the inequalities stemming from the crisis have been 
largely addressed by comparative research. It has been written much less about 
freedoms. This gap has been partially filled over the last three years, in cor res-
pond ence with the rise of the digital revolution in democratic procedures (Vaccari 
and Valeriani, 2018), the surge in the appeal of social media in politics and, more 
generally, technological pervasiveness in public institutions and services. An 
evidence-based alert has been launched by Freedom House, which claimed in its 
Freedom on the Net report (2018) that what has been praised as liberation from 
undue constraints—IT—proved to be a boomerang in the hands of a rather oli-
gopolistic network of dominant corporations, backed up by a regulation the gov-
ernments passed under pressure from those corporations. More importantly 
from our point of view, advanced democracies turn out to be exposed to the risk 
of falling victim to an illiberal turn (Freedom House, 2018), as technology goes 
hand in hand with the rise of surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019).
Economic factors are dominant in these explanations—dominant position, 
rent-seeking, oligopoly—whereas institutional variables, especially ones appraised 
in a comparative perspective, are in abeyance. Exceptions, where institutional fac-
tors are deemed to be fundamental explaining mechanisms, do exist, however, 
such as the essential works stressing growing authoritarian trends and democracy 
decline (see, e.g., Diamond, 2015, esp. chapters 3–5, and Graziosi,  2019, esp. 
chapters 1–3), even though they are devoted explicitly to freedoms in advanced 
democracies. Finally, from a policy-oriented point of view, one of the most 
in nova tive pieces of research on this topic by Sunstein (2019) addresses a ques-
tion that is of high relevance but far removed from the one addressed here: it 
looks at how, through ‘nudges’ or interventions that steer people in specific direc-
tions, they are helped to decide while maintaining their freedom of choice. In 
other words, nudges can increase ‘navigability’ for people by making it easier for 
them to get to their preferred destination/choice. On the whole, to conclude on 
this issue, there are no works on freedoms conducted within our perspective, or 
which we can use as a point of comparison.
8.5  Before Concluding
Even if we tried to focus our analysis on the political explanations of the extent 
and characteristics of the implementation of the two vital democratic values, the 
complexity of the pictures has been unavoidable. To simplify as much as possible, 
here we can point to the thread we uncovered in our research. It runs from a 
multi-dimensional dissatisfaction of varying origins to the multiple demands by 
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citizens, to the partisan political supply that also reshapes and exploits those 
demands electorally, to the interactions with different domestic and international 
(European) factors and actors, and the centrality of interinstitutional ac count abil-
ity as the fundamental pillar of every democracy. Out of this process, three differ-
ent democratic patterns unfolded. They are balanced democracy, protest 
democracy, and unchecked democracy, and we discussed them with their key 
features. However, what is the possible developments of those patterns? This is an 
additional question that we shall briefly address in the concluding remarks of 
this book.




9.1  Empirical Perspectives in Implementing  
Equality and Freedom
Taking stock of the empirical results of our research, we can now address two 
final questions. First, what are the specific and more general perspectives of the 
democracies we studied in terms of implementation of the two democratic values, 
especially when coping with crisis and protracted stagnation? Second, what could 
we do to promote a better, doable, reasonable implementation of the two values?
If considering the analysis of the previous Chapter  8, while Germany is on 
solid ground and the UK can pursue a virtuous path once it overcomes the pro-
foundly negative impact of Brexit, both Italy and Poland are going down two 
difficult and uncertain tracks. On the one hand, the kind of party-channelled 
protest that has been characterizing Italian democracy cannot be protracted 
indefinitely. At some point, it has to be translated into policies. However, when 
there is such a translation in a radicalized context, there also will be new occasions 
of political conflict. This means again entering a phase of prolonged uncertainty 
that can only have detrimental results in terms of redressing inequalities and 
guaranteeing freedoms, including the economic one. Poland has embarked on an 
even more dangerous path by heavily constraining interinstitutional accountabil-
ity and limit ing freedoms. Its position almost on the threshold between a demo-
cratic regime and a hybrid one opens the way to a possible additional deterioration 
or to a reaction of protest to re-establish a more liberal democracy.
The two other cases lie between balanced and protest democracy, with their 
different problems. With success, however limited, of Sanchez and the Socialists 
in the April 2019 elections, democracy in Spain might appear to be on the way 
towards a balanced democracy. However, the highly radicalized Catalan demand 
for secession may put that democracy in a tragic stalemate with possibly unex-
pected and unacceptable results. In this situation, there is no doubt that the insti-
tutional forbearance discussed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (see 2018 and Chapter 8) 
would be enormously helpful. However, the political self-restraint that character-
ized the phase of democratic transition and consolidation in Spain (Morlino, 1998) 
has also been abandoned because of the generational turnover. The highly painful 
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memories of civil war, still present in the 1970s and 1980s, have almost totally 
disappeared forty to fifty years on, and the related socialization process has been 
dramatically weakened by the profound and rapid advances and changes of new 
technological communication. In this situation, Spanish democracy could swing 
between stalemate and unexpected dramatic events if a stroke of genius by 
Sanchez does not miraculously solve the conflict.
French democracy is also in between and shows the problems and limits of a 
hyper majoritarian constitutional arrangement. On the one hand, such an 
arrangement leaves street protest as the only way out if demands go unheard. On 
the other hand, it gains from the recognition of the executive as the pivot of 
demo crat ic quality, a type of legitimation that enables the executive itself to keep 
going with a hyper majoritarian method (see Vauchez, 2016). Here, there are the 
additional difficulties of institutionalizing the protest, not only due to internal 
ideological and policy fragmentation but also because of the high current thresh-
old for entering the formal political arena; the extreme weakness of parliament; 
and relatively low constitutional accountability. Again, uncertainty is the charac-
terizing feature of this democracy too. At the same time, it should be remembered 
that France remains a peculiar case in terms of policy implementation. The high 
cohesiveness of the public institutions and the low degree of discontinuity in the 
elite created reasonable conditions for responding to the crisis, especially con-
cerning public sector reforms.
If from the empirical cases, we switch back to the three theoretical patterns—
namely balanced democracy, protest democracy, and unaccountable democ-
racy—a few additional considerations are in order. First, the three patterns cover 
almost all the existing empirical possibilities in Europe. The balanced democra-
cies include all those well-established democracies which, with great basic tradi-
tions and political structures, managed to overcome the Great Recession that only 
hit all these countries in 2009. Consequently, they had limited problems which, 
however, are present with higher percentages of dissatisfaction and small protest 
parties. This is even if there are still reasonably solid partisan and public institu-
tions complemented by strong inter-institutional accountability. Among the pro-
test democracies, in addition to Italy, we can include Greece, which is on its way 
to recovery and has seen the transformation of Syriza from a widely supported 
protest party that won the 2015 elections to an incumbent party. Despite all the 
difficulties, Tsipras is leading the country out of a perfect storm and possible ship-
wreck through to economic recovery (see Morlino and Raniolo, 2017). Among 
the unaccountable democracies, in addition to Poland, there is Hungary, which is 
in a slightly worse situation than Poland, as is also shown by Mainwaring and 
Bizzarro (2020,esp. Table 2) in their analysis of ‘democratic erosion with no 
breakdown’ in new democracies. What is probably more significant concerning 
the three patterns is that they also seem to give a complete analytic map of the 
contemporary possibilities of both erosion and good democracy, which are the 
adverse outcomes and the positive ones.
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Reflecting on the theoretical patterns1 only, protest democracy and unaccount-
able democracy may additionally be irresponsible to different extent. We are, how-
ever, considering two different kinds of irresponsibility. Within the first pattern, 
the incumbent populist actor exploits the citizen’s disaffection and demands to 
push the responsiveness beyond what could be done taking into account the 
interests of those same citizens in the middle run, or the sustainability of ex pend-
itures or also, as recalled by Mair (2009), the commitment towards other countries, 
if included into the European Union. This is an economic or international irre-
sponsibility. When analysing the second pattern, unaccountable democracy, 
the irresponsibility that can be carried out is the political irresponsibility. The 
incumbent authorities achieve such a result by undermining profoundly 
the checking, oversight role of other institutions. This is carried out through 
the revision of constitutional rules, through new laws or manipulating existing 
laws, such as the age retirement of constitutional justices, as happened in 
Poland. In this pattern, the media may acquire a really determining role, as 
also happened in Poland as they become the only constraint that can avoid the 
sliding into a hybrid regime.
Moreover, setting aside the empirical analysis that was giving the critical infor-
mation to shape the three patterns, illustrated in Chapter 8, the additional, pos-
sible pattern we should consider for the high possible meaningfulness is the one 
where participative protest is compounded by policies to undermine interinstitu-
tional accountability. This would be the most dangerous pattern, the radicalized 
democracy, as the protest could become more radicalized and even violent with a 
fragmented leadership and, at the same time, the weakening of oversight institu-
tions would affect freedoms. If protracted in the time, in a context of economic 
crisis or stagnation, the basis for a profound crisis of democracy and change 
toward a hybrid regime2 would be laid down.
Second, the external challenges faced by democracies in the early twenty-first 
century directly affect not only the goods to be delivered (possibly a mix of free-
doms and equalities) but also resilience and de-consolidation. We are referring 
here to the sustainability of economic development concerning the environment, 
to the demographic transformations of advanced societies and mass migrations, 
to changes in the geopolitical and international framework (including the risk of 
terrorism), to the impact of the digital technology revolution on our daily lives 
and our institutions (Harari, 2018; Mounk, 2018; Reynié, 2013).
Third, within the patterns we proposed, what kind of protest can we accept 
while remaining within the democratic realm and not crossing the threshold into 
a hybrid regime? Even if, as in Chapter 8, we discard the notion of protest formu-
lated by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, pp. 218–9), an action in defence of rights and 
1 We cannot discuss here the ‘space of attribute’ behind those patterns. They implicitly came out in 
Chapter 8 (see esp. Figure 8.3) but were not openly analysed.
2 On this notion see Morlino (2011, chapter 3).
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institutions, the issue of how many protests can be tolerated, and in what shape 
and form, is a crucial problem. For example, can the sorts of demonstrations and 
riots characterizing the Yellow Vests movement be accepted? When do demo crat-
ically elected authorities have the right and even the duty to intervene? This is 
only partially a new issue as it was very much in evidence at the time of the break-
down of democracy in Italy and Weimar Germany in the second and third decade 
of the last century (see, e.g. Capoccia, 2005) and during the wave of terrorism in 
the 1970s. Reflecting on these past events suggests a basic reply to the question: 
even non-conventional protest, on the very edge of legality, can be allowed as a 
guarantee of the right of citizens to freely express their demands if it is not violent 
and aimed at subverting the existing democratic institutions. From a different 
perspective, the limits of protest lie in the fact that the related actions cannot vio-
late existing laws. In this sense, the last defence of democracy is respect for the 
rule of law, which as a consequence becomes a burning issue in all protest democ-
racies as it gives the magistracy a stronger and also a political role.
Fourth, within the unaccountable democracy pattern, a parallel question is 
how much the repeal of constraints, legal or of another sort, on the incumbent 
authorities can be pushed. Like the previous question, this one is also a pro ced-
ural one, but with the most severe consequences for democratic contents. If we 
consider the Polish case, we can take it for granted that the incumbent party leaders 
of the PiS will promote social rights and consequently economic and social equal-
ities. However, without adequate checks on executive power, only possible with 
effective inter-institutional accountability, we do not know if that political com-
mitment will be kept. Furthermore, however, we are sure that freedoms will be 
violated. On this matter, the most meaningful lesson comes from Venezuela. In 
the first years of his rule, Chavez promoted a set of policies that were effectively 
bringing stronger economic equality, recorded by the improvement of the Gini index 
in the first decade of the century. At the same time, however, there was a growth 
of corruption and, above all, a fundamental undermining of inter-institutional 
accountability (see Morlino, 2016). When the price of oil fell, that was the end of 
the equality policies. A new roaring inequality reared its head, with the result that 
at the end of 2018, almost 80% of the entire population was living in poverty. This 
was a real tragedy, and one with no apparent way out due to the role of the army 
in supporting the new authoritarian leader, Maduro. With this and other examples 
in mind, the boundaries on the repealing of constraints on pol it ical power are 
set not only in keeping an independent high court and an equally independent 
ordinary magistracy but above all in keeping an active political opposition in 
parliament and a free media. Interventions in these two domains change the 
essential aspects of democracy and make the effective implementation of the two 
values a matter of chance. Eventually, some leader will inevitably be tempted to 
cross the threshold of democracy, as Chavez did.
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Fifth, the emphasis we are placing on interinstitutional accountability as the 
necessary cornerstone of a working democracy is intended to reaffirm that every 
policy decision risks remaining just on paper without this crucial, decisive con-
trol of political action. However, why has that democratic quality been becoming 
more and more critical in contemporary democracies? As also discussed in chap-
ters 6 and 8, the revolution of technological communication and the crucial role 
of social media increased the possibility of manipulating the formation of pol it-
ical opinion to an enormous degree. This was indirectly evident and presented in 
morally acceptable ways in the analysis by Sunstein (2019). The consequence is 
that in contemporary democracies there has been a weakening of classic electoral 
accountability, that is, of the possibility for the well-informed, educated citizen to 
analyse and assess the political actions of incumbent authorities and to be in a 
condition to reward or punish them.
‘Liberal thought has nourished an immense faith in the rationality of in di vid-
uals. [...] democracy is based on the assumption that voters know who it is best to 
vote for, free-market capitalism assumes that the client is always right, and liberal 
education teaches students to think for themselves’ (Harari,  2018, p. 217). 
However, ‘behavioural economics experts and evolutionary psychologists have 
shown that most human decisions are based on emotional reactions and heuristic 
shortcuts rather than on rational analysis’ (ibid., p. 218). This state of affairs in the 
era of the digital revolution has favoured what is called post-truth, based on mis-
information, false news, and propaganda.3 This is an institutional evolution, all 
the challenges and consequences of which are not fully grasped by the public or 
by the audience democracy mentioned by Manin (1997).
The consequence of all this has been a gradual switching of the burden of con-
trolling power on other institutionalized powers. In other words, in con tem por-
ary democracy, there has been an actual switching of key democratic control 
from citizens to other powers, as O’Donnell (1994) had already seen about the 
recently established Latin American democracies. Of course, the one discussed by 
O’Donnell was a mostly different context with other characteristics and legacies. 
However, can the quality of our democracies only be entrusted to non-majority 
and guarantee institutions? It is no coincidence that post-truth populism has 
found strength in the delegitimization of technocratic decisions and epistemoc-
racy. From this point of view, we can understand the attempts to revitalize the 
deliberative forms of democracies. They include, for example, the communicative 
rationality of Habermas (1981), or to strengthen the possibilities for, and the 
skillfulness of, control by the citizen—the monitoring democracy of Keane 
3 In a very timely book, D’Agostini and Ferrera (2019) propose a citizen’s set of ‘right to the truth’ 
or ‘aletic rights’, which also imply a critical approach to the reality to be understood, in our case, the 
political reality, without being fooled by governing authorities.
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(2009)—or simply to use ‘counter-democratic’ solutions that institutionalize the 
‘non-trust’ of citizens towards elites through more or less direct oversight, veto 
powers and the judicialization of politics (Rosanvallon, 2008).
9.2  What Could We Do to Promote the Two Values?
What possible conclusion can be drawn from the reflections just proposed about 
the possibility of implementing and even improving equalities and freedoms in 
our democracies? When thinking about the attitudes of dissatisfaction we ana-
lysed in Chapter 4, and all the consequences we analysed in the subsequent chap-
ters, there is no doubt that contemporary democracies must deliver the requested 
goods to citizens. Democracy can no longer be taken for granted just because of 
the past victories over totalitarianism. The conclusion Diamond (2008) reached 
years ago is even more appropriate today. On the side of freedoms, not openly 
questioned by anyone but also often not openly requested, the difficulties lie in 
the limits of the effective implementation of the rule of law in the countries we 
analysed, but also in all other countries. To these, we have to add (see Chapter 6) 
the constraints set by the external conditions we discussed regarding the para-
doxical effects of more information and more rules but less freedom. In this per-
spective, we must acknowledge, as we did in Chapter 7, the role of the European 
Union in promoting several freedoms.
On the side of equality, two points can be immediately stressed. First, citizens 
and parties do not always set redressing inequalities as a priority. This by itself 
undermines any programme in favour of promoting equalities. If equality is 
understood as social equality, we have to make two considerations that may 
sound ironic. On the one hand, the moderate leftist parties watered down their 
proposals to redress inequalities and, on the other hand, social rights entered the 
programme of rightist parties, identitarian populists included. To consider this 
change seriously, we should think that social rights have become a constitutive 
part of the contemporary European notion of democracy. Moreover, as already 
said, although analytically distinct the programmes for contrasting poverty are 
closely related to the welfare state and on this matter, there is greater sensitiveness 
and attention from parties of different ideologies. At the same time, however, 
beyond the recognition of welfare, there is no strong, relevant voice for re dis-
tribu tive policies.4 Even with the Great Recession, which brought about a change 
of priorities in favour of egalitarian policies, or just more considerable attention 
to equality in some countries, leftist parties with serious redistributive pro-
grammes never took centre stage in the political arena, as they gained only limit ed 
success among radicalized leftist voters.
4 Of course, except for the tiny, highly minoritarian radical left of the different countries.
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Accordingly, can we affirm that we should rethink democracy in terms of the 
capability of delivering the two praised goods? Of course, economic crisis and 
protracted stagnation leave no room for majorities in favour of equality and, as 
seen, the request for freedoms is not vocal as several freedoms are taken for 
granted. Moreover, we cannot ignore the key conclusions reached by Bertoldi and 
Salvati (2020) on the sustainability of contemporary Western democracies. They 
effectively recall that after the Second World War, there were three sets of related 
factors. They were international aspects (notably, the economic and military 
hegemony of the United States), cognitive and cultural beliefs, which pushed 
political elite of Anglo-Saxon and other countries to support Keynesian liberal-
ism, and structural-economic factors, such as technological and organizational 
revolution, growth of income and productivity, labour demand for semi-skilled 
workers and wage increase complemented by the expansion of welfare states 
within a relatively homogeneous population. All of them have now basically dis-
appeared. Consequently, democracies with the implementation of the two values 
that we have been experiencing in Western countries are no longer possible.
Even if we accept this conclusion, we cannot allow ourselves to make state-
ments about post-democracy or the end of the implementation of those values. 
The key feature of democracy, which has been allowing this kind of regime to 
prevail over all others, works in this situation as well. This is its flexibility and 
capacity for self-adaptation to external conditions. Consequently, democracy will 
deliver freedom and equality to the new conditions and actors that are present in 
the coming years. There is no reason for optimism, but there are also no reasons 
for pessimism and cynicism.
Our analysis proves that political agency can play a decisive role in cases of 
crisis, within the public institutions and between them and society. This state-
ment is fully consistent with conclusions reached in previous research (see, e.g. 
Morlino, 2011), where it was showed that in different regions of the world actors 
that engage into the processes of rule implementation are vital in ensuring the 
continuity of the functioning of the public institutions. This holds with greater 
importance than ever before in the countries that are coping with conditions of 
budget restriction or flawed legitimacy.
Despite being focused on the six biggest democracies of Europe, our research is 
also relevant for a broader global context. From a strictly empirical perspective, 
there is a mismatch in the advanced democracies between declared goals and 
actual trajectories undertaken concerning the most visible, comprehensive, and 
ambitious international platform: the 2030 UN agenda. In 2015 the 197 member 
States of the United Nations officially endorsed the sustainable development goals 
agenda, where freedoms and equalities—in the plural—play the role of the over-
arching principles expected to be shaping all policies adopted in the world. 
Ironically, the very democracies which were expected to act as templates to be 
imitated and transferred are today being challenged by the processes we described.
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To conclude this book, we can address a final question that would merit a 
book, and we are just mentioning here. How in a democracy can we better imple-
ment the two critical democratic values? What can be done to redress inequalities 
and consolidate social rights? How can we overcome the external constraints 
limit ing the effective exercise of some freedoms, while also protecting our dig-
nity? We are of the view that anyone who praises democracy cannot ignore these 
questions.
Whether we can come up with an effective answer is a different story. However, 
here we can affirm the need to commit to four possible types of actions. First, a 
recurrent characteristic of contemporary democracies is political polarization. 
We can see this not only in our six democracies but also in several others in 
Europe and the Americas, the United States included. No effective, durable agree-
ment can be found in most of those democracies if polarization and radicaliza-
tion are not reduced. That is, if the high and growing level of conflict and distance 
between political parties on different issues, also concerning freedoms and equal-
ities, is not tackled. Polarization often ends in decisional stalemate, or with differ-
ent, more majoritarian constitutional arrangements, the repealing of the law that 
the previous government had approved and consequently another de facto stale-
mate in various domains when there is an alternation of different governments.
In their work, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, pp. 220–31) are also very worried 
about the negative effect of polarization on egalitarian policies. Their proposals are 
very much specific and related to the US party system, with the Democrats and 
Republicans, and what they should do. Here, with an eye on European democracies, 
radicalized polarization is the result of unsolved problems. Consequently, on the 
one hand, the citizen should see very explicitly how the government is addressing 
their grievances and government should make an effort to solve their problems by 
referring to and underlining the common good and attention for all citizens, not 
just some specific stronger and more active groups only. The formula of pursuing 
broader social cooperation would recall neo-corporatist past solutions, today 
unfeasible, but still appears as the right social recipe that has not yet been overcome.
Second, based on our analysis, the salience of inter-institutional accountability 
appears strongly as a central aspect of our democracies. Consequently, every 
political party, every organized group, every citizen should care about reinforcing 
that accountability. We can reconsider it by including a richer set of dimensions. 
In other words, it is not just parliamentary opposition and the role of all the 
media that are important. We should also consider, first, the crucial role of the 
high courts, in preserving and keeping alive fundamental constitutional tenets, 
and guaranteeing a set of entitlements and protections for all citizens who praise 
equality and freedom in every democracy. Second, when active, the role of other 
courts in controlling public expenditure and of all the other independent au thor-
ities, such as the ombudsman, is essential. Even an institutionalized control by 
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peripheral authorities of central authorities, and vice versa, would help to enrich a 
fabric of checks and balances that structure that accountability. In a nutshell, as 
seen in Chapter  8, we have to restate that there is a close connection between 
interinstitutional accountability and protection of freedoms, and although in dir ect ly 
of equalities. The first is eventually the necessary condition of those protections.
Third, among the rights, the most important one in a democracy is the right to 
vote, which is grounded in other freedoms that concur to form the voter’s own 
political opinion. As said above, this right has been weakened by too much infor-
mation and the manipulation of it. In addition to many international think-tanks, 
the European Union, through different institutions, and governments and parlia-
ments, especially those of France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, have been taking 
several initiatives, law and regulations included, to combat different forms of 
disinformation. This commitment needs to continue in the attempt to provide 
further meaningfulness to the right to vote.
Finally, as we have said, it is challenging to craft solid majorities in favour of 
the strengthening of the welfare state beyond the protection of poverty. Sound 
and feasible domestic solutions are not easy to carry out, especially in a situation 
where, except for Germany, there is low economic growth or even stagnation in 
other countries. Thus, with different purposes, we could adopt the proposal made 
by Ferrera (2017) on the promotion and establishment of a European Union able 
to complement domestic and European solidarities. The reason why Ferrera is 
supporting this proposal is that he rightly envisages such a policy is a way to make 
the European Union more legitimate and to more effectively turn it into a work-
ing, recognized polity. From our perspective, except for the UK, which left the 
Union in 2020, all the other countries, and especially Italy, Poland, and Spain, 
would greatly benefit from the implementation of these policies.
Will some of these proposals, or others, be taken into consideration by citizens, 
parties, and governments? This is a question we cannot answer here.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.R. (2009) Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity, 
and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
Achen, C.H. and Bartels, L. (2017) Democracy for Realists. Why Elections Do Not Produce 
Responsive Governments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
AEGIS project (2019) ‘Cybersecurity and Privacy Landscape in Europe’, AEGIS project, 
Available at http://aegis-project.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/AEGIS-Cybersecurity- 
and-Privacy-landscape-in-Europe.pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Alagna, F. (2019) ‘The EU response to migrant smuggling: multi-level governance dynam-
ics in the Italian case’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Bologna.
Albi, A. (2005) EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Alesina, A., Favero, C., and Giavazzi, F. (2019) Austerity: When It Works and When It 
Doesn’t. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Alesina, A. and Giuliano, P. (2011) ‘Preferences for Redistribution’. In J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, 
and M.O.  Jackson (eds.) Handbook of Social Economics, Volume 1A. North Holland: 
Elsevier.
Allen, F., Carletti, E., Gray, J., and Gulati, M. (eds.) (2017) The Changing Geography of 
Finance and Regulation in Europe. Florence: European University Institute; London: 
Brevan Howard Centre at Imperial College; Milan: Baffi Carefin, Bocconi University.
Almond, G.A. and Powell, G.B. (1978) Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy. 
Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
Alvaredo  F., Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., and Zucman, G. (2018) World Inequality 
Report 2018. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Amable, B. (2003) The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Amnesty International (2017) Amnesty International Annual Report 2017/2018. Available 
at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/02/annual-report-201718/ (last 
accessed on 15 June 2019).
Andersen, D., J.  Møller, and Skaaning, S.-E. (2014) ‘The State-Democracy Nexus: 
Conceptual Distinctions, Theoretical Perspectives, and Comparative Approaches’, 
Democratization, 21(7): 1203–220.
Andersen, E. and Piccone, T. (2019) ‘The Meaning, Measuring, and Mattering of the Rule 
of Law’, DOJ Journal of Federal Law and Practice, 67(4): 103–24.
Atkinson, A.B. (1983) Economics of Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Atkinson, A.B. (2019) Measuring Poverty Around the World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Autor, D. (2014) ‘Skills, Education, and the Rise of Earnings Inequality Among the “Other 
99 Percent” ’, Science, 23 May: 344 (6186): 843–51.
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S. (1970) Power and Poverty. Theory and Practice. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Bachtler, J. and Mendez, C. (2007) ‘Who Governs EU Cohesion Policy? Deconstructing 
the Reforms of the Structural Funds’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(3): 535–64.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Bailey, D.J., De Waele, J., Escalona, F., and Vieira, M. (eds.) (2014) European Social 
Democracy During the Global Economic Crises. Renovation or Resignation? Manchester: 
Manchester University Press.
Bale, T. (2010) The Conservative Party. From Thatcher to Cameron. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bartels, L. (2008) Unequal Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bartolini, S. (2000) The Class Cleavage. The Electoral Mobilisation of the European Left 
1880–1980. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Bauböck, R. (2003) ‘Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism’, The 
International Migration Review, 37(3): 700–23.
Becker, S.O., Fetzer, T., and Novy, D. (2017) ‘Who Voted for Brexit? A Comprehensive 
District-Level Analysis’, Economic Policy, 32(2): 601–50.
Beetham, D. (2005) ‘Freedom as the Foundation’, in L.  Diamond and L.  Morlino (eds.) 
Assessing the Quality of Democracy. Theory and Empirical Analysis.  Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 32–46.
Berlin, I. (1969) Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bermeo, N. (2009) ‘Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy (II): Does Electoral Democracy 
Boost Economic Equality?’, Journal of Democracy, 20(4): 21–35.
Bermeo, N. and Bartels, L.M. (2014) ‘Mass Politics in Tough Times’, in N.  Bermeo and 
L.M. Bartels (eds.) Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great 
Recession. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–39.
Bertoldi, M. and Salvati, M. (2020) ‘Economic Crisis and Liberal Democracies’, in 
G.  Amato, B.  Barbisan, and C.  Pinelli (eds.) Rule of Law vs Majoritarian Democracy. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Bieber, T. and Wulfgramm, M. (2016) ‘The New Welfare State Constellation and Inequality: 
Findings and Perspectives’, in B.  Wulfgramm and S.  Leibfried (eds.) Welfare State 
Transformations and Inequality in OECD Countries. London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 
pp. 293–309.
Biebricher, T. and Vogelmann, F. (eds.) (2017) The Birth of Austerity. German Ordoliberalism 
and Contemporary Neoliberalism. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.
Biehl, D. (1992) ‘Structural Funds and Budgetary Transfers in the Community’, in 
A.  Hannequart (ed.) Economic and Social Cohesion in Europe. London/New York: 
Routledge, pp. 53–64.
Blum, S. and Kuhlmann, J. (2016) ‘Crisis? What Crisis? Restructuring the German Welfare 
System in Times of Unexpected Prosperity’, in K.  Schubert, P.  de Villota, and 
J.  Kuhlmann (eds.) Challenges to European Welfare Systems. Cham: Springer 
International Publishing.
Blyth, M. and Katz, R. (2005) ‘From Catch-All Politics to Cartelization: The Political 
Economy of the Cartel Party’, West European Politics, 28: 33–60.
Blyth, M. (2013) Austerity: The History of a Very Dangerous Idea. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Bobbio, N. (1984) ‘The Future of Democracy’, Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary, 
61: 3–16.
Bobbio, N. (1995) Eguaglianza e libertà. Turin: Einaudi.
Bosco, A. and Verney, S. (2012) ‘Electoral Epidemic: The Political Cost of Economic Crisis 
in Southern Europe’, South European Society and Politics, 17(2): 129–54.
Boix, C. (2007) ‘Emergence of Parties and Party Systems’, in C. Boix and S. Stokes (eds.) 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 499–521.
Boix, C. (2019) Democratic Capitalism at the Crossroads. Technological Change and the 
Future of Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
248 Bibliography
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Bollen, F. (1999) ‘The Reform of the EU Structural Funds:10 Questions on the Magnitude 
and Direction of Reforms’, EIPASCOPE Working Paper, 1: 2–10.
Börzel, T.A., Hofmann, T., and Panke, D. (2012) ‘Opinions, Referrals, and Judgments. 
Analyzing Longitudinal Patterns of Non-Compliance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 
19(4): 454–71.
Bosco, A. (2018) Le Quattro crisi della Spagna. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Boudon, R. (1984) La place du désordre. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Brady, D. (2009) Rich Democracies, Poor People. How Politics Explain Poverty. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Braghiroli, S. and Petsinis, V. (2019) ‘Between Party-Systems and Identity-Politics: The 
Populist and Radical Right in Estonia and Latvia’, European Politics and Society, 
Published online: 4 February 2019. Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.201
9.1569340 (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Bremer, B. (2018) ‘The Missing Left? Economic Crisis and the Programmatic Response of 
Social Democratic parties in Europe’, Party Politics, 24(1): 23–38.
Brunazzo, M. (2016) ‘The Origins and Development of Cohesion Policy’. In S. Piattoni and 
L. Polverari (eds.) Handbook on Cohesion Policy in the EU. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
pp. 17–35.
Budge, I. (2013) ‘The “Paradox of the Manifestos”: Satisfied Users, Critical Methodologists.’ 
Available at https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/down/papers/budge_paradox.pdf (last 
accessed on 15 June 2019).
Bühlmann, M., Merkel, W., Müller, L., and Wessels, B. (2012) ‘The Democracy Barometer: 
A New Instrument to Measure the Quality of Democracy and its Potential for 
Comparative Research’, European Political Science, 11(4): 519–36.
Burroni, L. (2016) Capitalismi a confronto. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Camaj, L. (2012) ‘The Media’s Role in Fighting Corruption: Media Effects on Governmental 
Accountability’, International Journal of Press/Politics, 18(1): 21–42.
Capoccia, G. (2005) Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Caporaso, J.A. (2007) ‘The Promises and Pitfalls of an Endogenous Theory of Institutional 
Change: A Comment’, West European Politics, 30(2): 392–404.
Carnegy, H. (2013) ‘France Avoids Radical Overhaul in Pension Reforms’, Financial 
Times, 27 August. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/a39fea58-0f35-11e3-
ae66-00144feabdc0 (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Carrapico, H. and Barrinha, A. (2017) ‘The EU as a Coherent (Cyber)Security Actor?’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(6): 1254–72.
Carter, I. (1999) A Measure of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Castels, F. and Mair, P. (1984) ‘Left-Right Political Scales: Some Expert Judgements’, 
European Journal of Political Research, 12(1): 73–88.
CAT – UN Committee Against Torture (2006), ‘Annual Report 2006’, at http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/ (last accessed on 4 May 2020).
CAT – UN Committee Against Torture (2010), ‘Annual Report 2010’, http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/bodies/cat/ (last accessed on 4 May 2020).
Ceka, B. and Magalhães, P. (2016) ‘How People Understand Democracy: A Social 
Dominance Approach’, in M.  Ferrin and H.  Kriesi (eds.) How Europeans View and 
Evaluate Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chapman, D. (2020) The Global Citizenship Nexus. London: Routledge.
Chevallier, J . (2017) L’Etat de droit. Paris : LGDJ.
Chiaramonte, A. and Emanuele, V. (2017). ‘Party System Volatility, Regeneration and 
De-Institutionalization in Western Europe (1945–2015)’, Party Politics, 23(4): 376–88.
Bibliography 249
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Ciobanu, C. (2019): Devil in the Detail of Polish Ruling Party’s Welfare Promises. 10 October. 
Online: https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/02/devil-in-the-details/ (last accessed on 17 
January 2020).
CJEU (2015) ‘Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2015. Maximillian 
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner’. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014CJ0362 (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Claes, M., De Visser, M., Popelier, P., and Van De Heyning, C. (2012) Constitutional 
Conversations in Europe: Actors, Topics and Procedures. Cambridge: Intersentia Uitgevers.
Coda Moscarola, F. and Borella, M. (2015) ‘The 2011 Pension reform in Italy and its 
effects on current and future retirees’, CERP Working Paper Working Paper 151/15. 
Available at http://www.cerp.carloalberto.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/WP_151.
pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Coicaud, J.-M. (2011) ‘Solidarity’, in B.  Badie, D.  Berg-Schlosser, and L.  Morlino (eds.) 
International Encyclopedia of Political Science. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 
pp. 2465–9.
Colomer, J.M. (ed.) (2008) Comparative European Politics. London and New York: 
Routledge.
Commaille, J. (2018) L’esprit sociologique des lois. Essai de sociologie politique du droit. 
Paris:Presses Universitaires de France.
Contini, F. (2018) ‘Towards a European Ethic for Algorithms?’, paper delivered at Exchange 
of views with the CEPEJ members. Study session ‘Justice of the future’ – 27 June.
Copelovitch, M., Frieden, J., and Walter, S. (2016), ‘The Political Economy of Euro Crisis’, 
Comparative Political Studies. doi: 10.1177/0010414016633227, pp. 1–30.
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C.H., Lindberg, S.I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., et al. 
(2019) ‘V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9’, Varieties of Democracy 
(V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy19
Council of Europe (2017) Protecting the Right to Freedom of Expression under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. A handbook for legal practitioners. Available at https://
rm.coe.int/handbook-freedom-of-expression-eng/1680732814 (last accessed on 15 
June 2019).
Council of the European Union (2005) ‘The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy’. 
Available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%20
2005%20REV%204 (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Council of the European Union (2015) ‘Decision Establishing Provisional Measures in the 
Area of International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and Greece’, Inter-institutional 
File: 2015/0209 (NLE). Available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-12098-2015-INIT/en/pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Council of the European Union (2017) ‘Schengen borders code: Council adopts regulation 
to reinforce checks at external borders’, press release, 7 March. Available at https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/07/regulation-reinforce-checks-
external-borders/ (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Cox, G.W. (1997) Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crepaldi, C., Da Roit, B., Castegnaro, C., and Pasquinelli, S. (2017) Minimum Income 
Policies in EU Member States, Study for the EMPL Committee, Policy Department 
Economic and Scientific Policy, European Union.
Crouch, C. (2004) Post-Democracy. Oxford: Polity Press.
Crouch, C. (2015) Governing Social Risks in Post-Crisis Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Crow, D. (2010) ‘The Party’s Over: Citizen Conceptions of Democracy and Political 
Dissatisfaction in Mexico’, Comparative Politics, 43(1): 41–61.
D’Agostini, F. and Ferrera, M. (2019) La verità al potere. Sei diritti aletici. Turin: Einaudi.
250 Bibliography
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Dahl, R.A. (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
Dahl, R.A. (1986) Democracy, Liberty, and Equality. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Dahl, R.A. (1989) Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dahl, R.A. (1997) Toward Democracy. A Journey. Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental 
Studies Press.
Dahl, R.A. (2001) Politica e virtù. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Dahl, R.A. (2006) On Political Equality. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dahrendorf, R. (1979) Lebenschancen. Anläufe zur sozialen und politischen Theorie. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Dahrendorf, R. (1988) The Modern Social Conflict: An Essay on the Politics of Liberty. 
Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
Dahrendorf, R. (1995) Quadrare il cerchio: benessere economico, coesione sociale e libertà 
politica. Bari: Laterza.
Dal Lago, A. (2017) Populismo digitale. Milan: Cortina Editore.
Dalton, R.J. (2008) ‘The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems: Party System 
Polarization, its Measurement, and its Consequences’, Comparative Political Studies, 
41(7): 899–920.
Dauderstädt, M. (2018) ‘Disposable Income Inequality, Cohesion and Crisis in Europe’, in 
R.M. Carmo, C. Rio, and M. Medgyesi (eds.) Reducing Inequalities. A Challenge for the 
European Union? Cham: Springer International Publishing.
De Haan, J., Berger, H., and Jansen, D. (2004) ‘Why Has the Stability and Growth Pact 
Failed?’, International Finance, 7(2): 235–60.
De la Porte, C. and Heins, E. (2014) ‘A New Era of European Integration? Governance of 
Labour Market and Social Policy since the Sovereign Debt Crisis’, Comparative European 
Politics, 12(1): 1–21.
De la Porte, C. and Natali, D. (2014) ‘Altered Europeanisation of Pension Reform in the 
Context of the Great Recession: Denmark and Italy Compared’, West European Politics, 
37(4): 732–49.
Deloire, C. (2018) ‘L’écosystème de l’information, comme le climat, est déréglé’, le1hebdo, 
230 (19 December).
De Masi, P.R. (1997) ‘IMF Estimates of Potential Output: Theory and Practice’, in Staff 
Studies for the World Economic Outlook, Washington: IMF, December, pp. 40–6.
De Sio, L. and Weber, T. (2014) ‘Issue Yield: A Model of Party Strategy in Multidimensional 
Space’, American Political Science Review, 108(4): 870–85.
De Witte, B. (2001) ‘The Nice Declaration: Time for a Constitutional Treaty of the 
European Union?’, International Spectator, 36(1): 21–30.
Della Porta, D. (2015) Social Movements in Times of Austerity. Cambridge: Polity.
Della Porta, D. and Mosca, L. (2015) ‘Conflitti e proteste locali fra comitati, campagne e 
movimenti’. In M. Salvati and L. Sciolla (eds.) L’Italia e le sue Regioni: L’età Repubblicana. 
Rome: Treccani, pp. 203–19.
Di Palma, G. (2011) Viaggio nelle modernità. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino.
Diamond, L. (2008) The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout 
the World. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
Diamond, L. (2015) In Search of Democracy. London: Routledge.
Diamond, L. and Morlino, L. (2005) Assessing the Quality of Democracy. Theory and 
Empirical Analysis. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dobbin, F., Simmons, B.A., and Garrett, G. (2007) ‘The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: 
Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?’, Annual Review of Sociology, 
33: 449–72.
Bibliography 251
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (2000) ‘Learning From Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in 
Contemporary Policy Making’, Governance, 13(1): 5–24.
Dolvik, J.E. and Martin, A. (eds.) (2015) European Social Models From Crisis to Crisis. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Donati, N. (2017) ‘The 7th Cohesion Forum: A battle of ideas on the future of the cohesion 
policy’ EU Visions, 27 July. Available at http://www.euvisions.eu/archive/cohesion-
battle-future/ (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Döring, H. and Manow, P. (2019) Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): 
Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Available at http://
www.parlgov.org/ (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Douglas, M. (1986) How Institutions Think. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Drucker, H.M. (1979) Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party. London: Routledge.
Dworkin, R. (1981) ‘What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 10: 185–246, reprinted in Dworkin, R. (2000) Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and 
Practice of Equality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 11–64.
Dworkin, R. (1981a), ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,’ Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 10: 283–345, reprinted in Dworkin, R.  (2000) Sovereign Virtue. The 
Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 65–119.
EAFR (2018) Fundamental Rights Reports. Available at https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-fundamental-rights-report-2018_en.pdf (last accessed on 15 
June 2019).
Easton, D. (1953) A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Easton, D. (1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley.
Economist (2018) ‘Is Democracy Safe in the Age of Big Data?’, The Economist, 25 August. 
Available at https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/08/25/is-democracy-safe-
in-the-age-of-big-data (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Edelman, M.J. (1985)  The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Champaign, IL: University of 
Illinois Press.
Elster, J. (1979) Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J. (1992) Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J. (2012) Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Emanuele,  V. and Chiaramonte, A. (2018) ‘A Growing Impact of New Parties: Myth or 
Reality? Party System Innovation in Western Europe after 1945’, Party Politics, 
24(5): 475–87.
Enrichens, F. (2018) ‘Health Care Management: A Data Driven Approach’, mimeo, Rome.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Esping-Andersen, G. (2013)  The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: John 
Wiley & Sons.
Eurobarometer (2014) ‘Eurobarometer 81.4: Europe 2020, Financial and Economic Crisis, 
European Citizenship, and Living Conditions’. Available at https://www.gesis.org/index.
php?id=10324&tx_eurobaromater_pi1[vol]=10324&tx_eurobaromater_pi1[pos1]=192 
(last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Eurobarometer (2015) ‘Standard Eurobarometer 84’. Available at https://data.europa.eu/
euodp/en/data/dataset/S2098_84_3_STD84_ENG (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Eurobarometer (2016) ‘Standard Eurobarometer 86’. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/
home-affairs/news/autumn-2016-standard-eurobarometer-immigration-and-terrorism- 
continue-be-seen-most-important_en (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
252 Bibliography
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
European Commission (2008) ‘EU Cohesion Policy 1988-2008:Investing in Europe’s future’, 
Inforegio Panorama, 26. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/
docgener/panorama/pdf/mag26/mag26_en.pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
European Commission (2009) Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and 
Responses.
European Commission (2014) A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, 
Fairness and Democratic Change. President Juncker’s Political Guidelines for the next 
European Commission. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/
president-junckers-political-guidelines_en (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
European Commission (2014a) An Introduction to EU Cohesion Policy 2014–2020. Available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/basic/basic_2014_ 
en.pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
European Commission (2017) ‘Reflection paper on the deepening of the economic and 
monetary union’. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/reflection-
paper-deepening-economic-and-monetary-union_en (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
European Commission (2018) ‘Rule of Law: Commission launches infringement pro ced ure 
to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court’, press release, 2 July. 
Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4341_en.htm (last accessed on 
15 June 2019).
European Commission (2019) ‘Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control’. Available 
athttps://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/
reintroduction-border-control_en (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
European Council (2000) ‘Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council’. Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21038/lisbon-european-council-presidency-
conclusions.pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
European Council (2012) ‘Spain: Memorandum of Understanding on Financial-Sector 
Policy Conditionality’. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/
mou/2012-07-20-spain-mou_en.pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
European Council (2016) ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’. Available at https://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/media/21929/15-euco-conclusions-final.pdf (last accessed on 15 
June 2019).
European Council (2017) Conclusions of the Presidency. Available at https://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/10/conclusion-pec/ (last accessed 
on 15 June 2019).
European Parliament (2018) ‘Question for written answer E-002535-18 to the Commission 
Rule 130 Charles Tannock (ECR)’. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/
document/E-8-2018-002535_EN.html (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
European Parliament (2018a) ‘Motion for a resolution to wind up the debate on the statement 
by the Commission pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure on the ad equacy 
of the protection afforded by the EU-US Privacy Shield (2018/2645(RSP))’. Available 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-8-2018-0305_EN.html (last 
accessed on 15 June 2019).
European Social Survey (2012) ESS Round 6: European Social Survey Round 6 Data. Data 
file edition 2.4. NSD—Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway—Data Archive 
and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS6-2012.
European Social Survey (2016) ESS Rounds 1–8: European Social Survey Rounds 1–8 Data. 
Data file editions 6.6, 3.6, 3.7, 4.5, 3.4, 2.4, 2.2, 2.1. NSD—Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data, Norway—Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
European Social Survey (2019) ESS Rounds 1–9: European Social Survey Rounds 1–9 
Data. Data file editions 6.6 round 1, 3.6 round 2, 3.7 round 3, 4.5 round 4, 3.4 round 5, 
Bibliography 253
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
2.4 round 6, 2.2 round 7, 2.1 round 8, 1.1 round 9. NSD—Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data, Norway—Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
European Values Study (2015) European Values Study Longitudinal Data File 1981–2008 
(EVS 1981–2008). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4804 Data file Version 3.0.0, 
doi:10.4232/1.12253.
Falkner, G. (2010) ‘European Union’. In F. Castles, S. Leibfried, H. Obinger, and C. Pierson 
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 292–305.
Ferrera, M. (2005) The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial 
Politics of Social Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ferrera, M. (2013) ‘Welfare State Transformations: From Neo-Liberalism to Liberal Neo-
Welfarism?’, in M.  Thatcher and V.  Schmidt (eds.) Resilient Liberalism in Europe’s 
Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 77–111.
Ferrera, M. (2016) ‘The Stein Rokkan Lecture 2016. Mission Impossible? Reconciling 
Economic and Social Europe after the Euro Crisis and Brexit’, European Journal of 
Political Research, 56(3): 3–22.
Ferrera, M. and Hemerijck, A. (2003) ‘Recalibrating European Welfare Regimes’, in 
J.  Zeitlin and D.  Trubeck (eds.) Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: 
European and American Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 88–128.
Ferrera, M., Hemerijck, A., and Rhodes M. (2000) Il futuro dell’Europa sociale. Bologna: 
Il Mulino.
Ferrera, M., Matsaganis, M., and Tortola, P.D. (2017) ‘Tackling the Adverse Effects of 
Globalisation and Integration: Ideas on a European Social Union’, Vision Europe 
Summit 2017 - Background paper. Available at https://www.carloalberto.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/11/no.506.pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Ferrin, M. and Kriesi, H. (eds.) (2016) How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Floridi, L. (2019) ‘Translating Principles into Practices of Digital Ethics: Five Risks of 
Being Unethical’. Philosophy and Technology 32(2): 185–93.
Flynn, N. (1993) Public Sector Management. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Fondazione Astrid and Circolo Fratelli Rosselli (eds.) (2018) Nuove (e Vecchie) Povertà: 
Quale Risposta? Reddito d’inclusione, reddito di cittadinanza, e oltre. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Forrester, A.C., Powell, B., Nowrasteh, A., and Landgrave, M. (2019) ‘Do Immigrants 
Import Terrorism? ’ Cato Working Paper, no. 56. Available at https://object.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-56.pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Förster, M. and Tóth, I. (2015) ‘Cross-Country Evidence of the Multiple Causes of 
Inequality in the OECD area’. In A. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (eds.) Handbook of 
Income Distribution. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 1729–844.
Fratesi, U. (2016). ‘Impact Assessment of EU Cohesion Policy: Theoretical and Empirical 
Issues’, in S.  Piattoni and L.  Polverari (eds.) Handbook on Cohesion Policy in the 
EU. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Freedom House (2018) Freedom on the Net. The Rise of Digital Authoritarism. Available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2018/rise-digital- 
authoritarianism (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Friedrich, C.J. (1963) Man and his Government. An Empirical Theory of Politics. New York: 
McGraw Hill.
Fuchs, D. (1991) ‘The Normalization of the Unconventional: New Forms of Political Action 
and New Social Movements’, in G. Meyer and F. Ryszka (eds.) Political Participation and 
Democracy in Poland and West Germany. Warsaw: Wydaeca, pp. 148–69.
254 Bibliography
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Fundamental Rights Agency (2018) ‘Annual Report’, Vienna: Office for Official 
Publications.
Gallino, L. (2011) Finanzcapitalismo. Turin: Einaudi.
Garton Ash, T. (2019) The Magic Lantern. The Revolution of ‘89 Witnessed in Warsaw, 
Budapest, Berlin & Prague. London: Atlantic Books.
Geissel, B., Kneuer, M., and Lauth, H.-J. (2016) ‘Measuring the Quality of Democracy: 
Introduction’, International Political Science Review, 37(5): 571–9.
Gerbaudo, P. (2019) The Digital Party: Political Organisation and Online Democracy. 
London: Pluto Press.
Gianaria, F. and Mittone, A. (2014) Culture alla sbarra. Turin: Einaudi.
Gibney, M.J. (2015) ‘Refugees and Justice Between States’, European Journal of Political 
Theory, 14(4): 448–63.
Gibney, M. et al. (2019) ‘The Political Terror Scale 1976–2018’, retrieved from the 
Political Terror Scale website: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org (last accessed on 4 
May 2020).
Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Giebler, H. and Merkel, W. (2016) ‘Freedom and Equality in Democracies: Is There a 
Trade-off?’, International Political Science Review, 37(5): 594–605.
Gilmore, B. (2014) The Spirit Level and Its Critics. Available at http://www.jbgilmore.
ca/2014/09/the-spirit-level-and-its-critics/ (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Gini, C. (1912) Variabilità e mutabilità. Bologna: Cuppini.
Giuliani, M. and Massari, S.A. (2018) It’s the Economy, Stupid. Votare in tempo di crisi. 
Bologna: Il Mulino.
Giunta, A. and Rossi, S. (2017) Che cosa sa fare l’Italia. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Glaeser, E.L. and Shleifer, A. (2005) ‘The Curley Effect’, Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, 21(1): 1–19.
Gluckmann A. (2011) Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité. Paris: Fondapol (www.fondapol.org).
Gomez  I.F., Churruca Muguruza, C., and Wouters, J. (2018) EU Human Rights and 
Democratization Policies. London: Routledge.
Gonzalez Begega, S. and Del Pino, E. (2017) ‘From Letting Europe in to Policy 
Conditionality. Welfare Reform in Spain under Austerity’ Instituto de Políticas y Bienes 
Públicos (IPP) Working Paper, no.1. Available at http://ipp.csic.es/sites/default/files/
content/workpaper/2017/2017_01_ippwp_gonzalezbegegadelpino.pdf (last accessed on 
15 June 2019).
Gordon, M.T. (2000) ‘Public Trust in Government: The US Media as an Agent of 
Accountability?’ International Review of Administrative Sciences, 66: 297–310.
Gosepath, S. (2016) ‘Philosophical Perspectives on Different Kinds of Inequalities’. In 
M.  Wulfgramm, T.  Bieber, and S.  Leibfried (eds.) Welfare State Transformations and 
Inequality in OECD Countries. Basingstoke: Palgave Macmillan, pp. 65–85.
Grabbe, H. (2014) ‘Six Lessons of Enlargement Ten Years On: The EU’s Transformative 
Power in Retrospect and Prospect’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(S1): 40–56.
Grayling, A.C. (2017) Democracy and its Crisis. London: Oneworld Publications.
Graziosi, A. (2019) Il Futuro Contro. Democrazia, Libertà, Mondo Giusto.  Bologna: 
Il Mulino.
Grzeszczak, R. and Karolewski, I.P. (2018) ‘The Rule of Law Crisis in Poland: A New 
Chapter’, VerfBlog, 2018/8/08, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-rule-of-law-crisis-in-poland- 
a-new-chapter/.
Bibliography 255
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Guarnieri, C. and Piana, D. (2011) ‘Bringing the Outside inside Macro and Micro Factors 
to Put the Dialogue among Highest Courts into its Right Context’, Utrecht Law Review, 
8(2): 139–57.
Guttman, L. (1980) ‘Recent Structural Laws of Human Behaviour’, The Bulletin of the 
Institute of Communications Research, Keio University, 14: 1–12.
Gwiazda, A. (2015) Democracy in Poland: Representation, Participation, Competition and 
Accountability since 1989. London: Routledge.
Habermas, J. (1962) Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Neuwied: Luchterhand.
Habermas, J. (1981) Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp.
Hacker, J.S. and Pierson, P. (2010) Winner-take-all Politics: How Washington Made the Rich 
Richer—and Turned its Back on the Middle Class. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Hall, P.A. and Gingerich, D.W. (2009) ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional 
Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis’, British Journal of 
Political Science, 39(3): 449–82.
Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (eds.) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Halmai, G. (2018) ‘Abuse of Constitutional Identity. The Hungarian Constitutional Court 
on Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law’, Review of Central and East 
European Law, 43(1): 23–42.
Hannequart, A. (1992) ‘Economic and Social Cohesion and the Structural Funds: An 
Introduction’. In A. Hannequart (ed.) Economic and Social Cohesion in Europe. London/
New York: Routledge, pp. 1–18.
Hantrais, L. (2017) ‘The Social Dimension in EU and UK Policy Development: Shaping the 
Post-Brexit Legacy’, Centre for International Studies London School of Economics 
Working Paper CIS/2017/04. Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-relations/
assets/documents/cis/working-papers/cis-working-paper-2017-04-hantrais.pdf (last 
accessed on 15 June 2019).
Harari, Y.N. (2018) Lessons for the 21st Century. London: Jonathan Cape.
Hassenteufel, P. and Palier, B. (2015) ‘Still the Sound of Silence? Towards a New Phase in 
the Europeanisation of Welfare State Policies in France’, Comparative European Politics, 
13(1): 112–30.
Heclo, H. (1974) Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
Held, D. (2006) Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hemerijck, A. (2013) Changing Welfare States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hernandez, E. (2016) ‘Europeans’ Views of Democracy: The Core Elements of Democracy’, 
in M. Ferrin and H. Kriesi (eds.) How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 43–63.
Hernández, E. and Kriesi, H. (2016), ‘Turning Your Back on the EU. The Role of 
Eurosceptic Parties in the 2014 European Parliament Elections’, Electoral Studies, 
44: 515–24.
Hibbs, D. (1987) The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hibbs, D. and Dennis, C. (1988) ‘Income Distribution in the United States’, American 
Political Science Review, 82: 467–90.
Hirschman, A.O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hofstadter, R. (1963) The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
256 Bibliography
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Hopkin, J. and Lynch, J. (2016) ‘Winner-take-all Politics in Europe? European Inequality 
in Comparative Perspective’, Politics & Society, 44(3): 335–43.
Horn, A., Kevins, A., Jensen, C., and Van Kersbergen, K. (2017) ‘Peeping at the Corpus – 
What Is Really Going on Behind the Equality and Welfare Items of the Manifesto 
Project?’, Journal of European Social Policy, 27(5): 403–16.
Hotham, L. and Nacif, L. (2018) ‘Article 7 TEU and the Polish case – a recast’, KSLR EU 
Law Blog, 16 April. Available at https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1274 
(last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Huber, E. and Stephens, J.D. (2001) Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Parties and 
Policies in Global Markets. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Hübner, D. (2017) ‘View: EU Must Not Surrender to Illiberal Forces’. Euronews, 29 
December. Available at https://www.euronews.com/2017/12/29/view-eu-must-not-
surrender-to-illiberal-forces (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
IDEA (2017) The Global State of Democracy. Exploring Democracy Resilience. Stockholm: 
International IDEA.
Ignazi, P. (2017) Party and democracy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Inglehart, R.F. and Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic 
Have-nots and Cultural Backlash, Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working 
Paper Series, 16–026.
ITU (2019) ‘Proposed edits to Draft Recommendation on Policy Framework and Principles 
for Data protection in the context of Big Data relating to International 
Telecommunication Services’, ITU-T T17-SG03 Contribution 232. Available at https://
www.itu.int/md/T17-SG03-C-0232/en (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. (2008) ‘Electoral Institutions, Parties, and the Politics of Class: 
Explaining the Formation of Redistributive Coalitions’, in P.  Beramendi and 
C.J. Anderson (eds.) Democracy, Inequality and Representation. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, pp. 93–126.
Jacobs, M. and Mazzucato, M. (eds.) (2016) Rethinking Capitalism: Economics and Policy 
for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. Oxford: Blackwell Publications.
Jessoula, M. and Pavolini, E. (2012) Italy Annual National Report 2012: Pensions, Health 
and Long-term care. Annual ASISP report for DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities. Brussels: European Commission.
Jia, J., Jin, G., and Wagman, L. (2019) ‘The short-run effects of GDPR on technology 
venture investment’, VoxEU, 7 January. Available at https://voxeu.org/article/short-run-
effects-gdpr-technology-venture-investment (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Jimeno-Bulnes, M. (2004) ‘After September 11th: The Fight Against Terrorism in National 
and European Law. Substantive and Procedural Rules: Some Examples’, European Law 
Journal, 10(2): 235–53.
Jouen, M. (2015) ‘The Macro-economic Conditionality, the Story of a Triple Penalty for 
Regions’, Jacques Delors Institute Policy Paper, no.131. Available at http://www. 
institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/macroeconomicconditionnality-jouen-
jdi-march15.pdf?pdf=ok (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Karamessini, M. and Rubery, J. (eds.) (2014) Women and Austerity. The Economic Crisis 
and the Future for Gender Equality. Abingdon: Routledge.
Karvonen, L. and Kuhnle, S. (eds.) (2000) Party Systems and Voter Alignments. London: 
Routledge.
Keane, J. (2009) The Life and the Death of Democracy. London: Simon & Schuster.
Kelton, S. (2016) ‘The Failure of Austerity. Rethinking Fiscal Policy’, in M.  Jacobs and 
M. Mazzucato (eds.) Rethinking Capitalism. Economics and Policy for Sustainable and 
inclusive growth. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 28–47.
Bibliography 257
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Kindleberger, C.P. (1987) ‘Financial Crisis’, in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.) 
The New Palgrave. A Dictionary of Economics. London: Palgrave.
Klingemann, H., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I., and McDonald, M.D. (eds.) (2006). 
Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern 
Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990–2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kluknavska, A. and Smolík, J. (2016) ‘We Hate Them All? Issue Adaptation of Extreme 
Right Parties in Slovakia 1993–2016’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30: 1–10.
Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D. (1999) ‘How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of 
Europeanization’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 3(7). Available at http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302746 (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Koncewicz, T.T. (2018) ‘The Capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond: Of 
Institution(s), Fidelities and the Rule of Law in Flux’, Review of Central and East 
European Law, 43(2): 116–73.
Koop, C. and Lodge, M. (2017) ‘What is Regulation? An Interdisciplinary Concept 
Analysis’, Regulation and Governance, 11(1): 95–108.
Kramer, M.H. (2003) The Quality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kriesi, H. (2013) ‘Democratic Legitimacy: Is There a Legitimacy Crisis in Contemporary 
Politics?’ Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 54(4): 609–38.
Kriesi, H. (2014) ‘The Political Consequences of Economic Crisis in Europe: Electoral 
Punishment and Popular Protest’. In N. Bermeo, and L.M. Bartels (eds.) Mass Politics in 
Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 297–333.
Kriesi, H., Saris, W., and Moncagatta, P. (2016) ‘The Structure of Europeans’ Views of 
Democracy: Citizens’ Models of Democracy’, in M.  Ferrin and H.  Kriesi (eds.) How 
Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kriesi, H.P. (2015) The Politics of Advanced Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Krueger, A.B. (2012). ‘The Rise and Consequences of Inequality in the United States’, 
January 12 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/krueger_cap_speech_final_
remarks.pdf.
Krugman, P. (2009) ‘Deficits Saved the World’, The New York Times, 15 July 2009.
Kurlantzick, J. (2013) Democracy in Retreat. The Revolt of the Middle Class and the 
Worldwide Decline of Representative Government. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Laffan, B. (2017) ‘Brexit’, in F. Allen, E. Carletti, J. Gray, and M. Gulati (eds.) The Changing 
Geography of Finance and Regulation in Europe. Florence: European University Institute; 
London: Brevan Howard Centre at Imperial College; Milan: Baffi Carefin, Bocconi 
University, pp. 129–140.
Lane, J.-E. and Ersson, S. (2000) The New Institutional Politics. Performance and outcomes. 
New York and London: Routledge.
Lanzara, G.F. and Patriotta, G. (2001) ‘Technology and the Courtroom: An Inquiry into 
Knowledge Making in Organization’, Journal of Management Studies, 38(6): 943–71.
Larch, M., Van den Noord, P., and Jonung, L. (2010) ‘The Stability and Growth Pact: 
Lessons from the Great Recession’, European Economy, Economic Paper, 429. Brussels: 
DG ECFIN.
Lasswell, H.D. and Kaplan, A. (1950) Power and Society. A Framework for Political Inquiry. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lauth, H.-J. and Schlenkrich, O. (2018) ‘Making Trade-Offs Visible: Theoretical and 
Methodological Considerations about the Relationship between Dimensions and 
Institutions of Democracy and Empirical Findings’, Politics and Governance, 6(1): 78–91.
258 Bibliography
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Lawson, K. and Lanzaro, J. (2010) Political Parties and Democracy, Volume 1: The 
Americans. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC CLIO.
Leask, K. (2019) ‘The “Right to Be Forgotten” Online’, Thebmjopinion, 7 February. 
Available at https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2019/02/07/kathryn-leask-the-right-to-be-
forgotten-online/(last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Lessig, L. (2006) Code, and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books.
Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D. (2018) How Democracies Die. What History Reveals About Our 
Future. New York: Penguin Books.
Lewis-Beck, M.S. and Stegmaier, M. (2013) ‘The VP-function Revisited: A Survey of the 
Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after Over 40 Years’, Public Choice, 
157(3–4): 367–85.
Lijphart, A. (2012) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-
Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lim, D.J., Moutselos, M., and McKenna, M. (2019) ‘Puzzled Out? The Unsurprising 
Outcomes of the Greek Bailout Negotiations’, Journal of European Public Policy, 
26(3): 325–43.
Lindvall, J. (2014) ‘The Electoral Consequences of the Two Great Crises’, European Journal 
of Political Research, 53(4): 747–65.
Linz, J. (2006) Democrazia e autoritarismo. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Lipset, S.M. (1960) ‘Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy’, in S.M. Lipset, Political 
Man. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (eds.) (1967) Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press.
Magda, I., Brzeziński, M., Chłoń-Domińczak, A., Kotowska, I.E., Myck, M., Najsztub, M., 
et al. (2019) ‘Rodzina 500+ - ocena programu i propozycje zmian’. Warsaw: Instytutu 
Badań Strukturalnych (IBS), Centrum Analiz Ekonomicznych CenEA, GRAPE, Szkoły 
Głównej Handlowej i Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, https://ibs.org.pl/publications/
rodzina-500-ocena-programu-i-propozycje-zmian/.
Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K. (2010) Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and 
Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, S. and Bizzarro, F. (2020), ‘Outcomes after Democratic Transitions in Third 
Wave Democracies’, in D. Berg-Schlosser, B. Badie and L. Morlino (eds.) Handbook of 
Political Science. Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Mair, P. (1997) Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Mair, P. (2006) ‘Sistemi partitici e alternanza al governo 1950–1999’. In L. Bardi (ed.) Partiti 
e sistemi di partito. Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 245–64.
Mair, P. (2009) Representative Versus Responsible Government, MPIfG Working Paper, n. 8, 
Max Planck, Köln: Institute for the Study of Societies.
Mair, P. (2013) Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy. London: Verso Books.
Mak, E. (2008) ‘Balancing Territoriality and Functionality; Specialization as a Tool for 
Reforming Jurisdiction in the Netherlands, France and Germany’, International Journal 
for Court Administration, 2 (October): 1–8.
Mania, K. (2015) ‘Online Dispute Resolution: The Future of Justice’, in International 
Comparative Jurisprudence, I(1): 76–86.
Manin, B. (1997) The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Manzella, G.P. and Mendez, C. (2009) ‘The Turning Points of EU Cohesion Policy’, 
University of Strathclyde European Policies Research Centre Working Paper. Available 
Bibliography 259
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/policy/future/pdf/8_manzella_final-
formatted.pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Marshall, T.H. (1950) Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
McCoy, J. and Somer, M. (2019) ‘Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It 
Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies’, The ANNALS of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 681(1): 234–71.
McDermott, Y. (2017). ‘Conceptualising the Right to Data Protection in an Era of Big Data’, 
Big Data & Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951716686994 (last accessed on 4 
May 2020).
McIlwain, C.H. (1947) Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern. New York: Cornell 
University Press.
McQuail, D. (2005) Mass Communication Theory. London: Sage.
Meier Jæger, M. (2006) ‘Welfare Regimes and Attitudes Towards Redistribution: The 
Regime Hypothesis Revisited’, European Sociological Review, 22(2): 157–70.
Mény, Y. (2019) Popolo ma non troppo. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Meredith, S. (2019): Europe’s brain drain is getting worse—so some countries are scrap-
ping income tax for young people. August 5. Online: https://www.Meredith.
com/2019/08/05/poland-and-croatia-propose-scrapping-income-taxes-for-young-
people.html (last accessed on 17 January 2020).
Milanovic, B. (2016) Global Inequality. A New Approach for the Age of Globalization. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Ministerstwo Finansów (2020): Niższy PIT. Online: https://www.gov.pl/web/finanse/
nizszy-pit (last accessed on 17 January 2020).
Molinié, F. and Piana, D (2018) La lutte contre le terrorisme et les droits fondamentaux. 
Paris: Société de législation comparée.
Monteleone, S. and Puccio, L. (2018) ‘The Privacy Shield Update on the state of play of the 
EU-US data transfer’, European Parliamentary Research Service. Available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/625151/EPRS_IDA(2018)625151_ 
EN.pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Morin, E. (2019), La fraternité, pourquoi? Paris: Actes Sud.
Morlino, L. (1981) Dalla democrazia all’autoritarismo. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Morlino, L. (1998) Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Morlino, L. (2003) Democrazie e democratizzazioni. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Morlino, L. (2004) ‘What Is a “Good” Democracy?’, Democratization, 11(5): 10–32.
Morlino, L. (2011) Changes for Democracy. Actors, Structures and Processes. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Morlino, L. (2014) ‘Transizione in stallo e conseguente instabilità’, in M.  Almagisti, 
L. Lanzalaco, and L. Verzichelli (eds.) La transizione politica italiana. Da Tangentopoli a 
oggi, Rome: Carocci, pp. 197–221.
Morlino, L. (2016) The Quality of Democracies in Latin America. A Report for 
IDEA. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Morlino, L. and Magen, A. (eds.) (2009) International Actors, Democratization and the Rule 
of Law: Anchoring Democracy? London: Routledge.
Morlino, L. and Piana, D. (2014) ‘Economic Crisis in a Stalemated Democracy: The Italian 
Case’, The American Behavioral Scientists, 58(12): 1657–682.
Morlino, L., Piana, D., and Raniolo, F. (eds.) (2013). La qualità della democrazia in Italia. 
Bologna: Il Mulino.
260 Bibliography
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Morlino, L. and Quaranta, M. (2016) ‘ “What is the impact of the economic crisis on 
democracy? Evidence from Europe’, International Political Science Review, 37(5): 618–33.
Morlino, L. and Raniolo, F. (2017) The Impact of the Economic Crisis on South European 
Democracies. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Morlino, L. and Sadurski, W. (eds.) (2010) Comparing Central and Eastern European Post-
Communist Countries. London: Routledge.
Morlino, L. and Tarchi, M. (1996) ‘The Dissatisfied Society. Protest and Support in Italy’. 
European Journal of Political Research, 30(1): 41–63.
Mounk, Y. (2018) The People vs. Democracy. Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to 
Save It. London and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Mudde, C. (ed.) (2016) The Populist Radical Right: A Reader. London: Taylor & Francis.
Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2013) Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: 
Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America, in ‘Government and Opposition’, 
48(2): 147–74, 2013 doi:10.1017/gov.2012.11.
Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017) Populism. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. (1996) Liberals and Communitarians. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Müller, J.W. (2016) What is Populism? Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015) The Quest for Good Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Natili, M. (2019) The Politics of Minimum Income. Explaining Path Departure and Policy 
Reversal in the Age of Austerity. London: Palgrave.
Ngai, V. (2012). Stability and Growth Pact and Fiscal Discipline in the Eurozone, University 
of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center Working Papers 12–10.
Norris, P. (2001) Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet 
Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Norris, P. (2005) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. London: Basic Books.
Nussbaum, M. (2011) Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
O’Donnell, G. (1994) ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 5(1): 55–69.
O’Donnell, G. (1998) Horizontal Accountability in the New Democracies, Journal of 
Democracy, 9(3): 112–26.
O’Donnell, G., Cullell, J.V., and Iazzetta, O.M. (eds.) (2004) The Quality of Democracy. 
Theory and Applications. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
O’Donnell, R. (1992) ‘Policy Requirements for Regional Balance in Economic and 
Monetary Union’, in A.  Hannequart (ed.) Economic and Social Cohesion in Europe. 
London/New York: Routledge, pp. 21–52.
OECD (2013) Perspectives économiques de l’OCDE. Paris  : Éditions OCDE. Available at 
https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_outlook-v2013-2-fr (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
OECD (2016) Policy Priorities for Making Poland a More Inclusive and Knowledge-Based 
Economy. Paris: Éditions OCDE.
OECD (2017) How’s Life? 2017: Measuring Well-being. Paris: Éditions OCDE. Available at 
https://doi.org/10.1787/how_life-2017-en (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
OECD (2018) Case Studies on Leaving No One Behind: A companion volume to the 
Development Co-operation Report 2018. Paris: Éditions OCDE.
Bibliography 261
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
OECD (2018a) A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility. Paris: 
Éditions OCDE.
OECD (2019) Skills Strategy. Paris: Éditions OCDE.
OECD (2019a) Legal Needs Surveys and Access to Justice. Paris: Éditions OCDE.
Ongaro, E. and Van Thiel, S. (eds.) (2017) The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration 
and Management in Europe. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Oppenheim, F.E. (1961) Dimensions of Freedom: An Analysis. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Orenstein, M.A. and Haas, M.R. (2005) ‘Globalization and the Future of Welfare States in 
Postcommunist East-Central European Countries’, in M. Glatzer and D. Rueschemeyer 
(eds.) Globalization and the Future of the Welfare State. Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, pp. 130–52.
Panebianco, A. (2004) Il potere, lo stato, la libertà. La gracile costituzione della società libera. 
Bologna: Il Mulino.
Panebianco, A. (2018) Persone e Mondi. Azioni individuali e ordine internazionale. Bologna: 
Il Mulino.
Papadopoulos, Y. (2013) Democracy in Crisis? Politics, Governance and Policy. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave.
Papadopoulos, Y. (2016), ‘Interactive Governance: Authorisation, Representation, and 
Accountability’, in J.  Edelenbos and I.  van Meerkerk (eds.), Critical Reflections on 
Interactive Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 146–66.
Pappas, T. (2014) Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece. London: Palgrave.
Paquin, S. (2011) ‘Autonomy, Subnational’, in B. Badie, D. Berg-Schlosser, and L. Morlino 
(eds.) International Encyclopedia of Political Science. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, pp. 123–8.
Parsi, V.E. (2012) La fine dell’uguaglianza: Come la crisi economica sta distruggendo il primo 
valore della nostra società. Milan: Mondadori.
Parsi, V.E. (2018) Titanic. Il naufragio dell’ordine liberale. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Pavolini, E., León, M., Guillén, A.M., and Ascoli, U. (2015) ‘From Austerity to Permanent 
Strain? The EU and Welfare State Reform in Italy and Spain’, Comparative European 
Politics, 13(1): 1–21.
Pech, L. and Kelemen, D. (2019) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Constitutional Pluralism: 
Undermining the Rule of Law in the Name of Constitutional Identity in Hungary and 
Poland’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 21: 59–74.
Pernice, I. (2001) ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union’, WHI paper 5/02. 
Available at http://www.whi-berlin.de/documents/whi-paper0502.pdf (last accessed on 
15 June 2019).
Peters, G. and Pierre, I. (2017) The Next Public Administration: Debates and Dilemmas. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Petmesidou, M. and Guillén, A.M. (2014), ‘Can the Welfare State as We Know It Survive? 
A View from the Crisis-Ridden South European Periphery’, South European Society and 
Politics, 19(3): 295–307.
Pettit, P. (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Pharr, S.J. and Putnam, R.D. (2000) Disaffected Democracies. What’s Troubling the Trilateral 
Countries? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Piana, D. (2013) ‘Magistratura’, in L. Morlino, D. Piana, and F. Raniolo (eds.) La qualità 
della democrazia in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 177–96.
Piana, D. (2015) Uguale per tutti? Bologna: Il Mulino.
Piana, D. (2020), ‘Judicial Power’, in D.  Berg-Schlosser, B.  Badie, and L.  Morlino (eds.) 
Handbook of Political Science. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
262 Bibliography
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Piana, D. and Molinié, F. (2018) ‘Synthèse des Travaux’, in D. Piana and F. Molinié (eds.) La 
lutte contre le terrorisme et les droits fondamentaux en droit comparé. Paris: Société de 
législation comparée, pp. 13–66.
Pierson, P. (1994) Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of 
Retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pierson P. (2000) ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The 
American Political Science Review, 94(2): 251–67.
Piketty, T. (2013) Le Capital au XXIe Siècle. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Pizzorno, A. (2012) ‘In nome del popolo sovrano’, Il Mulino, n.2, pp. 201–16.
Pogátsa, Z. (2017). ‘The Political Economy of Illiberal Democracy’, Social Europe, 20 
November. Available at https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-political-economy-of-illiberal-
democracy (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Polanyi, K. (1944) The Great Transformation, Vol. 2. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2017) Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis 
into The Age of Austerity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Polverari L. and Bachtler J., with Davies S., Kah S., Mendez, C., Michie, R., and Vironen, 
H. (2014) ‘Balance of Competences Cohesion Review: Literature Review on EU 
Cohesion Policy’, Final Report to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. 
Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/336227/bis_14_988_BALANCE_OF_COMPETENCES_
COHESION_REVIEW_2.pdf (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Quaranta, M. (2018), ‘How Citizens Evaluate Democracy: An Assessment Using the 
European Social Survey’, in European Political Science Review, 10(2): 191–217.
Radaelli, C.M. (2005) ‘Diffusion Without Convergence: How Political Context Shapes the 
Adoption of Regulatory Impact Assessment’, Journal of European Public Policy, 
12(5): 924–43.
Rajan, R.G. (2010). Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Raniolo, F. (2013) I partiti politici. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reynié, D. (2013) Les nouveaux populismes. Paris: Fayard.
Rodríguez, B. (2013) ‘Spain Moves Forward with Tough Pension Reform: Government 
Document’, Reuters, 17 September. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
spain-pensions/spain-moves-forward-with-tough-pension-reform-government-
document-idUSBRE98G0YK20130917 (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Rodrik, D. (1997) ‘Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate’, Foreign Policy, 
107: 19–37.
Rosamond, B. (2009) ‘Supranational Governance’, in C. Rumford (ed.) The Handbook of 
European Studies. London: SAGE, pp. 89–109.
Rosanvallon, P. (2008) Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Rosanvallon, P. (2011) La Société des Egaux. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Rosanvallon, P. (2016) ‘How to Create a Society of Equals’, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb.
Rose, R. (1984) Understanding Big Government. London: Sage.
Rose, R. and Davies, P.L. (1994) Inheritance in Public Policy: Change without Choice in 
Britain. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Rothstein, B. and Uslaner, E.M. (2005) ‘All for All: Equality and Social Trust’, LSE Health 
and Social Care Discussion Paper No. 15.
Rothstein, B. and Varraich, A. (2017) Making Sense of Corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Bibliography 263
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Rueschemeyer, D. (2005) ‘Addressing Inequality’, in L.  Diamond and L.  Morlino (eds.) 
Assessing the Quality of Democracy. Theory and Empirical Analysis. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 47–61.
Ruggie, J.G. (1982) ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36(2): 379–415.
Runciman, D. (2018) How Democracy Ends. London: Profile Books.
Russell, P. (2010) ‘A Revised Theory of Judicial Independence’, in L. Sossin and A.M. Dodek 
(eds.) Judicial Independence in Context. Toronto: Irwin Law.
Russell, P.H. and O’Brien, D.M. (eds.) (2001) Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy 
Critical Perspectives from around the World. Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia Press.
Sabatier  P.A. (1998) “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for 
Europe, Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1): 98–130.
Sadurski, W. (2005) Rights Before Courts. A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist 
States of Central and Eastern Europe. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Sadurski, W. (2019) Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sadurski, W. (2008) Equality and Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Salverda W., Nolan, B., and Smeeding, T.H. (eds.) (2009) The Oxford Handbook of Economic 
Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sandulli, A. (2018) Il ruolo del diritto in Europa. L’integrazione europea dalla prospettiva del 
diritto amministrativo. Milano: Franco Angeli.
Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and Party Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sartori, G. (1987) The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Chatham: Chatham House.
Sartori, G. (2016) Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. London: 
ECPR Press.
Sawulski, J. (2017) ‘Is Poland a Welfare State?’ IBS Policy Paper, no.2. Available at http://
ibs.org.pl/app/uploads/2017/10/IBS_Policy_Paper_02_2017_en.pdf (last accessed on 15 
June 2019).
Schlozman  K.L., Verba, S., and Brady, H.E. (2012) The Unheavenly Chorus. Unequal 
Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Schmitter, P.C. (2011) ‘The Future of “Real-existing” Democracy. Society and Economy. In 
Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of the Corvinus University of Budapest, 33(2): 
399–428.
Sen, A. (1992) Inequality Reexamined. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (1995) Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sen, A. (1997) ‘From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality’, Southern Economic 
Journal, 64(2): 383–401.
Shahzad, A. (2006) ‘What Is Globalization—Historical Background’, Jadavpur Journal of 
International Relations, 10(1): 204–12.
Sheppele, K.L. (2017) ‘Populist Constitutionalism? (6): Kim Lane Scheppele on Autocratic 
Legalism’. Available at https://blogs.eui.eu/constitutionalism-politics-working-group/
populist-constitutionalism-6-kim-lane-scheppele-autocratic-legalism/ (last accessed on 
15 June 2019).
Simmons, B.  A., Dobbin, F., and Garrett, G. (2006) ‘The International Diffusion of 
Liberalism’, International Organization, 60: 781–810.
Singer, M.M. (2011) ‘Who Says “It’s the Economy”? Cross-National and Cross-Individual 
Variation in the Salience of Economic Performance’, Comparative Political Studies, 44(3): 
284–312.
264 Bibliography
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Sinha, T. (2018) ‘A Comparative Study of the European Stability Mechanism with the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program of the United States’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business, 38(2): 307–32.
Skinner, Q. (2012) Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skrzypczak, N. (2017): Trotz Krise mit EU-Kommission. Polens Regierende sind beliebt wie 
nie. 24 October. Online: https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Polens-Regierende-sind-beliebt-
wie-nie-article20098805.html (last accessed on 17 January 2020).
Solove, D.J. (2006) ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 154(3): 
477–560.
Solt, F. (2016) ‘The Standardized World Income Inequality Database’, Social Science 
Quarterly, 97(5): 1267–81.
Somaini, E. (2002) Uguaglianza. Teorie, politiche, problemi. Rome: Donzelli Editore.
Somer, M. and McCoy, J. (2019) ‘Transformations through Polarizations and Global 
Threats to Democracy’, ANNALS, AAPSS, 681 (January): 8–22.
Sotiropoulos, D.A. (2004) ‘Southern European Public Bureaucracies in Comparative 
Perspective’, West European Politics, 27(3): 405–22.
Sottilotta, C.E. (2017) ‘The Strategic Use of Government-Sponsored Referendums in 
Contemporary Europe: Issues and Implications’, Journal of Contemporary European 
Research, 3(4): 1361–376.
Sroka, A. (2017) Accountability and Democracy in Poland and Spain. Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang.
Starmans, C., Sheskin, M., and Blum, P. (2017) ‘Why People Prefer Unequal Societies’, 
Nature Human Behaviour, 1 (April): 1–7.
Stiglitz, J.E. (2016) ‘Inequality and Economic Growth’, in M.  Jacobs and M.  Mazzucato 
(eds.) Rethinking Capitalism. Economics and Policy for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. 
Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 134–55.
Stiglitz, J.E. (2012) The Price of Inequality. How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our 
Future. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Stirn, B. (2018) ‘Propos Introductifs’, in D. Piana and F. Molinié (eds.) La lutte contre le ter-
rorisme et les droits fondamentaux en droit comparé. Paris: Société de législation comparée.
Streeck, W. (2013) Gekaufte Zeit: die Vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus. 
Suhrkamp: Verlag.
Streeck, W. and Schäfer, A. (eds.) (2013) Politics in the Age of Austerity. Cambridge: Polity.
Strøm, K. (1990) ‘A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties’, American Journal 
of Political Science, 34(2), 565–98.
Sumner, W.G. (1906) Folkways: A Study of the Social Importance of Usages, Manners, 
Customs, Mores, and Morals. Boston, MA: Ginn.
Sunstein, C.R. (2001) Republic.Com. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sunstein, C.R. (2017) #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sunstein, C.R. (2019) On Freedom. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Svimez Rapporto (2019) L’Economia e la Società del Mezzogiorno. Rome: Svimez.
Swisher, K. (2018) ‘The Expensive Education of Mark Zuckerberg and Silicon Valley’, New 
York Times, August 2.
Tebaldi, M. (2017) (ed.) Sicurezza, libertà e democrazia. Analisi comparata di sei paesi euro-
pei. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Therborn, G. (2013) The Killing Fields of Inequality. London: Polity.
Thomassen, J. (1995) ‘Support for Democratic Values’, in H.  Klingemann and D.  Fuchs 
(eds.) Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 383–416.
Bibliography 265
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Tilly, C. (2007) Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Torcal, M. and Montero, J.R. (eds.) (2006) Political Disaffection in Contemporary 
Democracies. Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics. London: Routledge.
Trigilia, C. (2017) Crescita economica e coesione nelle democrazie avanzate: Un divorzio 
inevitabile? (Vol. 14). Firenze: Firenze University Press.
Tsebelis, G. (1990) Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press
Turnbull-Dugarte, S.J. (2019) ‘Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral 
support for Vox’, Research and Politics, April–June, 1–8.
Vaccari, C. and Valeriani, A. (2018) ‘Digital Political Talk and Political Participation: 
Comparing Established and Third Wave Democracies’, SAGE Open, 8(2): 1–14.
van Hüllen, V. and Börzel, T. (2013) ‘State-Building and the European Union’s Fight 
against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters’, APSA 2013 
Annual Meeting Paper. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2299787 (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
Van Kessel, S. (2015) Populist Parties in Europe. Agents of Discontent? Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Vandamme, J. (1992) ‘Foreword’, in A. Hannequart (ed.) Economic and Social Cohesion in 
Europe. London/New York: Routledge, pp. x–xi.
Vauchez, A. (2016) Democratizing Europe. London: Palgrave.
Verba, S. (1978) Participation and Political Equality. A Seven-Nation Comparison. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Verba, S. (2006) ‘Fairness, Equality, and Democracy: Three Big Words’, Social Research: An 
International Quarterly of Social Sciences, 73(2): 499–540.
Verba, S., Nie, N.H., and Kim, J. (1978) Participation and Political Equality. A Seven-Nation 
Comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Verba, S. and Orren, G.H. (1985) Equality in America. The View from the Top. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L., and Brady, H.E. (1995) Voice and Equality. Civic Voluntarism in 
American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Verbeek, J. and Osorio Rodarte, I. (2015) ‘Increasingly, inequality within, not across, coun-
tries is rising’, https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/increasingly-inequality-
within-not-across-countries-rising (last accessed on 4 May 2020).
Verzelloni, L. (2018) ‘Una fotografia in movimento: riflessioni comparative sulla govern-
ance dei sistemi giudiziari europei’, Archivio Penale, 2: 25–46.
Vittori, D. (2017) ‘Podemos and Five Stars Movement: Divergent Trajectories in a Similar 
Crisis?’ Constellations, 24(3): 324–38.
Voigt, S. and Hayo, B. (2003) ‘Explaining de facto judicial independence’, Discussion 
Paper No. 46/03, Department of Economics, University of Kassel. Available at https://
econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/le/papers/0306/0306001.pdf (last accessed on 
15 June 2019).
Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I., McDonald, M.D., and Klingemann, H. (eds.) (2013) 
Mapping Policy Preferences From Texts: Statistical Solutions for Manifesto Analysts. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Volkens, A., Krause, W., Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T., Merz, N., Regel, S., et al. (2019) The 
Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2019b. 
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). https://doi.org/ 
10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2019b
266 Bibliography
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
Walecka, K. (2019) ‘(In)stability of the Party System in Poland’, in M.  Lisi (ed.) Party 
System Change, The European Crisis and the State of Democracy. London: Routledge, 
pp. 194–212.
Ware, A. (1996) Political Parties and Party Systems (Vol. 9). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Warlouzet, L. (2014) ‘Dépasser la crise de l’histoire de l’intégration européenne’, Politique 
européenne, 2(44): 98–122.
Wasserfallen, F. and Lehner, T. (2017) ‘Mapping Contestation on Economic and Fiscal 
Integration: Evidence from New Data’, EMU Choices Working Paper Series, no.1.
Watson, S.E. (2015) The Left Divided. The Development and Transformation of Advanced 
Welfare States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weiler, J.H.H. (2015) ‘GAL at a Crossroads: Preface to the Symposium’, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, 13(2): 463–4.
Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2009) The Spirit Level: How Greater Equality Makes Societies 
Stronger. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
World Economic Forum (2015) ‘Deep Shift Technology Tipping Points and Societal 
Impact Survey Report’. Available at https://www.weforum.org/reports/deep-shift-
technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impact (last accessed on 15 June 2019).
World Economic Forum (2019) ‘Our Shared Digital Future Responsible Digital 
Transformation’, Board Briefing. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
Wouters, J. (2018) Global Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Wulfgramm, M., Bieber, T., and Leibfried, S. (eds.) (2016) Welfare State Transformations 
and Inequality in OECD Countries. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgave Macmillan.
Wyrzykowski, M. (ed.) (1998) Constitution-making Process. Warsaw: Institute of Public 
Affairs.
Yılmaz, E. (2016) ‘Resources, Capabilities, Social Justice, Redistribution’, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Economics, 28(2): 230–54.
Zakaria, F. (2003) The Future of Freedom. New York: Norton.
Zuboff, S. (2019) The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the 
New Frontier of Power. New York: Public Affairs.
Bibliography 267
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 07/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 03/09/20, SPi
Index of Authors
Note: Footnote numbers are indicated by ‘n.’ following the paragraph number.
For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion,
appear on only one of those pages.
Acemoglu, D. 213
Almond, G.A. 114n.4, 131




Bartels, L.M. 3–5, 232–4
Beetham, D. 16
Berlin, I. 18













Crouch, C. 10, 229–30
D’Agostini, F. 241n.3
Dahl, R.A. 2, 7–8, 13–14, 16





Dworkin, R. 10n.8, 11–12, 16–17, 212
Easton, D. 122n.21, 216
Elster, J. 21, 112, 160






















Krugman, P. 39–40, 111
Kuhlmann, J. 194
Lauth, H.-J. 3n.2, 214n.1




McCoy, J. 120, 124, 224n.8
Mainwaring, S. 238
Mair, P. 90n.4, 144, 149–50, 239
Manin, B. 241
Marshall, T.H. 12, 17
Mazzucato, M. 122
Merkel, W. 13, 213–14
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 03/09/20, SPi
Milanovic, B. 5, 23, 33, 119–20, 232
Mill, J.S. 17–18
Morin, E. 7n.4
Morlino, L. 3n.2, 4–5
Mounk, Y. 138–9, 229–31
Mudde, C. 137
Norris, P. 137–8
Nussbaum, M. 11–12, 16–18, 212









Piketty, T. 5, 23, 25, 28, 30n.6, 232
Pizzorno, A. 120n.20
Powell, G.B. 114n.4, 131
Putnam, R. 89
Raniolo, F. 4–5





Rovira Kaltwasser, C. 137
Rubery, J. 34–5
Rueschemeyer, D. 13
Sadurski, W. 13, 68–9, 162n.7
Salvati, M. 243
Salverda W. 232
Sartori, G. 1–3, 18, 124–6, 139–40, 142–3, 212–13
Sawulski, J. 50n.20
Schlenkrich, O. 3n.2, 214n.1
Schumpeter, J. 5
Sen, A. 10–12, 16–17, 23, 42, 212
Skinner, Q. 17–18
Somer, M. 120, 124, 224n.8
Soskice, D. 115–16
Stephens, J.D. 140–1
Stiglitz, J.E. 5, 9, 23, 114–15, 232
Sumner, W.G. 111n.1








Ziblatt, D. 229–32, 237–40, 244
Zuboff, S. 163–4
270 Index of Authors
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
General Index
Note: Tables and figures, are indicated by italics t and f, following the paragraph number; ‘n.’ indicates 
de footnote number. Chronological references are placed at the beginning of the entries and follow 
chronological order.
For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion,




electoral accountability 6, 110, 241
public opinion on accountability 
mechanisms 232–3
technological development and 164
unaccountable democracy 225–8, 226f, 
235–6, 238–40 
see also inter-institutional accountability





Amnesty International 66–7, 82–3
anarchism 5
Arab Spring 208
austerity policies 149–50, 223–4
anti-austerity movements 123
austerity paradigm 170n.11
EU 186–7, 191–2, 198–9, 206, 209–10, 218
female labour 34–5
Great Recession (2008–14) 3–4, 10, 118–19





Berlusconi, Silvio 3–4, 28n.3, 117t, 124, 
130n.35, 145–6
Blair, Tony 124–5, 136, 216
Brexit (UK) 5, 89–90, 132, 144, 188–9, 237
2020 Withdrawal Treaty 203–4
Article 50, Treaty of Lisbon 177–8
Brexit referendum 3–4, 91n.5, 147–8, 
175–6, 228–9
Brexit Treaty, equality and freedoms 194
CJEU and 203–4
Conservative Party 124
economic freedoms in UK/EU 
exchanges 203–4
euro-scepticism 91n.5
freedom of movement 156n.1, 203–4
individual freedoms 176
normative uncertainty 177–8
system-level polarization 124, 139
welfare state 194 
see also EU; UK
Brexit Party (UK) 130, 228–9
budget
budget constraints 149–50, 243
EU and national budgets 192




bureaucracy 117–18, 176–7, 221
‘informal State’/‘distributive State’ 118–19
Cambridge Analytica (UK) 61, 168–9, 202
Cameron, David 3–4, 124, 147–8, 228–9
capabilities 11–12, 18, 178
capitalism
democracy and 114–15
globalization and finance-capitalism 5
inequality and 122, 140
surveillance capitalism 234–5
transformation of 140
capitalism, varieties of 112, 114–16, 117t, 122, 
142–3, 224–5
post-communist market economy 115–16
varieties of capitalism/welfare regimes 
relation 115n.10 
see also coordinated market economies; 
inequality, domestic explanations; liberal/
competitive market economies; mixed 
market economies
Chavez, Hugo 240












political citizenship 12, 19–20
right to citizenship 77, 83
Spain 77–8
UK 78
Ciudadanos (Spain) 126n.29, 130–1, 133, 
137–9, 147
civil rights 19–20, 62, 67–74, 83, 179–82
Civil Liberties Index 75f
efficiency/freedom tension 74–5
EU 196, 200
indicators and sources of data 61t
migration/migrants 219
non-resident immigrants 219
Poland 74, 79, 84–5
revival of normative production in 74
right of association 74
right of expression 74
rule of law and 158–60
shrinking of 74 
see also economic freedom; freedom of 
movement; freedom of religion; 
incarceration and prisons; justice system










Great Recession (2008–14) 145, 147–8
Italy 140–1, 145–6, 148–9
Poland 147





competitiveness 115–21, 151, 177
EU 197
relevant for freedoms and equalities 219–21
Conservative Party (UK) 124, 228–9
constitutionalism 200, 213
coordinated market economies 115–16, 151
France 216
Germany 115–16, 216
inequality reduction 115–16, 119–20, 
151, 216
redistributive policies 119–20, 151 
see also capitalism, varieties of; inequality, 
domestic explanations
Corbyn, Jeremy 124–5, 144, 228–9
corruption 225–6
anti-corruption policies/control of 
corruption 157–8, 159f, 183, 196–7, 199, 
217, 220–1, 224–5
economic (in)equality and 221
France 221
freedom and equality 220–1
Germany 221
social (in)equality and 221
UK 221
Venezuela 240
Council of Europe 65–7, 80, 190–1, 196–7
CTP (Council of Europe Committee) 62–3
crises
economic crises, political 
consequences of 3–5
economic crisis as drivers of democratic 
institutions crisis 79–80
economic and financial crises 3–4
Eurozone crisis 3, 194, 206, 208
migration crisis 24, 47–9, 53–4, 201–2
migration crisis/economic crisis 
interconnectedness 54–7
political agency in 243
‘security crisis as a game changer’ 231–2 
see also Great Recession
cybercrime 197, 223–4





privacy protection 78, 158–60, 164, 166–7, 
183–4, 197, 201–2, 209 









OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
General Index 273
deliberative democracy 75–6, 241–2
democracy-cum-sovereignty 6
democratic deterioration 230–2, 235, 238
egalitarian democracy 212–13
flexibility and capacity for self-adaptation 243




legitimacy of 90–1, 150
participative democracy 75–6
post-democracy 10, 229–30, 243
radicalized democracy 239





democracy, explanatory model 219–29, 
226f, 238–40
balanced democracy 225–6, 226f, 228, 235–8





Italy 226–7, 232, 237–8
Poland 226–8, 232, 237–8, 240
protest democracy 225–7, 226f, 235–40
Spain 228, 237–8
UK 228–9, 237
unaccountable democracy 225–8, 226f, 
235–6, 238–40
democracy patterns 112, 114, 116, 117t, 
122, 224–5
chancellor democracies 144, 234
consensual/negotiated democracy 90–1, 114, 
116, 117t, 118, 144n.53, 151, 216
executive-parties institutional set 116
France 216, 228, 238
Germany 116, 144–5
Great Recession (2008–14) 118–19
Italy 118–19
prime minister 19–20, 234
Spain 116, 118–19
UK 228–9
unitary/federal institutional set 116, 144–5
veto players 116 
see also inequality, domestic explanations; 
majoritarian democracy
democratic procedural dimensions 6, 13, 
169, 171–2
Poland, procedural model of 
democracy 79–80
rule of law and 157n.2, 161n.5
substantive aspects of democracy/procedural 
dimensions link 8
democratic quality 2–3, 6, 110, 241
EU 189–90
France 238






as changed and readapted 1
mutual convergence mechanism 2–3 
see also equality; freedom
Die Linke (Germany) 130–2, 144, 148, 151–2
digitalization 139n.50, 142–3, 164, 217, 
224, 234–5
digital intellectual property 165, 209
e-government 165–7, 178, 199, 201–2, 217
France 165, 169–70, 217
freedom and 167, 172–3
freedom of information 76–7, 83
Germany 165
inequality and 140
Italy 165–6, 169–70, 217
Poland 165–6, 168–70
post-truth and 241
public sector 164–6, 183–4
Spain 165–6, 217
UK 165, 168–9 
see also ICT; Internet; IT
disaffected democracies 87–91, 88f
curvilinear trend 90
democratic legitimacy, crisis of 90–1
France 89–91
Germany 89–91
Great Recession (2008–14) 90–1









variance in the answers 89
dissatisfaction 215–16, 220, 224–5, 229–30, 235–6
Great Recession (2008–14) 224
neo-populism and 121–3, 131, 140,  
150–1
responsiveness and 131, 135, 151,  
224–5, 227
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
274 General Index
Doing Business reports 73–4
Duda, Andrzej 81, 135, 162n.7
EASO (European Asylum Support Office) 52
ECHR (European Convention on Human 
Rights) 69n.6, 176, 181, 190–1
ECHR (European Court for Human 
Rights) 69n.6, 186, 190–1, 194, 200
economic freedom 2–3, 72–4, 83, 162
Annual Report on Economic Freedom, Fraser 
Institute 74
Brexit and 203–4
business freedom 73, 83
capacity of individuals to plan  
decisions 73–4
Economic Freedom Index, Heritage 




Great Recession (2008–14) 72–4
insolvency resolution 74
Italy 72–4
liberal democracy and 72
Poland 72–4
property rights 11–12, 19, 62, 69, 72–3, 161
rule of law 72, 160
Spain 72–4
UK 72–4
economic growth 8–9, 113, 117–18, 173–4, 217
inequality and 10n.7, 115–16
low/weak economic growth 152, 215–16, 245
Poland 118




ethnic (in)equality and 49, 120
EU 190
France 25–7, 29–31, 33, 35–7, 54–5, 
57–9, 216
gender pay gap 33–5, 58–9
Germany 25–7, 29–31, 33, 35–7, 54, 57–9
Great Recession (2008–14) 33, 37, 54–5, 57
government intervention 31, 37–8, 40–1
income inequality 8–9, 33
indicators 25t
Italy 25–6, 29–31, 33, 35–7, 54–5, 57–9, 
90, 140–1
migration 49
neo-populism and 138, 151
opportunities for access to material/
immaterial goods 23
Poland 25–7, 29–31, 33, 35–7, 57–9, 118
public opinion on 95, 96f, 97–8, 97f, 102, 
113–14, 215
sources of data 25t
Spain 23, 25–6, 29, 33, 35–7, 54–5, 57–9, 90
UK 25–31, 33, 35–7, 54, 58–9, 118
unemployment 35–6, 35f, 58–9
youth unemployment 36 
see also Gini Index; income inequality; 
Income Quintile Share Ratio;  






economic equality and 42
ethnic inequality and 42–3
EU 190–1, 194–5
France 42–3
government expenditure on 40–3, 42f, 
57, 192–3
Italy 42–3, 57–9, 193, 209–10
Poland 42–3
Spain 42–3, 57, 193, 209–10
UK 42–3, 57–9, 215 
see also social (in)equality
EHRC (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission) 63–4
elections
2019 elections, Poland 82
centrifugal electoral competition 124
electoral accountability 6, 110, 241
electoral law 75n.7, 181–2
electoral turnover 174, 176–7
electoral volatility 124, 126
fairness of 219–21
freedom of opposition 93, 95f




‘incentive structure’ of political 
competition 144




right to seek employment 11–12, 19






OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
General Index 275
as democratic value 1, 13–14
equality/fairness connection 9, 10n.8, 14
equality/interpersonal trust connection 8–9
equality/justice connection 9, 14
equality of opportunities 10–14, 11t, 17
equality of results 10, 11t





provisions of non-discrimination 11–12, 19
as relational concept 23
research questions on 15–16
resources and 11–14
social rights and 9, 12, 14, 213
as social value 9
structural factors and 5 
see also economic (in)equality; ethnic (in)
equality; EU(in)equalities; freedom and 
equality; gender (in)equality; inequality; 
political equality; social (in)equality
ERDF (European Regional Development 
Fund) 205–6
ESF (European Social Fund) 205–6
ESS (European Social Survey) 21–2, 52–3, 91–2, 
94–5, 97, 108
ethnic (in)equality 15, 24, 47–57, 120,  
216–17
cultural discrimination 47–9
definition of 50, 52n.22
economic (in)equality and 49, 120
education and 42–3
ethnic discrimination 47–9
France 58–9, 120, 151
freedom and equality 218
gender (in)equality and 49
Germany 51, 58–9, 120, 151
Great Recession (2008–14) 24, 120, 151
indicators 25t
Italy 120, 151
majoritarian democracies and 120, 216
measures of 47–9
migration and 24, 47–50, 151, 216–17, 219
neo-populism 138, 151
Poland 58–9, 120, 138, 151
sources of data 25t
Spain 51, 58–9, 120, 151
terrorism and 218
UK 120, 151 
see also migration/migrants
EU (European Union) 218, 224–5
actor-centred approach 188–9
anti-corruption policies 196–7, 199
austerity policies 186–7, 191–2, 198–9, 206, 
209–10, 218
cohesion policy 204–10, 218




enlargement 186, 206, 208
euro-scepticism 91n.5
European integration 185, 189, 196–7
European level/domestic level 
interplay 185–9, 209
fiscal austerity 15–16
France 193, 197–8, 209–10




Great Recession (2008–14) 3–4, 191–2, 206, 
209–10, 218
Hungary 202–3, 206–7, 210–11
Italy 193, 209–10, 218
legitimacy of 185, 189, 245
migrant detention 204–5
migration/migrants 49, 52, 60, 200, 208
mutual recognition principle 190–1, 194–5, 197
national budgets and 192
non-discrimination principle 189–91
patterns, targets, and mechanisms of 
influence 187, 188t, 189
Poland 185–6, 188–9, 194, 200, 202–3, 
208–11, 210t, 218
public expenditure 199, 209–10
sanctioning power of 202–3, 210–11
SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) 191–2
single market 186, 196, 198–9
Six Pack 192, 209–10
Social Europe 148, 189–91
social rights 12n.10, 186
Spain 38–9, 193, 209–10, 218
surveillance 186–7, 192–3, 208
terrorism/counterterrorism provisions  
186–7, 189, 200–1, 210
Two Pack 192, 209–10
UK 185–6, 188–9, 194, 197–8, 200, 203–4, 
209–10, 210t 
see also Brexit; Schengen area
EU, freedoms 21, 185–9, 196
1995–1999 196
1999–2009 196
civil rights 196, 200
economic freedom 197–9
EU influence on freedoms 185, 196–204, 
210–11, 218, 242
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
276 General Index
freedom of movement 186–7, 196–7, 208
IT 189, 197
justice system 196–7, 199–200
market, legislation on 197–8
matrix of external factors and domestic 
freedoms 197, 198t
minority rights 186
rule of law 196–7, 199, 206–7 





EU influence on equalities 185, 189–96, 
209, 218
health 190–1, 194–5
matrix of external factors and domestic 
equalities 191–2, 191t
social (in)equality 190, 194–5
welfare state/system 38–9, 190–1, 194
EU acts and treaties
Lisbon Treaty 197
Maastricht Treaty/Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) 189, 191–2, 202–3, 
205–6, 210–11
SEA (Single European Act) 205–6
TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU) 201
Treaty of Rome 205
TSCG (Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and 
Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union) 192
EU data protection 61, 165–6, 169, 197
EU-US Privacy Shield framework 202, 210
EU-US Safe Harbour regime 202
GDRP (General Data Protection 
Regulation) 197, 201–2, 209 
see also data protection
Europe
Eastern Europe 10, 50–1, 136n.46, 213, 
219–20, 226–7
Latin American/European populism 
distinction 137
neo-populist parties 126–8, 127t, 148, 153t
Southern Europe 4–5, 17, 118, 138
European Agency for Fundamental Rights 64–5
European Central Bank 38–9
European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 12n.10, 14–15, 189
European Commission 38–9, 205–6
asylum applications 52
CEPEJ (Commission Européenne pour l’E 
cience des Systèmes Judiciaires) 69
DG Justice 69
Poland 202–3
European Council 38–9, 206
European Parliament 12n.10, 165, 171, 
201–2, 209
European Stability Mechanism 177, 186–7
European Union Council 3–4
Europeanization 6, 197
EUROSTAT (European Statistical 
Office) 21–2, 33–4
Eurozone crisis 3, 194, 206, 208–10
EVS (European Value Study) 91, 99, 101–2
the executive 116, 169–70, 223–6, 234
France 238
Poland 81, 147, 180–2, 240
rule of law 172, 175–6, 180–2
UK 78
fairness 9, 11, 14, 72, 102
electoral process 219–21
equality/fairness connection 9, 10n.8, 14










social media 167–8, 184
Spain 168
surveillance against 168
UK 168, 184 
see also freedom of information; information
Farage, Nigel 130, 215–16




citizenship, right to 77
coalition government 141
coordinated market economy 216
corruption 221
counterterrorism provisions 69–70, 160
democracy patterns 216, 228, 238
democratic quality 238
digitalization 165, 169–70, 217
disaffected democracy 89–91
economic freedom 72–4
economic (in)equality 25–7, 29–31, 33, 35–7, 
54–5, 57–9, 216
education, expenditure on 42–3
EU, freedoms (cont.)
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
General Index 277
Etat d’urgence regime 69–70, 160, 175–6
ethnic (in)equality 58–9, 120, 151
EU and 193, 197–8, 209–10
the executive 238
fake news 168
freedom of expression 91–2
freedom of movement 68–9, 83
freedom of religion 70–1
gender pay gap 34
Gilets Jaunes/Yellow Vests movement 124–5, 
132, 134–5, 152, 228, 239–40
Great Recession (2008–14) 5, 101–2, 
145–7, 209–10
health, expenditure on 41




justice system 69–70, 180–2
left-wing politics 141, 143, 146–7, 151–2
migrant detention 64–5
migration/migrants 49, 51–5, 57–8, 120–1
mixed market economy 115–16, 197–8
parties, list of 108t





rule of law 68–9, 158, 160
social (in)equality 58–9, 95–7, 216
social protection 31–3, 39–40, 192–3
surveillance 168, 217
terrorism/counterterrorism provisions  




France, neo-populism 130, 134–5, 137–8, 
148, 151–2





freedom 1, 16–21, 60, 242
twenty-first century 2
2015 onwards 60, 200–1
affiliation 19
architectures of choice 17–18
bodily integrity 18
citizenship and 178–9




digitalization and 167, 172–3
emotions 19
forms of 11–12
freedom of choice 18, 163–4, 235
Great Recession (2008–14) 60, 156–7
guarantee of freedoms 16–17
indicators and sources of data 61t
individual freedoms, protection of 60–1, 
63–4, 83–4, 157, 200–1
inter-institutional accountability 
and 223, 244–5
interplay of two policy waves 60–2, 83–4
justification 16–17
liberal democracy and 16, 60
migration and 60–2, 64–5, 77, 83, 178, 
200–1, 208
negative/protective liberty 18
Poland 78–85, 161, 168–9, 178, 223, 227–8, 
237, 240
quantitative/qualitative approaches 61–2
research methodology and data 61–2, 62n.1
research questions on 20–1, 62
rule of law and 18n.13, 157–62, 174, 217
security/freedom tension 3n.2, 171–3, 178–9, 
183, 210, 218, 220, 223–4, n.1
senses, imagination and thought 18
structural factors and 5
technology and 169–70, 183
terrorism/counterterrorism provisions 
and 60–2, 64–5, 68–71, 77–8, 83–4, 160, 
171, 178, 180–1, 183
traits of 18
triad agents/action 212–13
worsening of 83–4, 162–3, 171–2, 183, 201 
see also civil rights; EU, freedoms;  
freedom, domestic explanations; freedom 
and equality; personal dignity; 
political rights
freedom, domestic explanations 20, 156, 217
civil rights and protection of dignity and 
improvement of justice systems 162, 
179–83, 217
paradox of more information, less 
freedom 162–70, 183, 217, 242
paradox of more rules, less freedom 162, 
170–9, 183, 217–18, 242
rule of law compound hypothesis 157–62
what affects freedoms and where? 156–7 




OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
278 General Index
as context and time-dependent relation  
100, 107
corruption and 220–1
democratic quality and 213
empirical relation 213, 214f
equality/freedom connection 2–3, 17–18, 21, 
149–50, 171, 212–19
ethnic (in)equality and 218
explanatory model 219–29
Germany 237
freedom: micro-level of democracy vs 
equality: macro-oriented spirit 212–13
freedom: ‘vertical impetus’ vs equality: 
‘horizontal urge’ 212–13
implementation of the two values 108, 232, 
235–42, 244
indirect connection 218–20, 227–8
Italy 237
mutual convergence mechanism 2–3, 213, 
214f, 225, 230
mutual convergence of qualities 219
mutual reinforcing 213–14
negative relationship between socio-economic 
inequality and freedom 213–14
‘people/leaders and social/economic/cultural 
reality’ consistency on request of freedom 
and equality 106–8
Poland 227–8, 237
political parties and 102–7
promoting the two values 242–5
‘public demand/leaders actions’ congruence 
on 106–8, 113–14
public opinion on 91–102, 101f, 111, 118–19
public opinion on relative importance 
of 99–102, 99f
qualities relevant for 219–21
sustainable development goals and 243




balance and 149–50 
see also parties, commitment to freedom  
and equality
freedom of expression 18, 75–6, 80, 84–5
as core feature of democracy 92
public opinion on 91–2, 92f, 93f
Freedom House 76–8, 166–8, 234–5
freedom of information 76–7, 156–7, 169, 203
asymmetry of information 172, 184
digitalization and 76–7, 83
paradox of more information, less 
freedom 162–70, 183, 242
plural and independent information 219–21
technology and 164, 169, 183–4, 241 
see also fake news; information; 
Internet; media
freedom of movement 156–7
border control protocols 64–5, 200–1, 208
Brexit 156n.1, 203–4
domestic movement 67–8, 67f, 83
EU 186–7, 196–7, 208
EU, Bologna process 194–5









freedom of press 75–7, 80, 83–4, 178
Italy 166–7
Poland 166–7
public opinion on 92–3, 94f, 
see also media






religious organization repression 76, 76f, 83
Spain 71–2
French Revolution 7
GAFAM (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, 
Microsoft) 169
gender (in)equality 15, 24–5
ethnic (in)equality and 49









balanced democracy 228, 237
citizenship, right to 77
coalition government 145, 147–8
coordinated market economy 115–16, 216
corruption 221
democracy patterns 116, 144–5
digitalization 165
freedom and equality (cont.)




economic (in)equality 25–7, 29–31, 33, 35–7, 
54, 57–9
ethnic (in)equality 51, 58–9, 120, 151
EU and 194, 200, 209–10
fake news 168
freedom and equality 237
freedom of expression 91–2
freedom of movement 68
freedom of religion 71
gender pay gap 34
Great Recession (2008–14) 5, 54, 194, 
209–10
health, expenditure on 41
inequality 58–9, 117, 140
inflows of EU citizens into 68
inter-institutional accountability 222–3, 228
Internet 164, 167–8
justice system 69, 181–2
migration/migrants 49, 51–4, 56, 58, 120–1
neo-populism 130–2, 151
parties, list of 108t




rule of law 158, 160, 228
social (in)equality 58–9, 95–7
social market economy 120–1, 145, 151, 216
social protection 39–40, 192–3
unemployment 35–6
veto rulers 176–7
welfare state 117–18, 194
Gini Index 25–30, 26f, 33, 37
EU 186–7
Gini coefficient and vote for leftist 
parties 141–3, 142f












economic (in)equality and government 
intervention 31, 37–8, 40–1
e-government 165–7, 178, 199, 201–2, 217
‘the fatigue of being in government’ 148, 152
France 145–7, 152
freedom of opposition and critique 93–4, 95f
Great Recession (2008–14) 145–8
Italy 145–7, 152
limited government powers vs fundamental 
rights 223, 223t





see also coalition government; public 
expenditure; state
governmental effectiveness 157–8, 159f, 183, 
217, 224–5
EU 198–9
worldwide governance indicators 158n.3
Great Depression (1930s) 3–5, 39–40
Great Recession (2008–14) 2, 231–2
austerity policies 3–4, 10, 118–19
automatic stabilizers 39–40
catalysing effect of 5, 90, 101–2, 122n.22, 136, 
140, 170–1





economic (in)equality 33, 37, 54–5, 57
equality 9, 60, 107, 140–1
ethnic (in)equality 24, 120, 151
EU 3–4, 191–2, 206, 209–10, 218
France 5, 101–2, 145–7, 209–10
freedoms and 60, 156–7
Germany 5, 54, 194, 209–10
governments 145–8
impact of 3–4, 10
inequality 57, 111, 140, 234–5, 242
Italy 3–5, 26, 54–5, 100–1, 118–19, 145–6, 
193, 209–10, 215
left-wing politics 141–2
migration crisis/economic crisis 
interconnectedness 54–7
migration/migrants 120–1, 151
neo-liberal convergence and 136
neo-populism and 126–8, 138, 145, 148, 151
as opportunity for innovation and political 
change 122
Poland 3–5, 38–9, 46–7, 209–10, 226–7
policy paradigms and 141–2
political consequences of 3–5
poverty 43
social (in)equality 46–7, 111
social protection 39–41, 43, 57, 192–3
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
280 General Index
Spain 5, 26, 37–9, 54–5, 100–2, 118–19, 147, 
193, 209–10, 215











government expenditure on 40–1, 41f, 43, 57
Italy 41, 57–9, 209–10
Poland 41
Spain 41, 57, 209–10
UK 41, 58–9, 215 
see also social (in)equality
Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom 
Index 72–3, 72f, 86t
Hollande, François 145–6
Horizon 2020 research EMU-SCEUS 21–2
Human Rights Watch 70–1, 80–2, 160
Hungary 79–80, 126–8
EU and 202–3, 206–7, 210–11
illiberal democracy 230
unaccountable democracy 238
ICT (Information and Communications 
Technology) 164–5, 169–71, 217
EU 165, 209 
see also digitalization; Internet; IT
identitarian-exclusionary-right populism  
136–40, 149, 151
‘domain of identification’ 139–40
France 139–40, 219
Italy 139–40, 219
Poland 140n.51, 151–2, 219
social rights 242
sovereignty, security, anti-immigration 
and 139, 225–6
Spain 139–40 
see also neo-populism, types of
ideology
Marxist-Leninist ideology 213
migration/migrants 120–1, 151, 216–17










political radicalization in prisons 217
prisoners related to terrorist 
activity 69–70, 81–2 
see also justice system; personal dignity
income, basic or minimum 43–6, 113








income distribution 27–31, 37, 119–20






problems related to 8–9
public opinion on 95, 96f, 97–8, 97f, 113–14
Spain 97–8, 113–14
UK 97–8
Income Quintile Share Ratio 28–30, 29f, 33





inequality 23–59, 232–3, 242
capitalism and 122, 140
coordinated market economy and inequality 
reduction 115–16, 119–20, 151, 216
definition 10
digitalization and 140
disaffected democracies and 89–91
France 58–9, 117
Germany 58–9, 117, 140
Great Recession (2008–14) 57, 111, 140, 
234–5, 242
indicators 24, 25t
Italy 58–9, 100–2, 118–19, 215
left-wing politics and 140–52, 242
liberal/competitive market economy and high 
inequality 115–16, 119–20, 151, 216
micro/macro perspective 23–5, 47




Great Recession (2008–14) (cont.)
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
General Index 281
public opinion on 90–1
sources of data 24, 25t
Spain 58–9, 100–2, 118–19, 215
UK 58–9 
see also economic (in)equality; ethnic (in)
equality; EU(in)equalities; gender (in)
equality; inequality, domestic explanations; 
social (in)equality
inequality, domestic explanations 15, 110, 215–16
budget constraints 112–14, 118–19
comparative political economy/comparative 
politics integration 115–16
contextual factors 112, 114–21
economic structural factors 119–20
France 117–18
Germany 117–18
institutional factors 112, 114–21
Italy 118
neo-populist challenge 112, 121–40





varieties of capitalism 112, 114–16, 122,  
224–5 
see also capitalism, varieties of; democracy, 
patterns of
information
asymmetry of information 172, 184
disinformation/misinformation 166–8, 
241, 245
plural and independent information 184n.17, 
219–21, 241
post-truth 241
see also freedom of information
institutions 111n.1, 230–1
democratic principles and 111
‘efficiency’ institutions 117n.15





institutional forbearance 231–2, 237–8
institutional isomorphism 136
outputs/outcomes and 117
political agency and 243
public debt 113–14
redistributive institutions 117n.15
relevant but not decisive role of 119–20 
see also inequality, domestic explanations
integrity 69–70, 157–8, 219–21
bodily integrity 18
media integrity 222, 224–5
intelligence services 178–81
interest groups 111, 116n.13, 194, 229–30
inter-institutional accountability 6, 161, 221–6, 
222f, 226f, 238
as cornerstone of democracy 241, 244–5
France 222–3
freedom and 223, 244–5
Germany 222–3, 228
Italy 222–3
limited government powers vs fundamental 
rights 223, 223t
plural and independent 
information 184n.17, 221






International Technology Union 164
Internet 164, 184
censorship on 167–8
counterterrorism provisions 167–8,  
170–1
criminal investigations and 166–7





political rights and 75–6, 78





UK 164, 167–8 




freedom and 166–7, 170–1, 183–4
IT regulation 166–70, 197, 234–5




coalition government 140–1, 145–6, 148–9
data protection 166
democracy patterns 118–19
digitalization 165–6, 169–70, 217
disaffected democracy 89–91
economic freedom 72–4
economic (in)equality 25–6, 29–31, 33, 35–7, 
54–5, 57–9, 90, 140–1
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
282 General Index
education, expenditure on 42–3, 57–9, 
193, 209–10
ethnic (in)equality 120, 151
EU and 193, 209–10, 218
fake news 168, 184
freedom and equality 237
freedom of expression 91–2
freedom of movement 68
freedom of religion 71
gender pay gap 34
Great Recession (2008–14) 3–5, 26, 54–5, 
100–1, 118–19, 145–6, 193, 209–10, 215
health, expenditure on 41, 57–9, 209–10
incarceration and prisons 65–6, 69–70
(in)equality 58–9, 100–2, 118–19, 215
inter-institutional accountability 222–3
Internet 164, 167
justice system 69, 83, 180–2
left-wing politics 140–1, 143, 146–7, 151–2
migrant detention 65
migration/migrants 49–55, 57–8, 120–1, 140–1
mixed market economy 115–16, 118
parties, list of 108t
party-channelled protest 237
pension system reform 193
personal dignity 64, 84–5
political rights 74–7
poverty 30–1, 33, 43–6, 118–19
protest democracy 226–7, 237–8
rule adoption 172–4
rule of law 158–60, 163n.8, 181
social (in)equality 57, 95–7, 140–1







vote, right to 75n.7
welfare state 136n.44
youth unemployment 36
Italy, neo-populism 130–4, 137–8, 148, 151–2
identitarian-exclusionary-right 
populism 139–40, 219
political ‘voice’ and anti-party 
sentiment 132, 146–8




equality/justice connection 9, 14
solidarity and 14–15
justice system 217–18
access to 69, 83, 179
ADR (dispute resolution mechanisms) 69
budget and human resources 180–1
courts, crucial role of 244–5
courts, independence of 181–2, 196–7, 240
EU 196–7, 199–200
fair trial, right to 69, 160, 179, 182, 
196–7, 223–4
France 69–70, 180–2
functional compensation of the judicial 
branch 181
Germany 69, 181–2
IT instruments 180, 182
Italy 69, 83, 180–2
judicialization of politics 241–2
length of trial 83, 180–1
modernization of 157–8, 160, 180, 182–3, 217
Poland 78–82, 149, 161, 162n.7, 181–2, 200, 
203, 217, 226–7
politicization of the judicial branch 181–2
soft laws 179–80, 196–7, 199–200, 217
Spain 69, 83, 180–2
UK 69, 180–2 




labour market 114–15, 195, 199–200
inequality of opportunities 36
Italy 118–19, 193
Rodzina 500Plus (Family 500Plus) 47n.18
segmentation/dualism 117–19
Spain 118–19, 193
Labour Party (UK) 132, 143, 149–50
radicalization of 124–5, 215–16, 228–9
Latin America 136n.46, 219–20, 226–7, 241–2
delegative democracy 227n.9
Latin American/European populism 
distinction 137
League of Salvini (Italy) 130, 132, 134, 138–40, 
149, 151–2, 219
left-wing politics 234
France 141, 143, 146–7, 151–2
Germany 144, 151–2
Gini coefficient and vote for leftist 
parties 141–3, 142f
Great Recession (2008–14) 141–2
inequalities 242
Italy 140–1, 143, 146–7, 151–2
neo-populist parties 126–8, 129t, 130–1
Poland 143, 151–2
radical left 126–8, 130–1, 242
Italy (cont.)
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
General Index 283
reactivation of the left-right cleavages 148
redistribution 144, 242
responsibility vs responsiveness 
tension 149–50
salience of freedom and equality 140–1
Spain 143–4, 151–2
stronger left, lower inequality 140–52
‘third way’ paradigm 136, 141–2, 216
TINA (There Is No Alternative) 141–2
‘two lefts’ 141
UK 143–4, 151–2 
see also revendicative-inclusionary-left 
populism
legitimacy 121–2, 219–20, 243
delegitimization of technocratic decisions and 
epistemocracy by populism 241–2
democracy, legitimacy of 90–1, 150
EU 185, 189, 245
Lehman Brothers 3
liberal/competitive market economies 115–16, 
119–20, 145
high levels of inequality 115–16, 119–20, 
151, 216
UK 115–16, 118, 197–8
‘winner takes all’ logic 119–20, 151, 216 
see also capitalism, varieties of; inequality, 
domestic explanations
liberal democracy
economic freedom and 72
equality and 7–8
equality before the law and 94–5
freedom as key value of 16, 60
rule of law and 217–18
liberal theory 72, 169, 172
liberalism 89–90, 212–13, 227–8, 241, 243
liberal economic reforms 10
liberal welfare regime 115n.10
undemocratic liberalism 230–1 
see also liberal/competitive market economies
ligatures 17
M5S (Five Star Movement, Italy) 126–8, 130–1, 
133–4, 137–9
coalition with right-wing parties 139–40, 152
political ‘voice’ and anti-party 
sentiment 132, 146–8
Macron, Emmanuel 132, 134–5, 137–8, 
146–7, 182
Maduro, Nicolás 240
majoritarian democracy 114, 116, 117t, 118–19, 
144n.53, 228–9, 238
ethnic (in)equality 120, 216
polarization 120, 244
‘winner takes all’ logic 119–20, 151, 216 
see also democracy patterns
Manifesto Project 102
market economy 37–8, 117t, 144–5
democracy and 114–15
social market economy 115–16, 120–1, 
151, 216 
see also coordinated market economies; 




May, Theresa 83–4, 147–8
media 217, 239–40
media integrity 222, 224–5
media pluralism 176–7, 184
Poland 149, 169–70, 203, 226–7, 239
public opinion and 1, 224–5, 241
technological innovation and 1 
see also fake news; freedom of information; 






Poland, detention of asylum seekers 82
Spain 64–5
migration/migrants 6, 56–7
2015 migration crisis 24, 53–4
African migrants 5
anti-immigration stance 3–4, 90, 131, 134, 
139, 225–8
asylum applications 52
border control protocols 64–5, 200–1
civil rights 219
economic (in)equality 49
ethnic diversity 49–50, 57–8
ethnic (in)equality and 24, 47–50, 151, 
216–17, 219
EU 49, 52, 60, 200, 204–5, 208
extension of political citizenship to adult 
residents 19–20
France 49, 51–5, 57–8, 120–1
freedoms and 60–2, 64–5, 77, 83, 178, 
200–1, 208
Germany 49, 51–4, 56, 58, 120–1





ideology 120–1, 151, 216–17
illegal/clandestine migration 50–1, 
52n.25, 64–5
impact on the country’s culture, perception 
of 54–7, 55f
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
284 General Index
impact on the country’s economy, perception 
of 54–6, 54f, 58
impact on the country as place to live, 
perception of 53–4, 53f
international migrants 52n.25
international migrants by country 51–2, 51f
Italy 49–55, 57–8, 120–1, 140–1
legal migration 50–1, 64
migration crisis 24, 47–9, 53–4, 201–2
migration crisis/economic crisis 
interconnectedness 54–7
migration waves 50–2, 60, 77, 83, 172–3, 
178, 231–2
neo-populism 138
perception data on 52–6, 58
perception of immigration as indicator of 
voters’ intentions 138–9
personal dignity 64–5
Poland 49, 51–9, 120–1
public opinion on 120–1
ratio of newly arriving immigrants on the 
population 50–1, 50f
refugees 24, 52n.25, 56–8
securitization of 201
social protection and 49
social rights of migrants 219
Spain 49, 51–2, 54–9, 120–1
UK 49, 51–2, 54, 56, 83–4, 120–1 
see also anti-immigration stance; ethnic (in)
equality; migrant detention
mixed market economies 115–16
France 115–16, 197–8
Italy 115–16, 118
Spain 115–16, 118 
see also capitalism, varieties of; inequality, 
domestic explanations
Monti, Mario 3–4, 118, 145–6, 193




nationalism 3–5, 132, 138
neo-corporatism 244
neoliberalism 17, 212
Great Recession and neo-liberal 
convergence 136
neoliberal convergence between 
parties 139–40, 145
neo-populism 90–1, 112, 121–50, 215–16
causes of the development of 139n.50
challenge to party system/traditional 
parties 123
countries under study 128, 129t, 130–1
dissatisfaction and 121–3, 131, 140,  
150–1
economic (in)equality 138, 151
electoral success of 121–3, 126–8, 219
ethnic (in)equality 138, 151
European neo-populist parties 126–8, 127t, 
148, 153t
Germany 130–2, 151
Great Recession (2008–14) 126–8, 138, 145, 
148, 151
hypothesis 1: adaptive institutional 
responsiveness 121, 131, 136–40, 
 215–16
hypothesis 2: stronger leftist incumbent 
parties 121, 140–52, 216
inequality and 139
Latin American/European populism 
distinction 137
neo-populism, protest, and political 
consequences 131–6
neo-populist dilemma: redistribution vs 
identity 136–40
polarization 148–9
as protest parties/protest populism 90–1, 
121–3, 152, 215–16, 229–30
responsiveness 121–2, 131, 135, 148, 
151, 215–16
security and 123, 137–9, 212–13
social (in)equality 138
stronger left, lower inequality 140–52
UK 130–2, 139, 151, 215–16 
see also France, neo-populism; Italy, 
neo-populism; neo-populism, types of; 
populism; Poland, neo-populism; Spain, 
neo-populism
neo-populism, types of 136
economic, social, ethnic (in)equality and 138
immigration and nationalist issues 138
populist party mobilization 139–40
‘rebellion’ against multi-ethnic 
democracy 138–9





NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) 70–2, 
 82, 167
OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) 165–6
Digital Government Initiative 164n.9
on digital revolution 167
migrant detention (cont.)
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
General Index 285
evaluation of regulative norms 173–4, 174t
inequality 140
on social mobility 47
on tax evasion 24n.1
oligarchy 233–4
oligopoly 234–5
Open Data Barometer 164
opposition (political opposition) 240






agenda-setting by 148, 216–17
appearance of new parties 90–1, 123
entering government 144
freedom and equality 102–7
list of parties 108t
‘mobilization of prejudice’ by 120
party ideologies and cabinets 144–6, 146t
redistribution and 144




see also neo-populism; protest parties
parties, attitudes and behaviours towards
‘exit’ 121–2, 135, 150
‘loyalty’ to traditional parties and 
institutions 121–2, 135
‘voice’ (protest vote) 121–2, 135, 150
parties, commitment to freedom and 
equality 102–7, 103f, 215






public demand/party supply consistency on 
freedom and equality 106–8
salience of freedom and equality by party 
family 104–7, 105f
salience of freedom and equality of the two 
largest parties 103–4, 104f, 140–1
Spain 102–7
UK 102–7
party leaders 107, 224
agenda-setting by 113–14
manipulative role of 107–8, 138–9, 226–7
‘mobilization of prejudice’ by 120
Poland 227–8
public demand/leaders actions ‘congruence’ 
on freedom and equality 106–8, 113–14
unaccountable power 227
party manifestos 102, 140–1, 215
agenda-setting by 113–14, 138n.49
party system 23, 116n.13
changes in 124
fluidization of 124n.26
neoliberal convergence between 
parties 139–40, 145
neo-populism as challenge to party system/
traditional parties 123
polarization of 124–6, 128, 131, 139–40, 
220–1, 224, 244
radicalization of 124–5, 128
Spain 133
two-partyism/multi-partyism 234
US 233–4, 244 
see also parties
pension system reform 45, 193, 218
personal dignity 20, 62–7, 82–3
France 64
freedom and 19–20, 62–7
freedom from torture and inhuman 
treatment 62–4, 63f, 84–5
Germany 63–4, 84–5
indicators and sources of data 61t
Italy 64, 84–5
migrants and refugees 64–5
Poland 63–4, 67
rule of law and 67, 160
Spain 64
State violence 66–7, 82–3
UK 63–4
UN Committee Against Torture 64
violence perpetrated by public officers  
66–7, 82–3 
see also incarceration and prisons; migrant 
detention
Philippe, Édouard 146–7
Pirate Party (Germany) 130n.36
PiS (Law and Justice Party, Poland) 126–8, 
130–2, 135, 147, 226–7, 240
2019 electoral victory 46, 135, 147, 227–8
distributive and identitarian 
profile 138, 227–8
judiciary, independence of 81, 227–8
Kaczynski brothers 135
media regulation 81
Polish welfare state 45–6, 89–90, 135
social rights 216, 240
traditional conservative values 132, 135, 
138, 227–8
Podemos (Spain) 130–3, 139, 144, 147
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
286 General Index
Poland 5–6
2015 change of government 45, 226–7
asylum seekers 82
citizenship 203









economic (in)equality 25–7, 29–31, 33, 35–7, 
57–9, 118
education, expenditure on 42–3
ethnic (in)equality 58–9, 120, 138, 151
EU and 185–6, 188–9, 194, 200, 202–3, 
208–11, 210t, 218
the executive 81, 147, 180–2, 240
freedom 78–85, 161, 168–9, 178, 223, 227–8, 
237, 240
freedom and equality 227–8, 237
freedom of expression 91–2
freedom of movement 67–9, 79, 83–5
freedom of religion 84–5
gender pay gap 34, 58–9
Great Recession (2008–14) 3–5, 38–9, 46–7, 
209–10, 226–7
health, expenditure on 41
incarceration and prisons 66, 81–2
inequality 58–9, 140
inter-institutional accountability 222–3, 
226–8, 237
Internet 81–2, 164
judiciary, independence of 78–82, 149, 161, 
162n.7, 181–2, 200, 203, 217, 226–7
left-wing politics 143, 151–2
media 149, 169–70, 203, 226–7, 239
migrant detention 82
migration/migrants 49, 51–9, 120–1
parties, list of 108t
party system polarization 124–5
personal dignity 63–4, 67
‘phoenix effect’ 118
Police Act 68–9
political rights 79, 203
post-communist market economy 115–16
Rodzina 500Plus (Family 500Plus) 45
rule adoption 172–3
rule of law 78–80, 82, 158, 161, 163n.8, 
168–9, 182–3, 223
social (in)equality 58–9, 95–7, 118
social protection 39, 192–3
surveillance 81–2, 217
terrorism/counterterrorism provisions 81–2
unaccountable democracy 226–7, 237–8, 240
unemployment 35–6
veto rulers 162n.7, 176–7, 182–3
Poland, neo-populism 130–2, 135, 139, 148–9
identitarian-exclusionary-right 
populism 140n.51, 151–2, 219
nationalist loyalty cum distributive 
policies 132
PiS 138, 227–8 
see also PiS
polarization 226f, 231–2
majoritarian democracies 120, 244
negative effect on egalitarian policies 244
neo-populism 148–9
party system polarization 124–6, 128, 131, 
139–40, 220–1, 224, 244
‘pernicious polarization’ 120, 124, 224n.8





political polarization 124–5, 244
reduction of 244
system-level polarization 124
UK 124–5, 139, 228–9
policy 2, 178
Great Recession (2008–14) and policy 
paradigms 141–2
symbolic use of policies 216
political equality 13–14, 94, 214n.1, 232 
see also equality
political irresponsibility 239
political rights 19–20, 74–8, 83–4
citizenship, right to 77–8, 83
democracy and 16
France 74–7
freedom of association 76, 79–80, 83–5, 
161, 178
freedom of opposition 93, 95f
Germany 74–7
increase in spaces and possibilities for 75–6
indicators and sources of data 61t
Internet and 75–6, 78
Italy 74–7
organization of public events, manifestations 






OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
General Index 287
UK 76–7 
see also freedom of expression; freedom of 
press; freedom of religion
political voluntarism 119–20
populism
delegitimization of technocratic decisions and 
epistemocracy by 241–2
far-right parties 136n.46
‘politics as electoral spectacle’/‘politics as 
organized combat’ 142–3
post-truth populism 241–2




absolute poverty threshold 35n.9
child poverty 45–6
Germany 43
Great Recession (2008–14) 43




provisions to fight poverty 43
public opinion on government action against 
poverty 98–9, 98f, 102
Spain 30–1, 43
UK 43
welfare state and 229–30, 242, 245 
see also risk-of-poverty rate; risk-of-poverty 
rate before social transfers









property rights 11–12, 19, 62, 69, 72–3, 161
protest 123, 220, 225–6, 232, 239
anti-austerity movements 123
France 238
France, Yellow Vests movement 124–5, 132, 
134–5, 152, 228, 239–40
GJM (Global Justice Movement) 123
globalization 123
inter-institutional accountability and 239
non-conventional protest 123, 239–40
participative protest 239
protest democracy 225–7, 226f, 235–40
protest movements 122, 234
protests, limits to 239–40
radicalized protest 239
see also neo-populism; protest parties
protest parties 122–31, 215–16, 220, 225, 
229–30, 232




polarization of party system 124–6
protest parties/protest populism 90–1, 121–3, 
152, 215–16, 229–30
voting for 121–3, 151–2 
see also neo-populism
PSOE (Spain) 130, 133, 143, 149, 152




Great Recession (2008–14) 113
gross debt in six European countries 113, 113f






public expenditure 111–12, 192–3
automatic stabilizers 39–40, 57, 111–12, 117
budget constraints 112
education 40–3, 42f, 57, 192–3
EU 199, 209–10
growth of 112n.3
health 40–1, 41f, 43, 57
social protection 39, 40f, 43, 111–12, 192–3
public opinion 24, 91, 107, 215, 220
on economic equality 95, 96f, 97–8, 97f, 102, 
113–14, 215
on equality and accountability 
mechanisms 232–3
on equality before the law 94–5, 96f, 113–14
on ethnic diversity 57–8
on freedom and equality 91–102, 101f, 
111, 118–19
on freedom and equality, relative importance 
of 99–102, 99f
on freedom of expression 91–2, 92f, 93f
on freedom of opposition 93, 95f
on freedom of press 92–3, 94f
on government action against poverty 98–9, 
98f, 102
Great Recession (2008–14) 100–2
on inequality 90–1
on migration 120–1
media and 1, 224–5, 241
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
288 General Index
public demand/leaders actions congruence on 
freedom and equality 106–8, 113–14
on social equality 95–7, 215
volatility of people attitudes 108
radicalization 139, 237
Internet and 224
party system radicalization 124–5, 128
polarization/radicalization 
distinction 125n.27





Rajoy, Mariano 124, 147
redistributive policies 111–12, 118–19, 150–2, 
224–5, 242
coalition government 144, 148–9
consensual democracies with coordinated 
economies 151
coordinated market economies and  
119–20
left-wing politics 144, 242
neo-populism and 122, 139–40, 148–9
neo-populist dilemma: redistribution vs 
identity 136–40
parties and 144
proportional electoral system and 144n.53
redistributive institutions 117n.15






comparative research 5, 24
data 21–2
democracies analysed 5–6
distinct features identified 5
double filtering process 21, 112
global context 243
qualitative assessments of cases 5
research design 5
research questions 2–3, 5, 15–16, 20–1, 
110–11, 212, 229




responsiveness 6, 88, 108, 219–20




neo-populism 121–2, 131, 135, 148, 
151, 215–16
responsibility vs responsiveness 
tension 149–50
revendicative-inclusionary-left populism 136–40, 
 148–9, 151, 225–6
austerity policies 145
worsening of ‘living standards’ and 139 
see also neo-populism, types of
rights 12
compliance of public order with fundamental 
rights 157–8, 160, 183, 217
democracy and 16
European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 12n.10 
see also economic rights; political rights; 
social rights
right-wing politics
coalition with right-wing parties 139–40, 147
far-right parties 70–1, 126–8, 136n.46
neo-populist parties 126–8, 129t, 130
Poland 147
prevalence of right-wing/centre-right 
governments 144–5
social rights and 216, 242 
see also identitarian-exclusionary-right 
populism
risk-of-poverty rate 30–1, 31f, 33, 58–9
alternative methods of calculation 34n.8
risk-of-poverty rate before social 
transfers 30–3, 32f
















rule of law 6, 224–5
civil rights and 158–60
courts, functioning of 161
economic freedom 72, 160
EU 196–7, 199, 206–7
the executive 172, 175–6, 180–2
France 68–9, 158, 160
public opinion (cont.)
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
General Index 289
freedom and 18n.13, 157–62, 174, 217
Germany 158, 160, 228
Italy 158–60, 163n.8, 181
as Janus notion 161
liberal democracy and 217–18
paradox of more rules, less freedom 162, 
170–9, 183, 217–18, 242
personal dignity and 67, 160
Poland 78–80, 82, 158, 161, 163n.8, 168–9, 
182–3, 223
public opinion on equality before the 
law 94–5, 96f, 113–14, 157n.2
quality of regulation 181




subversion of 79–80, 163n.8, 168–9, 182–3
UK 158, 160
World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index 84
rule of law, dimensions of 157–8
anti-corruption policies/control of 
corruption 157–8, 159f, 183, 196–7, 199, 
217, 220–1, 224–5
compliance of public order with fundamental 
rights 157–8, 160, 183, 217
governmental effectiveness 157–8, 159f, 183, 
217, 224–5
Great Recession (2008–14) 158
judicial system modernization 157–8, 160
Sanchez, Pedro 147, 237–8
Sarkozy, Nicolas 70–1, 145–6, 182
Schengen area
border control protocols 64–5, 200–1
free movement across national 
borders 67–8, 83
Schengen agreement 186, 197, 208
Schengen Committee 204–5
security 76, 78–9
neo-populism and 123, 137–9, 212–13
right to 19
‘security crisis as a game changer’ 231–2
security/freedom tension 3n.2, 171–3, 178–9, 
183, 210, 218, 220, 223–4, n.1 
see also cybersecurity; data protection; 
terrorism
securitization 74–5, 160, 178–9, 183, 201
Sinn Féin (UK) 104–7, 130–1, 143
social cohesion 118–19, 122, 206
social (in)equality 15, 23–4, 37–47, 57, 111
corruption and 221
EU 190, 194–5
France 58–9, 95–7, 216
Germany 58–9, 95–7
government expenditure on education 40–3, 
 42f, 57
government expenditure on health 40–1, 
41f, 43, 57
government expenditure on social 
protection 39, 40f, 43
government intervention 37–8
Great Recession (2008–14) 46–7, 111
indicators 25t
Italy 57, 95–7, 140–1
minimum income 43–6
neo-populism 138
Poland 58–9, 95–7, 118
public opinion on 95–7, 215
social equality: two dimensions 15
social mobility 47, 48t
sources of data 25t
Spain 57–9, 95–7
UK 57, 95–7, 118
welfare state/system and 38–9, 44–5 
see also social protection; welfare 
state/system
social media 165, 169, 217, 234–5
fake news 167–8, 184
public opinion and 241 
see also media
social protection 111
automatic stabilizers 39–40, 57, 111
definition 43n.14
France 31–3, 39–40, 192–3
Germany 39–40, 192–3
government expenditure on 39, 40f, 43, 
111–12, 192–3
Great Recession (2008–14) 39–41, 43, 
57, 192–3
Italy 31–3, 39–40, 58–9, 118–19, 192–3
migrants and 49
Poland 39, 192–3
Spain 31–3, 39–40, 118–19, 192–3
UK 39–41, 57, 192–3, 209–10 
see also social (in)equality; welfare 
state/system
social rights
in contemporary European notion of 
democracy 242
equality and 9, 12, 14, 213
EU 12n.10, 186





right-wing politics 216, 242
welfare system and 38 
see also rights
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
290 General Index
social transfers 36, 43, 46–7
at-risk-of-poverty rate before social 
transfers 30–3, 32f
ratio Gini before and after social 
transfer 27–8, 27f
UK 27–8





Cataluña secession 160, 177, 228, 237–8
citizenship, right to 77–8





economic (in)equality 23, 25–6, 29, 33,  
35–7, 54–5, 57–9, 90
education, expenditure on 42–3, 57, 
193, 209–10
ethnic (in)equality 51, 58–9, 120, 151
EU and 38–9, 193, 209–10, 218
fake news 168
freedom of expression 91–2
freedom of movement 68–9
freedom of religion 71–2
gender pay gap 34
Great Recession (2008–14) 5, 26, 37–9, 54–5, 
100–2, 118–19, 147, 193, 209–10, 215
health, expenditure on 41, 57, 209–10
(in)equality 58–9, 100–2, 118–19, 215
inter-institutional accountability 222–3
Internet 164
justice system 69, 83, 180–2
left-wing politics 143–4, 151–2
migrant detention 64–5
migration/migrants 49, 51–2, 54–9, 120–1
mixed market economy 115–16, 118
parties, list of 108t





rule of law 158–60
social (in)equality 57–9, 95–7





Spain, neo-populism 130–3, 137–8, 149, 151–2
identitarian-exclusionary-right 
populism 139–40




State violence 66–7, 82–3 
see also government
surveillance 200–1
EU 186–7, 192–3, 208
fake news, surveillance against 168
France 168, 217




resources allocated to 180–1
surveillance capitalism 234–5
UK 217
sustainability 117–18, 172, 239
of contemporary Western democracies 243
sustainable development goals 243
synchronization thesis 114n.4, 131







accountability and technological 
development 164
freedom and 169–70, 183
freedom of information and 164, 169, 
183–4, 241
freedom of movement and 183–4
Global Technological Index 167
surveillance capitalism and 234–5
technological innovation 1, 160, 163–4, 
204–5, 241 
see also digitalization; ICT; Internet; IT
terrorism 5–6, 60, 180–1
1970s 239–40
2011 171, 218
border control protocols 64–5, 200–1
compliance of the public order to 
fundamental rights and surge in 157–8
counterterrorism provisions 64–5, 68–71, 
74–5, 78, 81–4, 171, 223–4
ethnic (in)equality and 218
EU, terrorism/counterterrorism 
provisions 186–7, 189, 200–1, 210
France 69–70, 160, 171, 175–6, 180–1, 183, 218
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
General Index 291
freedoms and 60–2, 64–5, 68–71, 77–8, 83–4, 
160, 171, 178, 180–1, 183
Italy 71
Poland 81–2
prisoners related to terrorist 
activity 69–70, 81–2
terrorist attacks 74–5, 171
UK 171, 177–8 
see also security
‘third way’ paradigm 136, 141–2, 216
trade unions 115n.6, 118–19, 229–30
truth
post-truth 241–2
right to the truth 241n.3
Tsipras, Alexis 238
UK (United Kingdom) 5–6
austerity policies 194, 209–10
balanced democracy 237
citizenship, right to 78





economic freedom 72–4, 203–4
economic (in)equality 25–31, 33, 35–7, 54, 
58–9, 118
education, expenditure on 42–3, 57–9, 215
ethnic (in)equality 120, 151
EU and 185–6, 188–9, 194, 197–8, 200, 
203–4, 209–10, 210t
the executive 78
fake news 168, 184
freedom and equality 237
freedom of expression 91–2
freedom of movement 68, 83–5
gender pay gap 34
Great Recession (2008–14) 5, 26–8, 54, 
101–2, 209–10
health, expenditure on 41, 58–9, 215
Home Office Hostile Environment 
Policy 83–4
inequality 58–9
inflows of EU citizens into 68
inter-institutional accountability 222–3
Internet 164, 167–8
justice system 69, 180–2
left-wing politics 143–4, 151–2
liberal/competitive market economy 115–16, 
118, 197–8
migration/migrants 49, 51–2, 54, 56, 
83–4, 120–1
neo-populism 130–2, 139, 151, 215–16
parties, list of 108t
party system polarization 124–5, 228–9
personal dignity 63–4





rule of law 158, 160
social (in)equality 57, 95–7, 118
social protection 39–41, 57, 192–3, 209–10






welfare state 194, 215 
see also Brexit
UKIP (UK Independence Party) 130, 138–40, 
147–8, 151, 215–16, 219
UN (United Nations) 52n.25, 243
2030 agenda 243
UN Committee Against Torture 64
UN Human Rights Committee 167
UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime) 62–3
unconventional
non-conventional protest 123, 239–40
normalization of the unconventional 123
unconventional participation 123
unemployment 35–6, 35f, 58–9








Unidos Podemos (Spain) 130, 132–3, 147




Varieties of Democracy dataset 62–3, 76
Venezuela 240
Venice Commission 80–1





OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
292 General Index
Italy 176–7






democracy patterns and 116
veto powers 174–5, 224–7, 241–2
Visegrád Group 138, 148
vote
abstention 121–2, 123n.24
democracy and universal suffrage 16
economic crisis and voting behaviour 3–5
Italy 75n.7
perception of immigration as indicator of 
voters’ intentions 138–9
protest parties, voting for 121–3, 151–2
right to vote 19–20, 75–6, 245 
see also elections
Vox (Spain) 130–1, 133, 138–40, 147, 149, 151, 219
welfare state/system 12, 140–1
Assistential welfare regime 115n.10
Brexit 194
Conservative welfare regime 115n.10
economic crisis and 4–5
EU 38–9, 190–1, 194
France 117–18, 216
Germany 117–18, 194
Great Recession (2008–14) 38–9
Italy 136n.44
liberal welfare regime 115n.10
partisan politics and 140–1
paternalistic welfare states 140–1
Poland 45–6, 89–90, 135
poverty and 229–30, 242, 245
social democratic welfare regime 115n.10
social (in)equality and 38–9, 44–5
social rights and 38
strengthening of, beyond the protection of 
poverty 245
UK 194, 215
varieties of capitalism/welfare regimes 
relation 115n.10
welfare provisions 38–9, 44–5, 79–80 
see also social (in)equality; social protection
World Economic Forum 47, 164
World Justice Project 84, 223
World War II 1, 147–8, 197–8, 243
Worldwide Governance Indicators 181
xenophobia 10, 70–1, 77
Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez 124, 147
veto rulers (cont.)
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 16/09/20, SPi
